

# The New Scramble for Africa

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	INTRODUCTION
<u>7</u>	THE CONTRADICTIONS OF MODERN IMPERIALISM AND AFRICA
	PART ONE
	THE BUILD-UP OF CONTRADICTIONS AND RIVALRY
<u>23</u>	CHAPTER I • COLONIAL PROBLEMS IN THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE WESTERN ALLIES DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR
<u>34</u>	CHAPTER II • IDEOLOGICAL CAMOUFLAGE FOR ATTEMPTS TO REDISTRIBUTE SPHERES OF COLONIAL RULE
<u>48</u>	CHAPTER III • THE “VACUUM” THEORY AND THE PRACTICE OF EXPANSION
<u>56</u>	CHAPTER IV • THE COLONIAL POWERS’ “SECOND FRONT”
	PART TWO
	ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE INTER-IMPERIALIST STRUGGLE IN THE NEWLY INDEPENDENT COUNTRIES OF AFRICA
<u>77</u>	CHAPTER V • CONFLICT BETWEEN PRIVATE CAPITAL FROM DIFFERENT FOREIGN COUNTRIES
<u>98</u>	CHAPTER VI • STATE “AID” AS A WEAPON IN THE COMPETITIVE STRUGGLE
<u>119</u>	CHAPTER VII • THE TRADE WAR IN ITS CONCEALED AND OVERT FORMS
<u>140</u>	CHAPTER VIII • AFRICA’S RAW MATERIAL RESOURCES AND THE SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION
<u>163</u>	CHAPTER IX • THE MONOPOLIES’ STRUGGLE FOR THE SOURCES OF STRATEGIC MATERIALS
	PART THREE
	SOCIO-POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE INTER-IMPERIALIST STRUGGLE IN THE NEWLY INDEPENDENT COUNTRIES OF AFRICA
<u>197</u>	CHAPTER X • THE STRUGGLE FOR POLITICAL INFLUENCE IN THE COUNTRIES OF FREE AFRICA

<a href="#"><u>229</u></a>	<b>CHAPTER XI • IDEOLOGICAL RIVALRY AND THE MASS MEDIA</b>
<a href="#"><u>243</u></a>	<b>CHAPTER XII • THE TRAINING OF NATIONAL PERSONNEL AS A PART OF THE INTER-IMPERIALIST STRUGGLE</b>
<a href="#"><u>257</u></a>	<b>CHAPTER XIII • THE ATTEMPT TO SEIZE CONTROL OF THE TRADE UNION MOVEMENT</b>
<a href="#"><u>266</u></a>	<b>CHAPTER XIV • THE CONTRADICTIONS BETWEEN THE IMPERIALIST POWERS OVER REGIONAL CO-OPERATION BETWEEN AFRICAN COUNTRIES</b>
<a href="#"><u>283</u></a>	<b>CHAPTER XV • AFRICAN ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND THE INTER-IMPERIALIST CONTRADICTIONS</b>
<a href="#"><u>298</u></a>	<b>CONCLUSION</b>
<a href="#"><u>306</u></a>	<b>NOTES</b>

## INTRODUCTION

### THE CONTRADICTIONS OF MODERN IMPERIALISM AND AFRICA

p World imperialism is now making greater efforts than ever before to unite the ranks of the monopolist bourgeoisie. It is being prompted to take this step by the common class interests of the capitalist world. The two world systems are locked in struggle, the scientific and technological revolution is in full swing, and there is an upsurge of activity in the international workers' movement and the national liberation movement. Despite its attempts to adapt to the new conditions, capitalism is steadily losing ground in world economics and politics.

p The trend towards greater centralisation in the imperialist camp does not eliminate inter-imperialist contradictions. They continue to develop. Moreover, the old antagonisms of capitalism are joined by new ones, which interlock with them, forming a single cluster of tensions.

p In his Report to the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union the General Secretary of the Party's Central Committee, Leonid Brezhnev, said: "The contradictions between the imperialist states have not been eliminated either by the processes of integration or the imperialists' class concern for pooling their efforts in fighting against the socialist world. By the early 1970s, the main centres of imperialist rivalry have become clearly visible: these are the USA—Western Europe (above all, the six Common Market countries)—Japan. The economic and political competitive struggle between them has been growing ever more acute,"^^1^^

8

p Thus, the inter-imperialist struggle is part of the integral system of co-operation and rivalry, unity and contradictions between the imperialist powers.

p The contradictions of modern imperialism have a number of new distinctive features. In the first place, they are conditioned in their development by the main contradiction of the times. Imperialism today is one of the two opposing world systems, and it is, moreover, steadily weakening in the struggle with socialism.

p In the second place, the scientific and technological revolution is exercising a tremendous influence on the processes that are taking place in the capitalist world. It is accelerating the growth of production, while at the same time widening the gaps between the levels of scientific and technological development in individual capitalist countries. The result is a more and more uneven development.

p In the third place, modern capitalism is state-monopoly capitalism. It is inseparable from capitalism as such as a socio-economic formation. No matter what modifications a capitalist society undergoes at the stage of state-monopoly capitalism, its antagonisms

continue to deepen. Relying on the strength and support of the state, the bourgeoisie of every imperialist power seeks to reinforce and extend its position in the competitive capitalist world market. It also tried to help the national monopolies in their competition against the monopolies of other countries.

p The present stage is a particularly clear illustration of Lenin's law of the spasmodic and uneven development of capitalism. The action of this law is also inextricably bound up with the struggle between the two world systems.

p Competition with the world socialist system forces capitalist ruling circles to stimulate economic growth even more vigorously. But different scientific, technological and economic potentials produce a further imbalance in the development of individual capitalist countries. This loosens the relative unity of the imperialist camp and intensifies the contradictions between its members.

p A comparison of the main capitalist states' industrial potential, foreign trade and currency reserves enables one to assess the present and future state of the struggle between the imperialist powers. The unevenness of their recent development is shown in "Table 1.

p It can be seen from the table that in 1950 the USA and Great Britain accounted for 66.2 per cent of the production of the whole capitalist world. Ten years later this figure had fallen to 55.1 per cent, and after a further ten years—to 48.3 per cent. At the same time production in the countries defeated in the Second World War (the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and Japan) rose from 10.7 per cent of the total world output in 1950 to 17.4 per cent in 1960 and 23 per cent in 1970.

p The development of the export trade displays even greater unevenness. This is even more symptomatic, given that the motto of capitalist business circles is to boost exports and reduce imports. In 1950 the two main capitalist powers (the USA and Britain) accounted for about 30 per cent of the capitalist world's exports. Ten years later this index had sunk to 27 per cent, and by the end of the following decade—to 22.7 per cent. The corresponding totals for the FRG, Japan and Italy were 7.3 per cent, 17.1 per cent and 24.9 per cent.

p The figures relating to the gold and currency reserves tell the same story. In 1948 the USA's reserves amounted to six times the total possessed by France, the FRG, Italy and Japan. By 1959 they were only twice as great as those of the above group of countries, and in 1969 already lagged behind them.

p Finally, the table shows that between 1937 and 1959 the industrial growth rate of the USA was the capitalist world's highest; between 1960 and 1970 it was the last but one.

p It can be concluded from the table that quick changes in the rates of economic growth of the main capitalist countries are inherent in the modern capitalist system. It is also clear that unevenness in development has now reached a postwar peak.

p The imperialist states seek to defend their class interests jointly by organising aggressive military blocs and alliances, creating international monopolies and promoting economic integration. The latter merits special attention, since it is often claimed that the integration processes now visible in the capitalist world are evidence of “stabilisation” and a 10

	USA	Great Britain	FRG	France	Italy	Japan
Proportion of the capitalist world's industrial production (%)	1950 54.6	11.6	6.6	4.4	2.5	1.6
	1960 45.8	9.3	9.6	4.7	3.4	4.4
	1970 41.3	7.0	9.7	4.8	3.7	9.6
Proportion of world capitalist exports (%)	1950 18.3	11.0	3.6	5.5	2.2	1.5
	1960 18.1	8.9	10.2	6.1	3.3	3.6
	1970 15.6	7.1	12.2	6.3	5.8	6.9
Gold and currency reserves (end-of-1948)	24,399.0	2,009.0	295.0	553.0	—	—
-year totals in millions of dollars)	1959 19,507.0	2,750.0	4,533.0	1,720.0	2,953.0	1,321.0
	1969 16,964.0	2,527.0	7,129.0	3,833.0	5,005.0	3,654.0
Average annual growth rates of industrial production (%)	1937–59 4.8	2.1	3.7*	3.3	4.0	3.8
	1960–70 4.5	2.9	6.1	5.6	6.8	13.9

1937–45—all Germany. Sources: UN *Statistical Yearbook*, *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics* for the relevant years and months; *Ekonomicheskoye polozheniye kapitalisticheskikh i razvivayushchihhsya stran* (*The Economic Position of Capitalist and Developing Countries*), surveys for 1967 and the beginning of 1968, for 1969 and the beginning of 1970. Supplement to the journal *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya* (*World Economy and International Relations*); *International Financial Statistics*, March 1950, 1954, 1961, June 1970. 11 transition to a "non-conflict stage". The formations reflecting integration can unquestionably be seen as the result of stronger centralising tendencies in the imperialist camp. Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that capitalist integration is an *imperialist* means of overcoming the narrowness of national boundaries at the current stage of the development of productive forces: it is a peaceful way of re-allocating spheres of influence for the benefit of the various countries' monopolies. Consequently, capitalist integration inevitably leads not only to the worsening of traditional contradictions between the members of the different groupings, but also to "the creation of new contradictions— between the integrated groupings and the outside world, as well as inside these groupings".^^2^^

p Inter-imperialist contradictions are not substantially lessened by the recent accelerated formation of international monopolies. The process reflects the typical capitalist tendency to strengthen the interdependence of national economies and to internationalise production as much as possible. The intensification of the process whereby monopoly participants merge their capital and the interpenetration that inevitably results lead to a clash of interests between the imperialist states involved. Moreover, a serious antagonism within modern imperialism—between the interests of the state and the international corporation—is becoming more pronounced. Trade and customs boundaries are beginning to hinder the activities of these corporations, especially if their enterprises are located in several countries and linked by a system of co-ordinated deliveries. When this happens, the governments of the countries concerned are forced to “liberalise” trade and introduce legislation that is damaging to national interests as a whole. The “super-monopolies”' disregard for national sovereignty is one of the major sources of inter-imperialist contradictions, and the situation is likely to deteriorate. The President of the American International Chamber of Commerce, Mr. Christopher H. Phillips, points out that conflict between states and multi-national corporations will become still more

pronounced in the near future. National authorities should accommodate themselves to the supranational demands of an increasingly interdependent world.<sup>3</sup> But 12 capitulation to expansionist international monopolies also means ultimately the economic redistribution of the world. The strong stand to benefit.

p The special feature of today's imperialist contradictions is that now the forces and interests not only of states, but also of economic blocs of capitalist countries are clashing in the international arena. Competition between joint forces is added to the traditional rivalry between "national" imperialisms: economic groupings struggle among themselves and with individual powers, and conflicts arise within the groupings.

p In the general complex of inter-imperialist contradictions the main antagonism nowadays is between the USA and the European Economic Community. The clashes here are particularly bitter. Next comes the string of contradictions between the USA and Japan. The traditional rivalry between these two powers is currently assuming new qualitative features.

p But more than just economic processes are at work, and this must be recognised if a correct picture is to be drawn of the evolution of inter-imperialist contradictions and their future development. The bitterness of the clash is not necessarily in direct proportion to the powers' economic standing and potential. A good example is the clashes that have taken place in recent years between the USA and France. The economic forces that the two sides have been able to muster are far from equal. Nowadays politics is playing an increasing role in international contacts. The nature, pace, forms and special features of rivalry and competition between the imperialist states depend largely on politics, both foreign and domestic. The interdependence of foreign and domestic policies and their interaction are today becoming particularly close and complicated, with foreign policy factors sometimes exerting a decisive effect on the course of the inter-imperialist struggle. It is no accident that this struggle is spreading more and more to the sphere of foreign policy and military and political problems, as is reflected by the crisis in NATO and the other military and political blocs.

p The world socialist system exerts an ever growing influence on inter-imperialist contradictions in foreign policy 13 too. The foreign policy of the socialist countries encourages disunity in the imperialist military and political alliances. What is more, political and economic relations with the socialist countries are themselves becoming objects of interimperialist rivalry. Some capitalist groups have an interest in developing these relations, as is predetermined objectively by the evolution of the international division of labour and the world market. Others are against contacts with the socialist countries, and they try to restrain their rivals' attempts in this direction. In fact, the socialist countries' foreign policy has caused the bourgeois camp to split into a pacifist section and an aggressive one, a process foreseen by Lenin.

p The radically new character of the correlation of forces now present in the international arena, due primarily to the economic growth and military power of the Soviet Union, has substantially altered the ways in which imperialist contradictions can be resolved. As

before, imperialism "is distinguished by a minimum fondness for peace and freedom and by a maximum and universal development of militarism".<sup>4</sup> It also retains its main political feature—".. reaction everywhere..."<sup>5</sup> Nevertheless, it is now unlikely that the main contradiction of the age will be resolved by military means, i.e., in a world war. Imperialism has to co-exist peacefully with the socialist system and confine its aggressive intrigues to outlying areas. As for inter-imperialist antagonisms, the existence of the socialist community also restricts the likelihood of military conflict between the imperialist powers.

**p** However, imperialist forces are constantly striving to reallocate spheres of influence. The struggle takes many forms, and embraces the whole capitalist world. At the present time intense rivalry between the imperialist powers is centred on the developing countries.

**p** The disintegration of the colonial system marked the beginning of a momentous process: the former colonial powers became less able to lord it over the countries they once ruled, and they lost the monopoly on deliveries of manufactured goods, machinery and equipment to the newly independent countries. The imperial powers also had to forfeit the monopoly on the import of the raw materials produced by the former colonies, and they were no longer the only countries able to offer them loans, credits and technical know-how. This process affected imperialism as a whole, since the imperialists were no longer in a position to hamper the development of co-operation in these areas of the international division of labour between socialist and newly independent countries. The result is that, on the one hand, there is now the basis for a unified imperialist policy towards the younger states; on the other hand—and this is the main point—the imperialists have to compete ever more bitterly among themselves for the narrowing spheres of influence in the Third World, which remains one of the principal sources of profit for the capitalist states. Here too, then, relations between the imperialist forces are feeling the effects of two tendencies—towards unity and disunity, as they become entangled in clusters of contradictions.

**p** Class solidarity urges the imperialist powers to unite in the struggle against the further growth of the national liberation movement and the strengthening of the contacts that have been made by the newly independent countries with the socialist community. They hold identical views on the strategy for pushing the Third World along the road of capitalist development. These common aims determine the essence of neo-colonialism and its methods of expansion. At the same time, since the overwhelming majority of new states have remained in the capitalist division of labour and market system and so continue to be subjected to imperialist exploitation, they are the object of fierce competition between the imperialist powers and monopoly groupings.

**p** The inter-imperialist struggle embraces the former colonial and dependent world for the simple reason that the monopolies still run the key sectors of the developing countries' economies, and the collapse of the colonial empires has made the new states accessible to the competing imperialist forces. The traditional method of squeezing out rivals by military force is now, of course, unlikely to be used. Yet, despite changes in the methods



employed to resolve interimperialist contradictions, they have lost none of their bitterness. The competing capitalist powers are still devising and putting into effect new ways of economically and politically redistributing the former colonial empires.

15

p The developing world covers a vast area, but the continent of Africa has become the imperialist powers' main battlefield. There are a number of good reasons for this.

p Firstly, the developing world is far from being homogeneous in character. The countries thus classified, and there are more than 100 of them, are all at different levels of socio-economic and political development. Compared with Asia and Latin America, Africa is, on the whole, the most backward continent. Secondly, Africa was the most clearcut embodiment of the colonial system of imperialism: African territories formed part of six colonial empires, and rivalry between the colonialists is deeply rooted in the history of the area. Thirdly, the colonial regimes in Africa were the last to fall. Fourthly, Africa is remarkably well endowed. Its raw material, power and human resources are of considerable interest to the imperialist countries, despite the structural changes that have taken place in the material production of the capitalist world economy. All these factors prompt imperialist expansion in Africa, and, since the interests of the different powers clash, contradictions and conflict result. Since the collapse of the colonial empires the imperialist powers have in fact been trying to carry out a new economic and, to some extent, political redivision of Africa.

p The inter-imperialist struggle in Africa during the postwar period has passed through several quite distinct historical stages, closely connected with the onward march of world events and the development of the national liberation movement. Imperialist rivalry was spurred on during the war years (1939–45). Despite the specific features of the war situation, colonial issues occupied a considerable place in relations between the Western allies, among which were the two main metropolises, Great Britain and France, and their principal opponent, the USA. Each of these powers planned to reshape the postwar world to suit its own monopoly capital. The growth period of the national liberation movement in Africa (1946–60) is marked, on the one hand, by the joint efforts of the imperialist powers to ward off the downfall of colonialism, and, on the other, by the active intervention of the USA and, later, the FRG, Italy and Japan 16 (which had noted the weakness of the European colonialists) in areas that were still undisputably controlled by the former colonial powers.

p From the beginning of the sixties the liberated countries of Africa started to take shape socially and economically. They began to fight for their economic independence and to overcome their economic backwardness. However, they still provided the capitalist world with vital raw materials, a ready market and cheap manpower. The elimination of the political and other barriers with which the former metropolises had walled round their colonial possessions allowed their imperialist competitors a much freer access to the newly independent countries.

p The inter-imperialist contradictions in Africa fall into several main groups, and can be summarised as follows:

p 1. There are economic contradictions between the former metropolises, i.e., Britain, France and Belgium, on the one hand, and other countries of monopoly capital (USA, FRG and Japan) on the other.

p 2. Contradictions exist between the USA, whose expansionist policy is directed mainly at military and political objectives, and the West European countries and Japan, whose interests are largely economic.

p 3. There are contradictions between the European Economic Community (EEC) and the USA, whose position in Africa is being undermined by the expansion of “Eurafrica” association.<sup>66</sup> The inroads of American monopoly capital are being seriously obstructed by the association system.

p 4. The members of the EEC suffer from contradictions between themselves. Particularly acute are those between France, the FRG and Britain.

p 5. Finally, contradictions exist between Japan, which owing to the rapid growth of its economy is trying to gain a firm foothold in Africa, and the countries of Western Europe.

p This categorisation is to some extent arbitrary, since all the contradictions are closely intertwined. In addition, their development frequently involves shifts among the imperialist powers from unity of action (in various combinations) against national liberation forces to bitter clashes and complete disarray.

17

p The imperialist powers are united in their efforts to keep the independent countries of Africa within the sphere of the capitalist mode of production. They are agreed that these countries should remain under the control of an industrially developed capitalist state. But which one? This is the question that causes the rivalry, competition and conflict. The condition laid down by American imperialism for an “agreed” policy *vis-d-vis* the social, political and economic development of the African countries is the handing over of the leading role to the USA. The minimum claim of the FRG and Japan is for complete parity. The former metropolises are simply trying to retain the right to “regulate” the development of the countries in which they alone held the reins of power not so long ago. In other words, the basic principles underlying the African policies of the imperialist countries are ridden with deep contradictions. The specific interests of the individual states also clash.

p The policies of all the competing imperialist powers are in fact motivated by the same interests, whence the conflict.

p Twenty per cent of Britain's foreign investments are made in Africa, 12 per cent of its foreign trade is with African countries and 27 per cent of the profits from its "overseas operations" come from there. Nor should it be forgotten that British imperialism's struggle to retain its position in Africa has political overtones too. Most of Britain's former African possessions have become its Commonwealth "partners". This development is regarded as essential to Britain's retention of its prestige as a great power.

p France has an even larger stake in Africa than Britain. 32 per cent of all French private investment abroad is in the French-speaking countries of Africa. The need to protect the interests of French monopoly capital from its imperialist competitors was a not inconsiderable factor underlying France's decision to bind its liberated colonies together by a series of agreements on co-operation and to secure associate membership for them in the Common Market. Michel Debre, the former French Minister for National Defence, said on the 25 July 1970: "French-speaking Africa provides almost unlimited scope for a policy of national interests."^^7^^

p US interests in Africa are also both economic and political. African raw materials are of considerable importance to the 18 American monopolies. The USA obtains from Africa almost 100 per cent of its imported diamonds, lithium materials, beryllium, columbite and cobalt; 25–50 per cent of its imported antimony, chromium, manganese and tantalum; and a considerable quantity of rubber, gold, uranium and oil. The high returns on investment in African countries also attract US private capital. By 1970 direct American capital investment in Africa amounted to almost 3,000 million dollars, but one must bear in mind that the official figures do not show indirect investment (through US participation in European companies). Some American monopolies in Africa are making a 40 per cent return on invested capital, i.e., some 1,000 million dollars annually.

p By extending their political influence to the European powers' former possessions in Africa, the American ruling circles are attempting to reduce the standing of the old metropolises in the general system of international relations. This tendency follows from the USA's claim to "world leadership" and from the conviction that only American political influence can protect the young states from "communist infiltration". There are long-standing political differences between France and the USA. Although considered the USA's major partner, Britain ceased long ago to be regarded by the USA as a very powerful ally.

p At present the FRG, Japan and Italy are chiefly pursuing economic aims in Africa (though that is not to say that political problems do not come in for incidental attention). West German monopolies are trying to compensate for the lack of raw materials at home, to gain access to minerals that are in short supply and to create a steady outlet for their wares in African countries.

p Over the last few years Japan has sharply increased its trade with Africa and is actively investing private capital, mainly in the continent's mining and manufacturing industries.

p Italy's role in Africa is certainly not a leading one, but African countries receive 84 per cent of the total exports of Italian capital to the Third World. In North African markets Italian companies hold their own against French, West German and even US companies.

p The inter-imperialist struggle rages throughout vast areas 19 of Africa. It involves practically all the newly independent African states to varying degrees, but the main centres of rivalry can be pinpointed quite easily.

p Anglo-American contradictions are concentrated in the countries that once made up British Africa. Franco-American contradictions are located in the French-speaking countries. It is these territories that form the major battlefield for the contradictions between the USA and the EEC. In East Africa Britain, already under pressure from the USA, is beginning to face stiffer competition from the FRG and Japan. French, US and West German capital fights for control of North Africa. Finally, the African states which possess valuable mineral deposits are prizes sought by the largest monopoly amalgamations of all the main imperialist powers.

p The relations between the imperialist states involved in Africa are particularly affected by the socialist-orientated countries. The desire to divert these countries from their chosen path of development forces the imperialist powers into some sort of unity, while doing nothing to eliminate the contradictions between them. The methods for resolving them simply vary according to the requirements of the situation. Thus, the imperialists' internecine struggle for political and ideological influence recedes into the background. But economic competition continues unabated, and the struggle goes on for raw material resources, profitable investment spheres and markets for commodities and services. There are two reasons why the inter-imperialist struggle is being conducted in the socialist-orientated countries. The first is that usually these countries are still dependent on the world capitalist market and foreign capital, with all that that entails. The second is that the capitalist monopolies' opposition to independent development mainly takes the form of attempts to penetrate the economies of the socialist- orientated countries more thoroughly. This inevitably spurs on competition and rivalry, since the monopolies are all aiming at the same targets, e.g., Algerien oil, Guinean bauxites, etc.

p The socialist system has a profound effect on the contradictions between the imperialist powers in Africa, and the crucial role is that played by the policies of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Under the influence of these 20 policies, based on international friendship and co-operation with revolutionary, liberation and anti-imperialist forces on the continent, the international relations of imperialism are undergoing considerable modifications. Gone are the times when monopoly capital expanded into the developing countries and had only its imperialist competitors to contend with: nowadays it must reckon with a world socialist system and its readiness to offer all-round support to liberated countries.

p The peoples of the former colonies and the leaders of the national liberation movements are convinced that the socialist states are their true friends and allies in the struggle against imperialism and neo-colonialism and for social and economic progress. It would

seem that in the circumstances only one outcome is possible: under pressure from socialism, the imperialists will seek to consolidate their forces; the presence of a common enemy will oblige them to set their differences aside. But the mechanism of the influence of the policies of the socialist community, and those of the Soviet Union in the first place, on inter-imperialist relations in the developing countries and also the results of this influence turn out to be more complicated and are not always adequately summed up by conventional formulas. Imperialism's loss of territorial monopoly and the narrowing of its sphere of domination give rise to new contradictions between the capitalist states. Individual interests often prevail over imperialist solidarity.

p The course of events in the capitalist world in recent years has shown that the collapse of the colonial system led to the intensification of the inter-imperialist struggle to re-allocate spheres of influence. The forms of struggle also became considerably more elaborate. Rivalry between the international monopolies is made all the more bitter by imperialism's loss of key positions in world economy and politics together with the uneven development of the main imperialist powers, the deepening of the financial crisis and the acuteness of the export problem. In this situation inter-imperialist contradictions are spreading further to include the newly independent countries. The struggle rages around these countries' "reserve markets", capital investment spheres and sources of strategic raw materials, as well as for political and ideological influence. The nature and dynamics of the development of imperialist contradictions in that part of the world which 21 recently made up the colonial empires can be clearly observed in Africa, where the interests of practically all the imperialist powers clash.

p This book does not claim to deal exhaustively with a subject as complex as the evolution and probable future of the inter-imperialist contradictions in Africa. In the first place, the author has limited the object of study to the interimperialist struggle in the newly independent African countries, and does not touch on the interesting but separate topic of the relations between the imperialist powers in racist, colonial Southern Africa. In the second place, some of the processes examined have not yet fully revealed themselves, while others require far more reliable factual material than has as yet been amassed. Consequently, some points are dealt with in outline only, and the conclusions drawn must be regarded as provisional.

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**PART ONE**  
**THE BUILD-UP**  
**OF CONTRADICTIONS AND RIVALRY**

**CHAPTER I**  
**COLONIAL PROBLEMS IN THE RELATIONSHIP**  
**OF THE WESTERN ALLIES DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR**

p The events of today have been prepared by long and far-reaching historical processes. Consequently, a description of the general evolution of inter-imperialist contradictions in Africa is a necessary preliminary to a study of certain aspects of them. The Second World War gave fresh impetus to the inter-imperialist struggle to redistribute markets and spheres of influence. Despite the war situation, colonial problems had a substantial effect on the relationship of the Western allies, giving rise to constant clashes. The basis for many of the contradictions between them and their present-day rivalry dates from precisely this period.

p In September 1940 after the fall of France the fascist countries (Germany and Italy) concluded an agreement whereby the northern and eastern parts of Africa would go to Italy, and the remainder of the continent south of the Sahara to Germany. At the same time the slogan "Get England out of Africa" gained currency among the axis powers.

p It was obviously a belligerent stance perfectly natural in wartime, and it only served to further irritate the European opponents of the axis powers. It also made the latter's aggressive intentions perfectly clear. However, the allies were far from united, and the colonial issue sparked off sharp disagreement and mutual distrust. Britain had no intention of withdrawing from Africa: instead, she tried to enlarge her colonial possessions at the expense of the defeated French.

p This objective lay behind the suggestions made by the British Government in the summer of 1940, when France's days seemed already numbered, to the effect that a single Anglo-French state should be set up. London's plans were then put into more practical effect in a unilateral action about which France had not been consulted. On the 17 June 1940 the Foreign Office instructed all British consuls in the French colonies to offer "protection" to the French, should France be defeated.

p Naturally, the French Government categorically rejected London's "integrationist" ideas, and protested strongly against the Foreign Office action.<sup>1</sup> However, British imperialism made repeated attempts throughout the war to effect the legal seizure of French colonies. This caused sharp differences between the British Government and the leadership of the "Fighting French" forces. The repercussions have not died down even to this day.

p In supporting de Gaulle as leader of the "Free French" movement, the British were thinking of more than just consolidating the forces of the Western allies. A secondary aim



was to use de Gaulle in order to take over the French colonies. But it had already become clear in 1942 that de Gaulle was stubbornly resisting London's plans, in spite of the military situation. The conflict took on such proportions that the British Government even began to look round for a "substitute" for de Gaulle, who was said by Churchill not to be making a "proper contribution" to victory over the axis powers. Only the absence of a suitable candidate foiled this attempt. Nevertheless, the British continued to do everything possible to prevent de Gaulle from establishing control over France's colonial possessions. In the spring of 1942, London and Washington turned down his suggestion that the "Free French" National Committee be recognised as the provisional government. In May 1942, without informing de Gaulle, the British landed troops on Madagascar. Worse still, from April to July 1942 the British Government did not allow de Gaulle out of London and prevented him from visiting the Lebanon and Syria, both territories mandated to France. 25 Nevertheless, the "Free French" leader managed to make his way to the Middle East, where he saw with his own eyes that British undertakings "not to pursue any political aims in the states of the Levant and not to encroach on France's position in the area" were not being honoured.

p Upon de Gaulle's return to London, a complete breakdown in relations between him and Churchill was barely staved off. But since de Gaulle needed British support and he was necessary to Churchill in view of the forthcoming inevitable Anglo-American confrontation after the North Africa landings, the conflict was smoothed over. However, the most serious contradictions over the colonial issue during the war arose between the USA and Great Britain.

p First of all, meeting with no resistance from its allies, who were recoiling under the blows of Hitler's war machine, the USA embarked on an intensive penetration of their overseas markets. But Washington also wished to remove the official hurdles blocking its entry to the colonial world. In the course of Churchill's first meeting with Roosevelt in August 1941 he was asked about "equal access to markets". Roosevelt also demanded that this point be included in a declaration of war aims. What was really at stake here was the system of imperial preferences introduced in 1932. Seeing the danger, Churchill became very annoyed and replied: "Mr. President, I believe you are trying to do away with the British Empire. Every idea you entertain about the structure of the postwar world demonstrates it."^^2^^ In the circumstances of the time, however, Churchill had to agree in principle to the American demand. The joint declaration incorporated the phrase "equal access to markets".

p It is perfectly natural that British colonies should have been coveted. Given the situation as it then was, Washington simply wrote off the other European colonial powers, which had been defeated in war: France, Belgium and Holland. Only Great Britain stood in its way, and the American bourgeoisie had longed for the opportunity to get their hands on the British Empire. It should be remembered that in 1942, at the instigation of the US Under-Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, the State Department drew up a plan for handing all colonies over to an international trusteeship body, which the USA intended to dominate. Needless to say, 26 Britain categorically opposed the

plan. Anthony Eden conveyed British views direct to Roosevelt during his visit to Washington in March 1943.<sup>3</sup>

p From the very outset of the war the view began to form in Washington that, even if the war were won, the British would be too exhausted to hold on to the whole of the Empire, and their natural “successors” were the Americans. This view continued to spread. In 1944 the influential American journal *Fortune* wrote that the collapse of colonial empires demonstrated their inability to exist independently. The governments of the metropolises should invite the USA to help them devise a new colonial policy, and it was of primary importance that London should consult Washington on the question of Africa.

p The problem of the colonial possessions, and particularly Britain’s African colonies, proved to be a stumbling-block in Anglo-American relations throughout the war years. It was the cause of frequent disagreement at meetings between Roosevelt and Churchill.

p The conflict began before the USA entered the war at the consultations held between the two leaders in August 1941 in Argentia Bay, near the Newfoundland coast. This was the meeting that resulted in the declaration of war aims known as the Atlantic Charter. The eight points of the Charter proclaimed the main objective of the war to be the destruction of Nazi tyranny, and mentioned a few general democratic principles. In particular, it was stated that the USA and Britain respected the right of all peoples to choose their own form of government, and also that both powers sought the restoration of the sovereign rights and independence of those peoples which had been deprived of them by force.

p In both Africa and Asia most of the politically conscious opinion believed not without reason that these Charter provisions applied to the colonies as well. American propaganda supported this view. However, immediately he returned to England, Churchill gave his version of what the Charter meant. In his report to Parliament on the 9 September 1941 he declared: "At the Atlantic meeting we had in mind, primarily, the restoration of the sovereignty, self-government and national life of the states and nations of Europe now 27 under the Nazi yoke, and the territorial boundaries which may have to be made. So that is quite a separate problem from the progressive evolution of self-governing institutions in the regions and peoples which owe allegiance to the British Crown."<sup>4</sup> In other words, Churchill unequivocally excluded from the jurisdiction of the Atlantic Charter Britain’s colonial empire. Shortly after, Roosevelt rejected Churchill’s interpretation, stating on the 22 February 1942 that the Charter applied to the whole world and so to the British Empire as well. A similar assertion was made in May 1942 by the US Under-Secretary of State, Sumner Welles: "The principles of the Atlantic Charter must be guaranteed to the world as a whole—in all oceans and in all continents".<sup>5</sup>

p These "variant readings" of the Atlantic Charter should not be regarded as a chance occurrence or misunderstanding. American diplomacy had set itself the task of taking advantage of a good opportunity to put pressure on Britain and provide American monopolies with access to British colonies. Elliott Roosevelt, the President’s son, recalls



some of the views his father expressed to him while awaiting Churchill's arrival for the Argentia meeting. Talking about the aims of the war, the President said that the USA had no intention of just being a kind uncle whom the British Empire could make use of in order to extract itself from a difficult position and then forget about. Roosevelt then produced a finesounding phrase to explain his position: as President of the USA, he was obliged to make clear to the British. . . that "America won't help England in this war simply so that she will be able to continue to ride roughshod over colonial peoples". In the subsequent discussion with Churchill the position sounded a little different. It was a question of removing "barriers", the economic agreements that gave some states advantages over others. Roosevelt was not insisting that Britain stop "suppressing colonial peoples"; he was simply out to abolish the Empire trade agreements that had been obstructing the US monopolies.^6^

p To some extent, this marked a return to the Open Door Policy announced by the USA way back in 1899. The policy was supposed to ease the "peaceful economic" penetration of American capital into underdeveloped countries, so that vast profits could be made out of the backward peoples without incurring the stigma of colonialism. "America ... is robbing all and sundry and doing so in a unique fashion. She has no colonies"^^7^^—this was Lenin's view of the tactics of American imperialism.

p Some American historians describe Roosevelt as "a most complicated human being—a man of a bewildering variety of moods and motives", and claim that this fact, in conjunction with his reticence and reserve and the absence of notes and diaries makes it impossible to obtain "reliable and detailed information on the motivation of his foreign policy".^^8^^ In fact, however, Roosevelt the man may have displayed a variety of moods and motives, but not Roosevelt the politician. The facts show that in clearing the path for the United States into the colonial empires of the European metropolises he was quite consistent and single-minded. His ideas on colonial policy come very close to what was later called neo-colonialism. He told Churchill, for example, that 20th century colonial methods "involve bringing industry to these colonies" and "increasing the wealth of a people by increasing their standard of living, by educating them, by bringing them sanitation—by making sure that they get a return for the raw wealth of their community".^^9^^ In other words, "you need to develop before you can exploit"—with the help of the United States, of course.

p An example of such tactics is provided by Roosevelt's position on the question of France's African colonies. This gave rise to sharp differences between the British, the French and the Americans at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, after the landing of Anglo-American troops in North Africa. By that time it is quite certain that Roosevelt regarded Britain and France not only as allies, but also as rivals. He said at the time that "the English mean to maintain their hold on their colonies. They mean to help the French maintain their hold on their colonies".^^10^^

p Consequently, while preparations for the landing operation were being made, the Americans attempted to relegate the British to second place, suggesting that during the initial stage their role should be limited to transporting troops and supplying sea and air

cover. However, London was perfectly aware that if the first landing party consisted entirely of 29 American units, the USA would be in a very strong position to assert its authority over the occupied territories. Churchill objected, and the provision of British vessels for troop transportation was halted. As a result, the operation began six weeks behind schedule.

p But even after agreement had been reached and the landings had been successful, the USA took steps to deprive Britain of an equal share in administering the occupied areas. Cordell Hull dispatched special instructions to American representatives in North Africa, stating that the USA "bore the main responsibility" for managing North Africa's economic resources, strategic raw materials, finance, transport, industry, food supplies and even public health. Even American sources note that these and similar measures were motivated by the aim of "acquiring colonies in North Africa" or at least bases.<sup>11</sup>

p Churchill's message saying that de Gaulle refused to leave London for Casablanca, since "he's furious over the methods used to get control in Morocco and Algeria and French West Africa",<sup>12</sup> was regarded by Roosevelt as an attempt to blackmail the Americans to drop their support for Giraud. True American businessman that he was, Roosevelt was shocked not by European colonial rule in Africa as such, but by its inefficiency. "Wealth!" he said to his sons in Casablanca. "They (i.e., the European metropolises—*author*) have robbed this continent of billions, and all because they were too short-sighted to understand that their billions were pennies, compared to the possibilities! . . .",<sup>13</sup>

p At a meeting between himself, Churchill and the Sultan of Morocco on the 22 January 1943 Roosevelt discarded theoretical discussion in favour of practical measures. He stated at the outset that the postwar position of colonies would be very different from their prewar status. Then he recalled the ties between French and British financiers, who had formed joint syndicates to exploit the colonies. Finally, he pointed out that, in order to tap Morocco's natural resources, (1) the United States could arrange to train Moroccan specialists in the best American universities, and (2) the Sultan would have no difficulty in negotiating contracts with American firms, which would both work the country's natural resources and provide revenue. The Sultan was delighted, and the 30 British Prime Minister, biting his cigar in fury (as eye-witnesses recall), left the room.

p The episode is revealing in more ways than one. It shows the origins of the USA's postwar expansion into Africa, lays bare the inter-imperialist contradictions over the colonial question and illustrates the methods of American neo-colonialism, which have been further developed since that time.

p Roosevelt was in no doubt as to the future status of the French colonial possessions. He not only supposed that after the liberation of France the United States (with some assistance from the British) would be able to retain its military control for many years over the French colonies in North Africa; but he was not at all sure whether it would be right to return the colonies to France "at any time".

p The USA maintained this position for many years, and it coloured Franco-American relations. In his memoirs General de Gaulle recalls how even during the war the United States had made attempts to take over North Africa and prevent France from reasserting herself as a sovereign state.<sup>14</sup>

p According to the American historian William Langer, the issue of the French colonies in North Africa even influenced the US Government's decision to preserve diplomatic relations with the Vichy regime, despite its obviously pro-fascist bias. The American ruling circles hoped in this way to facilitate their penetration of North Africa, an area that was "of crucial importance" to the USA.<sup>15</sup>

p US aspirations to the French colonial succession boded ill for Britain. In the first place, London had already concluded in 1943 that Britain would be unable to grab the French possessions, and, in the second place, feared that the question of partitioning the British colonies might arise. In the circumstances, the British Government preferred to oppose "the dissolution of empires" on principle. In response to Roosevelt's idea that Dakar and Bizerta should be handed over to the USA and Britain for use as bases, Eden declared in his memorandum of the 13 July 1943 that the suggestion ran counter to British interests. Britain had no need of any French territory, and disapproved on principle of any policy that might lead to the downfall of the colonial empires. Eden noted in passing that the USA had no wish to see a strong French government in office, nor did it wish the French colonial empire to remain intact.

p With the evident approval of the US Government, American monopolies made great strides in Africa during the war. A special trade mission, which included some prominent businessmen, visited British, French and Belgian colonies in Africa in 1942. Shortly afterwards, in October 1942, the magazine *Life* condemned British colonial policy and advised Britain to give up the Empire. But the British gave as good as they got. The April 1943 issue of the *National Review* contained a sharply worded account of the plight of the American Negroes, who were said to be worse off than colonial slaves, and on the 16 September 1944 *The Economist* called on the government to tell the Americans frankly and clearly that neither Britain nor the other European colonial powers had the slightest intention of giving up their colonies.

p Statesmen too, especially those of the USA and Britain, did some straight talking over the colonial issue. During the war the leader of the American Republican Party, Wendell Willkie, made repeated demands for the abolition of the colonial system, promising the peoples of Asia and Africa "guarantees" of their independence.<sup>16</sup> The British Secretary of State for the Colonies, Oliver Stanley, responded by saying that he was more interested in what Britons thought of the British Empire than in American views.<sup>17</sup>

p But the most persistent opposition to American pretensions came from the Prime Minister himself, Winston Churchill.

p His position was most pointedly summed up in his famous speech made at the Lord Mayor's luncheon on the 10 November 1942, when he declared: "I have not become the

King's First Minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire".<sup>18</sup>

p Even at the Yalta Conference in 1945, when the US State Secretary, Edward Stettinius, raised the question of the future role of the United Nations *vis-d-vis* the dependent territories, Churchill flared up immediately and said that in no circumstances would he consent to anyone's "thrusting interfering fingers into the very life of the British Empire".

32

p Despite the military situation and Britain's increasing financial dependence on the USA, the Churchill Government used more than just words to resist American aspirations. A good example is the two countries' relations with regard to the Lend-Lease arrangement.

p During negotiations over the quantity of Lend-Lease supplies and the procedure for their delivery and payment the US Government insisted that in exchange for American aid Britain should open the markets of the British Empire to American goods and abolish preferential customs tariffs. The discussion begun in Argentia Bay continued. The USA was not satisfied with the compromise article included in the Atlantic Charter. Despite Churchill's fierce resistance, the hopelessness of the situation forced the British to back down. Article 7 of the Anglo-American Lend-Lease agreement signed on the 23 February 1942 stipulated that after the war Great Britain would remove all impediments to international trade and reduce tariffs. However, Churchill's compliance with the American demand was only a trick. Cordell Hull recalls in his memoirs: "Thereafter, however, it frequently became apparent to me that Prime Minister Churchill, despite this pledge, was determined to hold on to imperial preference".<sup>19</sup>

p Grave concern was aroused in London by the fact that the USA had taken the initiative in devising a preliminary plan for a general international trusteeship system. To this end a special committee, headed by Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles, was set up in the State Department in the second half of 1942. Accordingly, in February 1943 Whitehall suggested to the White House that a joint declaration on colonial policy should be published. The British draft of the document stated that responsibility for governing colonies and seeing to their defence needs should remain with the appropriate colonial powers. Bearing in mind the differences in the stage of development attained by the various colonies, these powers would gradually lead them to selfgovernment. No specific timetable was laid down. The sole concession made by Britain lay in the proposal to establish regional commissions to promote international cooperation over the improvement of living standards in the colonies.<sup>20</sup>

33

p It goes without saying that a document of this kind was unacceptable to a United States government that was trying to unlock the gates of the British colonial empire. The British Cabinet, in turn, rejected a draft prepared by the State Department, since the term

“independence” occurred in a description of the future status of the colonial peoples. Although the document was referring not to the granting of independence but simply to the establishment of a timetable for granting it, Washington was informed that “the memorandum and draft resolution would not be acceptable to His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom in their present form”.<sup>21</sup>

p In the meantime the USA’s interest in the colonies of the European metropolises, especially the African ones, continued to grow. The well-known American specialist in African affairs, Rupert Emerson, comments: “It was only as World War II developed that the United States came into direct and extensive contact with Africa.”<sup>22</sup> What was meant by “contact” was clarified in the summer of 1943 in a public statement made by Henry Villard, the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs of the US State Department: “Never before has the word ‘Africa’ meant so much to the people of the United States ... the war has turned a powerful searchlight on Africa, focusing attention on its strategic position.”<sup>23</sup>

p This is accurate. Strategic factors, as well as economic and political considerations, prompted US interest in Africa.

p The following figures convey a clear picture of the practical results of the strengthening of the USA’s grip on Africa during the war years. Before the war American monopolies controlled 43 per cent of all African mining operations for manganese ore; by 1946 the proportion had risen to 76.8 per cent. Their control over copper mining rose from 7.1 per cent to 29.2 per cent, and over vanadium extraction from 35.9 per cent to 43.1 per cent. A similar situation developed in relation to chromium, cobalt, rubber, columbite and other valuable minerals. During the period 1941–45 there was a fourfold increase in US trade with Africa: from 250 to 1,058 million dollars’ worth. Private capital investment by the monopolies grew by 50 per cent over these years.

34

p The enterprise of the monopolies was backed up by official action. A special delegation led by Robert Murphy of the State Department and William Donovan, one of the leaders of US intelligence, was sent to North Africa in December 1940. On the 26 February 1941 Murphy signed an agreement on US economic aid to North Africa with General Weygand, head of the Vichy administration in North Africa. General Catroux, a supporter of de Gaulle, described these political manoeuvres and the subsequent US decision to land troops in North Africa as an attempt to take over the French colonies there.<sup>24</sup> De Gaulle himself was in no two minds as to the real plans of the USA and Britain. He called the “political conduct” of his allies “blatant selfishness” and was “less inclined than ever to place any trust in the ideological formulas that they employed to conceal it”.<sup>25</sup>

The contradictions between Britain, the USA and France over colonial issues grew stronger during the early postwar period preceding the liberation of the enslaved countries from colonial rule.

## CHAPTER II

### IDEOLOGICAL CAMOUFLAGE FOR ATTEMPTS TO REDISTRIBUTE SPHERES OF COLONIAL RULE

p Of the well-tried "ideological formulas" (to use de Gaulle's phrase) with which the USA concealed its expansionist drive into Africa the most important must surely be "anticolonialism". American propaganda and numerous official statements aimed at the countries of Africa constantly recall the "traditional anti-colonialism" of the USA. This claim is used not only as a means of misleading the African peoples, but also as a weapon against imperialist competitors, especially the former metropolises.

p During the Second World War it was quite common in US political and scientific circles to hear views which could have been considered to be anti-colonialist in spirit. But such sentiments were only anti-colonialist in appearance. They were not inspired by any conviction in the right of the colonial peoples to self-determination. Two factors contributed towards the anti-colonial tenor of some of the statements made at the time: amazement in Washington at the ease with which Japan had swept away the colonial regimes of South-East Asia, and the conviction, especially on the part of Roosevelt and Hull, that the European colonial powers were not just incapable of running their colonies efficiently: they were also unable to defend them. The person mainly responsible for creating the myth of the USA's "anti-colonialism" was the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull. He suggested several times that the European metropolises should fix dates upon which the colonial peoples would be accorded full independence.<sup>1</sup>

p These and many other, similar facts might, of course, mislead the inexperienced. But these statements were only made for use in the inter-imperialist struggle, and had no connection whatsoever with anti-colonialism as such. The USA's "traditional anti-colonialism" was no more than a fiction. In his book *The Myth of the State*<sup>2</sup> the philosopher Ernst Cassirer concluded that in the 20th century, with its unprecedented breakthroughs in science and technology, man learnt to create myths that were just as sophisticated and efficient as the tanks and planes that were built for the same purpose. Skilful myth-makers have appeared, producing a highly dangerous commodity, since it is aimed at the most sensitive of all targets—the human mind. This conclusion is amply illustrated by the "anti-colonial" myth concocted by prominent members of the state apparatus of the USA.

p The American "anti-colonialism" myth stems largely from speculation over America's history and from attempts to attribute to modern US imperialism some of the progressive traits of American democracy in the 18th century. These tendencies can be found not only in propaganda publications, but also in the works of certain academics. Professor Walt Rostow, for example, who held responsible posts in the White House for a number of years, wrote: "Despite all the Communist talk of American imperialism, we are committed, by the nature of our system, to support the cause of national independence."<sup>3</sup> Yet a brief dip into history reveals a completely different picture, as the facts relating to Africa show clearly.



[p](#) Leaving aside the shameful role of American slave– traders in Africa (they led the field up to 1865), one can find examples of direct US aggression against North African countries shortly after the declaration of independence. The American war with Tripolitania lasted from 1801 to 1805. The ruler of Tunisia was induced to capitulate in 1805 when threatened by the guns of American warships. In 1815 a seaborne expedition was sent to Algeria. From 1849 to 1852 the shores of Africa were patrolled by a squadron of American warships under the command of Commodore Perry. Landing parties went ashore systematically, plundering and massacring Africans. In 1858 under the pretext of "protecting American citizens", US naval forces were directed to Egypt. More such incidents could be listed.

[p](#) Not very convincing either is the contention that the United States never acted as a colonial power in relation to Africa. It is true that the USA did not participate directly in the imperialist division of the continent of Africa, but the reason is not to be found in any "anti-colonialist" attitude. At that time American capitalism was not in a position to compete with West European capitalism. In any case, there was sufficient scope for US expansion elsewhere. It was at this time that the Philippines were seized, the Hawaiian Islands annexed and a protectorate established over Cuba.

[p](#) One other historical fact is beyond dispute. Throughout the period preceding the Second World War not once did the USA ever demonstrate its "anti-colonialism" in relation to Africa. The conferences on the Moroccan question held in Madrid in 1880 and in Algiers in 1906 and the Berlin Conference of 1884–85 which enabled Belgium to take possession of the Congo are instances of this. President Cleveland even declined to submit the Final Act of the Berlin Conference to the Senate, since the document failed to take sufficient account of America's commercial interests.<sup>44</sup>

[p](#) During the Anglo-Boer War of 1899–1902 the USA formally adopted a policy of non-interference, but John Hay, the Secretary of State, repeatedly made clear his attachment to Great Britain and his assumption that Britain could count on "American friendship in the war".<sup>45</sup>

[p](#) Nor did the USA find it possible to manifest its "anticolonialism" at the Versailles Peace Conference, where the fate of Germany's African colonies was being decided. One of the main architects of the Versailles Treaty, US President Woodrow Wilson, supported the idea of sharing out Germany's colonial legacy between Britain, France, Belgium and the Union of South Africa. This was to be done by the notorious mandate system—a camouflaged form of colonialism.

[p](#) In relation to Italian aggression against Ethiopia in 1935 Washington all but openly encouraged the aggressor. Despite the obviously colonial nature of the Italian claims to this sovereign African state, the US Congress adopted a neutrality motion in August 1935

and placed an embargo on the supply of weapons, ammunition and other military equipment to Ethiopia. Italian troops invaded the country in September 1935. Moreover, like other imperialist powers, the USA sabotaged the imposition of sanctions against the aggressor, and American exports to Italy rose considerably during the war months. Rupert Emerson writes: "...the Fascist overrunning of Ethiopia . . . had a poignant meaning for many Negro Americans which their white fellow citizens were unlikely to share."

**p** Some American historians try to maintain that during the Second World War the USA followed a consistently anti-colonialist line and that the American view on the colonial question was "that no people, therefore, should be denied the right to independence". The examples usually cited to support this assertion consist, of extracts from a foreign policy statement made in 1942 by Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State. "Secretary Hull . . . declared that it would always be the American purpose 'to use the full measure of our influence to support the attainment of freedom by all peoples who, by their acts, show themselves worthy of it and ready for it'."

**p** However, this statement diverges clearly from the view (quoted above) expressed by the Under-Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, about the unconditional application of the Atlantic Charter principles to the world as a whole. It is hardly surprising that Hull called Welles's statement "premature" and later compelled him to resign. Expounding the government's official position, the Secretary of State said that colonial peoples had to "show themselves worthy" of freedom and "ready for it"! So, in Hull's opinion, not all the enslaved peoples had an automatic right to freedom. The question arises as to who is to judge whether a people has "shown itself worthy of freedom" and is "ready for it". There is only one possible answer—the colonial powers. Even Hull's claim that the USA intended to use its "influence" is hardly sufficient indication that his position was anti-colonialist.

**p** The main point, curiously overlooked by American historians, is that the USA's position on the granting of independence to colonial peoples, albeit hedged round with numerous conditions, had by the end of the war undergone substantial changes. Thus, at the Moscow Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the USSR, the USA and Britain (October-November 1943) the American delegation submitted a draft United Nations declaration on national independence. In fact, the document provided for the redistribution of the colonies and aimed to remove all obstacles to the penetration of the European colonial dependencies by American monopolies. In the guise of a suitable international body, the United States would also have been able to govern colonies. However, the true designs of American imperialism were cunningly concealed in democratic-sounding phrases. In particular, the draft contained the stipulation "to fix, at the earliest practicable moments, dates upon which the colonial peoples shall be accorded the status of full independence". This was pure demagoguery, since the US State Department was already aware that the British would not support that clause. Eden reminded Hull that he had already informed the US Ambassador in London, John Winant, that the British Government did not accept the views incorporated in the American draft, and refused to discuss the matter at the Conference.



p Later on the Americans themselves discarded all mention of the granting of independence to colonial peoples, even in a limited interpretation. All the later numerous documents and statements from Washington dealing with the aims of an international trusteeship system omitted both the article about granting the colonial peoples independence and the point about preparing them for self-government.

39

p The reason for the transformation does not, of course, lie in any US “retreat” under British “pressure”, as some American investigators maintain. Several factors led to the withdrawal of the term “independence”. Firstly, the war years saw the growing influence on US foreign policy of military circles which regarded the colonial possessions of their European allies as good sites for bases, without sparing a thought for the liberation of the colonial peoples. Secondly, influential groups which were fundamentally opposed to any international trusteeship system became active in the USA. Thirdly, and this is the main point, Britain and the USA, struggling as they were for the leading role in the postwar world, noticed that the military successes of the Soviet Union and its decisive contribution to the defeat of Hitler’s Germany were causing world opinion to listen more readily to the voice of Moscow. In the circumstances Roosevelt and his aides thought it advisable to exercise restraint in their approach to the future of the colonial peoples.

p Despite the greatly increased interest that the USA had taken in Africa during the war years, the device of America’s “anti-colonialism” was only very rarely employed in the first postwar decade, even as just a political gambit. Washington’s African policy then was to compete with the European colonial powers and gradually oust them from their traditional spheres of influence; but not to undermine their colonial rule in Africa.

p From the political, economic and strategic viewpoints, “co-existence” in Africa with the established colonialists was considered in the United States to be the most convenient way of penetrating that continent. It is not difficult to find reasons for this view. In the first place, under the impact of national liberation uprisings in Asia, US ruling circles concluded that the African colonial rule of their European NATO allies would be less of a hindrance to the expansion of the American monopolies than the possible rise to power of progressive forces. Secondly, any demand to decolonise Africa, even if it were just for propaganda purposes, would create an open breach between the United States and Britain, France and Belgium; American ruling circles wished to avoid this at all costs. Thirdly, since the USA had never really adopted an anti-colonial posture, it did not occur to anyone in official quarters to state, especially in public, that Africa should be freed. Finally, as Professor Emerson points out, "even the assumption of a standard American hostility to colonialism was not taken to have any present applicability to Africa south of the Sahara, which was no doubt seen as a dark continent of primitive peoples for whom colonial tutelage was in order".<sup>10</sup>

p Also contrary to historical fact is the story put out by American sources that by the fifties the European colonial powers came under US “pressure” to grant their African colonies independence at the earliest possible moment. In fact, Washington simply

looked on while Britain. France and Belgium were prompted by other factors to undertake colonial reform. Rupert Emerson observes: "The British creation of an African unofficial majority in the Gold Coast Legislative Council in 1946, for example, went at least as far as the United States was likely to suggest."<sup>11</sup> Other examples are not difficult to find. Henry Byroade, the US Assistant Secretary of State, stated bluntly in 1953 that "premature independence (i.e., for African colonies—*author*) can be dangerous, retrogressive and destructive". Unstinting in his praise of the actions of the colonial powers in Africa, including Portugal, Byroade "called for the frank recognition that American security was linked to the strength and stability of these powers and their legitimate interest in their dependencies".<sup>12</sup> This view differs somewhat from the spasmodic warnings delivered to the colonial powers by American spokesmen during the war to the effect that the USA was not fighting to preserve their empires!

[p](#) One other interesting detail is on record. American members of a UN mission which visited Tanganyika in 1955 insisted on a 25-year period of "preparation" for independence. Tanganyika became an independent state just six years later, in 1961.

[p](#) It is perfectly obvious from many American sources that for a certain period after the war the USA considered that it had nothing to gain from the granting of independence to the peoples of Africa. How did the US foreign policymakers of the time come to this conclusion? Ignoring the continent's growing struggle for national liberation and turning a blind eye to the European powers' cruel suppression of any resistance, Washington considered that "nothing was happening" in Africa. George McGhee, the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, stated publicly, for example, that Africa was one place "where—in the broadest sense—no crisis exists". It was "a region of 10 million square miles in which no significant inroads have been made by Communism". The area was thus "relatively stable and secure".<sup>13</sup> So the conclusion was in no doubt: since Africa's "stability and security" were a direct result of colonial rule, there was no point in the USA's trying to upset the balance. European colonialism was regarded as a "barrier to Communism" and so should not be weakened.

[p](#) Official circles in the USA maintained this position until it became clear that the growth of the national liberation movement was an irreversible process that would inevitably bring about the freedom of the African colonies. As early as 1956 the prominent American diplomat Chester Bowles wrote that "the most powerful country in the world . . . cannot declare itself to be a non-participant in the affairs of a continent boiling with change. . .".<sup>14</sup>

[p](#) But even at the end of the fifties, when the liberation of Africa had already begun, the official US position was far from being "anti-colonialist". Joseph Satterthwaite, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, put it this way: "We support African political aspirations where they are moderate, non-violent and constructive and take into account their obligations to and interdependence with the world community. We also support the principle of continued African ties with Western Europe. We see no reason why there should be a conflict between these two concepts."<sup>15</sup> In other words, the

USA was not exactly against political freedom for Africa, so long as Africa remained within the West's sphere of influence.

p With the colonial system in a state of collapse, Walt Rostow was one of the first to clarify the new US role. He called the national liberation movement and the forced retreat of the colonialists a "revolution of modernisation", and did not object to his European competitors' loss of direct rule in the former colonies. What he did insist on was the need for the United States to "protect" the processes taking place in the liberated countries and to show them a sample of what the "new partnership" might mean. This thinly veiled claim to the colonial succession reflected the new "vacuum theory", which had recently taken shape. According to this theory, European rule in Africa should be replaced by an "active presence", i.e., rule in all but name by the USA. The emergence of the theory also indicated that Washington's African policy had come in for a certain amount of revision. Professor Vernon McKay, the wellknown expert on the African policy of the USA, refers to this in his memorable sentence: "By the time Britain took the crucial, precedent-setting step of giving independence to Ghana on March 6, 1957, it was obvious to even the most conservative officials that the United States could not be more royalist than the Queen."<sup>16</sup>

p There is another important aspect to the appearance of something akin to a political doctrine governing the US attitude to Africa. Washington was in the grip of anxiety over the growing influence of socialist ideas in Africa and the initiation of co-operation between the Soviet Union and other states of the socialist community and African countries.

p Bourgeois historians and Western periodicals regularly hark back to the assertion that after a gap of about ten years since the end of the war the USA "fully adopted" an "anti-colonialist" outlook. True, there is some controversy over identifying the "turning-point" in Washington's African policy. Some writers say it occurred in 1956, while others say 1957-58 or 1961, i.e., the year when the Kennedy Administration took over, and so on. Each view has facts to support it. In 1956 the Office of African Affairs was founded at the State Department. In 1958 Congress converted this section into a special Bureau of African Affairs and created a new post, that of Secretary of State for African Affairs for the man who presided over it. At the time of Dean Rusk's promotion to the position of Secretary of State President Kennedy commented that Rusk's assistant on African policies was to be the former Governor of the State of Michigan, G. Mennen Williams, who was noted for his "liberal" views. They also recall that as early as 1957 in one of his speeches John Kennedy voiced an opinion that it was not very consistent with the US role as an ally of France when he advocated independence for Algeria.<sup>17</sup>

p All these facts and many others certainly testify to the United States' growing interest in Africa. But, as frequently happens in bourgeois accounts, the main topic has been allowed to slip out of focus. Neither reorganisation inside the State Department nor the remarks made by American politicians had any connection with anti-colonialism as such. The supposed swing towards "anti-colonialism" in US African policies, discernible from the middle of the fifties, must be viewed in the light of three factors: the vigorous upsurge

of the national liberation struggle in Africa, the growing influence of the socialist system on the course of world events and the intensification of inter-imperialist rivalry in Africa.

p Washington saw that the African colonies would inevitably attain their freedom and so made a virtue of political necessity. There was no alternative to a show of "anti-colonialism". Open support of the colonialists was ruled out by that time, and a "neutral" position might prove damaging to later policies. As Emerson puts it, "the intensification of African nationalism (i.e., the national liberation struggle— *author*) and the growing readiness of Britain, France and Belgium to yield to it forced the United States to run to catch up with a procession which it would have liked to believe it was leading".<sup>18</sup>

p The redivision of colonial Africa became a non-starter. The liberation struggle of the African peoples demolished the plans of the imperialists. A new question emerged into the limelight: how could the USA obtain advantages over the departing colonialists in the independent countries? How could US prestige be raised in the eyes of African peoples?

p Washington's new move did not pass unnoticed in the European metropolises. The British were the first to respond. Britain's representative to the UN Trusteeship Council, Alan Burns, published a book in 1957 called *In Defence of Colonies*. He pours scorn on the "traditional anti-colonialism" proclaimed by so much US propaganda and the verbiage from statesmen and politicians. Citing numerous examples of American colonial conquests, Burns showed that US colonial policy did not differ from that of the European powers; 44 the only differentiating factor was geography. For good measure Burns adds: "Fewer of the aboriginal inhabitants were killed in the present British colonies than perished in the American wars against the Indians."<sup>19</sup>

p The collapse of European colonial rule in Africa was, on the whole, welcomed by ruling circles in Washington. William Attwood, the former US Ambassador to Guinea and Kenya, pointed out, for example, that, with the British withdrawal, the USA was at long last presented with the opportunity for "intrusion into their East African preserve".<sup>20</sup> These words apply equally well to other parts of the continent. The USA was more concerned with another aspect of the question: what course of development would the liberated countries follow, and might there not be an increase in the influence of progressive forces and the socialist states? The USA wished to see that African development was not hostile to the American system, that influences opposed to the American way of life were kept at bay, that access was maintained to the continent's raw materials and that US strategic needs were catered for. All this was stated in the report made by Senator Francis Bolton's special study mission to Africa. In other words, ideological control of Africa would have to be exercised by the United States.<sup>21</sup> Similar views are encountered in a number of other official US Government documents. For example, the report of a task force assigned by Kennedy in December 1960 to study African policy rejected the idea that "Africa was still a semidependency of Europe and that America should not intrude... But it stressed that US 'intrusion' should be low-key, practical. . .".<sup>22</sup> The "anti-colonialism" line was supposed to provide the ideological fuel for the "new course". The USA's main purpose was to take control of the national

liberation movement in Africa and to "turn the tide"<sup>23</sup> of events, directing them into a channel that would suit the American monopolies.

p It was not, of course, difficult at first for the United States to pose as an "anti-colonialist", since the general course of events in Africa did not oblige the Americans to give any practical demonstration of their feelings. The fact that they were officially regarded as allies of the colonial powers was no obstacle either. The colonialists were themselves<sup>45</sup> compelled to make concessions to the national liberation forces and to "grant" their colonies independence.

p The net result, as even American researchers note, was that "the United States may have received more credit than it deserved" in Africa.<sup>24</sup> But the idyll was comparatively short-lived. In the first place, the contradictions between the former European metropolises and American imperialism, their would-be successor, went from bad to worse. In his press conference of the 23 July 1964 de Gaulle declared: "The colonial powers which have accomplished, in more or less difficult circumstances, the transfer of their sovereignty to local regimes felt that everywhere, directly or indirectly, they were under pressure from Washington." In the second place, the true value of American statements began to dawn on the African countries themselves. The myth of US "anticolonialism" received a severe setback on the 24 November 1964, when mercenary troops parachuted into Stanleyville from American planes. The sight of the USA making common cause with the Belgian colonialists was a clear indication to Africans of the reality behind Washington's African policies and intentions.

p It was with a certain malicious glee that the West German periodical *Aussenpolitik* commented that as a result of this action and a number of others "the political capital accumulated by the USA over the last few years as a counterweight to the colonial powers . . . has melted away. The African countries have realised that the main aim of US policy is to hinder communist infiltration. Against a background of growing national awareness among the peoples of Africa, this position can only look like paternalism. Owing to this and also through its leading role in NATO, of which Portugal, the most hated colonial power in Africa, is also a member, the USA has gained the stigma of neocolonialism."<sup>25</sup>

p However, American ruling circles saw no cause for embarrassment. Moreover, the appearance of anti-American feeling in most African countries not only failed to impede US expansion in the continent, but rather had the opposite effect: it gave added impetus to American activity and persistence. This, in turn, intensified the inter-imperialist struggle for influence. The African scholar Professor Ali Mazrui<sup>46</sup> writes: "Then gradually American aid, American personnel and American cultural and diplomatic influence began to touch the course of events in many of the new countries. And the crystallization of African attitudes towards the United States became a point of departure from a total African obsession with the former colonial powers."<sup>26</sup>

p Even today the USA has not abandoned its "anti-colonialist" image. Instead, a few modifications have been made and additional arguments supplied. For example, every

effort is made to stress the “anti-colonial” nature of the “Peace Corps”. Its former director, J. Hood Vaughn, declared before Congress in July 1968 that the “Peace Corps” was not an agency for promoting US foreign policy.

p Declarations of this type are supposed to back up the USA’s “anti-colonial” stance. This has become a particularly necessary step in a situation where Africa has, by and large, achieved political independence, but the economic position of the former metropolises in the young states has generally remained quite firm. This state of affairs presented a considerable obstacle to US plans for expansion. It was essential to find the key that would “unlock the door” into Africa. The “anti-colonialist” propaganda was just such a key. Its aim was to convince the African countries of the USA’s friendship and good intentions. They were to believe that colonial designs were completely alien to an America that had experienced the yoke of British colonialism. It must be said that the spreading of the myth brought great practical benefits to the USA, and many representatives of the developing world fell under its spell to some extent.

p Today the “anti-colonialist” line is intended not only to emphasise the “difference” between the USA and the former metropolises, but also to create the illusion that the USA is not an imperialist state at all; from this it would follow that US relationships with developing countries are fundamentally different from those maintained by such traditional colonial powers as Britain and France.

p Seeing “anti-colonialism” as an important device for boosting American influence in Africa, the US propaganda machine spares no effort in publicising it. Use is even made of the fact that in recent years the government has steadily whittled down the “aid” money available to African 47 countries. The reasoning paraded by American spokesmen could sound convincing to the uninitiated: the USA is not a colonial power and so bears no responsibility for the aftermath of a colonial regime; only America’s “anti-colonialist” tradition prompts it to “participate” in the destinies of the liberated peoples and “make sacrifices”, since the aid furnished to African countries brings in no profit and is simply “a burden on the American economy”.<sup>27</sup> At the same time the activities of the American monopolies are depicted as no more than “normal business”. Moreover, the point is rammed home that the monopolies are not interested in the political orientation of the African country into which they are sinking their capital. Philip Quigg, the editor of the journal *Foreign Affairs*, comments as follows: “The average American businessman with interests or markets in Africa . . . professes to be apolitical, is chary of giving his opinions and favours whatever status quo prevails, whether it be of the left or right. Because he is likely to have worldwide involvements, he may have no particular interest in Africa beyond the preservation of a climate in which he can achieve an adequate return on his investment. He is a conservative force, but not a reactionary one.”<sup>28</sup>

p Not only is the USA’s “anti-colonialism” substantiated in this way, but an attempt is also being made to refute any notion that penetration by the American monopolies may pose a threat to the independence of a young state. The Africans are told that American investments do not mean any increase in US influence.

The political headquarters and ideological services of the former metropolises do not just remain idle spectators as the USA endeavours to persuade the liberated peoples of its "anti-colonialism". One of the counter-measures taken in Britain and France was the wholesale rewriting of the history of colonialism. It was depicted as "the motive force of progress". Colonialism was not, of course, swept away by the national liberation movement, but was shown to have abolished itself, having completed its "historic mission". In British publications one even comes across claims that Britain, unlike the USA, has "rendered a great service" to the peoples of Africa by "helping them towards civilisation"; the USA "declined to take on" this "historic mission".



### CHAPTER III

#### THE “VACUUM” THEORY AND THE PRACTICE OF EXPANSION

p The “anti-colonialism” myth set the USA apart from the European metropolises on the moral and ethical level. Another ideological formula, the so-called “vacuum” theory, was employed by US imperialism in its attempts to find a political and legal basis for its claim to be the trustee of the liberated countries.

p The colonial powers reckoned that they would be able to keep Africa free of revolutionary change, but they were disappointed. The independence of Libya was proclaimed in December 1951. In July 1952 a revolution took place in Egypt. The Sudan, Morocco and Tunisia put an end to colonial oppression in January and March 1956. The national liberation movement gathered momentum in regions south of the Sahara as well. This was the moment at which the notorious “vacuum” theory emerged on to the scene. Its potential usefulness was grasped immediately by the ruling circles of America and West Germany. The theory stated in effect that the place of the retiring colonial powers had to be filled by other powers which were capable of “protecting” the young states from “chaos” and “turmoil”.

p The theory was first put forward in a collective work published by the American Council on Foreign Relations. This Council was managed by prominent members of US foreign policy departments, one of whom was Allen Dulles, the familiar figure of the CIA. It was further developed at the Conference on Contemporary Africa which the John Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies sponsored in Washington in August 1954. It was declared at the Conference that "the European countries are increasingly less able to carry the responsibility they have assumed in this area".<sup>1</sup>

p The proponents of the “vacuum” theory tried to give it some respectability in imperialist circles by basing their arguments on the need to oppose the “communist” threat to the liberated countries. This was a perfectly natural gambit, since the stepping up of the American and West German penetration of Africa in the mid-fifties coincided with the decision taken by ruling circles in the West to escalate the "cold war" and adopt a series of measures against the Soviet Union, other countries of the socialist community and the national liberation movement. By giving an anti-communist finish to their plans for securing the colonial succession, the USA and the FRG thought that, even if they were unable to throw the European metropolises off guard completely, they could at least contain their opposition to the new policy. The West German co-authors of the “vacuum” theory were particularly zealous in this respect. This is hardly surprising, given the correlation of forces at the time and the need for the FRG, if not for the USA, to disguise its intentions more thoroughly. Thus, having announced that the main aim of the FRG’s policies in Africa was to resist "the spread of communism", Bonn’s ideologists constantly linked this proposition with the “vacuum” theory. In an article entitled "Black Africa—the Power-less Continent" the influential West German journal *Aussenpolitik* wrote: "In the eyes of the interested non-African states, the decolonisation process has created a



power vacuum in Africa that has to be filled before the enemy steps in.. . Western countries are prepared to take over the zones of influence more or less voluntarily evacuated by the colonial powers in order to further the main aim—to ensure an anti-communist orientation there.”^^2^^

p In the United States the problem of the "African Succession" was described in much franker terms. The aims pursued were also spelled out more honestly. In his book *The New Africa* the correspondent of the Washington *Evening Star*, Smith Hempstone, wrote that Britain and France were leaving Africa with their reputations there well and truly sullied. The vacancy should be filled by a smiling and personable America, so that the profits would start rolling in.^^3^^

p The European colonial powers did not in the least share the view that any sort of “vacuum” could form in Africa, nor were they packing their bags. However, the metropolises had to contend with a growing national liberation movement as well as the aspirations of their competitor-allies. The deepening of inter-imperialist contradictions forced 50 them to take counter-measures and keep changing their ground in order to neutralise the expansion into Africa of the USA, the FRG and, later, Japan. In an effort to enlist the support of other states for the fight against the liberation movement and the growing influence of the Soviet Union in Africa, the colonial powers were obliged to bargain with their NATO colleagues, while at the same time striving to preserve and strengthen their own positions in the continent.

p Immediately after the war the contradictions between Britain and America were the most blatant. Britain emerged from the war economically weakened yet hanging on to her vast colonial empire. It included a considerable part of Tropical Africa and the Middle East, the whole of the Indian sub-continent, Malaya and other parts of South-East Asia, as well as a number of territories in Oceania and the Western Hemisphere. The USA, victorious and resplendent in its economic, political and military might, naturally gazed longingly at the domains of its weaker European allies, which no longer possessed the economic, political or military capacity to keep their overseas dependencies safe from their imperialist rival.

p During the first postwar years Washington’s “anti-colonialists” fixed their sights firmly on the British colonies. Even in wartime the colonial issue had proved a stumbling-block in the Anglo-American alliance. Numerous British documents and materials, as well as the statements of British leaders show that at least up to 1946 London was not considering the possibility of losing its colonial empire; on the contrary, it was assumed that the colonies could be preserved under undivided British rule, irrespective of Washington.

p However, when the growth of the national liberation movement in the colonies began to take on menacing proportions, British ruling circles realised that they could not hold firm in isolation. British diplomacy then had to face up to the problem, which persisted up to the beginning of the sixties, of how to bring about joint British-US action against the liberation forces and yet retain Britain’s overwhelming influence in the colonial world.

The problem remained unsolved. Despite the persistent efforts of both the British Conservative and Labour Governments to form a single Anglo-American colonial front, commanded by the British 51 of course, the USA of Presidents Truman, Eisenhower and, especially, Kennedy displayed a firm resolve not to "drag Britain's chestnuts out of the fire".

p During the disintegration of the colonial system the US position was aptly summed up by Under-Secretary of State Eugene Rostow in his article "Europe and the USA—Partners out of Necessity": "The European states emerged from the war seriously weakened and, since they possessed overseas empires, were faced by the bitter prospect of a more or less rapid withdrawal from them. Despite the financial relief that such a course entailed, it was a nerve-shattering and often traumatic experience. We are now feeling the weight of the burden that history has thrust upon us. We have taken upon ourselves responsibility for the new world in Asia, Africa and the Middle East where, abandoned by Western Europe, a considerable number of weak, vulnerable young nations have evolved. The British and French will have to accept the loss of their world empires and become reconciled to their new dimension in world politics.'""^1^^

p However, Washington's attempts to carry out a "changing of the guard" unilaterally in the liberated countries were not to the liking of London and Paris. The British Government tried assiduously to bring the USA into line with their colonial policy or, failing that, to at least ensure US neutrality.

p Before his retirement Winston Churchill was very active in this field, especially over the knotty problem of Egypt. For instance, addressing a meeting of the US Congress on the 17 January 1952, Churchill endeavoured to limit Washington's opposition to British policy in Egypt. He declared that the British troops stationed there were acting "as servants and guardians of the commerce of the world", and called upon the United States to station troops in the Suez Canal zone "as a symbol of the unity of purpose which inspires us".^^5^^

p The British Government took other steps to secure US support. On the 27 July 1956, the day after Egypt's decision to nationalise the Suez Canal Company, Eden stated that British troops based in Cyprus would again, if necessary, occupy the Canal Zone. Eden appealed to the USA to join Britain, recalling that in 1950 Britain had unhesitatingly supported America in the Korean War.^0^^ But the principle 52 of "one good turn deserves another" proved weaker in the event than the inter-imperialist contradictions. The efforts of Labour leaders to bring pressure to bear on the USA were equally fruitless. The speech delivered by Herbert Morrison in the British House of Commons in which he expressed the Labour Opposition's disenchantment with the "unsatisfactory" conduct of "our American friends" who "do rather try our patience"^^7^^ made no impression on the USA. There was no response to Morrison's appeal to the American Government to demonstrate "to the whole world" that Britain, the USA and France were "united".

p The depth of Anglo-American contradictions in Africa in the fifties was most clearly revealed by the situation that resulted from the three-pronged attack on Egypt in 1956.

p It can be stated without exaggeration that London gravely underestimated Washington's determination to pursue an independent policy towards North-East Africa and not to be guided by the interests of its British ally. When planning the joint attack on Egypt with France and Israel, the British Government was clearly mistaken in its assumption that the USA would, at the worst, adopt a policy of non-interference. In fact, the opposite happened.

p The intensity of Anglo-American contradictions during that period can be gauged from the exchange of telegrams between Eden and Eisenhower. In reply to Eisenhower's personal telegram of the 30 October 1956 suggesting immediate and frank Anglo-American consultation<sup>8</sup> Eden said nothing positive, stating simply that "when the dust settles there may well be a chance for our doing a really constructive piece of work together". Even when a few hours later on the same day Eisenhower protested at the Anglo-French ultimatum to Egypt, Eden could still, as he put it, see "no reason at this moment to suppose that the United States would oppose us at the United Nations upon almost every point".<sup>9</sup>

p As is generally known, the decisive role in halting the attack on Egypt by Britain, France and Israel was played by the firm position of the Soviet Union. In special messages sent on the 5 November 1956 to the governments of Britain, France and Israel the Soviet Government demanded an immediate end to the aggression, delivering a stern warning<sup>10</sup> which, as is recognised by the English historian F. S. Northedge, dealt the final blow to the British policy in Egypt.

p However, the brunt of British criticism was borne by the USA, whose reluctance to protect the interests of Britain to the detriment of its own caused unprecedented annoyance in official quarters in London and provoked an outburst of anti-American feeling even among Conservatives. In November 1956 110 Conservative Members of Parliament tabled a motion in the House of Commons sharply condemning US policy during the events in Egypt. As they saw it, the American attitude was "gravely endangering the Atlantic alliance".<sup>11</sup>

p Another noteworthy example of Anglo-American contradictions exacerbated by the practical application of the "vacuum" theory is the split between the two powers over the Baghdad Pact.

p The creation of the British-instigated Baghdad Pact ( subsequently renamed CENTO) in 1955 had a direct bearing on the problem of defending British possessions in the Middle East and Africa. The US Government supported the idea of the Pact in principle, but later, when the organisation actually emerged, not only refused to accede to it, but also, in Eden's words, "tried to take credit for this attitude in capitals like Cairo, which were hostile to the pact".<sup>12</sup>

p The point was that despite the officially declared aim of CENTO—defence against the "communist threat"—British diplomacy had other ends in sight. With the help of the Pact, London hoped in the first place to be able to look after British interests in the

Middle East and North Africa, which were threatened not by communism (and certainly not by Arab communism), but by the national liberation movement. A no less important problem seemed to the British Government to be the growth of US influence in the area. By creating a multilateral bloc, London supposed that the USA could be involved in a military and political alliance headed by Britain. This would have the effect of not only placing the might of America at the service of British interests, but also limiting the contradictions and disagreements in the policies of both powers towards that part of the world. The plan did not quite work out. Up to the end of 1958 the USA flatly refused to accede to the new pact, since such a step would have implied support for British aspirations in the Arab East and North Africa and hence a renunciation of its own policy. In later years the United States became a member of the pact's main committees, concluded bilateral military agreements with Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, completely ousted Britain from the leading role in CENTO and proceeded to make systematic use of the bloc for its own ends.

p US moves connected with the setting up of CENTO and the openly negative attitude of the Americans towards the British-led aggression in Egypt marked the beginning of Anglo-American rivalry in an Africa that was being cleared of the rule of the European metropolises. The position adopted by the USA at that time was accurately expressed by John Foster Dulles. He declared that, although Great Britain and the USA were allies in NATO, on other matters "the United States would not identify itself fully with colonial powers".<sup>13</sup>

p The British Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, subsequently gave the British view of the USA's "independent role" in a confidential message to Commonwealth representatives. Listing the "mistakes" made by Britain in the Middle East and North Africa, among which he included the withdrawal of British troops from the Suez Canal zone, Lloyd commented bitterly that these "mistakes" were the result of "strong American pressure". He concluded: "We have striven hard to arrive at a common Anglo-American policy without success. We have to look after ourselves now."<sup>14</sup>

p The main disagreements between the USA and the European metropolises were not over the question of what part a decolonised Africa would play in the capitalist world. There was no particular difference of opinion here. The question that really troubled relations between the imperialist powers and which still remains to be solved was— who should exercise "control" over the newly independent countries?

p In the late fifties and early sixties Britain, Belgium and, to some extent, France held the view that collaboration with the USA in the Third World was desirable. Washington's position, however, was the exact opposite. "Joint efforts" with any colonial power were generally thought to be a hindrance to US interests. This position was embodied in the "vacuum" theory, which was a real windfall for American imperialism. The FRG, Japan and some other countries caught on quickly. After all, it was no longer a question of cutting one's rivals, but simply of filling a "vacuum". It was much more convenient to follow such a course than to openly abide by Emerson's recommendations, for example. He advised the USA to be completely independent in its relations with African countries

and in its handling of African problems. US policy should in no circumstances be influenced by America's European allies.<sup>16</sup>

**p** Despite its anti-communist trimmings, the “vacuum” theory was directed primarily against the USA's European allies, the colonial powers. Its designers proceeded from the view that there was no point in fighting a losing battle to preserve the colonial regimes. Naturally, the Americans had no intention of accelerating the liberation of the colonies: on the contrary, they strove to retard the process; but it was clear to them that it would inevitably win in the end. As G. Mennen Williams, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, declared, the United States supported the "continuing tide of self-determination" so long as it took the form of a "deliberate, expeditious preparation for selfgovernment"<sup>16</sup>—after consultation with the USA, of course. It was obviously intended to “consult” not the outgoing metropolises but the forces which came to power in the new states that would emerge from the former colonies. Thus "filling the vacuum" meant simply that the USA would step in as “spiritual” leader of a liberated country and would ensure that the metropolis aspiring to that role was disqualified.

The other noteworthy feature of the “vacuum” theory was that it reflected not only the scepticism prevalent in US ruling circles over their European allies but also the American conviction that the peoples of Africa were incapable of shaping their own destinies and building a new life by themselves. Even today this assumption underlies much of Washington's African policy.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE COLONIAL POWERS' "SECOND FRONT"

p The intrusion of the USA into what were once the African "preserves" of the European metropolises began during the war and proceeded at an ever increasing rate afterwards. The expansion of West German imperialism into Africa was renewed during the fifties. Japan followed suit later on. The attempts to redivide the African colonies became one of the important factors in the imperialist struggle in the "black continent".

p In order to justify its claims to Africa in the eyes of its allies, the United States adduced a variety of arguments, not the least prominent of which were those concerned with military and strategic considerations. An example is contained in the secret report drafted by US Admiral Fechteler and published in the French paper *Le Monde*.<sup>1</sup> The Americans naturally challenged the authenticity of the document, claiming that it was just an article that had been previously published in the *Proceedings of the American Naval Institute*. Denials of this sort only had the effect of corroborating the existence and the alleged contents of the report. Having assessed the situation in Western Europe, Admiral Fechteler proposed, in effect, to replace European colonial rule in the whole of North and North-East Africa by American "patronage". He also stressed that "Arab nationalism ... could be heard and understood by the American leaders".<sup>2</sup> But the United States launched its main attack on colonial Africa in the economic field.

p On the 20 January 1949 in his inaugural address President Truman announced a broad campaign for redistributing the colonial world and spheres of influence. "Point Four" of this programme, which dealt with the increased export of American private capital under the guise of "aid to backward areas", was of direct relevance to Africa. The US Chamber of Commerce hastened to declare the African continent a highly favourable area for "American capital investment", while business circles indicated that 6,000 million dollars would be invested in Africa over the coming 10–15 years. This did not in fact happen, of course. Direct American capital investment in Africa over the period 1950–61 grew from 300 million to only 1,000 million dollars. Nevertheless, US plans for financial and economic expansion into Africa caused grave anxiety during these years in the capitals of the colonial powers.

p The USA launched its onslaught on British colonial Africa from three bases: from the Republic of South Africa, where branches of the largest American monopolies had established themselves with comparative ease; from London, since the American monopolies were widely represented in the City; and from the USA directly. Typical examples of US penetration are not hard to find. In Ghana (then the Gold Coast), despite the resistance of British firms, US companies began exploiting bauxite and manganese ore deposits. In Nigeria the American Smelting and Refining Corporation organised in the spring of 1952 a mixed syndicate for mining zinc, lead and silver ores. In Tanganyika in 1952 American capital was used to help expand the lead- and copper- mining industries. The United States also started to penetrate Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Southern Rhodesia. In August 1950 a government mission from Southern Rhodesia



visited the USA at the invitation of the Americans. It was agreed that American capital would henceforth be granted the same privileges as British investment. Soon the American Metal Company had taken over the two largest copper– mining concerns, Roan Antelope and Mufulira Mines, and in 1959 the Americans secured the transfer of the Board of the Rhodesian Selection Trust, which managed these and a number of other companies, from London to Northern Rhodesia.

p In 1955 the Rhodesian branch of the Vanadium Corporation of America, called the Rhodesian Vanadium Corporation, which mined for chromites in Southern Rhodesia, bought up the shares of the Wihdons Mineral Company, which extracted manganese ore in Northern Rhodesia.

p In 1957 the American Newmont Mining Company set up in Tanganyika the company Western Rift Exploration in order to prospect for radioactive elements and rare and nonferrous metals and extract them.

p US oil monopolies also made their debut in Africa. The Socony Mobil concern began drilling for oil in Nigeria and 58 then tried to obtain as a concession an oil-rich area of 4,000 square miles. Standard Oil (New Jersey) made a similar move. Between 1956 and 1957 the Gulf Oil Corporation intensified its search for oil in Ghana. It is significant that the total capital investment by the American oil monopolies in British East and British West Africa amounted by 1956 to about half of all private direct US investment in this group of British colonies.

p American capital had already acquired a strong position in the Belgian Congo during the war years as a result of mining uranium ore there for the manufacture of atomic bombs. The next step, in the spring of 1950, was the purchase by a group of American monopolies of a large packet of shares in the British Tanganyika Concessions. This move made the British ruling circles very unhappy. In November 1950 Tanganyika Concessions bowed to British Government pressure and gave an undertaking not to sell to anyone for at least ten years its holdings of the share capital of other companies without first obtaining Treasury consent. In the meantime, though, American monopolies had secured direct access to the Belgian Congo's uranium and copper mines, as well as its railways.

p In 1954 Belgians were completely ousted from control of the uranium mines by the Americans. There was sharp reaction in Brussels. Belgium's Foreign Minister sent a special message to the President of the USA pointing out that the Americans had broken a standing agreement and demanding recognition of Belgium's right to joint management of the uranium workings. Many deputies in the Belgian Parliament also protested against the US action. Nevertheless, Washington remained deaf to these and subsequent protests.

p In 1949, at the suggestion of the USA, a Franco-American corporation for stimulating joint investment in the French colonies was formed, as well as the North American Oil Society, in which Standard Oil (New Jersey) came to have the major stake. At the same time, making use of France's weakened position, the American monopolies gained

concessions in Senegal, the Cameroons, French Guinea, Dahomey, Morocco and Algeria. The last two countries provided a base for representatives of the US non-ferrous metal and 59 mining industry: the Newmont Mining Company, Mines Incorporated and Joseph Lade moved in. They were interested in mining lead ore and other minerals. These firms managed to take over a non-ferrous metal plant in Zellija (Morocco). In Gabon the United States Steel Corporation swallowed up 50 per cent of the shares in the SOMIFER company, which mined for iron ore, and 65 per cent of the shares in the Compagnie Minière de l'Ogooué S. A., which extracted manganese. It was only after sharp protests in France that the American holding in the Compagnie Minière was reduced to 49 per cent. In Togo and Senegal American groups gained respectively 31 per cent and 12 per cent of the share capital of the companies that were mining for phosphates in Benin and Tigba. This list of examples is by no means exhaustive.

p Although the scale of the operation differed from place to place, American capital made an all-out effort to open the door into every African country. The USA wishes to maintain is right to equal economic opportunities in African territories —that is how the USA's African policy was summed up by George McGhee, the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and African Affairs, speaking in May 1950 in Oklahoma City. These words expressed not so much the US claim to "equal opportunities" in Africa as the desire to occupy a monopoly position. Naturally, this course was not acceptable to the European colonial powers, and their resistance to American expansion into Africa mounted. Both in the US Congress and the American press repeated attacks were made (for good reason) on London in particular. In theory London agreed to the influx of American capital into its colonies, but in practice raised one obstacle after another. In November 1951 the National Foreign Trade Council, a very influential body in US business circles, even adopted a special resolution demanding that the governments of the European colonial powers create normal conditions for American capital investment.

p However, despite the military and political alliance with the USA, Britain was not prepared to surrender colonial advantage without a fight. This is shown in the speech Churchill made before the US Congress on 17 January 1952. In it he warned the USA and other pretenders to the British 60 legacy: "Let no man underrate the abiding power of the British Commonwealth and Empire ... the British Commonwealth of Nations, spread all over the world, is not prepared to become a state or group of states in any continental federal system on either side of the Atlantic."^^3^^ This rebuff was backed up with practical measures. Between 1950 and 1955 the British Government extended the system of empire preference.

p West Germany's penetration of Africa during the period preceding the liberation of the continent was accomplished mainly through trade. In 1951 the FRG's exports to Africa far exceeded the prewar level and over the following five years increased 2.3 times. Over the same period West German imports rose 1.7 times.

p The fastest growth occurred in the export to West Germany of the African countries' raw materials and foodstuffs. Imports of Nigerian rubber increased from 20 tons in 1949 to 5,200 tons in 1956. During the same period imports of timber went up from 127,000 to



3.4 million cubic feet; cocoa beans from 400 to 8,200 tons; iron ore from Sierra Leone from 200 tons (1950) to 464,000 tons; coffee from Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika from 21,000 to 280,000 tons; and cotton from Tanganyika from 700 tons (1953) to 5,900 tons. Trade was particularly intensive between the FRG and the countries of British East Africa. Although lagging far behind Britain, the USA and Japan in terms of the volume of its exports to these countries in 1950–57, the FRG's export growth rate was higher. During the last 2-3 years of the period Britain had good reason to contemplate the West German penetration with alarm and even with jealousy, as *The Times* pointed out.

p Meanwhile Bonn was making far-reaching plans. The familiar figure of Hjalmar Schacht was talking of "restoring the German colonial empire in a new form".<sup>4</sup> The West German monopolies—Krupp, Heinkel, Haenschel, Volkswagenwerke and Siemens—followed in the footsteps of the trading firms. West German capital began to be invested in a number of African countries. During the colonial period, however, the sum invested was small: in 1958 it amounted to only 108 million marks, spread throughout Africa. Britain and France placed rigid limitations on their 61 traditional enemy's investment in their colonies. Nevertheless, the annual increment in West German capital investment in Africa (averaging 55.6 per cent) was higher than in Europe (38 per cent) or Asia (25 per cent).

p In view of its position in the first half of 1950, the FRG was, of course, still "gathering strength" and simply followed in the wake of the USA, France and Britain. West German diplomacy and the monopolies were obliged to be cautious and conceal their true objectives. Gerhard Schroder, the Foreign Minister in the Adenauer Government, even went so far as to state: "We have no African policy."<sup>5</sup> In fact, there was an African policy, and it was conducted in terms that were far from welcome to the other imperialist powers. Thus, West German spokesmen stressed that, since the Germans had lost their colonies as early as in the First World War, they were free of the "psychological burden" that weighed upon the European colonial powers. From the FRG, defeated in war, could come no "imperialist threat as, for example, from the USA". The fate of West Germany, it was said, was very similar to that of the African countries: both were underprivileged and were "extras on the stage of world politics". And so on. Bonn clearly wished Africa to regard the FRG as a "dependent" country "on the end of a leash" held by the Western allies.

p Japanese trade expansion began in British East Africa, where the cheap products of Japanese light industry, especially textiles, started to compete successfully with British goods. Next, Japanese businessmen appeared in West African countries, where, according to the Kyodo Tsushin Agency, trade was of "enormous" benefit to Japan. By 1960 Japan's exports to Nigeria were 7 times greater than her imports, and in the case of trade with Sierra Leone exports exceeded imports 80 times. A number of West African countries were obliged to introduce import quotas on Japanese goods. The unique feature in the Japanese penetration of Africa was that it took place under direct US patronage — the American monopolies then viewed Japanese capital as an ally.

p Since the imperialist rivals of the European metropolises concealed their drive for expansion by championing “ anticolonialism”, the “liberalisation of trade”, “joint aid for 62 the colonies’ development”, etc., which, naturally, went down very well in Africa at the time, the old colonial powers had to resort to various defensive tactics. In fact they had to wage a war on two fronts: against the growing national liberation movement and against the pressure of their imperialist competitors. Hence the duality of many of the measures taken.

p Britain, France and Belgium formulated their own “ colonial development plans” in opposition to the American programmes for “aid to backward areas”. This too produced clashes between the colonialists and the “pretenders”.

p Speaking in the House of Commons on the 22 January 1948, Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary, made it perfectly clear that the measures taken by the government were intended primarily to serve the interests of the European colonial powers. He said: “In the first place, we turn our eyes to Africa, where great responsibilities are shared by us with South Africa, France, Belgium and Portugal. ... The organisation of Western Europe must be economically supported. That involves the closest possible collaboration with the Commonwealth and with overseas territories, not only British but French, Dutch, Belgian and Portuguese.”^^6^^ And not a word about the overseas ally whose capital was stubbornly carving out for itself an equal share in the British programmes for exploiting the colonies! Congressional reaction in the USA was violent. Britain came in for a barrage of criticism: here was a country which was in receipt of considerable sums of money from the USA, was investing them in the colonies and raking in the profits, and yet was placing obstacles in the way of an American colonial expansion! In 1950 under pressure from Washington, London acquiesced to the holding of negotiations between the Colonial Development Corporation and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank). However, the negotiations foundered, and it was only in February 1953 that the Bank managed to sign an agreement with Britain about a loan of £60 million to finance colonial development.

p It is understandable that Britain’s policy towards her African possessions in the postwar years was preoccupied by the fight against the national liberation movement. This 63 applied to both the Labour Government of 1945–51 and to the Conservative Government which succeeded it. However, the policy did not lose sight of the need to defend the colonial empire against inroads made by imperialist competitors.

p Once dependent on Washington, London was in no position to decline discussion of colonial matters. The question of the access of American capital to Empire markets was a topic that cropped up on any occasion, even though the actual aim of a meeting might be to examine the Marshall Plan, the Mutual Security Programme, Britain’s eligibility for fresh loans or the possibility of setting up joint military bases. Great Britain would invariably agree—admittedly, with reservations—to an influx of American capital and would promise to see that it financed her “colonial programmes”. In practice, though, Britain did everything to impede this process. As *The Economist* put it, “... a

Commonwealth whose development was financed predominantly from America would not long remain a British Commonwealth".<sup>7</sup>

p Somewhat daunted by this prospect, British ruling circles adopted more subtle tactics. Basically, British capital had to be boss in the colonies. Therefore, more of it had to be exported. So American capital was welcome—provided that it was under the strict control of the City.

p During negotiations in Washington in March 1953 Eden and Butler confirmed Britain's acceptance of American capital. The question had already been aired at a Commonwealth conference on economic affairs, which took place in December 1952. But at the same time as the Washington negotiations (March 1953) London announced that the Commonwealth Development Finance Company (CDFC) had been set up, headed by representatives from the largest financial institutions and monopolies in Britain—the directors of the Bank of England, Royal Dutch-Shell, Unilever, the British Tobacco Trust, as well as gold and diamond mining companies, including Oppenheimer himself. CDFC's initial capital amounted to only £15 million. Nevertheless, its activities proved to be extremely profitable. The company made a clear profit of £457,000 in 1966/67. It was useful to Britain in two ways: it encouraged the private sector in the economies of Commonwealth countries and ensured the domination of British capital over its development. 64 This sector, in the words of Lord Godber, the company's chairman, "builds up its own connections and relationships, which have a natural tendency to persist and protect themselves, however radically surrounding conditions may change".<sup>8</sup>

p Britain's plans for "colonial development" were designed to make the Empire secure against military and political penetration by her competitors, as well as against economic penetration. The British Government set up its own programme for military construction in Africa in opposition to the USA's "strategic" declarations on the continent. At the beginning of 1953, for example, a 3-year plan was announced in London for forming units of colonial troops in West Africa. With this aim in mind, John Harding, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, went to inspect the area. Britain's Conservative Government continued the policy laid down by the Labour administration, aiming to preserve the sphere of Britain's "own military and political dominance" in Africa. It was, after all, Bevin who, in his speech of the 22 January 1948, said (referring to the USA) that Britain too had the right to put her own house in order.<sup>9</sup>

p The programmes and plans for "developing" their African colonies were, on the one hand, a means of defence for the metropolises but, on the other, they gave an added twist to inter-imperialist contradictions. The reason lay in the exceptionally favourable conditions that these measures provided for private monopolies. Nor should it be forgotten that the downfall of the colonial system in Asia led to a certain transfer of private capital interests to Africa. Many British and French firms which had previously been operating in South-East Asia now started to shift their assets to the African colonies.

p Naturally, the monopolies of the colonial powers had no wish to share capital investment spheres with their competitors from the USA or the FRG, whose

“development” programmes for the African countries also involved expanding the activities of their own monopoly capital.

p French and Belgian "development plans" for the African colonies had the same objectives as their British counterparts: to reinforce their own influence in the colonial possessions and to limit infiltration from their rivals.

65

p The first law on drawing up plans for "modernising the metropolis and the overseas territories" was passed by the French Government as early as 1946. Accordingly a special Planning Council and a General Commissariat for the Plan were created.

p In order to limit and control the expansion of American capital, the French made use of joint "development programmes". Thus, American companies were invited to help build a mining complex near Oujda on the border between Morocco and Algeria and to share in a number of other ventures.

p Since the USA was reaping the benefit from France's weak economic presence in the colonies (before the war only 10 per cent of France's exported capital went to her colonies), Paris took a number of measures to eliminate the disproportion. By 1955 60 per cent of French capital investment abroad was in her colonial possessions. However, French colonialism selected military suppression as the principal means of holding its ground. In fact, France waged colonial wars without a break right up to 1962.

p The United States was not slow to take advantage of its rival's errors, especially the short-sighted and ultra-conservative policy pursued by the French authorities in Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria. American representatives at the UN, official circles in Washington and the American press saw the opportunity to promote their interests and condemned the French Government. It was even accused of damaging not only French interests but those of all the Western powers through its actions. An influential American political yearbook, for example, commented: "Of all the conflicts of policy and interest that divided the non-Communist world, none had more harmed the material and moral position of the West than the civil war which had broken out in the French departments of Algeria on November 1, 1954."^^10^^ Before his election as President of the United States, John Kennedy condemned French policy in North Africa, and Algeria in particular, on several occasions. The *New York Herald Tribune* of the 3 March 1957 referred ironically to the "heightened sensitivity" of the French to relations with Morocco and to speculation that the USA might "squeeze them out" of that country. In conjunction with the "anti-colonial" 66 propaganda, these tactics permitted the USA to amass a certain amount of political capital in North Africa that paid dividends over a number of years.

p One point that American historians pass over in silence is that, to a certain extent, the United States itself financed French imperialism's colonial war against the Algerian people. The French military units serving in Algeria had previously formed part of NATO contingents and were partly equipped with American weapons. However, the fact

that France was considered an ally did not deter Washington from making anti-French statements and taking advantage of France's economic and military difficulties and her moral and political isolation in the eyes of the world.

p With de Gaulle's accession to power in 1958, the ruling circles of the Fifth Republic adopted a much tougher attitude towards the USA on a number of issues, including the colonial one. This course was backed up by organisational measures. The 1958 Constitution abolished the French Union. Its place was taken by a French Community, founded on the concept of equality for its members. In this way, France strove not only to restrain the national liberation movement, but also to counter the USA's "anti-colonialism" and refute American charges that the population of Frenchspeaking Africa were deprived of any rights.

p Belgium too devised a "10-year plan for developing the Congo" which was to cost 500 million dollars. The money was spent on airport and railway construction as well as on the expansion of mining operations for rare and non-ferrous metals, especially uranium. In an effort to maintain their grip on the country, the Belgian monopolists sided with their traditional partner, British capital, but the odds were overwhelming and they were finally obliged to allow American companies into the country as well.

p From time to time the European colonial powers were even forced to sink their differences and join forces against the expansion of their more dynamic competitors. In 1950, at the instigation of London, the Commission for Technical Co-operation in Africa South of the Sahara (CCTA) was inaugurated. The members were Britain, France, Belgium, Portugal, the Union of South Africa, Liberia and the Gold Coast (Ghana). They were joined in 1953 by the Federation 67 of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The Commission's main task was to raise the efficiency with which the old colonial powers were exploiting the resources of the African colonies. This in effect meant resisting the penetration of American monopolies into the field. In February 1958 the Foundation for Mutual Assistance in Africa South of the Sahara (FAMA) was created and made subject to the Commission. Its officially declared aim was "to assist in the provision of technical assistance for the region, such as the services of experts, instructors or advisers, the training of personnel and the supply of equipment for training purposes"^^11^^.

p These measures were the European colonialists' direct response to similar activities that had been undertaken since the early fifties by the American Rockefeller Foundation, the Ford Foundation and the Carnegie Endowment. They were also intended to combat the international education programme passed by the US Congress in 1948 and the subsequent American "aid" programmes for African countries. The US Assistant Secretary of State for African and Near Eastern Affairs had good reason to describe the attitude of the European powers to American programmes for the " development of backward countries" as critical and suspicious.

p As a result of the competitive struggle to redistribute the African colonies just before their liberation, significant changes took place in the line-up of forces in Africa between the colonial powers and their rivals, principally the USA. American imperialism was in

the ascendancy in Africa, while the positions of Britain, France and Belgium grew weaker. Nevertheless, the resistance put up by the colonialists to the expansion from outside was not without result. Despite the scale of the US intrusion, the metropolises managed to retain their predominant influence in the economies of their African possessions. From 1950 to 1960 ("Africa Year") US capital investment in the continent increased from 352.4 million to 1,000 million dollars, and yet it was significantly less than the sum total of British investments in the British colonies and the Republic of South Africa and French investments in the French colonies. Between 1950 and 1960 US trade with Africa grew from 863 million to 1,300 million dollars' worth, and yet comprised only 10 per cent of Africa's imports and exports, while Britain and France accounted for 60–70 per cent. These figures relate to the continent as a whole, and include those countries in which the USA met with hardly any resistance—the Republic of South Africa and Liberia. As for the purely colonial areas, the difference in strength between the main competitors—the USA and the European metropolises—was even more clearly seen. The colonial barriers did their job.

p The European powers did all they could to hinder the spread of American "aid" too. Even where aid to dependent territories was involved, "the metropolitan powers did not welcome foreign intrusion into their colonial domains", as Emerson puts it.<sup>12</sup> This is quite true. The British authorities would seize on the slightest opportunity to procrastinate, as, for example, over the admission of American experts to the Congo and Tanganyika. The report of a US Senate commission that visited Africa in 1956 mentioned that the population of Ghana had not been given so much as a hint of the presence of US specialists helping to build the Takoradi-Accra railway. France employed the same tactics. It is hardly surprising that total American "aid" to Africa during the period 1946–60 amounted to less than 40 per cent of British "aid" and 30 per cent of French.

p Yet, in spite of all the counter-measures taken by the colonial powers, their competitors—the USA and, to some extent, the FRG and Japan—made good use of the first postwar years and managed to set up in Africa an array of springboards from which the later expansion drive was launched, though in changed circumstances.

p American imperialism's breakthrough into Africa and the hotting-up of the inter-imperialist struggle there produced one other result: the exploitation of the peoples of Africa was intensified. This, in conjunction with other factors, spurred on the steady growth of resistance to the colonialists and led to a violent upsurge in the national liberation movement. As the colonies began to attain independence, so imperialist rivalry changed and adopted new forms.

p At the end of the fifties and the beginning of the sixties, when the colonial systems of Britain, France and Belgium were crumbling under the blows of the national liberation movement, the ruling circles of the USA and the FRG posed as the "disinterested friends" of the African peoples, sympathising with them in their struggle to rid themselves of the rule of the old colonial powers. This line was followed by both propaganda and official circles. An example of this is the visit to East Africa paid by G. Mennen Williams, the US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, at the beginning of



1961. In this case, Washington was trying to make political capital out of the difference between its position and the manoeuvres of London, which was trying to stall over the granting of independence to Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika and a number of other colonies. So in Kenya Mennen Williams declared that the United States "supports the theory of Africa for the Africans", and in Tanganyika, questioned on his overall impressions about the arrangements being made by Britain for the independence of East African countries, he said: "There seems to be an effort being made in this direction. ..., but whether it is completely satisfactory is something I would have to analyse further."^^13^^

p In a somewhat modified version this device was used by the USA later on. In March 1965, for example, Mennen Williams stressed that it was "natural" that the liberated African countries "feel they must avoid exclusive relations with the former metropolis . . . the United States can give African countries a second 'great power' association which will increase their sense of independence".^^14^^

p The USA's demagogic "opposition" to the European metropolises in the colonial sphere was one of the factors compelling Britain and France to review their plans for the colonies and work out new ideas on relations with existing colonies and liberated ones. The American tactic of being the "disinterested friend" of the African peoples, which was just one step away from becoming their "spiritual counsellor", had to be countered by an effective policy with an appropriate ideological basis. In addition, given the enormous inequality of forces between the USA on the one hand and Britain and France on the other, Washington's position made it extremely difficult for the colonial powers to take any decisive steps against the national liberation movement. Meanwhile the growth of the movement was taking on frightening proportions for the colonialists and causing a chain reaction. The circumstances being such, it became impossible for the old order to survive.

70

p The USA's main attention at this time was focussed on the British colonies, where, as Washington imagined, the chances of seizing political influence were better than in French Africa. Caught between Scylla and Charybdis, London adopted counter-measures that had a dual aim: to find a *modus Vivendi* with the imperialist rival and to halt the national liberation movement (or at least do something to neutralise it).

p In accordance with these aims, the measures taken were of three main kinds: attempts to muster US support, to depict the decolonisation process as a "voluntary" step chosen by the metropolis and, lastly, to find an equivalent to colonial rule, so as to retain the decisive influence in the African part of the former Empire.

p Seeing in actions undertaken jointly with their imperialist competitors a real possibility of bolstering up their own position in the liberated countries, British ruling circles began to systematically propagandise the idea of the European colonial powers and the USA "pooling their efforts". In 1956 the London *Times* said that Britain was performing her legitimate and planned task of helping her colonies in Africa towards independence and needed all possible support from the USA.^^15^^ Other British papers harped on the



same tune. In 1959 London officially proposed to Washington that British and American policies in Africa south of the Sahara should be co-ordinated. The White House, however, refused. The *Chicago Sun and Times* reported that, although they had interests in common, the United States and Britain had adopted different approaches to Africa.<sup>17</sup>

p As the colonial system gradually disintegrated, so British appeals to the imperialist powers to take collective action became still more insistent. The English Conservative Quintin Hogg wrote in an American journal: "But there is every reason why we should co-ordinate all our endeavours together. . . . It's ultimately intolerable that. . . France, Britain and America should pursue divergent policies in the Middle East or that the Congo, Rhodesia, Kenya, Cyprus, Aden and Somalia should not be considered by us all in relation to one another."<sup>17</sup>

p These tactics bore witness to the weakening position of a Britain no longer able to withstand the onslaught of the national liberation movement and, at the same time, wrestle with imperialist competitors. The once greatest coloniser of them all could not manage a war on two fronts.

p Washington's negative response to British appeals for collaboration in Africa, together with the fact that the US position met with general approval in the African countries, forced the ruling circles of Britain into further manoeuvres and into a search for new arguments in support of their proposals.

p An elaborate programme was put forward by Andrew Cohen, a top civil servant who enjoyed great authority in the USA. He had been head of the African Division of the Colonial Office, had served as Governor of Uganda and represented Britain on the UN Trusteeship Council. Cohen's views, suggestions and arguments, which reflected the position of the British Government, are clearly recorded in his book *British Policy in Changing Africa*. He did not in the least doubt that Britain could cope independently with her colonial affairs if it were not for US interference. "Through our past experience in these countries, our knowledge of their problems and our friendship with their people," he wrote, "we are of course well qualified to provide them with assistance . . . but I believe that they will look in increasing measure to the United States. . . ."

p Proceeding from this position, Cohen proposed that the "Western world as a whole" should tackle the job of assisting the African countries. Moreover, he laid particular emphasis on the point that "the United States and Britain should realise that our interests in Africa are broadly the same". These interests, according to Cohen, were of three kinds: "moral and humanitarian"—the need to "help" the African peoples in their development, which had allegedly been started by the colonial powers; "economic"—the West's need for African raw materials and African markets for its goods; and, lastly, "political"—ensuring that Africa remained "friendly" to the Western world. Cohen appealed to various quarters in Britain and, above all, to the US Government to put an end to their differences over African policies: "These out-of-date appurtenances should be sloughed off." He pointed out that on both sides of the Atlantic there was a considerable number of

ill-informed people who did not understand the seriousness of the African problem and who still clung to outmoded viewpoints, seeing contradictions where none actually existed. As Cohen put it: "There are still some people in Britain, perhaps not very many, who look at Africa through paternalistic spectacles and regard the transfer of power to Colonial people as a form of defeat. . . . There are still quite a number of people in the United States who, in this cold world, find anti-colonialism a comfortable blanket to wrap themselves up in."

p Thus, Cohen, firstly, makes an indirect offer of British experience in colonial administration in return for American co-operation; secondly, he stresses the imperialist powers' community of economic and political interests in Africa; and, thirdly, he unambiguously rates the USA's "anti-colonialism" as political short-sightedness. In passing he rehabilitates the colonial system, whose mission apparently consisted in "helping the development" of the enslaved peoples; gently intimidates the transatlantic rival with the prospect of losing Africa's "friendship"; and, most important of all, proposes to organise on a new basis the joint exploitation of the continent's peoples and resources. It is hard to find another piece of British academic writing that contains such an economically phrased, yet all-embracing programme for protecting Britain's interests in a "changing Africa".<sup>18</sup>

p The main practical measure that the British ruling circles undertook during the collapse of the colonial system was the modification of the Commonwealth, the political structure intended to replace the colonial empire.

p This stratagem served several ends. It was to keep newly independent countries within the system of the international ties of modern capitalism; to provide a formal basis for the assertion that the disintegration of the British Empire was a natural part of its transformation into the "Free Commonwealth of Nations"; to perpetuate a decisive British influence in the former colonies; and, finally, to obstruct attempts by the USA to occupy the position vacated by the metropolis.

p Ruling circles in America were most unhappy over London's new move. Washington made cautious efforts to hinder British plans. After his visit to Africa in 1955 Chester Bowles wrote: "Gold Coast will request membership in the British Commonwealth as soon as it achieves independence. 73 Race-conscious South Africa indicates that if the Gold Coast is accepted, it will withdraw. I have no doubt that the British will make the right decision."<sup>19</sup> Bowles gives no indication of what he considers to be the right decision, but his subsequent arguments about the importance to Britain of the Union of South Africa speak eloquently of his choice of priority. American "specialists" on colonial problems, such as Professor Stefan Possony and Professor Vernon McKay, also recommended the British Government to seek "new forms" of military, economic and political co-operation with the liberated colonies instead of shrinking into its Commonwealth shell.

p However, Britain stuck to her chosen policy, and most of her former African colonies joined the Commonwealth. Britain's official representatives seized every opportunity to emphasise the Commonwealth's importance.

p When bluntly asked in the course of an interview given to the West German magazine *Der Spiegel* whether he considered that Britain had still not found a new role in the world after the loss of the Empire, Michael Stewart, the Labour Foreign Secretary in the Wilson Government, replied: ". .. It is misleading to say that we have 'lost an empire'. Of course, the Empire itself, or at least a very large part of it, has evolved into something quite different. It is no longer the Empire in the original sense of the word ... it has become the Commonwealth. And for us the Commonwealth is not just an empty idea, but a living reality."^^20^^

p The steps taken by the British ruling quarters in Africa gave rise to fresh contradictions between Britain and the USA. "That there is a quite serious divergence between the British and American views of the problems of central Africa is now plain",^^21^^ the London *Times* observed in this connection.

p Since France, as distinct from Britain, used methods of direct rule in her African possessions, French defensive measures were rather different. The French Union, created in 1946, was replaced in the 1959 Constitution by the French Community. The aim of this move was to prevent a complete break between the colonies and the metropolis and to forestall the formation of large federal states under the aegis of other imperialist powers.

74

p Thus, the law of 1956, which granted limited autonomy to the colonies in West and Equatorial Africa, was carried a little further. In accordance with this law, the government could accept decrees extending the authority of regional assemblies, but real power remained in the hands of the French governors. However, these measures failed to stave off the downfall of the colonial empire, and in 1960, when nearly all of France's African colonies attained independence, the Community ceased to exist.

p Endeavoring to preserve its influence in the former colonies, Paris outstripped even London during this period. France bound the young sovereign states by special bilateral agreements on co-operation that were designed to ensure that France retained ultimate control over their further development. In fact, a confederation of states was set up in this "renewal of the French Community". The President of France became the leader of the Community (he headed the Council consisting of the heads of state or government of the African countries), and the member states undertook to co-ordinate their foreign policies and defence, economic and financial arrangements.

p The ruling quarters of France saw further opportunities for preserving their African role in the creation of political and economic groupings of French-speaking countries. The

economic dependence of the participants on France guaranteed the former metropolis a strong political position.

But the most effective measure adopted by the French ruling circles to counter the expansion of US monopolies into Africa and the American “aid” policy as a whole was the setting up of an “association” between 18 African countries and the European Economic Community. Back in 1957, France and Belgium had included their African colonies in the Common Market (then being created) as associated territories. Then in 1963 the Yaounde Convention instituted the Association of African States and the Malagasy Republic with the European Economic Community (EAMA).<sup>22</sup> While offering the European neo-colonialists fresh opportunities for exploiting the associated countries, the realisation of the slogan of the “unity of Europe and Africa” erected barriers to the penetration of American capital into these countries.

75

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p The collapse throughout most of Africa of direct colonial rule created an entirely new situation there as regards the inter-imperialist struggle and changed its nature and forms. Firstly, since the colonial possessions had ceased to exist, the question of redistributing them became a non-starter. Secondly, the African countries were no longer the objects of colonial policy, but had been transformed into an independent active force. As a result, the imperialist powers’ struggle for political and economic influence could no longer be carried on by the old methods. Thirdly, the development of cooperation with Africa by the Soviet Union and other socialist states began to make its full impact on the forms and methods adopted by the struggle.

p Previously a factor that united the imperialists had been the plain need to resist the growth of the African peoples’ national liberation struggle. Now a new factor had been added—the problem of how to keep the liberated countries within the economic web of capitalism. This involves “protecting” these countries from the influence of socialist ideas and limiting their contacts with states of the socialist community. Thus, antagonism again flared up in the imperialist camp between the class interests of the monopolist bourgeoisie as a whole and the selfish interests of its separate sections, since, far from weakening their interests in a re-allocation of spheres of influence, the freeing of the colonies had actually increased it.

p The collapse of the colonial system helped to further level the development of imperialism in the different states. Many of the former specific features of the “national” imperialisms (French usury, British colonialism, etc.), which, to some extent, determined the means of their expansion and the tactics used against competitors, became less pronounced and lost their significance. In conjunction with the virtual disappearance of the “classical” method for carving up the world (internecine war between the metropolises) this factor led to the formation of a new complex of means, methods and tactics, basically identical in all the imperialist states, designed to protect their own interests in the now liberated countries. This complex includes the export of capital, 76

imperialist “aid”, the involvement of former colonies in various blocs, associations and groupings, the securing of privileges in trade and the means for acquiring political influence. This complex was formed in the course of the postwar period, with certain methods and tactics being constantly tested and improved.

The analysis contained in Part One of this book points to one further conclusion, which is vital to a historically valid understanding of the succeeding parts of this study. Bourgeois historical and political writing has displayed a tendency of late to view the contradictions between the Western powers in the developing countries as merely temporary and fortuitous episodes having no historical roots. The contradictions between France and her NATO partners are thus depicted as being simply a result of General de Gaulle’s foreign policy. Anglo-American disagreements are explained away as “unfortunate misunderstandings”, while Anglo-West German friction springs from the “delusions” current among the FRG leadership. And so it continues. It has been shown, in the foregoing chapters that inter-imperialist contradictions in colonial matters have built up throughout the war and postwar years. It is precisely this objective process that conditioned the further development of the inter-imperialist struggle in the newly independent countries.

**PART TWO**  
**ECONOMIC ASPECTS**  
**OF THE INTER-IMPERIALIST STRUGGLE**  
**IN THE NEWLY INDEPENDENT COUNTRIES**  
**OF AFRICA**

**CHAPTER V**  
**CONFLICT BETWEEN PRIVATE CAPITAL FROM**  
**DIFFERENT FOREIGN COUNTRIES**

p Lenin discovered that the export of capital constitutes a new economic category in the highest and final stage of capitalism. He showed that this phenomenon attains "enormous dimensions" in the age of imperialism, acquires crucial importance and becomes one of the "most essential economic bases of imperialism".<sup>1</sup>

p From the historical standpoint, the export of capital is indissolubly linked with the economic and political division of the world. At the present time it has taken on several additional qualities that are particularly dangerous to the developing countries. By investing capital in these countries' main industries the foreign monopolies seize almost total control over them. Sometimes they run the whole economy, since it is usually so undiversified that it relies on just one or two products. As Lenin summed up the process, this is economic annexation without political annexation.<sup>2</sup>

p Another reason why the policy of the foreign investors hinders the developing countries from achieving economic independence is that foreign capital is antagonistic towards the state sector of these countries' economies: it tries to limit their foreign economic contacts and to corner the internal market. The export of capital also accelerates the development of capitalism in the newly independent countries, but the local capitalism is subordinate and "second class". It is clear that the export of capital provides the material basis for neo-colonialism.

p Thus, in modern conditions the export of capital has come to perform new functions, in addition to the old ones, which will largely determine the phenomenon's future evolution. The export of capital today is intended to: (1) keep the developing countries within the world capitalist economy, (2) serve as a means of fighting the national liberation movement and world socialism and (3) help intensify the financial exploitation of the young states. The sum total of its old and new functions places the export of capital firmly among the weapons used in the inter-imperialist struggle in the developing countries.

p As is the case with other areas of expansion, the export of capital brings into conflict the general and specific interests of individual powers, producing rivalry and competition. These conflicts are further intensified by the fact that there has been a change in the structure of the export of capital. State-sponsored investments now make up

a sizeable proportion of such capital investments. On the one hand, this fact demonstrates the strengthening of state-monopoly tendencies in the export of capital, and, on the other, it points to its ever-growing political nature: a process is developing that is linked with a modification of inter-imperialist contradictions. Before the Second World War profits were the main spur in the monopolies' struggle in the world market, and the forms adopted by the struggle included the seizure of capital investment spheres. Now, however, direct capital investment, just like the provision of loans, credits and grants, is not undertaken for the sake of profits alone. An important stimulus for stepping up the export of capital to the developing countries is now the urge to outdo one's rival and secure additional levers of political influence.

p The continent of Africa illustrates clearly how the export of capital acts as a means of inter-imperialist struggle in the developing countries. It reveals the origins and results of the conflict between capital from different foreign countries. It is of great interest and highly topical to study these questions for a number of reasons. Firstly, the export of capital<sup>79</sup> (and the very concept of "foreign capital") is depicted in bourgeois writings as a technico-economic category—the transfer of funds from a highly developed to an underdeveloped country, which has the sole aim of "helping" the latter. Thus, the analysis makes no mention of the exploiter essence of foreign investments, the problem of the clash of interests between the "donor" countries, and the fact that the export of capital serves above all else as an instrument for the expansion of the particular imperialist power. Secondly, there is a clear tendency to belittle the significance of the export of capital, especially to developing African countries, on the grounds that there has been a reduction in the proportion of finance exported to the former colonial and dependent territories as measured against the total export of capital. Thus, the question of inter-imperialist rivalry is also pushed into the background, since in fact the point is simply that it has become less attractive for the Western powers to invest in the developing countries. Thirdly, foreign investment is linked solely with the liberated countries' need for development capital, and Western investments are viewed as being an answer to this need. Here too the attempt is being made to disguise exploitation as philanthropy, which naturally excludes the possibility of competition.

p The tendency to depict the export of capital as charity requires no further comment. It is an imperialist fiction widely used in relation to the developing countries and based on speculation with their vital needs. The influx of external finance really does occupy an important place in the structure of the newly independent countries' economies. It is, for example, the means whereby 12–16 per cent of the developing states' imports "are paid for. Foreign capital also finances a considerable part of their investments. As for the reduced share of these countries in the general amount of foreign investment, the situation merits closer examination. Statistics show that approximately two-thirds of direct private investment from the USA, Britain, the EEC countries and Japan goes to other developed capitalist states and only one-third to the developing countries. The main reason for this state of affairs is to be found in the changes that have occurred in the structure of the economies of the industrially developed countries. The scientific and technological<sup>80</sup> revolution has given them greater opportunities for massive capital investment with quick returns, whereas capital investment spheres in the developing areas



of the world remain limited. Another factor of no small importance is that the holders of capital assets see in the growth of the national liberation movement a real threat of expropriation.

p Should one conclude that the role of the export of capital (to African countries, for example) is diminishing? Are the Western powers losing interest in sinking their capital into Africa, and is the heat of battle between them for investment spheres cooling off? Careful analysis shows that such conclusions, which are encountered in print, are fundamentally unsound.

p The contradictions between the imperialist powers over private investment in Africa form part of their general world-wide rivalry in the export of capital. Although the world is currently witnessing the growing international unity of capital, the tendency is accompanied by interimperialist struggle. This is inevitable, since the economic foreign policy of any bourgeois state is directed primarily at strengthening and extending that country's own position abroad.

p Even the export of capital from one developed country to another, i.e., reciprocal investment, reflecting the objective process of the international integration of capital and the intermingling of interests, is by no means free of interimperialist contradictions. The balance of power as far as the mutual exchange of private capital between the USA and the European states and Japan is concerned shows that the USA's dominant position here" is almost unshaken, unlike the spheres of industrial production and foreign trade. This gives the American monopolies substantial advantages over their competitors. American imperialism obtains considerable political dividends in Western Europe and Japan. It is financial penetration that largely ensures the retention of its political influence against the background of the USA's declining position in world trade and gold reserves.

p The export of capital to the young states of Africa plays an even greater role in this respect, since it takes place on a basis that is completely different from that which prevails among the developed states. The imperialist powers' capital investment in Africa cannot be viewed as a part of the exchange of "surplus" capital, an everyday occurrence in the economic relations of the capitalist world. Here, in fact, no exchange takes place. The capital exported from Africa by the foreign monopolies is merely surplus value created by the labour of African workers. Thus, the export of capital from the imperialist powers to African countries widens the scope for the exploiter relations between them, while the "national" imperialisms have always wrestled with one another for dominance in this sphere.

p Foreign investments in the developing countries are to an incomparably greater degree bound up with the question of political influence than investments in the developed countries. While the intrusion of American private capital into Western Europe already evokes resentment and alarm among a considerable section of the bourgeoisie in the former metropolises in this connection, the prospect of losing political influence in the traditional areas of domination in Africa through the transfer of the controlling interest to

a competitor is a cause of particular anxiety, especially to the monopolies of Britain and France.

p One of the sources of inter-imperialist contradictions is the fact that the national monopolies all try to invest in the key (and, consequently, the same) sectors of the young countries' economies. There is no question of any "division of labour" here. As the magazine *United States News and World Report* aptly commented, the main thing is not the number of American enterprises operating in a country, but their strategic location in the key industries.<sup>3</sup> Consequently, the monopolies compete not for investment opportunities as such (there are more than enough capital investment spheres in the newly independent countries of Africa), but for investment in those industries whose seizure will ensure, in addition to good profits, the attainment of political ends.

p In the complex of contradictions between the imperialist powers the rivalry that stands out most sharply is that between the USA, Britain and France—the principal investors in Africa. The FRG and Japan are currently being more actively drawn into the competitive struggle.

The overall volume of capital exported from the main imperialist powers to African countries is progressively increasing, although the growth pattern varies from power to power, as does the proportion of African investments in the total amount of their capital invested abroad.

*Table 2 Direct Private Investment (Minus Depreciation Expenses) in Africa by the USA, Britain and France (in millions of dollars) Year South Africa Other African countries*  
*Total* '60, '68, of total foreign investments Country 1960 1968 % of total foreign investments  
 in IOCS USA 586 2 1 477 0 3 9 Britain 959 2 1 408 0 8 8 France ..... 614.1 1.  
 '295.0 32.0 Source:—: Calculated from SKITCJ/ *of Cinienl iusine.ss*, Sept. 1965; *Bomdol Trade Journal*, 26 Jan., 1968; *African Uepnii*, No 1, 1969; *Le Mnnileur nlriciin*, 17 July, 1969.

The table shows that British monopolies increased their direct private capital investments in Africa 1.5 times, French monopolies doubled theirs and American investment nearly trebled. The USA, which in 1960 trailed behind Britain and France in terms of the volume of its investments, led the field in 1968. This fact demonstrates vividly the futility of the efforts of some American economists to prove that US investment in Africa is not substantial. True, the American monopolies' direct capital investments in Africa are currently running at only about 4 per cent of their total overseas investments. The reason for this, however, is not so much "lack of interest" as the barriers that were erected, and still to a certain extent remain, against transatlantic capital. American sources confirm this thesis. Professor Emerson writes: "Since the colonial authorities were generally unreceptive to largescale American economic penetration and sought to preserve their dependent domains for themselves, the Union of South Africa and Liberia were the two major areas for American investment"<sup>4</sup>. The elimination of the official colonial barriers altered the position, as is shown in the following table.

*Table 3 The Cirowlli of Direct US Capital Investment in Africa (in millions of dollars)*  
 1950 140 155 287 2.4 1957 301 363 664 2.1 1961 311 753 1,064 2.8 1962 357 914 1 ,271  
 3.1 1963 411 1,014 1,426 3.5 1964 467 1 ,219 1 ,685 3.8 1965 529 1,380 1 ,918 3.9 1960  
 600 1 ,474 2,074 3.8 1967 667 1,611 2,278 3.8 1968 692 1,986 2,678 4.1 1972 960 3,179  
 4,139 5.2 s: Compiled and calculated from *Balance of Payments*, 1963; *Surcey ol Current*  
*Business*, Sept. 1965, Sept. 1967. Oct. 1968, Oct. 1969; *Africa Re-port*, No. 1, 1969;  
*Christian Science Monitor*, 22 April 1970; *Orexra-i Business Report*, July 1972, p. 19.

p It can be seen from the table that in 1957 the amounts of American capital investment in South Africa and the remainder of Africa were roughly equal, whereas in 1972 South Africa accounted for less than 25 per cent of total US investment in the continent. Over the eight-year period from 1964 to 1972 US private direct investment in the newly independent African countries almost trebled, climbing to 3,179 million dollars by the end of 1972. The average annual increase amounted to 14 per cent. The proportion of US overseas investment going to Africa also rose, from 2.1 per cent in 1957 to 5.2 in 1972.

84

p It is often asserted that the US monopolies "make hardly any profits" on their African investments, but the actual figures do not support this claim. In fact, Africa yields the highest rate of return anywhere in the world (a not unimportant factor in the competitive struggle!). Thus, during the period 1957–68 every 100 dollars invested abroad by American corporations produced a profit of 6-8 dollars in Canada, 6-14 dollars in Western Europe, 10–16 dollars in Latin America, but 26–31 dollars in Africa. The total profits raked in by US monopolies in Africa in 1967 were 65 per cent higher than the total amount of new capital invested in that year. The structure and geographical distribution of American investment in Africa testify to its competitive nature. 54 per cent of direct capital investment is placed in the oil industry, 17 per cent in mining, 16 per cent in manufacturing and 7 per cent in trading. Thus, American capital is pouring into precisely the areas that are already dominated by the former metropolises.

p American private capital comes into conflict with British capital mainly in those countries that once made up British Africa where there are rich mineral deposits. For example, after Nigeria had gained independence, capital from more than 100 different American companies and a number of banks flowed into the country, not to mention money from the US oil monopolies (see below). British firms were forced by massive investment from the American Kennecott Copper Corporation and the American Smelting and Refining Company to slacken their grip on the lead, zinc, tin, niobium and silver mining industries. Nigeria's textile industry was penetrated by US bank capital in the form of Arcturus Investment and Development, a subsidiary of Rockefeller's Chase Manhattan Bank. Even the United Africa Company lost its monopoly on a number of products: it was eased out of the profitable soft drinks trade by Pepsi-Cola.

p American capital is attacking British positions on a broad front in East Africa too, especially in Kenya. In 1960 Britain was the undisputed master of the country's economy. But by 1969 the USA accounted for about one-third of all foreign investment

in Kenya, a situation that was brought about largely by the agreement on investment guarantees concluded between the USA and Kenya. The US Embassy in 85 Nairobi officially stated that "The image of Kenyan development potential, financial self-reliance and good investment climate is well-known in the US. US companies look upon the Kenyan market as one of the most promising in Africa".^^5^^

p Banking occupies a special place in Anglo-American competition to export private capital to Africa. During the colonial period British banks held the monopoly in British Africa. Lloyds Bank, the Westminster Bank and the National Provincial combined with the Standard Bank to set up the Bank of West Africa, which dominated the whole region. Barclays Bank DCO (Dominion, Colonial and Overseas), the Standard Bank of South Africa and National & Grindlays had a wide network of branches throughout the southern and eastern parts of the continent. From the early sixties American banks tried to make inroads into Englishspeaking Africa. Branches of the Chase Manhattan 'Bank were opened in Nigeria, and in Southern Africa Chase Manhattan was joined by branches of the First National City Bank and the Bank of America. They also penetrated into East Africa. The passive resistance offered by the City of London to the intrusion of American bank capital into its sphere of operations produced no results of any substance. London then adopted a series of firmer measures designed to both consolidate the position of British banking houses and limit the activities of their American competitors.

p The principal measure was the setting up in Britain of a powerful banking coalition to operate in the developing countries and, especially, those in Africa. The autumn of 1969 saw the merger of two of the large British banks that operate outside Europe, the Standard Bank and the Chartered Bank. The new bank that has resulted from the merger controls assets of \$6,000 million. It has a wide network of branches at its disposal in the developing countries with dozens of thousands on staff. Over half these branches are in African countries.

p Since the Midland Bank and the National Westminster Bank are represented on the board of the Standard Bank and 13 per cent of the Chartered Bank's capital belongs to Barclays, once Britain's largest colonial bank, the new 86 banking group represents in effect the "Big Five" of the British banking world. This substantially boosts the competitiveness of the new group. The French press was clearly apprehensive at the news of the merger: "British banking know-how is superior to that of nearly all other financial establishments in Europe. What is more, the British bank has ten times as much foreign capital as the continental banks." A further feature of the amalgamation was also pointed out—the invitation to American banks to participate: "This transatlantic tie-up makes possible the procedure which the City thinks will best help it to resist the overseas expansion of the American banks, especially First National City, Chase Manhattan and the Bank of America".^^6^^

p France's anxiety was well-founded. Examination shows that the bitterest rivalry between foreign capitals is taking place in French-speaking Africa. US, West German, Japanese and, more recently, British monopolies are fighting determinedly to get their hands on the valuable raw materials located in these countries. While competing with one

another, however, they are at the same time encountering growing resistance from French capital. The Vice-President of one of the US financial giants, the Chase Manhattan Bank, Herve de Carmoy, commented: "French industrialists are coming to realise more clearly the great advantages secured by direct investment. . . . Above all it is the certainty of being able to capture markets that would otherwise remain closed through protectionism or access difficulties."^^7^^ But as to the prospects for French capital investment in the USA, Carmoy referred directly to the necessary conditions for this: "It is necessary to identify American firms which would be interested in an agreement with French firms. . . in exchange for access for their own products to the markets of Europe and French-speaking Africa."^^8^^ The remarks of this authoritative American financier do more than reveal the significance that the USA attaches to its overseas investments; they underline the increasing attention that US imperialism is devoting to capital investment spheres in Africa and give an indication of the direct rivalry in this connection with France. French private capital is in effect presented not with a deal but with an 87 ultimatum—to grant American companies unimpeded access to French-speaking Africa. Only if this demand is met will the doors to the USA be opened to French firms.

p The reasons for this situation become clear when it is recalled that French monopolies wished to restore their international position, weakened as a result of the Second World War, and renewed the export of capital to Africa on a massive scale, while putting obstacles in the way of other would-be investors. This export has undergone a radical transformation. Capital is now being mainly exported not as loans but in productive form, with the bulk of investment going to the franc zone.

p France is currently the most active exporter of capital to Africa, and the greater part of French private investments is concentrated in the countries which once formed the African part of the French colonial empire. According to 1969 figures, the total volume of direct private investment by French firms in Africa comprised some 32 per cent of all French capital investments of this type abroad. Although France takes third place after the USA and Britain in the volume of direct private investment in Africa, as can be seen from Table 2, it should be borne in mind that American and British direct private investment in Africa amounts to only 4 per cent and 9 per cent respectively of their total foreign investments, as opposed to the French figure of 32 per cent. This is a clear indication of the importance to France of the export of capital to Africa.

p In analysing the present state and prospects of the competitive struggle, one must also take account of differences in the distribution of US, British and French investments among the sectors of the African countries' economies. For example, the general volume of all direct private investment in the African oil industry is running at about 2,041 million dollars, or 41 per cent of all foreign capital investment. But the proportion of French investment in this supremely "competitive" African industry amounts to only 35 per cent of France's total investments in Africa. Even smaller is the amount of French direct private investment in mining—10 per cent, or 130 million dollars, whereas the investments of other powers in this sphere of production (excluding South Africa) reach 792 million dollars.

p Given that the oil and mining industries are the most profitable investment spheres and that France is crying out for minerals, it is clear that the French monopolies are at a disadvantage, which can only spur on the competitive struggle.

p In Gabon, for example, American private capital, as represented by the monopolies Bethlehem Steel and United States Steel, has largely excluded French firms from iron and manganese mining operations, having seized half the share capital of the mixed companies active in this field. Despite French resistance, West German capital is making determined inroads into Mauritania. By 1969 investment by West German firms in Mauritania had exceeded 15 million marks.

p 54 per cent of all French private direct investment is channelled into the manufacturing industry of African countries (about 275 million dollars) and the service industries—transport, trade and services (425 million dollars). The private capital of other imperialist powers is now penetrating these spheres too.

p In North Africa, for example, French capital held, until recently, a completely dominating position in the profitable service area of building and running hotels, motels and the like. American and West German companies are now mounting fierce competition against the French firms. The list of similar instances could be easily continued.

p Private capital investment by the FRG and Japan is still considerably smaller than that of the USA, Britain and France. However, the rate of investment growth of the monopolies of these countries and the geography of their penetration are already turning them into competitors, and not only of the former metropolises.

p The figures given below show that the volume of capital investment grew almost 6 times in the eight years from 1963 to 1970 and the average annual rate of increase amounted to 4.7 per cent. Africa received some 16 per cent of the FRG's private investments abroad, i.e., less than France's quota but greater than that of the USA and Britain.

Despite the fact that the West German monopolies are advancing into Africa on a broad front (by 1968 private capital from the FRG had been invested in 31 African 89 Private Capital Investment by the PRO in Africa (in millions of DM) 1960 ..... 179.9 1966 ..... 1962..... 228.4 1967..... 1963 . ..... 295.8 1969 ..... 1964..... 316.4 1970..... 484.6 564.1 676.2 1,003.0 1965..... 449.3 Sources: *Bundetanzeiger*, 30 June 1965; 18 November 1967; 19 April 1968; *Stnliatishes Jahrbuch fur BRD l'J69, If/71*. countries), the directions of the "main assaults" determining the principal areas of inter-imperialist rivalry are becoming more obvious too. By 1969 the most important of the West German monopolies' investments in the newly independent countries of Africa were distributed as follows (in millions of DM):



Liberia..... 134.1 Libya..... 56.1 Algeria..... 50.6 Ethiopia..... 47.6 Guinea.....  
 30.0 Nigeria..... 25.7 Source: *Übersee Rundschau*, No. 18, 1969. Ivory Coast.....20.0  
 Egypt .....18.8 Mauritania.....15.4 Morocco.....12.2 Congo (Kinshasa) 8.0  
 Togo.....4.0

p This information points clearly to the interests of the West German monopolies in Africa: iron ore in Liberia and Mauritania, oil in Libya and Algeria, bauxites in Guinea, timber from the tropical forests of the Ivory Coast, phosphates in Morocco and so on. But these same investment spheres also attract the monopolies of other powers. Consequently, in Liberia the FRG is competing against the USA, in the Ivory Coast and Morocco against France, while in Guinea, Libya and Algeria the FRG is an active protagonist in an imperialist free-for-all.

p The Japanese monopolies are comparative newcomers to Africa, but are gradually making their presence felt. As the *Japan Press* commented: "Though still distant for the 90 average Japanese, Africa has a lure for Japanese monopoly capital which seeks a virgin land for capital investment."^^0^^ In the face of stiff resistance, primarily from Britain and the USA, Japanese private capital has over the last few years been intensively penetrating the continent, particularly the English-speaking countries. By 1970 Japanese private investment in Africa was already in excess of 200 million dollars. The Japanese oil companies Mitsui Petroleum Development, Teikoku Oil and Teijin are sinking capital into the Nigerian oil drilling operations, thus competing with British Petroleum and American monopolies. Japanese textile firms are also making headway in Nigeria. In order to block the resistance of British capital, they are co-operating with French investors. A similar Japanese-French alliance, this time aimed at US monopolies, can be observed in Niger, where a consortium of Japanese companies is proceeding to mine uranium in conjunction with French companies. Their American rivals have been squeezed out.

p The involvement of partners is the norm in Japanese investment operations in Africa. The Japanese monopolies see this procedure as a ploy against British and American competition, of which they are constantly aware, and not only in Africa. For similar reasons, French, Italian and even West German capitalists willingly accept the Japanese offers. This is a clear example of the collective forms of inter-imperialist struggle, so typical of the current situation.

p There is no doubt that the penetration of Japanese private capital into Africa will gain in intensity. This is openly admitted in Japan itself. Fumihiko Kono, the President of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, who headed a Japanese Government mission which visited nine countries in Tropical Africa in February 1970, stressed in his report to the Government that "Africa is a promising virgin land for Japanese capital investment". Kono pointed to three factors which might facilitate the expansion of Japanese capital: the "unusual African interest in Japan's high economic growth"; the "relative absence of antagonism against Japan, as could be expected from Japan's minimal presence in the past in Africa"; and, most important of all, 91 the "unanimous desire of African nations to get rid of the continuing rule of their former suzerains."^^10^^ The observation that the



peoples of Africa long for complete economic independence is nothing new. What is interesting is the attempt being made by Japanese monopoly capital to use the desire for independence and the anti-colonial sentiments of African public opinion for its own ends in the competition for capital investment spheres in Africa. At the same time it must be admitted that Japan's economic successes and high-level production technology may cause it to be viewed by many African countries as a more promising partner than Britain, for instance, which is now floundering in a morass of financial and economic troubles. All these circumstances give Japanese monopolies the edge over their competitors in the assault on Africa, but at the same time they contribute towards intensifying the inter-imperialist struggle, Tokyo's competition with London and Washington. Japanese monopolist circles are aware of the prospects and are planning ahead. The *Japan Press* reports: "It may be too early to see how Africa and the Middle East will react to the planned massive capital investment drive by the Japanese. It may be noted, however, that in anticipation of local opposition and competition with American and British capital, the Japanese plan to make common cause with France, Italy and West Germany." Thus, the magazine not only revealed Japanese private capital's expansionist schemes for Africa, but also spelled out its opponents and possible allies, indicating simultaneously the deep contradictions between the Common Market countries, on the one hand, and Britain and the USA, on the other. Declarations of this sort are not very often found in bourgeois publications. The Japanese magazine provides further confirmation of the well-known fact that forces in the capitalist world are constantly regrouping: former enemies become allies and vice versa. Agreements between monopolies are temporary in nature, while competition is constant.

p The Japanese monopolies will undoubtedly make their contribution to the sharpening of the inter-imperialist struggle to export private capital to Africa. However, the main factor in the struggle will apparently be the growing 92 intrusion into Africa of American "private business", which is receiving steadily increasing state backing. An analysis of the modifications that the Nixon Administration has been making to its African policy shows that, although the existing methods of state economic, political and social expansion of the USA into Africa still fully retain their role as the most important instruments in the inter-imperialist struggle, another tendency is becoming more apparent—the wish to transfer the main burden on to the monopolies. Similar development can be detected in Britain, France and the FRG. In the circumstances the export of private capital has come to be one of the principal weapons in the struggle.

p The appearance and development of this tendency is brought about by several factors. Firstly, the deep and continuous crises of the balance of payments of the main imperialist powers compel them to reduce government expenditure. Secondly, the sectoral structure of these powers' foreign investments is changing. Direct investment in manufacturing is on the increase. This significantly extends the circle of private exporters of capital to the developing countries. Thirdly, the purpose of exporting finance is altering. The funding of the military and other non-productive spheres is declining, while money for economic development is being supplied in increasing quantities. Subsidies are steadily giving way to loans. In this way, private capital is offered an ever-increasing scope. Fourthly, state-monopoly capitalism in many developing countries has already perfected the

infrastructure and taken other ancillary measures, thus creating definite economic prerequisites for ensuring the safety and profitability of private capital investment.

p A fairly complete picture of American plans is conveyed in a report made to President Nixon by Secretary of State William Rogers. Entitled *The United States and Africa in the Seventies*, it was published in Washington on the 29 March 1970, six weeks after the visit made by the head of the State Department to ten African countries.

p The theme of the Rogers report is the need to further increase the volume of private US capital investment in Africa, which, as he put it, "can and must play an ever- 93 growing role" in the development of the African countries. Moreover, he advances certain ultimatum-like conditions, whose aim is to place American investors in a privileged position *vis-d-vis* their European and other competitors. Thus, in order to create an investment climate favourable to private American investors, Rogers proposes that African governments should devise "special programmes", pass investment laws, guarantee the integrity of investments, introduce "reasonable rules on entry, work and taxes" and so on. If this declaration of unconditional surrender is adopted by African governments, Rogers promises to make an attempt to "arouse the interest of average American investors in studying the possibilities" of making investments in order to develop the manufacturing industry, including flour-grinding, plywood production and even '... shrimp-fishing.

p Two features stand out in the declaration. Firstly, the US Secretary of State is speaking directly to the governments of African countries, completely ignoring their links with the former metropolises, their existing treaties and agreements, their association with the EEC, etc. Appealing to the sovereignty of young states is also one of the techniques used by the imperialists in their competitive struggle. Secondly, only "average investors" are mentioned, i.e., people who are firmly denied access to the most profitable investment spheres (the mining industry) by the big monopolies. It is worth recalling that of all American direct private investment in Africa, which amounted to 2,678 million dollars in 1968, 75 per cent went into mineral and oil extraction. This sum includes 692 million dollars invested in South Africa and 678 million in oil drilling in Libya before the revolutionary-democratic forces came to power.

p Thus, Rogers raises the question of further expanding American capital in Africa and involving the "average investor" in this. His arguments about the "interests" of the African countries are simply a camouflage for his true intentions. Clearing the way for private capital and squeezing out competitors is one of the main aims of US Government bodies, since the export of capital has always been the principal means of imperialist expansion. As is pointed out in 94 the documents of the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, held in Moscow, "The US monopolies have penetrated the economies of dozens of countries, where they are increasing their capital investments and are seeking to gain control of key positions in the economy".<sup>12</sup>

p In stepping up the export of capital to Africa, the USA goes farther than simply making appeals and declarations: it also takes practical measures. Thus, in 1969 the Overseas

Private Investment Corporation was set up in the USA (Rogers refers to it in a way that suggests that it arose merely from Washington's concern for the peoples of the developing countries). The Corporation is a typical product of state-monopoly capital. It officially belongs to the state, but private businessmen are appointed to run it. The way in which the Corporation is financed underlines the merger of state and private interests. Its funds consist of a reserve of 100 million dollars from the Agency for International Development (AID), supplementary state allocations amounting to 75 million dollars and a further 100 million dollars which AID will pay in instalments over five years from the interest received on earlier loans. However, the state will incur no losses, since the Corporation's profits over the next five years will total not less than 150 million dollars.

p The Corporation is an important means of strengthening the competitiveness of American capital investments. It provides not only guarantees but also loans in the local currency; it offers advice on schemes requiring capital investment and even becomes involved in investment itself. In Rogers's words, the Corporation will serve as a base "for a more effective, flexible and energetic approach to American capital investment" and for "attracting fresh American private investment in Africa".

p Other steps are also being taken in the USA to bolster capital investment in the developing countries and seek out new investment spheres. Apart from AID and the new Corporation, banks and numerous private organisations are involved. Moreover, opportunities for capital investment are not just sought; they are also created. The state finances special expert groups set up for this purpose. AID collates information on the investment situation and sells it to US 95 business circles in the form of the *Catalogue of Investment Information and Opportunities*. In 1969 20 African countries were covered by AID's "investigations". In addition, 27 "investigations" were actually carried out by American companies. The large American monopolies make regular use of AID's services.

p American private capital is helped by the state to set up permanent missions in African countries (the expenses are borne by AID). Such observation points have already been established in Addis Ababa, Kampala, Nairobi, Accra, Abidjan, Casablanca and Rabat. It is noteworthy that the list features four countries of former British Africa, which have remained within the sphere of interest of British monopolies, as well as Ethiopia and Morocco, which come in for special US attention.

p All these facts indicate that American monopoly capital intends to extend the scale of its economic assault on Africa, in accordance, moreover, with a carefully thought out strategic plan. Two circumstances point to an inevitable intensification in the USA's clashes with the former metropolises, as well as with Japan and the FRG. The first is that the centre of gravity in the export of American capital to Africa is shifting to long-term direct investment, which ensures the US monopolies of control over branches and subsidiaries in African countries where British or French monopolies currently have the upper hand. The second circumstance is that the American plans involve seizing positions in the developing manufacturing industry in Africa, as well as in trade and services. This

will lead to increasing rivalry between the USA and France in the first instance, as well as with Japan and the FRG.

p The effect of inter-imperialist contradictions can also be detected in the process whereby international monopolist amalgamations are being formed in Africa. Bourgeois economists try to depict the emergence of these amalgamations as resulting only from the weakening competition between national monopolies and from their switch-over to “collective” efforts at “aid” for the development of newly independent states. There can be no doubt that this process reflects a trend towards unity in the imperialist camp. But it most certainly does not herald any respite in the 96 competitive battle. Quite the reverse. It is precisely the intensifying competition in the present-day capitalist world that produces the formation of international monopolies.

p The competition between private capital from different countries is also responsible for the setting up of mixed companies. In principle, this development reflects the changes that have taken place in the developing countries. It has become more and more difficult for the monopolies to expand through their traditional methods—by organising branches and subsidiary companies. In many African countries there are increasing demands to curtail the domination of the economy by foreign capital and to nationalise its property. These demands are being met by a number of African governments. In the new conditions the monopolies are obliged to play a more subtle game and to change their tactics. As a result, mixed companies (with the participation of foreign and national, private and state capital) are gradually replacing the branches that are owned outright by the monopolies.

p The setting up of such companies undoubtedly means that foreign capital has had to retreat somewhat and that the young states are growing stronger. Nevertheless, it is evident that the process in its present form benefits the monopolies. They are actually widening the sphere of their penetration of the economies of the developing countries. They are taking control of national capital and using it in their own interests. But the main point is that the expansion is being concealed by a national camouflage. The monopolies are endeavouring to find allies in the developing countries, prevent nationalisation and forestall protectionist measures that might be taken by local governments. Were this not the state of affairs, it would be hard to explain the bitter competition between the largest corporations and firms in the USA, Britain, France, the FRG and Japan to become “partners” in the mixed companies formed to exploit Nigerian oil, Guinean bauxites, Zambian copper, uranium from Gabon and Niger, etc.

p There is no need to prove the harm that the influx of foreign private capital does to the developing countries and the consequences it leads to. However, it would be wrong to shut one’s eyes to the fact that the overwhelming majority of liberated countries are unable to accumulate capital and 97 undertake large-scale production, and are in need of outside assistance. What must, therefore, be considered is a radical change in the conditions under which foreign capital is invested in the developing countries. It is clearly impossible to formulate any single, universally valid solution to the problem. A deep analysis of the particular circumstances in each developing country is called for,

together with differentiated approach to different types of private capital and its national affiliation. Only then can it be decided how much foreign capital to attract, what measures to take in order to restrict and control it and when to start eliminating it from the national economy.

**p** As for the inter-imperialist contradictions over the export of capital, the African countries must take advantage of them. Under the effect of the world system of socialism on international economic relations, the Western powers are already making some concessions to the liberated countries in the provision of credit. The deepening of the inter-imperialist contradictions also offers many kinds of opportunities for improving the situation. Some African states, especially those which have opted for non-capitalist development, are already benefiting from the strife between the foreign monopolies.

**p** The export of capital remains one of the basic elements in the system of international economic relations of modern capitalism, and the expanded export of capital whips up the struggle to partition the world economically, while at the same time acting as one of the weapons in the fight. This conclusion is fully supported by an analysis of the state and tendencies of the international movement of capital. Despite the fall in the developing countries' share of total funds invested, they will continue to be a highly important investment sphere for foreign capital. It may even be assumed that, as their economies develop, their mining operations expand and manufacturing becomes established, some levelling off will take place in the distribution of the finance invested between the developed and the developing countries.

**p** At the same time the process of founding an independent national economy in the newly independent states is inseparably linked with limiting the imperialist powers' 98 opportunities to dominate and will further stimulate the rivalry and competition to export capital.

When assessing the role and place of private investment as one of the means of inter-imperialist struggle in the developing countries, it is necessary to take account of one further factor, which determines the amount and destination of capital investment—profitability. The figures show that new investments are already assured of profits from the investments that were made earlier. The financial exploitation of the developing countries is increasing. It is estimated that by the mid-seventies their total debts will amount to not less than 100,000 million dollars and that their annual payments will total 10,000 million dollars. In other words, their loan repayments will exceed the influx of new capital from abroad. This process is responsible for two contradictory tendencies. On the one hand, the prospect of the growth of profits stimulates the expansion of private capital and the competition thus engendered, but, on the other, the danger of the recipient's "bankruptcy" restrains investment activity. Whether the first or the second tendency predominates depends on the actual conditions in each developing country and on the nature of the guarantees offered the investor both by his own state and by the government of the particular liberated country.

## CHAPTER VI

### STATE "AID" AS A WEAPON IN THE COMPETITIVE STRUGGLE

p "Aid" to the developing countries is one of the new and most contradictory developments in the world capitalist economy and at the same time it is the main instrument in the policy of neo-colonialism. The very appearance of the "aid" concept is linked with the collapse of the colonial system. The West German journal *Internationales AfrikaForum* comments: "Before the Second World War it would not have occurred to any state to invest its own resources in the development of another country or its colonies."<sup>1</sup> This is true. The idea of "aid" was born in the minds of the ruling circles of the former metropolises and their imperialist partners and competitors when the need arose to preserve the capitalist system in vast regions of the world.

p The contradictory nature of "aid" results from the fact that it is not only a collective stratagem of imperialism. The national imperialisms are only united by a single aim: to keep the liberated countries within the orbit of the capitalist mode of production, to take control of their economic development and to limit the further growth of the national liberation movement. At the same time every imperialist power is pursuing its own aims, which reflect the interests of its own monopolist groups. Therefore, the policy of granting "aid" throws into sharp relief the inter-imperialist contradictions as a whole and the contradictions of neocolonialism in particular. In view of the role of "aid" in the development of young states, this aspect of the problem is of particular theoretical and practical interest.

p The main struggle as regards "aid" to the countries of Africa is between the former metropolises, which are trying to use it in order to retain their positions and influence in their "traditional preserves", and the USA, which employs "aid" as the principal instrument with which to bring about a re-allocation of spheres of influence in its favour.

p The definitions and assessments of "aid" given by writers of various nationalities reveal the sources of the contradictions and rivalry. For example, the American John Montgomery writes that "foreign aid is ... a complex instrument of national policy and domestic politics", which "has many different roles to play in American diplomacy",<sup>2</sup> while his fellow-American David Baldwin considers "aid" as "an instrument for the achievement of US foreign policy objectives".<sup>3</sup> Brian Crozier, one of the most energetic apologists for British neo-colonialism, notes that "with few exceptions the former colonies that have emerged into sovereignty are poor" and in need of "aid", and poses the rhetorical question: "Where is that help to come from?" He then goes on to state bluntly that "help of real value will come ... from the former metropolitan powers, which understand the needs of the territories concerned and speak a language that is understood by the politicians and officials of the receiving countries".<sup>4</sup> Bernard de Calloch, a prominent member of France's ruling party, the UNR-UDT, insists that "aid" should have "an economic aspect: orders for trench equipment and the employment of French technicians, for example, and a cultural aspect: the preference



accorded the French language".<sup>5</sup> The West German economist Karl Erdmann, commenting on the fact that the FRG is "incomparably more dependent on exports than the USA, France and Great Britain", sees "aid" as a weapon in Bonn's trade and economic policy. In his own words, "development aid" assures the FRG of "solid overseas markets" and helps the country to "make investments there and win trust". This particularly "applies to Africa, which is situated near Europe and is historically and culturally linked with Europe". Consequently, "aid" to the African countries has recently become "a matter of priority" for the FRG.<sup>6</sup>

p All these views have one thing in common. Each writer (and they include professors, politicians and statesmen) looks at the "aid" question only from the viewpoint of his own country's interests. This feature is further proof of the important fact that, while retaining its general imperialist, class nature, "aid" in practice acts in most cases as a means of expansion for the particular imperialist state.

p If one looks at the content and the main aims and functions of Western "aid", it will become apparent that it is they which are the root cause of the competitive struggle and the rivalry between the imperialist "donors". A feature of the state loans, grants and gifts made to the developing countries is that their nature is determined not so much by economic aims as by political and social motives. Hence, the struggle for political influence is added to the general complex of inter-imperialist contradictions in the field of the export of capital (described above). This conclusion is supported by a typical feature of foreign investments in African countries during recent years—the predominance of state investment over private investment. The strengthening of state-monopoly tendencies in the export of capital is in the interests of the monopolist bourgeoisie, since it raises the competitiveness of the bourgeoisie's own measures. One other circumstance is also of importance. The inter-imperialist contradictions of the past were ultimately resolved by war; in present-day conditions, as was pointed out above, such an outcome is improbable. But antagonisms accumulate and become protracted. This gives rise to the need for longterm strategy, which by its very nature private capital "is unable to follow. It will not go where economic benefits are not immediately forthcoming, no matter what the political aims being pursued. Consequently, the brunt of the longterm inter-imperialist struggle for positions in the liberated countries is borne by state-monopoly capital, which takes the form of various kinds of "aid".

p Despite the obvious political nature of imperialist "aid", its function as a source of financial profit should not be underestimated. This factor further strengthens the role of "aid" as a weapon of inter-imperialist rivalry. "Aid" brings in substantial profits to the "donor" states. The outflow of money from a number of developing countries (especially in Africa) in the form of interest, profits and dividends already exceeds the influx of new capital. According to a clearly conservative estimate, the total debt of the developing countries amounted in 1970 to 60,000 million dollars, and it continues to grow. But also on the increase is the sum needed to repay the loans, credits and the interest on them. Thus, the "donors" are losing nothing; on the contrary, they are doing very well for themselves. As was stated, for example, at the Commonwealth Conference in January 1969 by Reginald Prentice, the former British Minister of Overseas Development, nearly



all the money that Britain supplied to Zambia as “aid” returned to Britain in one way or another.

p Capitalism seeks to increase the role of the developing countries as a major source of profits. But this<sup>1</sup> is only possible through the introduction of modern production methods, which presupposes, in addition to capital investment, the massive export of technical know-how to these countries. Hence the considerable activation in recent years of "technical aid"—the sending of experts, consultants, specialists, teachers, etc., to the developing countries of Africa. This form of “aid” is also closely connected with the rivalry between the imperialist forces, since it opens up enormous opportunities for the competing states to penetrate practically every sphere of social, economic and political life in the continent’s newly independent countries. For the former metropolises "technical aid" acts to some extent as the equivalent of the colonial superstructure, and for their 102 imperialist competitors it serves as a means of squeezing out their rival and setting up their own levers of influence and control in the young states. It is significant in this connection that in the structure of French “aid”, for example, the proportion of money earmarked for "cultural and technical collaboration" rose between 1963 and 1969 from 36.2 to 51.7 per cent, and in British “aid” from 14 to 22.7 per cent, with Africa taking 89 per cent of the total allocation for technical “aid”. The main competitors are not going to be outdistanced. The FRG is currently spending to this end 23 per cent of her total “aid” provided under bilateral agreements and the USA—15 per cent.

p A most important function of imperialist “aid” is to help implant and develop capitalist relations in the liberated countries. But even this prime and general imperialist task is accomplished against a background of struggle and clashes between the capitalist powers. Through “aid”, each of them seeks to intensify its economic and trade links with a particular developing country or group of such countries. The former metropolises have an interest in fortifying their traditional relations with countries that once formed part of the colonial empires. They are seeking to prevent any changes in these countries’ market orientation and to bind their economies more closely to their own monopoly capital. For their part, the competing imperialist powers try to use “aid” as a means of reorienting the development of productive forces in the young states that are developing along capitalist lines to suit themselves. They wish to tie them to their own suppliers of equipment and consumers of raw material. “Aid” is often used for this purpose as an instrument for pressurising individual national governments and even as a means of bribing influential members of the ruling circles. W. Clark, the well-known British expert on “aid”, makes the point that “aid” may be given because of the need to update the former colonial relationships.<sup>7</sup> According to his American colleagues, “aid” is the "practice of giving bribes" for political ends and is often a straightforward monetary transaction.<sup>8</sup>

p One of the main functions of “aid”—to usher in private capital—is inseparably linked with aspects of the inter-imperialist struggle. Since foreign capital from different countries comes into fierce conflict in the most profitable and 103 promising investment spheres, it is natural that the means of furthering expansion (and “aid” in particular) are also in competition. There is no shortage of examples to show that “aid” agreements compel the receiving country to provide a "favourable climate" and various guarantees

only for capital from the creditor country. There are frequent instances of “aid” being a kind of bonus for services rendered to the private capital of a particular imperialist state. Clashes between the “donors” also arise in the choice of recipients of “aid” and its distribution among various spheres and sectors.

p The strengthening of the role of state “aid” as a means of supporting private capital does not just mean that “aid” and private capital are used jointly to finance promising ventures and enterprises in the newly independent countries; “aid” also acts as an equal “partner” of the monopolies, which involves it even more deeply in the vicissitudes of the inter-imperialist struggle. “Aid”, and especially American “aid”, is increasingly merging with private capital investments to form a single torrent of exported capital. This provides further grounds for regarding it as a weapon in the inter-imperialist struggle and rivalry.

p Thus, one can safely conclude that, irrespective of its form and distribution, imperialist “aid” serves the interests of the “donor”, i.e., the particular imperialist power: it secures privileges for that country’s monopolies, strengthens the position of its capital in the developing country’s economy, furthers the expansion of its exports and consolidates its political influence. Confirmation of this conclusion can also be found in the views of foreign specialists, especially those from countries which are feeling the pinch of competition or which as yet remain “outsiders” in the scramble for positions in the Third World. Two examples will suffice. In his book *The Last Chance for the Third World* Maurice Guernier, a former adviser to the General Commissioner for Planning, and director of the working group on development plans for France’s overseas territories, states frankly that, when offering “aid”, the great powers are guided by political considerations and try to establish their control over an area, easing out their political or commercial opponent.<sup>9</sup> The West German economist Karl Erdmann puts it more definitely: 104 “Aid from the great powers to the developing countries is connected with claims to domination and power. In fact, they are not offering aid for development, but are pursuing a policy with this instrument. Consequently, they are quite happy to call their development aid a development policy.”<sup>10</sup>

Statistical data give a clear indication of the balance of forces between the protagonists in the inter-imperialist struggle to furnish “aid” to Africa.

*Table 4 “Aid” to African Countries (Excluding South Africa and Egypt) (in millions of dollars)*

Years	Former metropolises (France, Britain, Italy, Belgium)	International organisations	Other West European countries (mainly the FRG)	USA	Total
1959	791	80	40	185	1,096
1960	862	198	26	211	1,297
1961	1,003	64	169	460	1,697
1962	1,016	94	163	488	1,761
1963	890	95	155	490	1,630
1964	791	179	138	359	1,467
1965	818	258	218	330	1,624
1966	895	274	216	384	1,769
1967	729	271	223	388	1,611

*Sources:* W. Nielsen, *The Great Powers and Africa*, N.Y., 1969, p. 1-iS; “Agency for International Development”, Washington, 1968.

p The table reveals a number of noteworthy processes that are taking place in the “aid” offered by the capitalist states to the African countries. Firstly, in 1961 US “aid” sharply increased—almost three times in comparison with the 1959 level, while that of the

European non-metropolitan countries increased more than fourfold. Secondly, in 1961 the former metropolises accounted for approximately 60 per cent of all “aid”, whereas in 1967 they accounted for only 47 per cent. Thirdly, in 1960 US “aid” made up a quarter of all “aid” from the colonial powers, while in 1967 the USA supplied more than half of it. These figures 105 demonstrate the aggressive nature of American “aid” to the newly independent countries of Africa, despite the fact that the continent of Africa was not officially recognised to be an area of primary interest to the USA.

p “Aid” from Britain is mainly offered to her former colonies, which are today sovereign states within the Commonwealth. British ruling circles are closely guarding this means of exerting influence, despite the financial difficulties that Britain is currently experiencing. It is thus not surprising that the cut-back in expenditure on many items in the budget has not affected “aid” in general, and “aid” to Africa in particular. Thus, from 1966 to 1972 British “aid” to the developing countries was running at £207.2 million every year, and Africa’s share in it amounted to £73.1 million, or 38.1 per cent of the total. Moreover, Africa’s share is on the increase. In 1966 the main recipients of “aid” were the countries of Asia, but in 1970 the African countries surged ahead with a 4 per cent lead. This is a clear indication of the significance which the British Government attributes to the use of “aid” in order to preserve its influence over the African part of the Commonwealth. It also shows that “aid” is viewed by London as an important weapon in the competitive struggle. A publication of the main British theoretical centre dealing with questions of foreign “aid”, the Overseas Development Institute, contains an eloquent admission to the effect that “aid” is a weapon in the competition between the “donor” and another power to gain political and commercial advantages in the country in question.<sup>11</sup> In this connection, the list of the Black Africa Commonwealth countries, to which Britain offered the bulk of her “aid” in 1970 is of considerable interest. *Zambia* received £3.2 million, Kenya £10.2 million, Uganda £4.8 million, Tanzania £4 million, Malawi £7.8 million, Nigeria £8 million and Botswana £5.9 million. As can be seen, the list is headed by Kenya and Nigeria, the two key countries for British imperialism on the east and west coasts of Africa. London is putting up a particularly hard struggle in these countries in order to preserve its political position there.

p The structure of British “aid” also underlines its competitive nature. Over the period 1963–69 some 33 per cent of the British “aid” was allocated to supporting the monetary 106 systems of the recipient countries, 19 per cent went on financing imports, 17 per cent was spent on technical co– operation, 15 per cent on the development of infrastructure, 9.3 per cent helped to develop industry and 6.7 per cent was spent on social measures. The proportion of money spent on supporting the financial systems shows the great interest that British ruling circles have in maintaining regimes that are most favourably disposed towards them. Bearing in mind the state of the British balance of payments, it can be seen that imports were also financed in the interests of Britain herself. The development of an infrastructure is, on the one hand, necessary to the young states, but, on the other hand— and this is the main point—it clears away all obstacles to the activities of the monopolies, which have no interest in investing in a nonproductive sphere. Authoritative British newspapers have often stressed that “aid” is an instrument in the long-term strategy of the former metropolis, which is primarily defending its own

interests. The *New Statesman* defined British "aid strategy" to the African countries in the following terms: "Our aid should be planned... to produce long-term economic effects. If, in the process, regimes fall and new social groups rise, we should carry on with our programmes, even if we are occasionally accused of political interference."

p The magazine even went so far as to urge its readers to pay no attention to the fact that "some African governments will object", since Britain was not answerable to them for her actions.<sup>12</sup>

p France relies to an even greater extent than Britain on "aid" in her struggle to preserve her position in Africa. 40 per cent of all kinds of Western "aid" to Africa comes from France, and 87.5% of all French "aid" to the developing countries is supplied to her former African colonies. Professor Rene Gendarme, an expert on French policy towards Africa, points out in this connection that development aid has become a most effective component of foreign policy and that it is a convenient way of carrying out decolonisation without detriment to traditional economic ties and without modifying the balance of forces.<sup>13</sup> It is not difficult to see what the French professor has in mind when he refers to "the balance of forces".

107

p Unlike Britain, France concentrates her "aid" on a small part of the African continent, which includes principally the countries of the Afro-Malagasy group. One of the explanations for this is supplied by Paris's fear that this part of former French Africa may cease to be influenced by France as a result of the growing competition from foreign capital (American, Japanese and West German), which tries to tempt local governments with "profitable" offers. The disintegration of the Afro-Malagasy group which started in 1973 shows that France's apprehensions were justified.

p Proportionally speaking, "aid" to the countries of the Afro-Malagasy group is running at a fairly constant level. The reduction in Algeria's share results directly from the social and economic transformations that have taken place there, its choice of a non-capitalist path of development and the curbing of the activities of French private capital in the country. Fluctuations in the proportion of "aid" received by Morocco and Tunisia reflect the level of relations between these countries and France, and also the intensity of the inter-imperialist struggle for influence in them. Reductions in French "aid" coincide with periods when "American and West German imperialism come upon the scene".<sup>14</sup>\* Thus, for a number of reasons and, in particular, as a result of the Moroccan Government's refusal to accede to Paris's demand that the Minister of the Interior, General Oufkir, who had been found guilty of kidnapping Ben Barka, should be retired, France drastically reduced her financial "aid" to Morocco (from 300 million francs in 1964 to 53 million in 1968). The USA and the FRG were not slow to benefit from the situation. In 1967 they had supplied 55.5 per cent of the total amount of foreign "aid" to Morocco, and in 1968 this figure had risen to 67.7 per cent. The proportion contributed by France shrank from 37 per cent to 16.2 per cent. It was only in 1969, as part of a general review of its Mediterranean policy, that the French Government made

concentrated efforts to restore its relations with Morocco and Tunisia and provided them with “aid” amounting to some 200 million francs.

p It should be noted that the ruling circles of France obtained a certain measure of success through their juggling with the “aid” funds. Although the gaining of political independence by countries which had formerly been French colonies caused the inter-imperialist contradictions there to intensify, the balance of forces has not been working automatically for the benefit of American or West German imperialism. Whenever the question of “aid” or technical co-operation arises, the overwhelming majority of the French-speaking countries of Africa still turns to the former metropolis. That is why France, just like Britain,<sup>10</sup> does not make any substantial cuts in her expenditure on “aid” and “co-operation”, despite all her financial difficulties. As Yvon Bourges, France’s Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, stressed, no circumstances whatever “would change anything in the privileged relations that France has with the states of Black Africa and Madagascar. Nor would any changes be made to the Aid and Co-operation Fund”.<sup>15</sup>

p While lagging considerably behind the USA, France and Britain in offering “aid” to the African countries, the FRG is nevertheless actively involved in the competitive struggle. When examining the role of the FRG, one must bear in mind that her “professional experience” is as yet rather limited: state allocations for “development aid” were first included in the Bonn budget in 1956, for political reasons as well as economic ones. Addressing the Bundestag on one occasion, the present Minister of Food, Agriculture and Forestry, Josef Ertl, stressed: “The Third World does certainly not play the deciding role in all issues. But anyone who follows UN debates knows that it has a sizeable contribution to make. ... So that it is there that we should seek friends.”<sup>10</sup> Thus, “aid” is regarded in West German ruling circles as an instrument of political influence, through which it is possible to restore German imperialism’s former position.

p By 1969 the FRG had already concluded agreements for the provision of financial and technical “aid” to 94 developing countries, of which 36 were in Africa. In its 1968 state budget Bonn allocated for “aid” purposes 2,188<sup>1</sup> million marks (50 million in 1956). In fact, by relying on “aid”, West Germany managed to put some pressure on Britain, France and even the USA in a number of African countries. Thus, in 1968, for example, the offer of credit to Morocco to the tune of DM 100 million was conditional upon the Moroccans’ pledge to give preference to purchases of West German goods. This aroused bitter resentment in a number of American and French firms. By granting considerable financial and technical “aid” to Tunisia, the FRG was by the beginning of 1970 second only to France in the list of Tunisia’s trading partners, having squeezed out the USA. The main African recipients of West German “aid” include countries in which the interests of West Germany inevitably clash with those of the former metropolises or the USA, or both.

p The volume of American “aid” to Africa grew progressively from the early sixties. As Rupert Emerson points out, before this time, during the colonial period “the metropolitan powers did not welcome foreign intrusion into their colonial domains”, even when it was

a question of “aid” for developing dependent territories. The declaration of the colonies’ independence radically changed the situation. “The frowns of the former colonial authorities could no longer be decisive even though the United States strove to avoid any impression that it was elbowing its allies aside in their former domains.”<sup>17</sup> The American professor’s eloquent admission testifies convincingly to the fact that from the very beginning “aid” was a field for competition between the imperialist powers and a weapon in their struggle for influence in the developing countries.

p The development of commodity exports and promotion of the expansion of private capital were from the outset the economic basis of the American policy of granting “aid” to African countries. It is not by mere chance that more than 90 per cent of all the money offered as “aid” is intended for purchases of goods by the developing countries from the USA itself. Whether a country receives “aid” or not depends on its willingness to sign agreements providing guarantees to private capital. The political aspect of American “aid” is largely determined by the USA’s wish to squeeze out the former metropolises and to become the supreme arbiter of the destinies of African countries. Thus, both the economic and political aims of the USA have come into conflict with the interests of the European powers.

p Typically enough, despite the conclusion contained in the report to President Kennedy made by General Clay’s 110 committee on “aid” policy towards the developing countries, which said that “since immediate security interests were less evident in Africa ... the committee regarded Africa ‘as an area where the Western European countries should logically bear most of the necessary aid burden’ ”,<sup>18</sup> an exception was made in the case of Ghana, the Congo (Kinshasa) Nigeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Ethiopia and Libya, i.e. those countries where the USA either wished to reverse the course of social and economic development, or was struggling for influence against the former metropolises, or was trying to deal with both issues at the same time. Moreover, as Rupert Emerson further informs us, Washington had decided to act independently towards the former British colonies, while in the former French possessions it intended to co-ordinate its actions with Paris. This differentiated approach did not arise arbitrarily and can be explained by the fact that France was considerably less enthusiastic than Britain in her response to US penetration of her spheres of influence. While the French Government saw US “aid” as directly encroaching on its preserves in Africa, London considered that, in view of the “threat of communist penetration” of its former African possessions, the intrusion of US “aid” was the lesser evil. London maintained this position until approximately 1966 and, needless to say, during this period it did much to abate Anglo-American rivalry in providing “aid” to the African countries and gave Washington a largely free hand.

p Commentators who analyse American “aid” to Africa usually draw their readers’ attention to the fact that from the late sixties onwards the so-called selective approach came to the fore. In other words, “aid” was offered mainly to a small group of specially chosen countries. In fact, however, the USA had been using this method all along, but the fact was only officially acknowledged in the second half of the sixties, and from then on the differentiation was further accentuated.



p Ever since the early postwar years the African countries selected to receive the bulk of American “aid” were those which were most important to the economic and political interests of the USA. These were Tunisia and Morocco, where Washington vied with Paris for influence; Nigeria, the Congo (Kinshasa) and Libya, which possessed reserves 111 of strategic raw materials to which the American monopolies were struggling to gain access; Liberia, the US “haven” in Africa; and Ethiopia and Ghana, the important bastions on the eastern and western coasts.

p In the authoritative view of Rupert Emerson, the question of granting “aid” to other African countries which had previously been British or French colonies was complicated by the unwillingness of the former metropolises to release these countries from their economic orbit.<sup>19</sup> Is this not, in fact, one of the reasons for the development of the tendency towards a “selective” approach in the USA?

p It is true that from 1966 to 1968 official circles in Washington, Congress, the press and even serious studies began to make the point in ever stronger terms that the USA was not receiving a "sufficient recompense" for its “aid” to the African countries. For this reason, Professor Charles Wolf of Boston University urged the government not to undertake any aid programmes which would cost more than the total profits received from the country.<sup>20</sup> Michael O’Leary of Syracuse University pointed out that "antipathy toward aid to non-allies was clearly shown" in American public opinion.<sup>21</sup> Furthermore, Rupert Emerson has observed that African “aid” programmes cause considerable political problems for the United States, since both increases and cuts in the programmes give rise to unfavourable criticism. In the first case "the former colonial powers accuse the USA of trying to oust its European allies from their traditional spheres of influence, while Left-wing circles raise charges of neo-colonialism. On the other hand, if the programmes are cut back, then everyone asserts that America has no wish to help the developing countries". The former White House adviser on African affairs makes no comment on the views of the "Left-wing circles". As for the USA’s European allies, he almost goes as far as to issue them with an ultimatum: "To meet those needs the fullest possible collaboration of all potential donor countries is obviously to be sought, but the price of winning their collaboration is too high if the United States must be prepared to play a role secondary to that of the ex-colonial powers. As American relations with Africa evolve, it is essential that America both have, and make it apparent that it has, an independent policy towards 112 African countries and not one contingent upon its relations with the former colonial metropolises."<sup>22</sup>

p The further course of US “aid” policy towards African countries shows that such recommendations were taken into consideration. One can identify three basic directions in which this policy developed. In all cases it led to a further intensification of the inter-imperialist struggle.

p Firstly, the number of countries which were the main recipients of American “aid” became even smaller. In 1969, for example, 90 per cent of “aid” granted through AID went to 15 countries, 80 per cent of the "development loans" went to 8 countries and 95 per cent of the "support aid" went to 4 countries. Among these countries were Liberia,



Morocco, Tunisia, Ethiopia, Ghana and several others, where the USA is trying to create a neo-colonialist shop window for its policy now that its European partners have been either pushed aside or had their activities put under American control.

p Secondly, American “aid” is being put increasingly on to a regional footing. In 1969 40 per cent of the money sent to Africa in accordance with AID programmes was invested in regional projects. At the same time the number of bilateral AID programmes for Africa was cut from 35 in 1968 to 21 in 1969 and 12 in 1970. These tactics have several objectives: to force the young states to form groupings that will benefit the USA; to economically link progressive regimes with reactionary ones; to create the conditions that would facilitate the expansion of private capital; and to weaken the influence of the former metropolises, which are trying to obstruct the establishment of American hegemony in Africa.

p Thirdly, there is a growing tendency in American “aid” strategy to make use of international financial and economic foundations such as the World Bank, AID and IDA, i.e., to replace bilateral “aid” by multilateral “aid”. Since interimperialist contradictions stand out with the greatest clarity over this issue, it merits closer consideration.

p Throughout the postwar period the greater part of imperialist “aid” to the developing countries has been offered on a bilateral basis. This, of course, gives the “donor” maximal opportunities for using “aid” in his own interests. 113 Such tactics were employed above all by the former metropolises. In the case of France, for example, multilateral “aid” accounts for less than 5 per cent of her total “aid”. Britain, which used to devote up to 10 per cent of the total to multilateral “aid”, has made a 15 per cent reduction in her participation in multilateral “aid” in recent years. Even the FRG is tirelessly championing the idea of bilateral “aid”, since it appears to offer the most real opportunity for penetrating the African continent.

p The European neo-colonialists’ attachment to bilateral “aid” cannot be explained by economic factors alone. Through this form of “aid” Britain, France and Belgium are attempting to make use of bilateral ties with the African countries in order to preserve their own political position there, while the FRG is similarly trying to acquire the means to exert economic and political influence. The expansion of multilateral “aid” facilities is depriving these countries of substantial benefits. As the West German journal *Internationales Afrika-Forum* for August 1967 pointed out, the money which the “aid”-giving countries channel through international agencies is “wasted for political use in bilateral relations”.

p In turn, by insisting on the priority of multilateral “aid”, the United States is trying to limit her opponents’ use of the bilateral version as a weapon in the struggle against America. By virtue of her dominating position within the international agencies the USA plans to take control of the contributions made by the other imperialist powers, to subordinate them to her own interests and at the same time (a matter of no small importance) oblige her partners to increase their “aid” allocations while reducing the American share.

p Washington's European allies do not openly reject the US proposals, but do their best to sabotage them. The endless discussions add a further twist to the inter-imperialist contradictions over providing the developing countries with "aid". A report of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) pointed out that the whole difficulty of co-ordinating "aid" lay in determining forms of co-operation which would be economically and politically acceptable to the countries which sat on the Committee.<sup>23</sup> However, despite the observation that "uncoordinated aid can be not only useless but even harmful to the economy of the receiving country" and that it is necessary to eliminate "confusion and competition" from the "aid" programmes, all attempts to hammer out agreed decisions invariably fail. Inter-imperialist rivalry makes it impossible to find "politically acceptable" ways of co-ordinating "aid".

p While continuing the discussion with her competitors, the USA is relentlessly implementing her own "aid" policy, thus making further tension in this sphere of inter-imperialist contradictions inevitable. Whereas, for example, the British Government maintained the general "aid" fund for 1970 at the level of 1968-69 and slashed its allocations for multilateral financial "aid", the USA did the exact opposite. In a message to Congress dealing with "aid" to foreign states for the 1969-70 financial year President Nixon declared forcefully that the use of international agencies for giving "aid" had to increase, and would increase when other states stepped up their participation.

p The outlook for inter-imperialist clashes over "aid" to the African countries can be judged from another document—the above-mentioned report made by Secretary of State William Rogers to President Nixon entitled *The United States and Africa in the Seventies*. The true class essence of the thesis that "the American programme for economic aid to Africa is geared to the national interests of the United States" is exhaustively revealed in the report, although there is no shortage of attempts to make it sound "humanitarian".

p Rogers does not promise to increase the volume of American financial "aid" to the African countries in the seventies. He looks to the former metropolises to provide the lion's share of the "aid" in view of "their strong historical connections with Africa". On the other hand, he insists that the conditions and principles laid down by the United States should be adopted. In his book *Foreign Aid and American Foreign Policy* the American "aid" specialist David Baldwin wrote: "Foreign aid is ... a means by which one nation tries to get other nations to act in desired ways."<sup>24</sup> The programme of American aid to Africa outlined in the report is the practical embodiment of this view. Rogers' plans for the seventies were: to continue with the selective approach to African countries; to increase the use of multilateral channels for supplying "aid"; to mainly support regional projects; to use loans almost exclusively for purchasing American goods and services; and to widen the involvement of American private business in the "development process".

p The aggressive nature of the programme reflects the growing competition between America and the EEC countries and Japan and the US drive to consolidate its weakened position in the world economy, to increase the pressure on the national liberation

movement in Africa and, in general, to safeguard the interests of American imperialism by coordinating all forms of expansion: “aid”, the export of capital, trade and political and social measures.

p The reason for giving added weight to the selective approach policy is clear. The USA “helps” those on whom, for one reason or another, it relies most heavily. But there are other points in the Rogers programme which should not be overlooked, especially the plans for making wide use of international organisations and particularly for activating the International Development Association (IDA).

p As is generally appreciated, the IDA, which the USA plans to activate during the seventies, operates under the auspices of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The fact that the World Bank serves as an instrument of imperialist policies, through which the tactical tasks of monopoly capital are accomplished and attempts are made to achieve its strategic class aims, does nothing to exclude the differences of interest which exist between the members of its governing board. The decisive voice in the World Bank and the IDA belongs to the United States. The USA provides most of the capital used by these organisations. Consequently, when allocating loans for various regions and activities, both organisations generally abide by American recommendations. Washington’s priorities become those of the IDA; the main recipients of the money, provided on the most easy terms, are those countries in Africa which have been selected by the United States. Naturally, the plans for further expanding this channel, while welcomed in America, are evoking resistance from the 116 European imperialists. Rogers points out that the USA has from 1969 onwards been involved in lengthy discussions with the other members of the IDA in an attempt to bring them round to the American point of view. However, London, Paris and Bonn are perfectly aware that the system of arrangements for the movement of capital that is being foisted upon them is, in the first instance, of economic and political benefit to the United States of America.

p By collectively introducing the norms of capitalist economy into the newly independent countries, this system sunders the traditional links between the young states and the former metropolises. It is highly improbable, therefore, that the West European powers will accept the American proposals, and it seems that a further intensification of the contradictions over this issue is inevitable.

p There are also other reasons for America’s attachment to collective activity via the international organisations. The point is that American business circles bitterly resent the increasingly frequent cases where “soft loans” from US funds are used to pay off the developing countries’ debts to other imperialist states. They are also fiercely indignant at the fact that the expansion of multilateral operations through the IDA was accomplished until recently by purchases of American goods worth only some 20 per cent of the US contributions. Some financial groupings in America are also annoyed by the “competition” from the World Bank and the IDA which, as they see it, benefits the Bank’s European members.

p Naturally, Washington hastened to make appropriate modifications to the activities of the World Bank and the IDA. When deciding whether to issue a loan, the Bank has since 1969 taken note of the amendments to the American law on “aid”, and the IDA has extended the range of countries receiving “aid”. Thus, American plans for activating international “aid” channels are largely determined by inter-imperialist competition. Hence the resistance that they are encountering from the USA’s European rivals.

p In an attempt to find ways out of the situation that has developed, Washington has devised new plans. A special working group on “aid” problems, set up on President Nixon’s instructions and headed by Rudolph Peterson, the 117 former chairman of the Bank of America, proposed that the system of bilateral “aid” should be completely abolished, that the US Agency for International Development (AID), which implemented the USA’s bilateral programmes, should be abandoned and that all “aid” funds should be transferred to an “international pool”. This “pool” was to be inaugurated by the USA, the West European states and Japan. These and other ideas produced by the Peterson group were outlined in a report handed to President Nixon in March 1970. The report naturally assumed that the other capitalist powers would also reject bilateral “aid” to the developing countries. Typically enough, Peterson’s proposal applies only to economic and technical “aid”. Military “aid” remains the individual prerogative of the USA. The group is of the opinion that a sharing of effort along these lines would put an end to the long-lasting disarray over the issue. At the same time the Peterson group suggested the creation of an American international bank for development with funds amounting to 4,000 million dollars and an institute for “technical aid” with a capital of 1,000 million dollars. If this were to happen, then the international “pool” and the World Bank would be financed through bodies outside the control of the US Congress.

p It is easy to see that all these proposals are a further development of the tendency in the USA to establish an American monopoly over the granting of “aid” to the developing countries. Washington’s European allies and Japan are unlikely to reject bilateral “aid” of their own free will, since it is essentially the same export of capital, just like private investment, but it pays not only financial, but also political, dividends.

p For the developing countries in general and the African countries in particular imperialist “aid” fully retains its neocolonialist character, no matter what organisational or technical modifications may be made to the procedures for granting it. But it would be a simplification to ignore a further aspect of the problem: irrespective of the imperialists’ ultimate plans, the financial means and technical resources that they offer the liberated countries are capable of stimulating some development in the latter’s productive forces. When stating that they have an interest in receiving aid, African 118 governments are planning to use precisely this aspect of it in their own interests. Consequently, only a firm and clear-sighted position on the part of the national governments which would reject any imperialist diktat connected with all forms of aid and its distribution offers an alternative to their subordination to the neo-colonialism of the “donor” states, regardless of whether they are acting collectively or in isolation.

p The inter-imperialist contradictions over “aid” show no signs of dying down. Quite the reverse. A bitter struggle is now centred on the problem of bilateral versus multilateral “aid”. It seems that the rivalry in the African countries that the imperialist powers consider to be the “key” countries will become even fiercer. The growing trend towards the stabilisation and, in the case of some Western powers, even the reduction of the amount of “aid” offered will help to build up the contradictions. This trend is caused, on the one hand, by the capitalist world’s financial and currency crisis and, on the other hand, by a certain disillusionment on the part of the “donors” with the results achieved through “aid”. The political dividends did not match up to expectations. Consequently, in addition to their attempts to strengthen the role of the “traditional” external sources of finance for the Third World (private investment), the imperialist powers are taking steps to heighten the effectiveness of “aid”. However, since each power is pursuing its own objectives, the contradictions must inevitably grow worse. This fact, in conjunction with correct tactics, can be used by the developing countries in order to secure further changes to their advantage in the procedure for receiving aid from the imperialist powers. It will also help them to resist the neocolonialist features of aid.

Clearly, there cannot be a single plan of action on this issue for all the developing countries, since their present levels of development and their internal conditions, like the tasks they face, are extremely diverse. But all the young states need to alter the nature of their relationships ( including the aid relationship) with the industrially developed capitalist powers. It appears that a promising opportunity for this is offered by the deepening contradiction between the imperialist powers over the problem of bilateral versus 119 multilateral aid. When trying to prove the advantages of the version they are championing, the imperialist powers will be forced to make further concessions to the liberated countries. This applies primarily to the former metropolises.

## **CHAPTER VII**

### **THE TRADE WAR IN ITS CONCEALED AND OVERT FORMS**

p The continent of Africa is one of the important fronts in the global trade war that is being waged between the imperialist powers. This front has acquired particular significance since the late fifties and early sixties, when the barriers that had protected the metropolises' colonial markets in Africa finally collapsed. The disappearance of the colonial regimes coincided in time with several developments: the relative oversaturation of the home markets and the increasing similarity of the production range of the main capitalist countries, leading to the feverish employment of all competitive advantages; the deterioration of the USA's position in the capitalist world; the appearance in Western Europe of closed economic groupings; and, finally, the active emergence of Japan into the world market. It also turned out that, when "departing" from Africa, the colonial powers did not leave it to fate to guide the foreign trade of their former possessions. On the contrary, they tied these countries with a chain of individual and collective treaties and agreements. The British system of imperial preference and the sterling area remained intact, the franc zone was strengthened and the Eurafrica Association appeared, with the result that almost a half of the continent was fenced off by customs barriers.

p From the mid-sixties onwards the lessening of home demand and the crisis situation in the British and US balances of payments led to the stepping up of their export assault on Africa and to bitter conflicts in the Englishspeaking countries of Africa. In the very same countries Japan came to be a dangerous rival for Britain. In the trade sphere the contradictions between the EEC and the USA 120 become more intense every year. The relations between the EEC and the associate countries in Africa are constantly criticised by Washington. The contradictions within the Common Market are also growing deeper, despite the rapid growth of internal trade and the common tariff structure.

p Inter-imperialist rivalry in the matter of trade with the African countries cannot be viewed merely as "healthy competition", as bourgeois economists choose to call it. When exposing Karl Kautsky's reformist notions, Lenin made the point that, if one imperialist power outstripped another in trade with regions that were traditionally under the latter's influence, then this "by no means proves the 'superiority' of free trade, for it is not a fight between free trade and protection. . . , but between two rival imperialisms, two monopolies, two groups of finance capital".^^1^^ The examples provided by the clashes between the former metropolises and their competitors in Africa fully confirm Lenin's view.

p One of the main complexes of inter-imperialist contradictions in trade with Africa lies in the relations between the USA and the EEC, with France being the most active spokesman for the Community. It is well-known that the American-French dialogue on this issue even reached "summit" level.



p In January 1970, a US Department of Agriculture representative officially warned the EEC countries that any protectionist tendencies in their foreign trade policy and any use they might make of trade barriers that would impede the development of exports would have the effect of obliging the USA to impose import restrictions on agricultural and industrial products. At more or less the same time the Ambassador Robert Schaetzel, the US representative to the Community, and Davis, a Department of Commerce official, issued similar statements. They made three charges against the Common Market countries: the common external tariff was too high, the agricultural policy was hindering the development of American exports to the European market and to the markets of third countries and, lastly, the preferential status which the EEC had arranged for African countries infringed the rules of international trade.

p The American position was spelled out even more specifically in the above-mentioned report made by US Secretary 121 of State William Rogers to President Nixon, *'The United States and Africa in the Seventies*. The report states: "We are also urging the elimination of discriminatory tariffs— sometimes called 'reverse preferences'—which put our goods at a competitive disadvantage in many African markets. We hope that European nations see no linkage between eliminating the preferences they currently receive in some twenty African nations and their levels of aid to those countries."^^2^^

p The American claims were twice rejected by the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Maurice Schumann. While making a government foreign policy statement in the National Assembly on the 25 April 1970, he pointed out that, despite US "aid" to Africa, it was the duty of Europe and France to assist African states on privileged terms. Schumann returned to this theme in the course of an interview given to the French weekly *Entreprise* on the 18 July 1970. When asked if he considered that US dissatisfaction over the Common Market's successes might grow into anger, Schumann replied: "The Americans claim that the system of preferences offered by the African countries to EEC members in the form of compensation for their efforts contradicts the system of general preferences which is being set up, runs counter to the rules of GATT, and that it is necessary to put an end to this state of affairs. To this we reply categorically that we should not be ashamed of this policy, for it is, in my view, one of the Community's greatest achievements."

p The aggravation of the contradictions between the USA and the EEC (and France in particular) as regards trade with Africa is a direct result of processes that have been taking place throughout the past decade.

p During the early postwar years US foreign trade, including trade with Africa, developed in the context of fierce Anglo-American rivalry, since the key positions in foreign markets had been captured by the British monopolies. From the end of the fifties France, the FRG and Japan also entered the competitive struggle, and this drastically reduced the USA's share of the capitalist world's foreign trade.

p During the early postwar years the USA made use of the temporary disappearance of Germany and Japan from the world capitalist market, as well as the weakened position

122 of Britain and France, and managed to oust her rivals to a considerable degree. However, the picture then began to change. Ever since 1960 the US share in the foreign trade of many countries has been falling, especially under the growing pressure of West German and Japanese monopolies. Consequently, American exporters have been making more determined efforts to capture African markets. But the former metropolises are pursuing the same tactics, which produces a competitive battle over trade with Africa.

p As can be seen from the table given below, the figures reflecting the total volume and the share of American trade with Africa show higher growth rates than the corresponding figures for Britain and France.

p The table also reveals a number of other interesting facts. Firstly, the USA is gradually catching up with Britain and France as regards exports to Africa. Secondly, ever since 1963 Britain and France have had a deficit trade balance with the African countries, while, in the case of the USA, exports have exceeded imports throughout the period. This is a typical picture of trade between the USA and the developing countries. The latter are obliged to cover the deficit trade balance through loans and credits, whereas the USA, by providing these, extends the opportunities for her own trade expansion and acquires a means of exerting political influence.

p The growth in US trade with the African countries, accompanied by bitter struggle with US competitors, is one of the results of the general modernisation of America's foreign trade system.

p In addition to a number of general steps, special measures were taken to activate trade with Africa. The year 1964 saw the creation in New York of an Afro-American Chamber of Commerce, the members of which included representatives from the largest banks and the mining and manufacturing industries (the First National City Bank, the OlinMathieson Chemical Corporation, American Metal Climax, etc.). The Chamber of Commerce collects and distributes commercial information on Africa, organises seminars for the employees of exporting firms, establishes contacts with the commercial attaches in African embassies, sends its own missions to Africa and even receives the heads of African

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Year	USA's Total Imports	USA's Total Exports	Imports from Africa	Exports to Africa	USA	Britain	France
1960	7,860	750	1,360	2,024	6,350	565	1,260
1961	7,790	810	1,360	1,856	6,540	620	1,320
1962	7,510	970	1,280	1,498	6,730	680	1,310
1963	8,370	980	1,412	1,606	7,480	710	1,435
1964	9,656	1,200	1,510	1,644	8,658	810	1,561
1965	10,359	1,224	1,690	1,660	9,185	875	2,001
1966	10,504	1,320	1,593	1,680	98,888	820	1,750
1967	10,860	1,155	1,600	1,627	10,320	770	1,740
1968	11,460	1,245	1,540	—	11,900	855	2,010
1969	13,110	1,370	1,720	—	13,100	900	2,170
1970	14,556	1,626	1,830	—	14,751	1,114	2,390
1971	18,685	1,634	1,810	—	15,396	1,317	2,570

Sources: *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics*, June 1962, 1965, 1968, 1970, 1971, 1972; W. A. Nielsen, *The Great Powers and Africa*, New York, 1969, pp. 100, 101. *Overseas Business Report*, July 1972, p. 21, 28, 29.

124 states. The Chamber of Commerce was not slow to produce results.

During the first year of its existence American exports to Africa rose by 21 per cent and US imports from Africa by 19 per cent.

p The USA's growing interest in trade with Africa is illustrated by the fact that at the beginning of 1969 three special export associations were created in order to stimulate the export of American commodities to African countries. 28 exporting companies joined these associations. The state provided them with a "support fund" amounting to 437,500 dollars.

p Although on average African countries account for only 2.5 per cent of American exports and imports, and the USA still lags behind Britain and France in terms of the volume of trade with Africa, trade between the USA and Africa has almost trebled since 1950, and by 1969 the USA's share in the total foreign trade turnover of the African countries was already 10 per cent.

p Trade with Africa is important to the USA not simply because the continent is a rapidly expanding market for American goods and a source of scarce raw materials. Trade is also one of the main instruments of American neo-colonialism, a means of establishing political influence. In his report to President Nixon, referred to earlier, Secretary of State William Rogers also pointed to the direct link that trade had with the political relations between the United States and the countries of Africa. Thus, the stepping up of American trade with Africa is dictated not only by economic, but also political, needs. This, in turn, whips up the inter-imperialist struggle still more.

p Despite the relative diminution in the share of African countries (including the members of the franc zone) in French foreign trade (a direct result of France's participation in the Common Market), French trade with Africa is on the increase, and the former colonies are serving once again as important markets for the sale of many French commodities and as major suppliers of food and industrial raw materials.

p In 1968, for instance, African countries received 54 per cent of all French pharmaceutical products that were exported, 47 per cent of instruments, 43 per cent of detergents, 40 per cent of metal products and the output of the 125 cotton industry, 30 per cent of sugar and railway equipment, 20-30 per cent of clothing, paper and cardboard and knitwear, and about 20 per cent of electrical equipment, footwear and cars. During this same year France imported from Africa 80 per cent of all the sugar that she imported, 65 per cent of wine and cocoa, 50 per cent of coffee, tea, fruit, edible oils, oil-producing crops and vegetables, 41 per cent of her lead, 30 per cent of metallic ores and so on. These figures show that the African market is not only retaining its importance to France, but that, in keeping with the general tendency to increase exports, its role is even increasing. It is precisely for the African market that France is above all arranging direct and indirect export subsidies, and is using the export of capital to boost the process.

p Despite some growth in French trade with English-speaking Tropical Africa and the Republic of South Africa, France's main trading contractor continues to be the Frenchspeaking countries of Tropical and North Africa. In 1967 over 90 per cent of

France's total African trade was with these two regions. It is precisely for this reason that Paris musters all available means to defend its trade position in French-speaking Africa, which accounts for some 15 per cent of all French foreign trade. As part of this process, France offers, on the whole, passive resistance to her EEC partners and raises specific barriers against Japan and particularly the USA.

p If one examines the geographical distribution of US exports to Africa, it is easy to see that America's principal trading partners, excluding South Africa and Liberia, are the continent's English-speaking countries. Of the former French possessions only Morocco, Tunisia, Gabon and the Ivory Coast can be singled out (in the last two countries US exporters are having to surmount high tariff walls). The American press declares in this connection that the markets of the French-speaking African countries have been converted into "French reservations", and officials in Washington threaten Paris with retaliatory action. Thus, at the Second UN Conference on Trade and Development (Delhi, February 1968) the American representative, Eugene Rostow, condemned the trade privileges which France enjoyed in Afrika and pointed out that the USA might, in turn, impose 126 market restrictions against countries which obstructed the free flow of American goods.

p The US Government is backing up its threats with practical measures. A trade bill forwarded to Congress by President Nixon in November 1969 contained special points that would extend presidential powers to take counter-measures against competitor-countries which limited the import of American goods or subsidised their own exports to third countries, consequently ousting the USA from their markets. The President also expressed the wish that Congress should pass a special declaration on government measures designed to encourage other countries to abolish or reduce non-tariff barriers. This action, of course, is not directed against France alone. It also applies to some extent to the other members of the European Economic Community and also to Japan. Nevertheless, French-speaking Africa is to feel the main effects of the measure.

p It should be pointed out that in some cases pressure from Washington produces results. In 1970 despite opposition from Paris, the countries of the Central African Customs and Economic Union (UDEAC) took steps to halve their general tariffs on most imported goods. Secretary of State William Rogers made a special point of saying that the USA had "been most encouraged to learn" of this and that "this measure offers the prospect of greater American trade with these countries".^^3^^

p Britain is putting up no less a fight than France for strong trading positions in Africa. Moreover, the British monopolies are not only trying to buttress their interests in the former British possessions, but are extending the area covered by their expansion.

p Britain lost guaranteed markets for her commodities as a result of the collapse of the colonial system. In addition, her chronic balance of payments deficit worsened markedly during the sixties. Accordingly, London's main aim in foreign trade was to boost exports by all possible means. The reason is clear enough. From 1960 to 1970 Britain's share in world capitalist trade fell by almost 3 per cent in exports and 2.5 per cent in imports.

Apart from the general weakening of Britain's economic potential in accordance with the law of the uneven development of capitalist countries, the 127 main reason for the country's diminishing role in world trade is the intensive penetration of the markets of the former British Empire by the monopolies of the USA, the FRG Japan, Italy and a number of other countries.

p Faced with this situation, Britain is increasing her trade with the developed capitalist countries (their share of British exports rose from 64 per cent to 75 per cent between 1955 and 1969, and of imports from 63 per cent to 70 per cent) and is taking steps at the same time to defend her traditional markets. Since the mid-sixties London has managed to halt the decline in the system of imperial preferences that had been taking place during the postwar period as part of the general process of trade liberalisation. This was an important factor in Britain's successful competitive battle in Commonwealth markets against other countries, since it coincided with an expansion in the trade of manufactured goods, on which the preferences were higher than for other items. All African Commonwealth countries (except Rhodesia) are included in the sterling area, which London still continues to nurture. The existence of the sterling area gives Britain substantial privileges both as regards the purchase of goods and food and in securing markets in the member countries. It was for this reason that, despite the devaluation of the pound in November 1967 and the worsening of its monetary situation, London made sure of keeping the sterling area intact by providing a dollar clause with regard to the foreign exchange reserves held by the central banks of the member countries. In spite of frequent recommendations from the USA, Britain has also refused to abandon her system of bilateral agreements on the general principles of conducting trade and providing reciprocal tariff concessions with the African Commonwealth countries.

p A typical example of the clash between the trading interests of Britain and her imperialist competitors can be seen in Nigeria, once the bastion of British colonialism in West Africa.

p In 1964 Britain had an absolute monopoly on Nigerian imports. Even in 1963 British exports exceeded the total quantity of goods imported by Nigeria from the USA, the FRG and Japan. By 1968, however, Britain had begun to lag behind her competitors in terms of export growth and their 128 total exports were already higher than Britain's. The situation caused concern in Britain. On the 24 July 1969, the London Chamber of Commerce published the report of a special trade delegation that had visited Nigeria, Ghana and Sierra Leone in March of that year in order to study the possibilities for increasing British exports to those countries. The report mentioned that Nigeria could be a particularly profitable trading partner for Britain, since the economic development programme compiled by the Federal Government offered British exporters broad opportunities for participation. The report also contained a serious warning about the growing competition in the Nigerian market from Japan and other states, which, it was said, ought to stimulate the British Government and British firms into taking appropriate steps.

p The activation of trade with French-speaking Africa was one such step. British trade with Algeria rose significantly from 1968 onwards. In 1968 the deliveries of Algerian goods to Britain increased by 38 per cent over the 1967 level, and British exports to Algeria shot up by 50 per cent. In its issue dated the 16 April 1969 the French weekly *Information Industrielle et Commerciale* commented that Algeria "had become a hotbed of international competition". During this period British trade with other countries in French-speaking Africa also increased. British exports to Zaire grew by 14 per cent, to Morocco by 37 per cent and to the Ivory Coast by 48 per cent. The Malagasy Republic, Tunisia, Cameroun, Burundi, Togo, Chad, Ruanda and Dahomey were similarly affected.

p It is symptomatic that in North Africa Britain is meeting opposition to her expansion not only from France but also from the FRG. In a report delivered at the annual meeting of the London Chamber of Commerce's Near and Middle Eastern Section in March 1969 its chairman, W. Rose, declared, for example, that the increase in British exports to North African countries that had been achieved in 1968 was not enough if Britain was to compete successfully against the FRG, in the first instance, which was trying to dislodge Britain from her position as the second largest exporter to North Africa. Rose pointed out that, although British deliveries to the area had grown by 25 per cent, France, the 129 FRG, Italy and Japan had achieved even more impressive results. He concluded that British firms needed to struggle in order to improve their position in North African markets.

p In the case of the FRG, trade with the African countries is of particular importance, since the country does not itself possess sufficient reserves of raw materials. Apart from this, the development of West German industry has considerably outstripped the growth of the home market. This is causing the FRG to boost her exports, mainly of manufactured goods. At the same time, foreign trade statistics make it clear that the FRG's major trading partners are themselves highly developed industrial countries. Consequently, West German exporters are striving to consolidate their grip on the promising markets of Africa. Although over the past decade West German trade with the developed capitalist countries, and especially with those belonging to the EEC, has risen sharply, the developing countries account for some 20 per cent of it, and in absolute terms their share is showing a strong tendency to increase.

Not only the former metropolises of Britain and France, but also the USA and Japan are facing competition from West German firms in Africa.

*Table 6* West Gorman Trade with Africa (excluding South Africa) (in millions of DM)  
 11)65 1U66 1967 1968 1969 1971 Imports 4 561 4 940 4 724 5,900 7 717 7,982 Exports  
 ..... 2,227 2,283 2,397 2,645 4,721 6,073 Sources: SJafisHsc/ies *Jahrbuch fur BRD*,  
 W6'J, S. 295; *Obrsee Rundschau*, 1972, N. 't, S. 6.

p The table shows that imports are running at a considerably higher level than exports. On the one hand, this benefits the African countries, since it gives them a positive trade balance with the FRG. On the other hand, it is a reflection 130 of the West German



tendency to view Africa as merely a supplier of raw materials, an appendage of the world capitalist economy.

p The main African targets for the FRG's trade expansion are the countries which possess reserves of raw materials that are necessary to keep West German industry running. In the case of West Africa, this means the Ivory Coast, Ghana, Nigeria and Liberia; in Central and East Africa— Zaire and Zambia. These are precisely the countries in which the former metropolises, as well as the USA and Japan, are struggling for influence.

p In North Africa the FRG is developing trade with Algeria, Morocco and Libya (in 1969 imports from Algeria increased by DM 67.5 million and from Libya by DM 185.2 million). At the opposite end of the continent there are flourishing trade links between the FRG and South Africa, which receives about 35 per cent of all West German exports to Africa.

p As a whole, Africa accounts for 5.8 per cent (1971) of the FRG's total exports, and 8.5 per cent of her imports. The economic expansion of West German monopolies in Africa is taking place in the midst of a fierce competitive battle with monopolies from the other imperialist powers, with the main rival differing from country to country. In 1969 a group of West German firms concluded an agreement with Algeria to supply her with 200 million DMs' worth of equipment for an engine assembly plant. This deal was pulled off in the face of American, British and French competition. West German exporters are holding their own against American and Japanese firms in the markets of Morocco and Tunisia, since an agreement with these countries provides for the duty-free import of a number of commodities from the FRG. In the African states that are associated with the EEC the FRG relies on the preference agreements with the Common Market for support in the trade battle against the USA. In order to boost exports to the English-speaking Commonwealth countries in Africa, Bonn offers large amounts of credit for the purchase of goods from West Germany. About 35 per cent of all the credit offered in 1969 was provided on these terms; among the recipients were Zambia, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Nigeria.

131

p The competition between the FRG and the other imperialist powers, particularly the USA and Britain, in the markets of Africa will become fiercer during the seventies, since there are no grounds for supposing that the general economic contradictions between the capitalist countries will resolve themselves even slightly. What is more, the West German authorities are making no secret of their intention to intensify their economic expansion into Africa. Dr. Erhard Eppler, the Federal Minister for Economic Co-operation, stated clearly on the 26 June 1969 that a broad economic "assault" on the African countries was planned by the FRG to take place during the seventies/ But the US and Japanese Governments have similar plans, and the former metropolises have not the slightest intention of yielding. It should, however, be borne in mind that, if the FRG manages to maintain both her high rate of economic growth, particularly in the industries geared to exports, and her monetary advantages, then the West German monopolies, as well as their

Japanese counterparts, will become increasingly dangerous rivals in Africa for the monopolies of other states in both the Old and the New World.

Another former metropolis, Italy, which was all but ousted from Africa during the early postwar years, is launching a commercial invasion of Africa on an ever increasing scale. According to the July 1970 issue of the Italian journal *Successo*, trade between Italy and Africa increased at a faster rate between 1961 and 1969 than Italy's foreign trade as a whole. Thus, Italian exports to African countries increased from 266.9 million dollars in 1961 to 719 million dollars in 1969. The average annual increase amounted to 14.5 per cent, while that of all Italian exports was 13.5 per cent. The import figures are even more revealing. During the same period Italy's imports from Africa rose from 330 million dollars to 1,114.5 million dollars, the average annual increase being 15.4 per cent, while that of all imports stood at 10.2 per cent. Italy's trade with Africa accounts for over 7 per cent of her total foreign trade (imports 9 per cent and exports 6.1 per cent). Italy's main trading partners in Africa are the countries with which the other imperialist powers also have an interest in establishing trade links, i.e., South Africa, the Ivory Coast, Libya, Nigeria, Algeria and Morocco.

132 *Table Japanese Trade with Africa (in millions of dollars)* 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 *Exports* All Africa . 350 380 330 470 600 810 720 835 920 1 140 1 400 North Africa ..... 55 65 36 52 56 43 45 67 76 Tropical Africa .... 245 270 ^15 325 449 530 534 637 705 793 944 Southern Africa ..... *Imports* All Africa . 120 155 60 175 80 215 115 285 140 '65 130 350 155 170 640 280 730 330 875 North Africa ..... 25 36 21 25 21 27 37 39 60 Tropical Africa .... 50 56 50 80 144 140 >09 °73 328 481 560 Southern Africa ..... 100 99 120 100 120 245 290 210 255 Sources: Compiled from *Monthly Bulletin of Statistic*\* June 196?, 1965, 1967. 1969, 1970, 1971. 133

p Japan's struggle for overseas markets has gathered momentum rapidly in recent years as a result of the significant strides that have been made in her industrial production. The highly competitive nature of Japanese products enables her to substantially increase exports to the developed capitalist countries, although here she is encountering serious obstacles—discrimination, various customs barriers and, lastly, a blunt refusal in some cases to import Japanese goods. Even the USA, Japan's main trading partner, has recently begun to resort to these measures. Accordingly, the Japanese monopolies are devoting more and more energy to channelling their export-led expansion into the developing countries, including those in Africa. Thus, in 1969 alone Japanese exports to Africa rose by 16.4 per cent above the 1968 level, and imports from Africa increased by 17.1 per cent. While enlarging the volume of her overseas trade, Japan has not (unlike the USA, Britain and France) reduced the African section of it. Between 1960 and 1968 the proportion of exports going to Africa diminished by a mere 1.4 per cent, and the proportion of imports even rose by 3.28 per cent.

p It should be noted that between 1960 and 1969 Japan's foreign trade turnover as a whole increased by roughly 4 times, the growth in both exports and imports being more or less identical. Thus, the fact that the African proportion of Japanese trade remained

largely unchanged gives a vivid indication of the scale of her commercial expansion into the "Dark Continent". This view is also supported by the absolute trade figures.

p Between 1960 and 1970 Japan's exports to Africa rose by more than 3.5 times and imports from Africa by 6 times. During the same period the USA and Britain increased their African exports and imports by only 1.5 times on average, and France even reduced her exports, though imports rose slightly. Japan is, thus, outstripping her principal competitors in terms of the rate at which she is developing trade with Africa, and is also gradually overtaking them in absolute terms. Given the currently limited capacity of the African market, this fact must be seen as constituting a serious threat to other states' commercial interests in Africa.

134

p It should be made clear that the main increase in Japanese trade is occurring in Tropical Africa, i.e., in that part of the continent where the inter-imperialist struggle is at its peak and the former metropolises are putting up the stiffest resistance. Japanese companies are concentrating on countries which are rich in mineral resources. For instance, between 1968 and 1969 Japanese trade with *Zaire* rose by 98.5 per cent and with Nigeria by 68.7 per cent. A Japanese Government delegation visited Africa in February 1970. Upon his return to Tokyo the head of the delegation, Fumihiko Kono, the president of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, was one of the initiators of the idea of creating a special committee on African affairs under the auspices of the Japan Federation of Economic Organisations. At the same time he "advised the Government to establish an 'African policy' of its own and vigorously carry it on".^^5^^ Since the Mitsubishi Company accounts for 10 per cent of the country's exports and 13 per cent of its imports, Kono's recommendation would appear to carry some weight.

p Japanese monopoly capital is as yet only making its debut in Africa, but it is already becoming a dangerous competitor there, especially for Britain and the USA. Japan is coming into conflict with these countries, since the structure of her trade with Africa is similar to theirs and the "geography of intrusion" is roughly the same. A further intensification is to be expected in the rivalry within this group of imperialist powers in the African markets, and especially in the continent's English-speaking countries.

p In recent years Africa has become a vast and promising market for the car industry. In this connection a fierce battle is taking place in Africa between the car manufactureres of the USA, Britain, the FRG, France, Italy and Japan. In former British Africa the struggle is mainly between British and American companies.

p British firms, which were the first to capture the car market of the former British colonies, are naturally trying not only to hold on to their position but also to extend it. For their part, the US automobile concerns are doing their utmost to push back their competitor. The "car war" is being fought on two fronts—the export of finished cars and the construction of local car assembly plants, which are in effect 135 subsidiary companies. Since the springboard for the attack on the continent's liberated countries is

South Africa, where the largest number of overseas branches of the major British and American firms is concentrated, the situation in that country must be briefly reviewed.

p As for the British car industry, the British Motor Corporation (BMC), the Leyland Motor Corporation (LMC) and the Rover Company all have branches in South Africa. In 1964 BMC built an assembly plant at Blackheath, near Cape Town. In the spring of 1967 LMC secured profitable terms from the South African Government and built a foundry for casting engine blocks and a diesel engine plant near Johannesburg. Until recently LMC was the largest producer and supplier of heavy lorries in South Africa. The Rover Company is represented by its subsidiary, Rover South African Manufacturing.

p The British firms' main competitors are the three American giants—General Motors, Chrysler and Ford. In 1966 they were joined by American Motors International. Chrysler is successfully eliminating the British firms in the sale of both cars and heavy vehicles. Chrysler's investments in South Africa have now reached a total of 35 million rands. In 1967 the concern proceeded to erect a new lorry assembly plant in Pretoria, much to the irritation of LMC. The General Motors and Ford branches in Port Elizabeth have recently expanded production so much that they are facing an overproduction crisis. The consequent "overheating" of the car market forced the British monopolies to use their influence on the South African Government and, as a result, measures were taken to reduce the production of the American factories. The US firms then partially switched over to organising the production of spares and components, a field in which British companies also held a dominating position.

p Relying on their production capacity in South Africa, the car monopolies began their struggle for the markets of the newly independent African countries in the mid-sixties. In Zambia, where the Rhodesian crisis had led to an urgent need for road haulage vehicles, the British Rover Company immediately set up an assembly plant at Ndola. Following suit, the American firm Willis Jeeps, which belonged to the 136 Kayzer group, built an assembly plant of their own in Lusaka. Fierce competition arose between the American and British firms to supply Zambia with oil transporters. The contest was won by LMC, whose South African branch managed in four months to deliver 150 vehicles of this type to Zambia for a total of 3 million rands.

p A curious situation has arisen in Rhodesia. Car assembly plants had been built in the country by Ford and BMC subsidiaries prior to the unilateral declaration of "independence". When "sanctions" were introduced against Rhodesia, the American Ford Motor Company of Rhodesia curtailed production at the beginning of 1967, assuming that its competitors would follow its example. However, the BMC works at Umtali carried on as usual. The local factories owned by Rover and Leyland employed similar tactics. This "incident" evoked bitter disagreement between the British and American subsidiaries. In the end the American factories started production once again.

p At the beginning of 1968 Leyland concluded a profitable deal with the Government of *Zaire* for the sale of 75 buses and 900 Land Rover vehicles. The Americans were not slow to react. After the visit to Kinshasa of Joseph Palmer, the US Assistant Secretary of

State for African Affairs, in July 1968, the US Government offered Zaire a loan of 15 million dollars (to be repaid over 30 years with an annual interest rate of 3.5 per cent) with which to purchase road haulage vehicles and spares from the USA.

p The West German Volkswagenwerke concern is very active in former French African territories and is gradually excluding French firms. Between 1968 and 1969 French exports to Madagascar fell by 11 per cent, while West German exports rose by 9.4 per cent, with the greatest increase taking place in car industry exports. "Independence has entailed increasing competition and the exclusion of France", the French journal *Temps Modernes* (No. 28, 1969) reported.

p In the foreseeable future the "car war" in Africa will, clearly, become more intense, since markets in the developed capitalist countries are diminishing and the car monopolies are jockeying for positions in the Third World. Moreover, the profits accruing from the Third World are twice as high as in Europe or the USA.

137

p Finally, we must examine one further aspect of the trade competition between the imperialist powers in Africa—the export of armaments.

p According to Western statistics, in 1959 alone the developing countries spent 19,000 million dollars on arms purchases, although foreign aid to them in the form of loans, gifts and subsidies totalled only 4,000 million dollars. Purchases of weapons and military equipment by these countries have continued at an ever increasing rate throughout the past decade. Africa is no exception, since not a single African state is capable of manufacturing weapons independently. The Western powers which supply arms—the USA, Britain, France and the FRG—recognised that the demand for armaments provided additional opportunities for extracting economic and political benefits. The arms business is not just a matter of commerce. Once the deliveries are made, instructors appear on the scene, and there arises the need to train local personnel and to regularly supply spare parts and ammunition. The imperialist powers make use of all these factors in order to subordinate the client country to the supplier and to strengthen their political influence on the local ruling circles. The sale of arms is also a profitable business, and the armaments manufacturers have a clear interest in its continuation.

p Consequently, the supply of military hardware to African countries has become an object of fierce competition and rivalry between the Western powers.

p The USA was first off the mark in the massive sale of weaponry to Third World countries, including those in Africa. In 1963 Robert McNamara, then Secretary of Defence, created the post of Special Adviser to the Secretary on these matters and appointed the experienced businessman Henry Cass. As a result of his exertions, the export of American arms to the developing countries trebled over the following three years: receipts shot up from 700 million dollars to 2,000 million dollars.

p Britain followed the US lead in 1964. The new Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, appointed Roy Mason to take charge of the armaments export programme. Two years later, in 1966, the French armaments commission also set up a special section—a department for foreign relations regarding 138 arms sales. It was at this time that a new job appeared in French embassies in African countries, that of attache for armaments. There were quick results. In 1968 French sales of military equipment netted a total of 4,000 million francs, compared with 3,000 million francs in 1966.

p The European arms suppliers—France, Britain and also Sweden and Switzerland—began to display particular interest in capturing the African armaments market from about 1966 onwards. Among other reasons for this was their fear that, if US aggression in Vietnam were halted, vast reserves of American military equipment would be released on to the market at give-away prices.

p All the French-speaking countries of Africa buy their weapons from France, with the exception of *Zaire*, where the USA has an armaments monopoly. It should also be mentioned that from the summer of 1967 until the end of 1969 considerable quantities of French arms were dispatched to Biafra, which had seceded from Nigeria.

p Britain occupies the dominant position in the sale of armaments to the English-speaking countries of Africa, since the African members of the Commonwealth are bound by agreements to this effect. Despite this, however, Washington is beginning to compete with London here too. Senator Eugene McCarthy refers to "the British, often in competition with the United States in the arms sales business. . . ."^^6^^

The scale of inter-imperialist rivalry over the export of arms to Africa should not, of course, be exaggerated, but it should not be overlooked that the total volume of military equipment delivered to Africa is constantly growing. According to calculations made by the West German journal *Volkswirt*, in 1968 the countries of North Africa purchased armaments to the value of DM 112.5 million, Central African countries bought the same amount and the Republic of South Africa spent DM 262.5 million on arms.^7^ The increasing armaments build-up in Africa, which the imperialist powers are making every effort to encourage, does more than simply activate the inter-imperialist rivalry in the African armaments market. It also creates additional difficulties for the development of the African countries, which could have dangerous consequences for the peoples of the continent.

139

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p The African trade war between the imperialist powers will, clearly, intensify in the near future in both its concealed and overt forms.

p This conclusion is supported by a number of factors. Despite the developing countries' diminishing share of the world export market, they are increasingly participating in world trade in absolute terms, and are becoming more integrated into the world capitalist market



system. Moreover, their participation is now direct and is no longer channelled through the metropolises, as was the case during the colonial period. Thus, the young states are feeling the increasing effect of the contradictory laws of this market and the full weight of its principal feature: it is the scene of a bitter struggle between groups of monopoly capital from different states. Owing to their currently low level of economic development, the liberated countries can, in the main, act only as the object of this struggle. At the same time, at a new stage in the national-democratic revolution, which presupposes the young states' attainment of economic independence, the imperialist powers' struggle for diminishing spheres of influence in Third World markets will inevitably assume more embittered forms.

p Clearly, the main disagreements will arise between the EEC countries and Japan, on the one hand, and the USA, on the other, since the trade contradictions between them are intensifying on a global scale.

Despite the increasing internationalisation of the capitalist system's world economic ties, imperialist protectionism is not shedding its aggressive nature. While protecting their home markets, either individually (e.g., USA) or collectively (EEC countries), the monopolies are simultaneously furthering their expansion into the developing countries. Their competition and the bitterness of their economic contradictions in these countries are on the increase. To an ever greater degree the state is being involved in the rivalry between the monopolies, and the continent of Africa, as a vast and promising export market, is not being left out of the struggle.

## **CHAPTER VIII**

### **AFRICA'S RAW MATERIAL RESOURCES AND THE SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION**

p The relentless growth of science and technology is a feature of the modern age. The phenomenon is connected directly with the competition between the two world systems and with the collapse of the colonial empires. Both of these processes have made a marked contribution towards the intensity of the scientific and technological revolution.

p The tendency to internationalise modern science has produced a situation in which, to varying degrees, the production of all the developed capitalist countries involves scientific and technological achievements. At the same time, these achievements give rise to a number of complex problems. The unevenness of capitalist development is accentuated, causing critical economic and social upheavals. The scientific and technological revolution was one of the factors responsible for the change in the balance of economic power between the various imperialist states. Thus, Britain was reduced to third place after the USA and the FRG, and then Japan surged ahead of the FRG and Britain to take second place. The inter-imperialist contradictions, which were aggravated by these changes, and also the considerable success of science in the socialist world are forcing the ruling circles in capitalist countries to go to great lengths to boost the development of science and technology and to supply industry with the necessary raw materials. In this way, the scientific and technological revolution lends further impetus to the inter-imperialist struggle for the sources of strategic and scarce raw materials.

p The structural changes in material production brought about by technological progress have altered the position of former colonies, now independent developing countries, in the world capitalist economy. Their role as exporters of raw materials of agricultural provenance declined perceptibly. This trend is now firmly established and points to a crisis situation in the structure of the international capitalist division of labour. At the same time, the developing countries remain an important source of many kinds of raw material for the imperialist powers.

p One must not lose sight of the fact that the relative decline in the importance of raw material commodities in world exports is attended by an increase in the absolute volume of the raw materials exported, including that exported by the developing countries (with the exception of primary food products). Synthetic substitutes are competing mainly with raw material of vegetable origin. As for mineral raw materials, they provide the basis for precisely those industries which are developing particularly rapidly as a result of the latest scientific advances.

p The increased demand for aluminium and copper arises from the development of electrical engineering, electronics, aircraft production, space exploration and other industries that are expanding as a result of the scientific and technological revolution.

p The average annual rate of increase in the consumption of aluminium in the capitalist countries since 1960 has been running at 10 per cent, and in Japan, the FRG and Austria at over 20 per cent. The US Government has urged the stockpiling of aluminium (in case of strikes in the aluminium industry), and has sharply reduced the sale of raw aluminium from the strategic reserves. Japan is suffering from an acute shortage of this metal, which at one time she even used to export. According to estimates made by the journal *World Metal Statistics* (May 1972), the annual production of raw aluminium in the capitalist and developing countries amounted in 1970 to 8,019,000 tons, and exceeded 9 million tons in 1972. Hence, it is natural that the demand for African bauxites has produced a bitter competitive struggle for the sources of this raw material.

p A similar situation is developing in the copper market. The production of refined copper in the capitalist and developing countries went up by 12.7 per cent in 1969 compared with the previous year. The highest increases were in the USA (20.5 per cent), Britain (16.8 per cent) and Japan (14.6 per cent). Copper mining in the capitalist and developing countries increased by 9 per cent in 1969, and by 10–12 per cent in 1971. Copper consumption is also tending to rise steadily. The increase in consumption between 1967 and 1969 amounted to 29.2 per cent in the FRG, 30.8 per cent in Canada and 32 per cent in Japan. In the USA some 7 per cent of all copper used goes on military production.

p The scientific and technological revolution has done more than simply raise demand for the ferrous and traditional non-ferrous metals (aluminium, copper, zinc, etc.). The new industries that are springing up from the scientific revolution, including the nuclear missile and aerospace industries, electronics and the industry producing special types of armaments, have drastically raised their specifications as to the quality of the materials and their possession of new properties: superhardness, greater resistance to heat, vibration, corrosion, radiation and the effect of micro-organisms, the ability to withstand high velocities and meteorite bombardment, and many others. Accordingly, there has been a steep climb in the demand for refractory metals (vanadium, niobium, tantalum, molybdenum, tungsten, selenium, zirconium and a number of rare-earth metals).

p Although the consumption of raw materials used in nuclear missile technology, electronics and space probe construction is as yet relatively small, it is displaying a clear tendency to increase. In addition, the imperialist powers, and especially the USA, are stockpiling rare metals for strategic purposes, since it is considered that in certain circumstances access to them could be made more difficult. This factor also affects the struggle for the sources of these kinds of raw material.

p The growth of the nuclear industry is having a substantial effect on the question of mining certain minerals in a number of developing African countries. The minerals in question are mainly the nuclear raw materials (uranium, thorium and lithium) and the metals used as building materials (tungsten, molybdenum, etc.).

p The imperialist powers are struggling for the sources of these kinds of raw material for a number of reasons. Firstly, in order to produce weapons of mass destruction. Secondly,

capitalist monopolies are trying to seize complete control of the mining of strategic raw materials that are in very short supply, since they command extremely high prices on the world market. Thirdly, the demand for uranium concentrates 143 in particular has increased, owing to the construction of atomic power stations, especially since nuclear power is seen as the principal future source of electrical power in the USA, Britain, France, the FRG, Japan and several other capitalist countries. This last point should be particularly noted.

p In 1969 the total capacity of atomic power stations in the capitalist countries amounted to 27 million kilowatts (6.8 million kw in 1966), with Britain accounting for 38 per cent, the USA 25 per cent and France 11 per cent. By 1980 it will have reached 345 million kw and will constitute 20– 22 per cent of the combined capacity of all the power stations in the capitalist world. In the USA, for instance, the proportion of all types of fuel used to produce electrical energy will have declined sharply by 1982, but it will have grown by some 35 times in the production of atomic energy. By 1976 the USA will possess 53 per cent of the world's atomic power production capacity, Britain 12 per cent, Japan 7 per cent and Canada 5 per cent. The development of atomic power production is leading to a new round in the imperialist powers' struggle for the sources of nuclear fuel. As will be shown below, the African countries are the main battlefield.

p The scientific and technological revolution has also put a new complexion on the question of oil, which has always been a source of inter-imperialist conflict. Changes in the extraction and consumption of oil and natural gas are being caused both by the raising of their importance in the world energy balance and by the growth of their use as raw materials for the chemical industry. In this connection, the role of those developing countries possessing large reserves of oil has risen enormously. It is symptomatic that oil production in the developed capitalist countries rose by 45 per cent between 1960 and 1970, and by 300 per cent in the developing countries. Total oil production in the capitalist world increased from 829 million tons in 1960 to 1,880 million tons in 1970.

p The closure of the Suez Canal following the Israeli aggression in 1967 and the need to transport oil and petroleum products from the Middle East by the longer Cape route also caused the oil monopolies to energetically explore 144 new areas. The search for oil was particularly intense in African countries (Ghana, the Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, Togo, the Malagasy Republic, etc.). In terms of the growth of oil output, Africa leads the oil-bearing regions of the world; in 1968 there was a 26.6 per cent increase over the 1967 level. This was mainly due to the unprecedented expansion of Libya's oil industry (with a 49.2 per cent increase) and also that of Algeria and Nigeria.

p The growth in the consumption of oil products in the capitalist countries is running at about 10 per cent per annum, and at 15 per cent on average in Japan. Oil refinery capacity is being greatly extended. In the countries of Western Europe it rose in 1969 by more than 20 per cent compared with 1967. In 1969 and 1970, 68 new oil refineries were built and 72 existing ones were extended in the capitalist countries (excluding the USA and Canada).

p One of the most important factors in the scientific and technological revolution's effect on the growth of oil extraction is the progressive expansion of the use of oil as a raw material for producing various chemical products ( *Table 8 The Growth of the Mining Industry in the Developing Countries and the Imperialist States (1963 = 100)* Mining Industry Africa's share in mining the All Mining Oil and (as main kinds of mineral raw material in the Developing Imperialist Developing Imperialist capitalist world countries countries countries (excluding oil and gas)\* % 1938 18 54 10 36 29.5 1948 27 68 20 59 32.5 1958 61 88 56 85 33.4 1968 148 115 160 120 39.7 \* Author's calculation. Sources: *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics*, May 1960; *Africa, Statistical Yearbook*, Moscow, 1969, pp. 129–43. 145 plastics, artificial fibre, etc.). The world's largest monopolies are competing in this field, since by and large only they can build and run petrochemical plants (it costs between 5 and 30 million dollars to build these plants, which is beyond the means of small and even medium-sized companies). During the past decade the number of petrochemical plants in the main imperialist states has trebled and now stands at about 1,500.

p Since 1960 there has been rapid growth in the production of plastics and other oil-derivatives.

p The high rate of technical progress in the petrochemical industry is not only shown by the output figures, which, incidentally, also reveal that the development rates attained in this sector of the economy by individual countries are far from equal. Numerous new and improved kinds of chemical products made their appearance in the world market as early as 1968. An example is the synthetic material kiana, made of polyamide fibre. It took the Du Pont de Nemours concern 20 years and 75 million dollars to produce this material. It is forecast that by 1975 the range of plastics produced in the USA will be renewed by 40 per cent compared with the 1965 level, petrochemicals will be renewed by 36 per cent and synthetic fibres by 30 per cent. Similar trends are apparent in other capitalist countries, especially Japan.

p By raising the demand for oil, the scientific and technological revolution is intensifying the inter-imperialist struggle for oil sources.

p Forecasts of the world consumption of mineral raw materials show that their production will have to rise at an even faster rate. According to foreign and Soviet specialists, the consumption of oil, natural gas, aluminium and several rare metals will treble over the next 20–30 years, and the consumption of ferrous and heavy non-ferrous metals will increase by 50–100 per cent. In 1975 the consumption of liquid fuel, light-weight non-ferrous metals, copper, cobalt and vanadium will be 50–80 per cent higher than in 1965; there will be a 30–50 per cent increase in the consumption of manganese, zinc and lead. An important factor in the process is the enlargement of the number of consumers of the raw materials, with a consequent increase 146 in the number of competitors. Japan provides us with a typical example. In July 1955 the Ministry for Foreign Trade and Industry announced "special measures to develop the petrochemical industry". Since then Japan has become second only to the USA in the capitalist world in the output of the principal petrochemicals, and continues to develop the industry at an ever increasing rate.

A number of ethyleneproducing factories with a capacity of between 300 and 500 thousand tons a year are being built in the country. By 1975 the production of ethylene in Japan will more than double in comparison with 1968; plastics production will go up by 150–175 per cent; the output of synthetic rubber (begun only in 1959) will rise by 120 per cent and synthetic fibre by 200 per cent. In addition, the Japanese are making progress in their attempts to improve the production of synthetic paper, and several factories are being built to produce synthetic protein from oil.

p The rapid growth of the petrochemical industry has made Japan one of the front-runners not only in the consumption of oil but also as regards the wish to capture oil sources. Typically enough, after the war the deepest penetration of foreign capital occurred in the Japanese oil industry. At present the position of foreign capital in this sector is gradually weakening. As the *Financial Times* of the 22 September 1969 observes: "During the last few years several battles have taken place between the Japanese authorities and foreign, mainly American, companies. So far the Japanese have come off best."

p The imperialist battle for other kinds of raw material, the consumption of which will also increase, especially uranium, is also hotting up. According to UN forecasts, by 1980 the demand for uranium will be 6 times as high as in 1970. There is nothing surprising in this. In Japan, for instance, in 1969 there was only one atomic power station in operation, with a capacity of 166 thousand kw. By 1975 there will be 13 of them, with a total capacity of 7,257 megawatts. In the USA in 1968 firms building atomic reactors received orders for 100 complete nuclear installations for atomic power stations.

p There are a number of other important factors that must be borne in mind when examining the effect of technical progress on raw material problems. The present scientific and technological revolution is developing under the impact of not only the traditional competition between the monopolies in world and domestic markets. The struggle between the two opposing social systems is also of tremendous importance. The contest with socialism caused the imperialist states, and especially the USA, to give priority consideration to the question of the rate of economic growth. In addition, the capitalist world rarely acts in unison in this struggle, as was shown above. In some instances, interimperialist rivalry intensifies under the influence of the struggle between the two systems. The capitalist monopolies are now faced with the additional task of surpassing one another in order to compete more successfully with the socialist countries. The result is that machinery becomes obsolete much sooner. Fundamental changes in technological processes often entail the replacement of perfectly usable machines, tools, etc., which in turn raises the consumption of raw materials. The last factor is that the lifting of colonial oppression from the countries of Asia and Africa has resulted in an expansion of the world market. National industries are springing up in the young states (on differing scales but practically everywhere), which also increases the demand for machinery, transport and so on. In addition to the need for extra raw materials for the manufacturing countries, the industrialisation of the former colonies and semi-colonies brings about a situation in which a certain quantity of the raw materials mined is used on the spot instead of being exported.



p The scientific and technological revolution is responsible for a number of contradictory tendencies in the world raw materials system and has brought substantial changes in industrial structure. But it has not yet led to the changes in the role and importance of raw materials that would lead one to conclude that the inter-imperialist struggle for raw material sources is showing any signs of dropping sharply in intensity in the foreseeable future.

p During the twenty years from 1938 to 1958 the mining industry in the developing countries grew by 43 per cent, and in the following decade by 87 per cent. During the same ten years the mining industry in the imperialist states 148 grew by only 27 per cent. Africa's share in the mining of mineral raw materials in the capitalist world rose by 7 per cent.

p Despite the fact that the competing monopolies are attempting to reduce the consumption of natural raw materials, are stepping up the use of secondary materials (e.g., through the use of waste, scrap metal, etc.) and are cutting down on the raw material content of the finished product (especially metal consumption in engineering and other industries), the total consumption of raw material continues to increase with the expansion of production. The growing importance of synthetic products and other substitutes boosts the demand for the oil and gas from which they are produced. Even in the developed capitalist states oil output has doubled over the last 20 years, and in the former colonies and semi-colonies it has shot up by nearly 10 times. Industry is now making wide use of fissionable materials, the ore of refractory metals and certain rare metals and elements that were not used previously.

p The militarisation of the economies of the imperialist powers is an important factor determining the role of the developing countries as the suppliers of minerals and fuel for the world capitalist market. The monopolies are using the increased possibilities of science and technology not just for their own selfish ends (to boost profits, intensify the exploitation of the masses and strengthen the means of coercion). Most scientific discoveries and vast material resources are diverted into military channels. In the USA 62 per cent of all scientific achievements are militarised, in Britain 40 per cent and in France and the FRG over 30 per cent. At the same time, much thought is given to the mobilisation of the raw material resources that are located both in the imperialist states themselves and in the developing countries which depend on them. Raw materials are being sought not only to meet the current needs of the war industry. Some kinds of raw materials are being accumulated and stockpiled. During the early postwar years the USA adopted a programme for creating strategic reserves of raw material, and, in accordance with this programme, raw material is still being imported from many countries throughout the world, including those in Africa. 149 Britain, France, the FRG and Japan are pursuing similar policies.

p According to official information, of the 99 sorts of raw material that are vital to the American economy the USA imports more than 30, and of the 97 actively used in industry the country is self-sufficient in only 23.

p The following figures describe the place of the import of raw materials in the American economy. Every year the USA exports approximately 30,000 million dollars' worth of goods and imports raw materials to the same value. The American metallurgical industry, which is dependent on imported raw material, has an annual output valued at 22,300 million dollars, of which the aluminium industry accounts for 3,900 million dollars.

p It is not surprising that the question of raw materials from Africa is mentioned in one way or another in all official documents and academic studies dealing with US policy in Africa. In 1961 the report of a group of American specialists to President Kennedy made it clear that Africa played a decisive role in Western defence: she safeguarded NATO's southern flank. Twenty kinds of strategic raw material were located in Africa.<sup>1</sup> In his book *Africa and United States Policy* Rupert Emerson observes that many American sources attempt to belittle Africa's economic importance to the USA. However, a detailed look at American imports from African countries reveals the continent's true significance to the USA. The USA imports from Africa nearly 100 per cent of her imported diamonds, lithium derivatives, beryllium, columbite, cobalt and palm oil; over 50 per cent of her cocoa, vanilla, long-staple cotton and mahogany; 25 per cent of her antimony, chrome, graphite, manganese and tantalum; and significant quantities of rubber, gold, uranium and oil.

p In their struggle to get at the African countries' raw material resources, the US monopolies are meeting with stiff competition from British, French and Belgian capital, which has exploited Africa's wealth for many decades and which still retains important positions. The West German and Japanese monopolies are also putting up a fight. Britain, which has no minerals of her own, is even more dependent on the import of raw materials than the USA. Britain imports 45 per cent of her manganese from Africa, 50 per cent of chromites, 45 per cent of copper, 60 per cent of bauxites and 60 per cent of her tin. African countries supply France with 100 per cent of her uranium, 30 per cent of oil, 95 per cent of phosphates, 33 per cent of iron ore, 30 per cent of non-ferrous metals, 66 per cent of unseasoned timber and 80 per cent of her tropical wood. The FRG is also becoming a major consumer of African oil, iron ore and non-ferrous and rare metals. Japan's purchases of raw materials from Africa for her ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgical industry are rising steeply. Raw materials and food account for approximately 80 per cent of Japanese imports. Japan imports nearly all the oil and iron ore that she needs. In 1969 her imports of iron ore rose to 68 million tons. Africa's share (7.82 million tons) amounts to over 10 per cent of all Japanese imports and is on the increase. Japanese firms are constructing gigantic ore-carriers in order to transport ore from West Africa.

p The African continent has already supplied the capitalist world with minerals for many decades. This role became even more prominent after the collapse of the colonial system for the following reasons. Many of the barriers through which the metropolises had limited the access of other imperialist powers to African raw materials also collapsed. Although geological surveys are far from complete, some of the reserves discovered have already placed a number of African countries high up in the list of the world's mineral "banks". The mining conditions and the abundance of cheap manpower in Africa offer

mining and oil companies the opportunity to net the world's highest returns on invested capital. The economic backwardness of most African countries, the absence of any real industry of their own and their acute need for capital make it easy for foreign monopolies to get their hands on the continent's natural resources. All these factors are at work to differing degrees in various countries, but they operate together, not in isolation. Naturally, the main factor is Africa's vast known reserves of scarce minerals: oil and gas deposits in Libya, Algeria and Nigeria, bauxites in Guinea, uranium in Gabon, Niger and the Central African Republic, iron ore in Liberia and Mauritania, copper in Zambia and Zaire, 151 manganese in Gabon, rare metals in Nigeria, Namibia and *Zaire*, gold and diamonds in Sierra Leone, and so on.

p During the postwar years Africa's raw material resources gave rise to a "rediscovery" of the continent. In 1953 the Sahara was considered to be a barren desert. The wellknown French specialist Professor Robert Capot-Rey declared that it was "too soon" to talk of there being oil in the Sahara,<sup>22</sup> but in 1959 at the Fifth World Petroleum Congress in New York experts concluded that North Africa would soon be as important a source of oil for the world market as the Middle East. A similar situation developed in Nigeria, where the enormous reserves of oil were only discovered in 1965. Large uranium beds were found in the Central African Republic and Niger in 1967; in Guinea the follow-up explorations of 1962 revealed the world's largest deposits of bauxites.

p Even though a cautious approach needs to be adopted towards the published statements of certain and probable mineral resources in Africa, since these statements are often inaccurate, they nevertheless provide ample testimony to the considerable importance of Africa in world resources. One further fact is of interest. Despite the intensive exploitation of mineral reserves in most parts of the continent, these deposits are showing no signs of exhaustion. In fact, the known reserves of many raw materials are even increasing. It is also noteworthy that the growth is taking place not only in absolute terms. Africa's share is increasing in the general reserves of the capitalist world. In the case of oil and gas, for example, of which Africa contained respectively 2 per cent and 8 per cent in 1961, the continent accounted for 12 per cent in 1970.

p The table given below shows that Africa currently contains over 80 per cent of the capitalist world's known reserves of cobalt and tantalum, 72 per cent of its chromites, 60 per cent of titanium, 40 per cent of copper and manganese, 30 per cent of bauxites, 27 per cent of uranium, 20 per cent of niobium and antimony and 13–15 per cent of lithium, beryllium, tin, graphite and asbestos.

p No information is published regarding the reserves of gold and diamonds. However, to judge from output levels, which in recent years have accounted for respectively 152

Estimated Reserves of Mineral Material in 1971		Mineral Unit		All capitalist and developing countries		Africa		Africa's proportion (%)	
Oil	.....	million tons	72,708.00	7,828.7	11.0	Gas	. . .	000 million m <sup>3</sup>	32,948.6
			5,462.0	17.0	Coal	....	million tons		2,694,544.00
			88,156	4.0	Iron ore	. . .	Manganese	. .	Copper
			212,397.00	984.00	253.20	129.80	30,825	403.2	95.7
			7.1	12.0	41.0	39.0	6.0	Chromites	. .
			1,050.20	1,161.5	80.9	Graphite	. . .	Cobalt	....
			158.60	2.40	23.7	2.0	15.0	87.0	Bauxites
			. . .	—					

9,682.00 3,350 30.0 Asbestos . . . — 93.50 13.7 14.0 Titanium . . . Tin . — 659.50 5.90 401.5 0.3 60.8 19.0 Lead ..... 79.90 4.4 5.5 Antimony . . Niobium . . . thousand tons 1.56 9,692.00 0.34 1,975.0 21.5 20.3 Tantalum . . . — 69.40 57.9 83.0 Beryllium . . Lithium . . . million tons 521.00 18.40 68 2.7 13.0 15.0 Uranium . . . thousand tons 587.00 251.8 31.6 Phosphates . . million tons 44,498.20 26,028.8 60.0 Sources: *A/riha, Statisticheskyy sbornik*, Moscow, 1969; *Petroleum Press Service*, January 1972; *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics*, 1972. 75 per cent and 98 per cent of the gold and diamond production of the whole capitalist world, Africa must contain the bulk of these minerals too.

p Taking the existing estimates of Africa's reserves of minerals and fuel as a starting point and comparing them with the output levels for 1969 and 1970, one can calculate for roughly how long these reserves are going to last.

p Naturally, these figures provide only a rough guide, since mining output will inevitably rise and new deposits 153 A Hough Guide to the Expected Duration of Some of Africa's  
 Haw Material Resources Oil Coal Gas Iron ore Manganese Copper Niobium Tin Zinc  
 Beryllium Tantalum 30 years Phosphates Titanium Graphite Bauxites Chromites Cobalt  
 Uranium Lead Lithium Asbestos Antimony 1,625 years 6,700 — 1,186 — 1,000 — 500  
 — 70 — 40 — 15 — 41 — 34 — 25 — 300 570 80 100 760 40 25 52 193 Source:  
 Calculations made by the Institute of Africa, USSR Academy of Sciences. will be  
 discovered, especially since the continent must still contain much unexplored wealth. It  
 should also be recalled that nearly all the prospecting and geological survey work in  
 Africa is in the hands of Western companies, which also control the world market  
 situation. Consequently, they often distort information regarding deposits or conceal it  
 altogether, as happened, for example, with the Guinean bauxite deposits at Boke.

p The role of African minerals in the world capitalist economy depends, of course, not just on the size of the deposits, but mainly on the rate of output. Examination shows that an absolute growth is taking place in output and, at the same time, Africa is becoming increasingly important in the world capitalist production of the most vital raw materials.

The output of mining and drilling operations in African countries has greatly increased over the past 10 years. The output of oil has risen 20 times, natural gas 15 times, bauxities by 250 per cent, copper ore by 60 per cent, manganese ore by 100 per cent, phosphates by 85 per cent, cobalt by 70 per cent and chromites by 40 per cent. Despite these figures, Africa remains the world's runner-up in terms of the growth of her gross national product. Since the achievement of independence the African countries' average annual per capita growth in GNP has not exceeded 1.2 per

154 *Table 10* Africa's Share in the Mining of the Main Kinds of Raw Minerals in the Capitalist World Material Unit All capitalist and developing countries Africa Africa's proportion (%) 1960 1965 1970 1960 1965 | 1970 196(1 1965 P'.ifO Oil million tons 882,9 1,233.0 1,900.0 13.7 106.9 294.0 1.5 8.7 15.5 Gas OCO million m<sup>3</sup> 516,6 587.4 800.0 0.6 5.9 15.5 0.1 1.1 1.9 Coal million tons 1,090.0 1,120.0 1,090.0 43.2 53.6 54.0 3.9 4.9 4 . 9 Iron ore — 341,4 401.3 460.0 15.8 39.5 57.8 4.6 9.8 12.2 Uranium thousand tons 47,0 18.7 28.0 9.0 3.4 6.0 19.2 18.7 22.0 Manganese million tons 6,4 8.5

11.4 3.1 4.6 6.4 48.0 54.0 56.0 Chromites — 3,1 3.0 1.8 1.4 2.6 1.9 45.0 52.0 51.3 Cobalt thousand tons 15,4 16.3 18.0 11.5 12.4 16.5 75.0 76.0 80.0 Vanadium — — 14.8 18.5 — 4.6 8.8 — 31.0 33.0 Copper — 3,548.4 4,086.7 6,050.0 977.5 1,115.0 1,280.0 26.9 27.1 26.9 Lead — 1,675.0 1,896.8 3,249.0 207.4 231.0 325.0 12.4 12.0 10.1 Till — 137.6 154.4 181.0 20.7 20.7 22.5 15.0 13.4 13.1 155 Bauxites Antimony Lithium Beryllium Phosphates Asbestos Gold Platinum Diamonds thousand tons 21,400.0 29,300.0 35,000.0 1,600.0 2,400.0 14.9 66.0 1.4 16.1 409.9 1,001.1 20.2 31.7 3,200.0 16.0 90.0 2.8 22.0 550.0 1,303.0 35.0 35.0 7.4 46.2 40.6 35.2 21.0 69.0 48.4 98.5 7.2 41.7 50.0 32.6 34.1 21.1 80.0 56.0 98.0 7.7 40.0 50.0 35.0 34.0 20.0 80.0 58.0 98.0 29.1 10.1 30.5 35.5 130.9 4.3 47.6 40.0 180.0 8.0 64.0 13.5 4.1 10.7 297.9 726.5 10.9 26.1 million tons thousand tons tons 1,416.5 1,914.6 2,750.0 1,053.0 22.6 1,275.3 35.8 32.2 1,625.0 65.0 35.0 million carats— *Sources:* Compiled and calculated from: *Afiha. Statistichethi tbornifc*, Moscow, 1969; R.K.A. Gardiner, *Refcatch for Economic mid Social Development Africa. Second Inteinationcl Congietsof Africanitl\**, Dakar, Senegal. December 11–111, 1967. p- 9; *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics*, May 1969. 1970; *Statistical Suimnaiy of the Mineral Industiy. Vóild Piodudion, Expo\* is and Importi 196J-2909*, London, 1971. 156 cent. This is a further indication that the intensive development of the mining industry is still largely in the interests of foreign capital.

p The data given in *Table 10* allow one to make several conclusions. Firstly, Africa dominates the capitalist world in the output of certain kinds of raw material, and especially the raw materials for which there is a growing demand owing to the development of new industries arising from the scientific and technological revolution, i.e., copper, antimony, lithium, cobalt, manganese, chromium, etc. Secondly, Africa's total share in the capitalist world's production of the 21 main types of mineral and fuel resources amounts to 35 per cent. This proportion tends to grow with the discovery and working of new deposits, especially of oil, gas, iron ore and bauxites. Thirdly, if one looks at the mineral output figures it becomes apparent that an absolute growth is taking place in the mining operations for all types of raw materials and the range of materials is also expanding. Fourthly, the table shows the volume of the raw material currently imported from Africa by the capitalist countries, since the bulk of the production goes to them.

p During the early postwar years most of Africa's fuel and mining output was sent to Britain, France and Belgium, but by the mid-sixties these countries had been joined by the USA, the FRG and Japan. Thus, it is of interest to compare the geography of the mining and export of the main types of African raw materials, since the clusters of contradictions and the mainsprings of the rivalry and competition between the imperialist powers in Africa are then revealed.

p *Table 11* shows that a list of the main consumers of African raw materials includes only the principal imperialist powers. Given the existing nature of the African countries' foreign trade links and their tendency to develop, this situation will, clearly, continue for a long time. Competition will only change the relative importance of a particular capitalist consumer.

In order to form an idea of the future balance of power between the capitalist states as far as the mining and consumption of African raw materials are concerned, we shall

157 *Table 11* The Main Suppliers and Consumers of African Raw Materials Raw Material Suppliers Consumers Possible Volume- of Annual Deliveries by 1980 Oil . Libya Algeria Nigeria Britain, USA, France, FRG, 400 million tons Iron ore ..... Gas .... Liberia, Mauritania, South Africa Algeria Libya Italy FRG, Britain, Japan Britain, France, Italy, FRG 80 million tons 20 000 million m<sup>3</sup> Manganese South Africa Gabon Ghana USA, Britain, France 6 million tons Chromites ..... Cobalt ..... Morocco, Zaire South Africa, Rhodesia Zambia Morocco Zaire USA, Britain, France USA Belgium France 4 million tons 15 thousand tons Copper . . Zambia South Africa Zaire Lead . Japan ' }fin 000 tons Zinc . . . Zaire, Zambia, Algeria, France, Belgium 250,000 tons Bauxites Namibia Guinea, Ghana Italy, Japan 158 Raw Material Suppliers Consumers Possible Volume of Annual Deliveries by 1980 Antimony South Africa USA 15 000 tons South Africa, Zaire USA 50 tons Rhodesia, Namibia USA, Britain 70 000 tons Phosphates ..... Uranium ..... Graphite Morocco, Tunisia South Africa, Gabon, Niger, Malagasy Rep., Zambia Malagasy Republic Britain, France, Belgium, FRG USA, France, Britain, FRG USA, France 15 million tons 6,000 tons of uranium oxide 20,000 tons Bery Ilium Uganda Mozambique, Mala– Britain, USA 2 500 tons gasy Republic *Source:* Author's calculations. 159 examine the general picture presented by their current participation in the main sectors of the African mining industry. It should be borne in mind that the African mining industry is conventionally divided into two types—the traditional mines that were opened during the colonial period and the new mines which have sprung up in recent years following intensive geological surveys and systematic reinvestigation of deposits located earlier.

p Thus, in the late fifties and early sixties new deposits of oil and gas of world-wide importance were discovered and worked in North and West Africa (Libya, Algeria and Nigeria), iron ore was found in West Africa (Liberia, Mauritania and Guinea), chromites (Rhodesia), manganese and uranium (Gabon and the Central African Republic) and bauxites (Guinea and Cameroun).

p It is mainly the old colonial mining monopolies, especially those of the former metropolises, that are active in the traditional sectors; but the new sectors attract capital from other powers too—the USA, the FRG, Japan, Italy and Canada. It is in this sector that, together with the amalgamation of monopoly capitals, the most persistent imperialist conflicts take place.

p It is typical, for instance, that some 75 per cent of the total amount of American and West German capital investment in Africa is in the new sectors of the mining and oil industry, while for Britain and France the figure is 50 per cent and 45 per cent respectively.

p Although the interests of the monopolies of various countries intermingle as regards the mining of African minerals and a system of collaboration is developing together with the formation of mixed companies, nevertheless in each region or even at individual major



locations either the capital of one particular foreign country holds sway or a power struggle is taking place between the monopolist amalgamations of competing powers.

p The operations of mining companies controlled by British capital are concentrated in Southern and Central Africa. Firms and companies dealing with raw materials, energy, transport, marketing, etc., forming part of the OppenheimerRothschild monopolist group are heavily represented in these areas. In all, the group brings together over 150 160 different corporations, companies and firms that are engaged in mining of gold, diamonds, copper, cobalt, coal, rare metals, asbestos, manganese and chromium, and which also sell these commodities on the world market. The largest members of the group are the Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa, De Beers Consolidated Mines, Tanganyika Concessions, Rio Tinto Zinc, Zambian Anglo-American Ltd. (ZAMANGLO) and a number of others. All these companies are almost entirely British, and the “Anglo-American” element in some of the names is purely traditional. American capital (especially from Morgan’s banks) was represented in them during the twenties, but later the Americans were bought out by the London banks. Moreover, as will be shown below, Zambian Anglo-American is the principal rival and competitor in copper mining of the American group Roan Selection Trust (RST).

p American capital in Africa still adds up to considerably less than the quantity of British capital, but its field of activity is considerably wider, since it is infiltrating not only former British Africa but also the countries which were previously under the control of other European metropolises. In practice, all African countries that are endowed with reserves of valuable raw material are coveted, to varying degrees, by the US monopolies. At first, American capital used to penetrate Africa mainly through the European mining companies already operating there. The US monopolies would buy up shares and organise mixed subsidiary companies. It was in this way, for example, that the US monopolies American Metal Climax (AMAX), Newmont Mining and others came to be firmly established in *Zambia*. AMAX acquired 50.6 per cent of the shares in RST, and Newmont Mining bought 56 per cent of the shares in the South African O’okiep Copper Company Ltd. (in which AMAX seized 20 per cent of the shares). The two monopolies have bought up nearly 60 per cent of the shares in the Tsumeb Corporation Ltd., which processes the polymetallic ore deposits of Namibia.

p The expansion of American capital into the zones of British influence was not the least important reason for the regrouping that took place among British monopolies in 1964 and which was intended to strengthen their position. 161 In Zambia the colonial British South Africa Company (BSAC) reigned supreme for many years. Its activities were based on privileges granted by arrangement with the British Government, one of which gave it exclusive rights to prospecting for minerals. With the declaration of Zambian independence these rights were abolished and BSAC received £4 million in compensation, with half of this sum being paid by the Government of Zambia. The new conditions seriously undermined BSAC’s competitiveness, and it was then decided to merge three British companies—BSAC, the Central Mining and Investment Corporation and Consolidated Mines Selection. The last two companies form part of the Anglo-American group. The new monopoly, known as Charter Consolidated, has capital

investments in South Africa, Namibia, Zambia, Rhodesia, Zaire, Angola and a number of other countries.

p From the late fifties and early sixties more companies began to be formed in Africa to exploit newly discovered deposits of iron ore, manganese, bauxites, copper, oil, gas and other minerals. Since the colonial barriers in many countries had collapsed by this time, American capital was able to compete on equal terms. US monopolies captured a half of all mining operations for manganese ore in Gabon (United States Steel Overseas Corporation) and a considerable part of the mining of Guinean bauxites (Harvey Aluminium and ALCOA), Mauritanian copper and so on.

p The following list showing the proportional participation of foreign capital in a number of countries (in %) is given as an illustration of the balance of power between the monopolies of the main imperialist powers in the African mining industry.<sup>33</sup>  
*Gabon*—manganese ore: France 51, USA 49; uranium: France 100. *Mauritania*—iron ore: France 55.8, Britain 19, Italy 15.2, FRG 5; copper: Britain and South Africa 45, France 18. *Senegal*—phosphates: France 84.3, USA 12. *Namibia*—polymetallic ores: USA 82, South Africa 15.6, Britain 2.4. *Libya*—oil: USA 90. *Nigeria*—oil: Britain 80, USA 10, France 5. *Ghana*—manganese ore: Britain 80, USA 12. *Rhodesia*—chromites: USA 78, Britain 14. *Uganda*—copper-cobalt ores: Britain 60, Holland 10—and so on.

162

p Even this short list shows that the positions of the monopolies of the main capitalist countries as regards the mining of African mineral resources are far from equal and that the former metropolises of Britain and France still have the greatest measure of control. This situation is intensifying the inter-imperialist struggle for the continent's raw material resources.

p The following two factors particularly embitter the competitive struggle of the monopolies for Africa's raw material wealth and narrow the field of activity of foreign capital. In a number of young African states, primarily those with a socialist orientation, steps are being taken to limit the exploitation of their resources by capitalist countries. Either foreign property is being nationalised or effective control is placed over it, and national and mixed mining companies are being set up. Such measures were taken in Algeria (oil), Guinea (bauxite mining), Zambia (copper belt workings) and so on.

p Another important factor—the strengthening of economic co-operation between the young countries and the Soviet Union and other states of the socialist community—has far-reaching effects. Firstly, the positions of national governments and the state sector are consolidated. Secondly, the socialist countries are giving considerable help to the local authorities in assessing the reserves of various kinds of minerals. For instance, the work carried out by Soviet geologists in Africa resulted in substantial modifications being made to the geological maps of certain countries that had been drawn by Western specialists. Thirdly, organisations from the socialist states are beginning to take part (on

completely equitable and mutually beneficial terms) in the mining of certain kinds of African raw materials.

[p](#) The elimination of foreign capital from what once seemed to be an impregnable position increases its struggle for influence from the now-eroded strongholds.

The data given above indicate that many of the natural resources belonging to the liberated countries of Africa play an important role in the economies of the main capitalist states, and this state of affairs will clearly persist for the next 10–15 years. At the same time, the high rate at which the African mining industry is being developed, together with the extremely poor growth of other industries and the fact that nearly all the raw material mined is exported to the West, leads to the situation in which the liberated countries continue to be raw material-supplying appendages of the imperialist powers within the world capitalist division of labour. Thus, the conditions are maintained not only for the exploitation of the young states but also for the continuation of the inter-imperialist struggle for the continent's raw material wealth.

## CHAPTER IX

### THE MONOPOLIES' STRUGGLE FOR THE SOURCES OF STRATEGIC MATERIALS

p Many industrially developed capitalist states, especially those in Western Europe, have always experienced an acute need for raw materials, since their reserves are either limited or non-existent. The shortage of raw materials is now being felt even by those countries whose own resources were previously considered adequate. The greatest need is for oil, non-ferrous metals and rare-earth minerals. Consequently, the monopolies' struggle for raw material sources, including those in African countries, increased during the sixties.

p In this connection, it is of interest to examine specific examples of inter-imperialist struggle for raw material sources in Africa. Naturally, it is impossible to carry out a detailed analysis of all the facts involved. We shall stick to the main battles which give the clearest illustration of this struggle and its means, forms, and methods, and which provide the key to understanding the real substance of many events in Africa as well as the reasons for certain important aspects of the policies of the imperialist powers in Africa.

p *'The contest in Zambia's copper belt and in Katanga (Zaire).* Zambia accounts for over 50 per cent of Africa's copper output and approximately 14 per cent of the output of all the capitalist and developing states. The country comes third in the world copper production league, after the USA and Chile. The copper belt forms part of the KatangaRhodesian mining area, which is one of the richest mineral 164 zones in the capitalist world. It stretches for more than 300 km and covers an area of 30,000 sq km. The reserves of copper ore amount to over 2,000 million tons (i.e., not less than 60 million tons of the actual metal), and it is the world's highest-grade ore, with a metal content of up to 5 per cent. For many years now the copper belt has been the object of a fierce competitive battle between the monopolies, especially those of Britain and the USA.

p Zambian copper is mined by two enormous monopoly groups, the Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa (henceforth referred to as Anglo-American), representing British capital, and Roan Selection Trust, which belongs to the bankers on Wall Street. The total investments of the two groups in the copper belt add up to about 900 million dollars and the average net profit exceeds 50 million dollars a year.

p The struggle between British and American monopolies for supremacy in the copper belt has always been determined by the profit factor and by competition in the world market. The USA is able to satisfy her copper requirements from her own resources and from Chilean imports, while American companies are major exporters of the metal, which goes mainly to Western Europe. But here American copper has to compete with Zambian copper, which is supplied by British monopolies and which is, moreover, cheaper and of higher quality. Naturally, the US copper-producing concerns strove to

seize new positions in the copper belt, which would enable them to regulate market prices in their own interests.

p In 1962 even before Zambian independence, Roan Selection Trust swallowed up one of the largest copper-belt corporations, Roan Antelope, in which it had previously held only 32.65 per cent of the share capital. This move increased RST's reserves of copper ore by 86 million tons and annual production of the metal by almost 100,000 tons. In turn, in 1964 the Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines, controlled by Anglo-American, acquired all the shares in Bancroft Mines, Ltd., which owned mines containing some 85 million tons of copper ore.

p With the declaration of Zambian independence, the Americans brought even more pressure to bear on the 165 position of their British competitors. Moreover, the assault was mounted under the banner of the "anti-colonialism" of the US companies, which, unlike Anglo-American, were "not connected" with the racists in South Africa. American propaganda intended for Zambian consumption frequently emphasised the fact that Anglo-American's headquarters were in Johannesburg and its governing board included well-known racists, whereas the directors of RST were firmly "opposed" to racial discrimination and were "true friends" of Zambia. The RST board was credited with constant efforts to revise the payments system for African miners and to improve their technical skills, and it was only the resistance of the British companies which prevented all this from happening. The American monthly *Fortune*, for example, declared that "RST, followed somewhat reluctantly at times by Anglo-American, has long made valiant efforts to allow Africans access to skilled jobs".<sup>1</sup> The demagogic nature of such statements becomes obvious if one bears in mind that, despite their "valiant efforts", the US monopolies did not manage to promote a single African to a responsible position in any of their companies that were exploiting the wealth of the copper belt, and only 3 per cent of the local workforce had been to a secondary school. The president of the ZAMANGLO group, which controls the activities of British companies in the copper belt, the South African multi-millionaire Harry Oppenheimer, gave a terse and categorical reply to the statements of his American competitors: "We are not worried about change. There is no doubt that we shall be able to collaborate with future governments."<sup>2</sup> Despite Oppenheimer's confident tone, the outlook for the British monopolies in Zambia gave rise to grave concern in London and Johannesburg. It was clear to Anglo-American's owners that the struggle would have to be waged on two fronts—against imperialist competitors and the leaders of the new Zambia, who were making no secret of their intention to place the country's wealth at the service of its people. The monopolies' concern was also shared by the British Government. Harold Wilson stated that the copper produced in Zambia was of vital importance to the United Kingdom. The British Prime Minister made it quite plain that Britain intended to struggle 166 with all the means at her disposal for these "vital interests".

p The crisis that arose in Southern Rhodesia with the declaration of "independence" by the racist regime of Ian Smith and all the subsequent developments had a curious effect on the competitive struggle in the copper belt. On the one hand, both the British and American monopolies had an interest in seeing that work was not interrupted in their

mines and factories, which obliged them to take joint action. But, on the other hand, each group tried to derive benefit from the situation at its partners' expense. Thus, before 1966 the output from the copper belt was conveyed by rail through Rhodesia to the port of Beira in Mozambique. The uncompromising stand taken by the Zambian Government against the racists in Southern Rhodesia made it impossible to use this rail route. The Americans offered to fly the copper out in Lockheed Hercules transport planes from Ndola, the centre of the copper belt, to Dar-es-Salaam in Tanzania. Since Lockheed was an American company, the British monopolies found themselves in a tight spot, and the air bridge was short-lived. The principal means of transporting Zambian copper came to be the railway owned by Tanganyika Concessions running through Angola to Benguela.

p The British monopolies which consumed and exported Zambian copper were the first to suffer from the interruptions in deliveries from the copper belt. The production of refined copper in Britain fell by 12 per cent in 1966 and by a further 5 per cent in 1967, a development which US suppliers were not slow to take advantage of, and they began to capture traditional British export markets in Europe. The "balance" was only restored in 1967 by the massive strike in the US copper industry, which cut production by almost 30 per cent.

p Inter-imperialist rivalry in the copper belt flared up with new force after the Zambian Government's decision, announced in August 1969, to partially nationalise the copper industry and to introduce new rules for granting licences to foreign mining companies. In accordance with this decision, the state was to buy 51 per cent of the shares in AngloAmerican and RST for 500 million dollars. The companies, 167 however, would still have a say in overall management and would be responsible for day-to-day control of production.

p The shares were to be transferred to the Zambian Government gradually: the transfer period was fixed at 12 years for Anglo-American and 8 years for Roan Selection Trust. The new rules for leasing land were an extremely important part of the government measure. The area previously allocated to the companies for geological survey work was to be reduced to one-sixteenth of its size.

p The decision of the Zambian Government alters the situation in the copper belt considerably. Firstly, the monopoly position of Anglo-American and RST is seriously weakened and, secondly, the limiting of their sphere of action provides a further spur to their mutual competitive struggle to consolidate and expand the position they still hold. The last vital factor follows from the new rules for granting licences to mining companies and from the simultaneous reduction of the area previously made over to AngloAmerican and RST. This measure opens up the copper belt to other companies, which makes the competitive battle much fiercer. Immediately after the regulations had been announced, the Zambian Government received applications for mining licences from more than 20 companies. As the France Presse agency reported on the 26 January 1970, "Lusaka is like a boom town. Groups of mining engineers from Japan and America are pushing aside the representatives of the old established firms."



p Thus, the inter-imperialist struggle in the copper belt is growing in intensity, and the number of protagonists is increasing. Through skilful control Zambia can derive undoubted benefits from the situation.

p The monopolies' rivalry in Zambia's copper belt is taking forms that are comparatively calm, but their struggle for copper and other natural resources in Katanga (Zaire) has already once led to tragic consequences.

p The region of Upper Katanga forms a single mining complex with the Zambian copper belt. 30 per cent of Africa's copper is mined in this region. In addition, *Zaire* produces every year up to 10,000 tons of cobalt (80 per cent of world output), 120,000 tons of zinc, 500 tons of cadmium, as well as a significant quantity of tin, germanium, tantalum 168 and other valuable minerals. The diamond mines in the basin of the River Kasai annually supply the world market with 12 million carats of industrial diamonds, or 65 per cent of the capitalist world output.

p Zaire's resources were exploited for many decades by British and Belgian capital. Before 1967 14.47 per cent of the share capital of the Belgian company Union Minière du Katanga belonged to the British Tanganyika Concessions. The diamond industry is significantly dependent on the British diamond monopoly De Beers Consolidated Mines. The mining centres of Katanga are served by the railway belonging to Tanganyika Concessions.

p During the postwar period the mineral wealth of Upper Katanga came to be the object of increasing rivalry between the imperialist powers. Ever since the end of the forties the USA had tried its utmost to penetrate into the area, but colonial barriers had blocked the advance of the American monopolies. The City of London awaited the granting of independence to the Congo with considerable trepidation, while Wall Street longed for this event. Anglo-Belgian industrial circles made ready to defend their interests, while the American monopolies prepared to invade the "reserve". David Rockefeller, who visited the Congo one year before the granting of independence, declared at a press conference in Leopoldville that the United States was highly interested in the Congo, since in ten years' time the USA would be importing 30 per cent of the raw materials on which all economic life on the far side of the Atlantic depended. It is not surprising, therefore, that on the eve of the Congolese crisis and despite the financial panic in the stock exchanges, the Rockefeller group spent 1.3 million dollars on acquiring shares in the Congolese firm Compagnie du Congo pour le Commerce et l'Industrie, controlled by the Belgian financial group Société Générale de Belgique. London reacted to the deal with a burst of indignation.

p The declaration of Congolese independence on the 30 June 1960 heralded the beginning of a grim struggle between the imperialists for positions in the country's mining industry.

p Since this book does not set out to present a detailed account of the events in the Congo, we shall concern ourselves only with the inter-imperialist contradictions and

the clash of interests between the monopolist circles of the USA, Belgium and Britain. This aspect of the Congolese issue deserves serious attention. The rivalry and all-out struggle between imperialist groupings were extremely bitter in the Congo and took various forms. Many of the ways and means of ousting competitors that were employed during the Congolese troubles became stock gambits in the later policies adopted by the capitalist states towards Africa.

p For obvious reasons, bourgeois historians have sidestepped the issue almost completely. Distorted accounts of the events in the Congo were given in the West, in order to justify the actions of the USA, Britain, Belgium and the countries which supported them. The only exception is the wellknown book *To Katanga and Back*, written by the UN representative in Katanga, Conor Cruise O'Brien. He supplies numerous facts which show that not only was there profound disagreement between Britain and the USA, but a real struggle was taking place for Katanga and for influence in the Congo.

p In brief, the main events in the first stage of the crisis were as follows. Belgium attacked the Congo on the 4 July 1960. On the 11 July Katanga, where the separatist and puppet Tshombe regime had been set up, inspired and financed by Tanganyika Concessions and Union Minière, seceded from the Congo. This action not only caused great harm to the young republic (the Congo was deprived of 60 per cent of its income), but also blocked the direct access to Katanga of the US monopolies. The 14 July 1960 saw the beginning of the "UN operation", which lasted until the 1 July 1964. On the 17 January 1961, the Congolese Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba and some of his aides were murdered. On the 18 September 1961, UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld was killed in a plane crash. For still unexplained reasons his plane crashed in Northern Rhodesia, 15 km from the town of Ndola, to which he was flying for a meeting with Tshombe. Hammarskjöld intended to convince Tshombe of the need to station UN troops in Katanga. Tshombe's agreement to this proposal would have been tantamount to the separatist leader's siding with the USA. However, these plans did not suit Britain and 170 Belgium, or Tshombe either. Hammarskjöld's mediation did not take place.

p Thus, the inter-imperialist contradictions are revealed with particular clarity during the first stage in the Congo crisis in 1960–61. Although the task of preventing the progressive regime headed by Patrice Lumumba from growing stronger caused no dissension in the imperialist camp, the ultimate aims of its members were different. Hence the clash in tactics. Britain, which had an interest in preserving her investments in the Union Minière company, supported Tshombe and the Katanga separatists. France and Belgium pursued a similar policy. The USA, which aimed to extend the position of her monopolies in the Congo, looked to the Central Government, headed by Cyrille Adoula.

p The contradictions between the USA and the European colonialists became apparent from the outset of the crisis. At the meeting of the Security Council held on the 14 July 1960 the USA voted for a resolution calling for the withdrawal of Belgian troops from the Congo, whereas France voted against and Britain abstained.

p In November 1961 the African and Asian representatives to the Security Council (United Arab Republic, Liberia and Ceylon) tabled a resolution calling for the removal of the chief cause of the Congolese crisis—the colonial powers’ military intervention in Katanga. The resolution contained the demands that the Congo’s political independence should be strengthened, her territorial integrity assured and separatist actions curtailed. Britain, Belgium and France opposed the main points of the resolution. In the main, the USA supported it, but introduced a number of amendments. The resolution was adopted on the 24 November 1961. The voting was 9 in favour and 2 abstentions (Britain and France).

p The Anglo-American conflict reached its peak in December 1961. On one and the same day (13 December), in an attempt to save Tshombe, London sent a special message to the acting UN Secretary General calling for an immediate ceasefire in Katanga, while Washington declared that it categorically rejected a ceasefire in the Congo "until the minimum objectives of the UN have been attained".-^^1^^ Under direct pressure from the USA, the 19 December 1961 saw 171 a “reconciliation” between Adoula and Tshombe at the Kitona military base. The UN Deputy Secretary General, Ralph Bunch, and the US ambassador to the Congo, Edmund Gullion, helped to arrange the meeting and took part in the negotiations and in drawing up the agreement. In purely formal terms, the Kitona agreement seemed to mark a capitulation by Tshombe, but in fact it was only a temporary compromise agreement between the imperialist powers. Britain, Belgium and France supported Tshombe and had no wish to place Katanga under the authority of the Central Government. The USA had already taken control of Adoula’s actions and was now trying to mesmerise Tshombe too. Walter Lippmann wrote: "Behind Adoula the main power is the United States Government. Behind Tshombe the main power consists of large private interests of Great Britain and Belgium."^^4^^

p The military operations in Katanga which the USA organised under the UN flag in the autumn of 1961 did not produce quick results. The economic boycott also had little effect. So the US monopolies and US diplomacy then tried a number of schemes in London and Brussels, but at the same time they stepped up military action too. The French paper *Lcs Echos* observed that the armed intervention in Katanga was really an episode in the economic war that had been begun in the Congo by several American groups seeking to take control of a new market.^5^^ In the end the Anglo-Belgian coalition was forced to compromise. When President Kennedy’s Special Representative for African Affairs, Chester Bowles, declared that, if the UN was unable to reunite the Congo, then the United States would probably do the job herself, London and Brussels took the hint.

p However, an examination of the final results makes it perfectly clear that the Americans lost the "first round" in the imperialist struggle for Katanga. They failed to achieve their stated aims, while British monopolies made sizable profits out of the events in the Congo. Tanganyika Concessions, for instance, earned about 10 million dollars from the Benguela railway, which transported all Katanga’s raw materials as from July 1960, since rail links between the “independent” province and the other regions of the Congo had been cut (the separatists had blown up the bridges). 172 Apart from this, as a result of the operations of

the Belgian side in Union Miniere in transferring its capital to Belgium, the British side made significant gains in Katanga, which also brought it extra profits amounting to some tens of millions of francs. The factories and mines owned by Union Miniere remained practically unaffected by the military operations, and from March 1962 the production of copper and cobalt even began to increase.

p Faced with this situation, the US Government turned again to the idea of economic sanctions against the Katanga separatists, which meant, in practice, against Union Miniere. American publications began to regularly print details of Union Miniere's profits and the Tshombe "Government's" income, which was being secured with the help of Britain and Belgium. However, the plans for economic sanctions against Katanga met with a negative response from governing circles in Britain, Belgium and France. An American military mission headed by General Truman was then sent to the Congo. As a result of this visit, UN troops entered Katanga in December 1962. Despite "indignation" in London (65 Conservative MPs demanded in Parliament that Katanga should be immediately granted the "right to selfdetermination"), the Americans were uncompromising and single-minded in their conduct of the "third round" of the battle for the Congo. *The New York Times* reported with great delight that nearly three-quarters of Union Miniere's productive capacity was already under the control of the forces of law and order.<sup>6</sup>

p The threat of considerable material damage forced the British and Belgian monopolists to make further concessions. Separatist resistance came to a halt, as did the calls for Katangan "independence" in the British, Belgian and French parliaments. The territorial integrity of the Congo was restored at the end of February 1963. There is no doubt that, had it not been for the imperialist contradictions, the problem of Katanga would have been resolved very much sooner; the progressive forces in the Congo would have dealt with it themselves and the Congolese people would not have made so many vain sacrifices.

p As a result of their eventful struggle with their competitors, the American monopolies were able to share in the 173 profits of the Union Miniere concern, which continued to exploit Katanga up to January 1967. In the new Congolese company GECOMIN (Societe Generale Congolaise des Mineral) formed to replace it 40 per cent of the share capital belongs to Belgian, British and US companies. But the rivalry between monopolist groups for a share in the exploitation of natural resources has by no means come to an end; it has simply entered a new phase. British and Belgian capital is trying to recover its lost position and American capital is seeking to extend its zone of influence. In addition, the economic battle for Congolese raw materials has been joined by the monopolies of France, the FRG and even Japan, with the last two being particularly active in the field.

p The British journal *African World* commented: "The main economic rivalry in the country today is among the French, German, Japanese, British and Italians, all of whom have shown a particular interest to invest in Congolese enterprises".<sup>7</sup> It is true that competition in this sphere is on the increase. In 1968 a consortium of five Japanese firms set up a special company to develop the mining industry. 85 per cent of its capital

belongs to the Japanese and 15 per cent to the Government of Zaire. The British firm of Leyland Motors is building new factories and is re-equipping old ones. Its capital investments in the country amounted in 1969 to £350,000. All Zaire's communications are in the hands of the private US-Belgian company Bell Telephone. But British Congo Diamond Distributors defeated their American rivals and secured exclusive rights to export the country's diamonds. The British also won a profitable contract to build bridges in Orientale Province.

**p** Examination of the numerous instances of competition and direct conflict between the companies of the imperialist powers in the Republic of Zaire enables one to draw a number of conclusions.

**p** Firstly, it is apparent that in the course of the struggle for raw material sources inter-imperialist contradictions are capable of reaching such a pitch that they may temporarily overshadow the main class antagonism in the modern world. Secondly, one can see how short-lived imperialist coalitions are. In the early sixties British and Belgian monopolies were acting jointly against US companies, whereas today they are locked in fierce competition with one another. Thirdly, the disastrous consequences of inter-imperialist rivalry for the destiny of the people of a liberated country stand out clearly.

**p** *7 lie monopolies' fierce competition for tlic uranium and bauxites of Central Africa.* The rivalry between the imperialist monopolies over the mining of African uranium has become very much fiercer in recent years. As the London journal *Africa Confidential* comments, "As the world's need for uranium soars ... so will the scramble for uranium in Africa grow more intense".<sup>8</sup> Statistics give no precise information about the reserves of uranium in Africa or, for that matter, anywhere else in the capitalist world. But it is possible to calculate from the scattered pieces of information that have been published that Africa accounts for more than 30 per cent of the known uranium reserves of the capitalist and developing countries and about 20 per cent of uranium output. Apart from South Africa, the main African countries which extract uranium or possess reserves of it are those in Central Africa.

**p** Ever since uranium deposits were discovered in Africa, all mining and export operations were monopolised by the major imperialist powers—the USA, Britain and France. The early period saw the establishment of a certain division between them of spheres of control over uranium deposits, determined by the dependence of an African country on the capital of a specific foreign power, and also by its former colonial affiliation. However, as the national economies of the countries which possess uranium reserves developed and as the demand for uranium grew in the second half of the sixties, the "gentlemen's agreements" began to be broken. Competition developed into rivalry and, in some cases, into outright struggle. The *Foreign Report*, marked "confidential" and published as a supplement to the British journal *The Economist*, even called an article on this problem "Central Africa: Battle for Uranium".<sup>9</sup>

**p** The balance of power between the capitalist monopolies in relation to African uranium appears to be as follows. American and British capital is operating in South Africa in

accordance with the agreement of 1950, whereby the USA and Britain were granted exclusive rights to mine and market the metal. Later they were joined by France and the FRG. West German capital is represented by the Degussa Company, which in 1958 signed a contract with the South African Government for the purchase of uranium concentrates. French companies are predominant in Gabon, the Central African Republic (CAR), the Malagasy Republic and Niger. Thus, apart from the southern part of the continent, the promising reserves of uranium are located in the countries of Central Africa and are, moreover, under the monopoly control of France.

p According to forecasts by UN statisticians, world demand for uranium will continue to grow. In 1975 it will stand at about 34–46,000 tons, in 1980 at 65–80,000 tons. Since Africa already provides not less than one-fifth of the world output of uranium and since the continent's share in the mining of this metal will increase substantially in the foreseeable future, the rivalry between the imperialist powers over the extraction of African uranium is becoming fiercer.

p The importance of individual countries in Africa's total output of uranium is changing. In the early sixties South Africa accounted for nearly 90 per cent of production. By 1972 about 50 per cent was being produced by other states. Thus, in Gabon the annual production of uranium has been brought up to 1,600 tons, in the CAR to 500 tons and Niger's output was planned to reach 1,000 tons in 1973.

p The most extensive uranium deposits are to be found in the African countries that were formerly French colonies. Consequently, imperialist rivalry, mainly between France and the USA, is now centred on them. Typical of the Franco-American struggle for influence is an episode that took place in Gabon, which, in addition to uranium, has considerable reserve of manganese, oil and natural gas. In 1964 the US ambassador to the country was publicly accused of inciting a revolt against the pro-French President, Leon M'Ba. The attempted coup was suppressed by French airborne troops and "angry French residents, armed with guns and grenades, attacked the American Embassy in Gabon's capital, Libreville".<sup>10</sup> In 1968 after it had been rumoured that there were plans for a further coup in Gabon, all 176 members of the American "Peace Corps" were expelled from the country.

p A no less bitter struggle between Washington and Paris developed in 1968 in other countries of Central Africa. At the centre of the struggle were the considerable deposits of uranium that had been discovered in the Central African Republic. The *Foreign Report* comments: "The complex politics of Central Africa and the return of the Central African Republic (CAR) to the Central African Economic and Customs Union (UDEAC) highlight the rivalry between France and the United States in this part of Africa. On the surface there seems little worth fighting for—until one realises the size of the uranium finds and potential finds in the area."<sup>11</sup>

p The course of events was as follows. Originally the CAR, Gabon, the Congo (Brazzaville), the Republic of Chad and Cameroun were members of UDEAC. The deciding voice in this grouping belonged to France. In April 1968 the CAR and the



Republic of Chad left UDEAC and formed a new economic grouping together with the Congo (Kinshasa)— the Union of Central African States (UEAC). The official explanation of this decision was that the CAR and Chad, which are landlocked countries, suspected that they were not getting their fair share of the customs revenue which was collected at the ports in the Congo (Brazzaville) and Cameroun. But, as the *Foreign Report* points out, it was considered in Paris that the move resulted from "American intrigue": "United States interests were trying to branch out from Kinshasa, where they were entrenched, into the traditionally French sphere of interest.... It was assumed that the Americans were attempting to take over . . . uranium production, which was important to the French nuclear programme."^^12^^

p The problem was too serious for the French monopolies to retreat. Yvon Bourges, the French Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, was sent to Bangui, the capital of the CAR, in November 1968, and in December a return visit was paid to Paris by the President of the CAR, Jean Bokassa. In the end the CAR left the new grouping and returned to the UDEAC fold. At the same time an agreement was concluded whereby a joint company would start construction work on 177 a uranium-producing plant in the CAR. A similar agreement was signed between France and Niger, providing for control by French firms over uranium production.

p France is not only employing diplomatic means to preserve her interests in the countries of former French Africa which possess strategic mineral resources. French garrisons containing a total of 6,500 men are to be found at present in Senegal, the Ivory Coast, Niger, Chad and Gabon. A Swiss paper observed, "economic and financial circles know that several territories possess known or suspected resources which are of great interest: such are Madagascar and the Ivory Coast and, in the case of uranium, Gabon, Niger and the Central African Republic".^^13^^

p The imperialist powers' struggle for uranium, as for other kinds of strategic raw material, engenders intra-African conflicts and is one of the sources of dissension in the continent. The US-French clash in Central Africa led to a worsening of relations between the CAR and the Republic of Zaire, as well as between the CAR and the Republic of Chad. Radio Kinshasa, for instance, expressed bitter resentment at the "campaign of provocation" from the CAR which coincided in time with Yvon Bourges' stay in Bangui. For her part, the CAR withdrew permission for Air Congo planes to land at Bangui. Border incidents began. Against the scale of world politics these facts seem trivial. But they make considerable negative impact in Africa itself.

p The economies of the African states suffer most. Uranium mining is of vast importance to those African countries which possess uranium deposits. These countries could have an income running into millions of dollars, and Niger and the CAR in particular are counting on this. In practice, however, the bulk of the profits accumulates, in safes belonging to the foreign companies that have seized the right to monopoly control over the exploitation of raw material resources. Thus, the world market price of uranium oxide in concentrates will be in the region of 20 dollars per kg during the seventies. Niger reckons to receive an annual 4 million dollars from the sale of her output, while the total

receipts will not be less than 20 million dollars. Consequently, 80 per cent of the proceeds will fall into the hands of the monopolies. Similar calculations can be made for other 178 countries too. The young African states are still only learning how to benefit from the inter-imperialist contradictions.

p Although many of the industrially developed countries, especially the USA and France, possess considerable reserves of their own bauxites, the world's largest aluminium monopolies are showing an ever greater interest in the African sources of this particular raw material. This is explained not only by the increase in the demand for aluminium in the capitalist countries. African bauxites are noted for their high quality, the deposits are conveniently sited geographically and can be mined easily, and there is a quick return on invested capital.

p The African countries which are endowed with the raw material for producing aluminium are coming to be the scene for conflicts between the capitalist powers. An example is the struggle for Guinean bauxites, in which the monopolies of the USA, France, the FRG and Italy took part.

p Before Guinea attained independence, geological survey work and mining operations on the country's bauxite deposits, which are the largest in the world, had been carried out since the early fifties by the French company Societe de Bauxite du Midi. In 1957 it was joined by the FRIA international consortium (48.5 per cent American capital, 26.5 per cent French, 10 per cent British, 10 per cent Swiss and 5 per cent West German). At the end of 1961 the Government of Guinea took a decision to terminate the activities of the Societe de Bauxite du Midi, but the results of its surveys, carefully hidden from the Guineans, became known to a number of West-European and American firms. As a result, suggestions for making a concession out of the Boke area, where extremely rich bauxite deposits had been located, were forwarded almost simultaneously by the aluminium monopolies of France, the FRG and the United States.

p The new US ambassador, William Attwood, who arrived in Guinea at this time, acted as go-between for the American companies. He recalls that, before leaving for Guinea, he saw "some aluminium industry executives, who were pressing for a US Government loan and guarantee to develop Guinea's bauxite deposits. . . ." After some tough bargaining Attwood managed in 1963 to get the concession granted to the relatively obscure American company Harvey Aluminium. However, the rival foreign monopolies carried on the fight, and Attwood tells us that he had to face "charges and countercharges of expropriation, favoritism, bad faith and worse".<sup>14</sup> The rivalry was engendered by a number of circumstances. Firstly, the world's largest aluminium companies had been excluded from an important bauxite location; secondly, these companies feared competition on the world market from Guinean bauxites; and, thirdly, given the current market situation, they had an interest in seeing that the new source of aluminium was kept in reserve for a time. Having enlisted the support of the World Bank, they managed to block the activities of Harvey Aluminium, and the vast bauxite deposit remained untouched. Harvey Aluminium did not begin work, blaming the intractability of the World Bank, whereas, when the contract was signed in 1963, one of the company's main

arguments had been the Bank's apparent agreement to provide subsidies for building communications to carry the bauxite from the mines to the ports. The hidden struggle lasted five years (up to autumn 1968), until the idea of internationalising the project was finally accepted.

p This step was forced on the Guinean Government, since the World Bank demanded reliable guarantees and Washington was only prepared to give them if the main American monopolies were allowed to participate in the mining operations. West German capital also took advantage of the situation. President Liibke lent personal support to the idea of involving West German firms in the project. In addition to Harvey Aluminium, which sold 80 per cent of its shares, the new international company, named HALCO Mining, came to have as its shareholders two more monopolies controlled by American capital—the ALCAN Aluminium Company and ALCOA, each with 27 per cent of the shares, the French companies Pechiney and Usines Kuhlmann S. A. (10 per cent), the West German Vereinigte Aluminium Werke (10 per cent) and the Italian Montecatini Edison (6 per cent). HALCO Mining and the Guinean Government have jointly formed a mixed company, the Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee (CBG).

180

p The imperialists have concluded a "truce", and the loser is Guinea, which is deprived for almost ten years of any additional income from the mining of the new bauxite deposits. As for US-French relations in the country, Attwood reveals that "... some French officials and businessmen regarded us (i.e., the USA—*author*) ... as interlopers in Guinea and sought to discredit us, often in petty ways, with their Guinean contacts".<sup>15</sup>

p This example also demonstrates the methods through which the imperialist powers are trying to resolve their own contradictions at the expense of a poorly developed country. Under the terms of the agreement signed in the autumn of 1968 in Washington, the World Bank granted Guinea a loan to finance the CBG at the extremely high annual interest rate of 6.5 per cent. Although the Guinean Government is supposed to take a 65 per cent share of CBG's profits, it will not actually receive any money until 25 years have passed, since the loan repayments can only be made from Guinea's part of the profits. Mining operations were scheduled to begin in 1972, and the companies forming HALCO Mining undertook to buy all the bauxite produced for the next 20 years at 7 dollars a ton. In 1969, however, the market price had already risen to 11 dollars. In the final analysis, as calculations show, the foreign companies' clear profit from the price difference alone will be four times as much as all the profits accruing to Guinea.

p At the same time, however, there is another aspect to this example: it shows how a developing country can benefit from inter-imperialist contradictions. The Guinean Government managed, for instance, to limit the monopoly rule of foreign capital in the bauxite mining industry, to secure important controls over its activities and to eliminate the dominating position of capital from one particular country. There is also no doubt that the Boke project will further the development of the country's economy and swell the

numbers of its working class—the agreement with HALCO Mining provides for a gradual increase in the number of Guineans employed on the project. In addition, the arrangements worked out with the World Bank and HALCO Mining have made the FRIA consortium give up its "181 neutral stand" and become more compliant. For a long time the Guinean Government had pressed FRIA to increase its bauxite production. The agreement was reached in October 1968. In the new competitive situation FRIA could not avoid compromising, and undertook to expand the annual production of alumina from 500,000 to 700,000 tons and also to cut down on the numbers of foreign experts and to organise a professional training centre for Guinean employees.

p Not only copper, uranium or bauxites formed the object of the bitter competition between the imperialist powers in Africa. A struggle is also developing over the sources of other minerals, from iron ore to diamonds. Making use of both legal and illegal methods, the companies of the USA, Britain, the FRG, France, Italy and Japan are trying to seize one another's concessions for mining manganese and tantalum, niobium and zirconium, columbite and vanadium. But the main battles are being fought in that classic sphere of inter-imperialist struggle—oil.

p *The tangle of contradictions over oil.* During the postwar years the capitalist monopolies' traditional struggle for both the old and the still unallocated oil locations extended to include those African countries in which oil reserves had been discovered. The struggle gathered momentum in the mid-sixties, when the estimates of Africa's place among the oil-bearing regions of the world took a sharp upward turn.

p The imperialist powers' struggle for Africa's oil resources contains an older and a newer phase. There were long, stubborn clashes over the oil in the Sahara. As long ago as 1958, in an attempt to ward off the attacks of the oil monopolies of the USA, Britain, the FRG and Italy, the French Government made it impossible for foreign companies to be granted independent oil concessions in the Sahara and limited their participation in mixed firms. Determined protests and threats issued from the American oil magnates, but they were unsuccessful, at least for as long as Algeria remained a colony. The French monopolies refused to budge. Nor were any results produced by a stern warning given to French companies by the American corporation Standard Oil of New Jersey (now Exxon) that it would do its utmost to impede the sale of surplus Saharan crude oil on the world market. The French were dealt the final retaliatory blow in the autumn of 1968. On the 19 October 1968 the American Getty Oil Company concluded an agreement with the Algerian SONATRACH corporation, whereby the Americans surrendered 51 per cent of their Saharan oil shares but received the right to sell Algerian oil, at a higher price, moreover, than the French were able to. The French oil amalgamation ERAP voiced a bitter protest, suspecting with good reason that the US monopolies were trying to eliminate the French oil firms from North Africa.

p There are ample examples to illustrate the history and present state of the rivalry between the monopolies of the capitalist countries in their attempts to obtain positions in the oil industries of the African states. Their interests clash in Algeria, Libya, Zaire, Morocco, Angola and Nigeria. The competition is sharpened by the fact that the

dominating positions in each of these countries had been seized by the foreign capital of a particular country before the oil was discovered. So France originally took control of survey work and oil production in Algeria, the USA in Libya, Britain in Nigeria, and so on. However, the allocation of spheres of influence was very much a matter of convention, and was completely ignored once the African countries had attained independence, especially since the African states opted for an independent oil policy.

p The struggle between the oil monopolies in Nigeria merits particular attention.

p Without making a detailed analysis of the complicated tangle of causes underlying the Nigerian crisis, we shall dwell on one highly important aspect of it—the role of the inter-imperialist contradictions in the country.

p “It is, of course, the oil that is the centre of the dispute.”<sup>16</sup> That was how the British *Financial Times* summed up the reasons for the civil war in Nigeria. It is difficult not to agree with this conclusion.

p In 1965 oil prospecting operations in the Niger Delta furnished promising results. The oil reserves discovered in the Eastern Region place Nigeria high up in the list of oil-rich countries. Before 1965 Nigeria's known reserves of oil were estimated at 130 million tons, and by 1972 at 1,579 million tons. In 1970 oil production increased by nearly 9 183 times in comparison with 1964—from 6 million to 54 million tons.

p The inter-imperialist struggle for influence in Nigeria became more acute in 1964, when the question was being discussed of her entry to the Common Market, with which at that time the only African countries which were associated were the former French colonies. The Nigerian national bourgeoisie saw greater benefits in association with the Common Market than in the traditional ties with the Commonwealth. Such feelings were actively encouraged by a number of circles in the Western states of mainland Europe and, above all, by the oil companies, which had been closely following the course of the search for oil in Nigeria. Britain, on the other hand, went to considerable lengths to frustrate these plans, which ran counter to her interests.

p The USA also energetically opposed Nigeria's association with the Common Market. Chapter XIV will give a detailed review of the motives behind the Anglo-American resistance to the various trends towards integration in Africa. In the case of Nigeria, apart from all other reasons, the British and American protests were mainly inspired by the interests of the oil monopolies, as became clear later.

p In the meantime the hidden struggle over Nigerian oil grew more and more heated. The oil companies of Europe and America were persistently forcing their way into areas where the British monopolies were still supreme. In particular, the French oil company SAFRAP obtained permission in May 1966 to carry out additional surveys, to drill for oil and to extract it. Further concessions were also granted to the American oil magnates.

p The activities of her competitors caused great anxiety in Britain. High hopes had been set on Nigerian oil and it was intended that by 1974 25 per cent of Britain's crude oil requirements would be met by Nigeria.

p The finding of large reserves of oil in Nigeria can be compared with the discovery of the diamond deposits in South Africa, copper in Zambia, and uranium in Zaire, which not only caused an economic boom in a number of capitalist countries, but also set in motion further stages in the inter-imperialist struggle in Africa. It emerged that the country's main oil-bearing regions were in the south ( 184 precisely the areas claimed by Biafra). The British *Daily Telegraph* commented: "The Niger Delta oil area, covering 400,000 square miles, has the potential of a second Kuwait."<sup>17</sup> The *Financial Times* observed: "The potential importance to Britain and the Western nations of this Atlantic crude hardly needs to be underlined at a time of upheaval in the Middle East."<sup>18</sup>

p Foreign capital investment in the Nigerian oil industry topped 500 million dollars in 1966. Oil came to be the largest investment sphere for foreign private capital. By mid-1966 oil production involved over 10,000 foreign specialists. The growth in the output of Nigerian oil, its high quality and the favourable drilling and transport conditions brought about a sharp increase in the foreign companies' profits. In 1966 they netted not less than £ 100 million (280 million dollars), i.e., a return of more than 50 per cent on the capital invested.

p The scramble for Nigeria's "black gold" led to fierce contradictions between the British, American, French and Italian oil monopolies. The British and Anglo-Dutch companies British Petroleum and Shell, which had invested about 200 million dollars in Nigerian oil and controlled 80 per cent of all oil production, managed to grab the lion's share. The American Gulf Oil Corporation received 10 per cent and the French group SAFRAP (ERAP) about 5 per cent. In addition, the system of taxing the oil companies was changed in 1966. The sum payable was now levied not on the oil produced but on the known reserves. Naturally, those companies which were already producing oil in substantial quantities, i.e., the Anglo-Dutch Shell-BP group, gained from this reform, and the losers were the French, Americans, Italians and others, who had only just embarked on industrial production. In these circumstances, the rivalry between the oil monopolies grew more intense from month to month and was a major cause of the worsening of the internal political crisis in Nigeria and the ensuing events.

p Anglo-French disagreements stood out most clearly in the complex tangle of inter-imperialist contradictions in Nigeria during the period immediately preceding the civil war. Despite all the efforts made by French monopolies, their position in the country remained comparatively weak owing to the constant opposition of British companies. In 1967 French capital investments in Nigeria amounted to a mere 5.5 per cent of all foreign investments. But a half of the French capital was invested in the oil industry of the Eastern Region, where 65 per cent of all Nigerian oil was produced before the war. In 1966 the French oil company ERAP produced 610,000 tons of oil in the area and aimed eventually to raise production to 2 million tons, which would amount to some 10 per cent of all oil purchased by France. These plans, however, were being frustrated by the



company's competitors, especially Shell-BP. What was more, a further seven large foreign oil monopolies (6 American and 1 Italian) had designs on Nigeria's oil. All in all, the French group was in dire straits.

p The Anglo-American contradictions in Nigeria did not stand out so clearly as the Anglo-French contradictions, but they too contributed to the deepening of the crisis. The USA openly resented her modest share (10 per cent) in the oil industry. The American oil companies did their utmost to obtain new concessions for survey work and oil production, especially in the coastal region not far from Port Harcourt. Since the Americans had greater experience of offshore drilling for oil than Shell-BP, the British became a little more accommodating, but still imposed numerous conditions.

p Major representatives of the US oil business—Mobil Oil, Texas Oil, Standard Oil of California and the Phillips Petroleum Company—invested over 150 million dollars in Nigeria, and thus acquired fairly solid starting positions for a competitive struggle. But, although originally opposed to Shell-BP, they later preferred to reach an agreement with the Anglo-Dutch group over a joint policy towards the French companies, which were viewed at that stage as the principal enemy.

p The anti-French alliance between the American and British oil companies is explained by the fact that the main contradictions in the imperialist struggle for oil are between Britain and France and the USA and France. At the same time, the "special relationship" between Britain and the USA obliged them to avoid open conflict in Nigeria, as elsewhere. 186 The other factor involved was the point that American capital relied less heavily on Nigerian oil at the time than British or French capital.

p When the Nigerian situation erupted, all the oil monopolies, irrespective of their temporary alliances, saw that there was a real chance of re-allocating spheres of influence. This is why the Western powers fanned the flames in effect and their relations with the belligerents were to some extent determined by the geographical position of the oil locations controlled by a monopoly or by the opportunities for obtaining more oil-bearing territory. Officially, Britain supported the Federal Government. Nevertheless, in July 1967, when the time came for the oil companies to pay the Nigerian Government its share of the profits, Shell-BP paid out £ 250 million to the leaders of Biafra, which had seceded in May. Typically enough, this was done despite the firm declaration by the Federal Government that it had the right to all concession dues. Military operations had not yet begun, but Shell-BP's provocative action made the situation worse. Shortly afterwards the separatists were responsible for the outbreak of civil war.

p It is equally typical that after the secession of the Eastern Region it was reported by the press that its rulers had offered to let 6 million acres of oil-bearing land to the American company Geothermal Research International,<sup>10</sup> and the US State Department set up a special "shock" group on Biafran matters headed by Under-Secretary of State Robert Moore. In this connection it may also be recalled that in March 1967 an information centre was opened in New York under the name of the "Government of Eastern Nigeria

Liaison Office”, which then proceeded to disseminate pro-Biafran propaganda. It was given every encouragement by various foundations in the USA.

p While Britain was supplying military equipment to the Federal Government, US planes with American crews maintained the "air bridge" from Portugal to Biafra, by means of which arms were transferred to the separatists. American welfare organisations helped Biafra with food and medical supplies and also provided large sums of money. The "Biafra lobby" in France also played a highly prominent role in equipping Biafra with armaments.

187

p It is also noteworthy that, as military operations gathered momentum, the bourgeois press came to regard the events in Nigeria less and less as the result of internal discord. Other assessments began to appear. For example, the British newspaper *The Sun* stated that "The Nigerian war has now become a gigantic post-colonial battle between Britain and France for political and economic dividends in West Africa as a whole".<sup>20</sup> *The Times* stressed that "... a success for Biafra is regarded in Gaullist circles as a success for Quebec. The enemy at bottom is the British Empire, sterling and the dollar."<sup>21</sup> The Labour weekly *Tribune* declared that the Biafran leader, Odumegwu Ojukwu, had promised to sell the oilfields that he had seized to French and Italian companies, and the *Daily Mirror* described France's policy towards Biafra as a part of the "policy of trying to penetrate former British African territories".<sup>22</sup>

p For its part, the French press echoed these statements to some extent. The Right-wing paper *L'Aurore* acknowledged, for example, that "all these accusations are not unfounded".<sup>23</sup> Having posed the question of whether France's position was dictated by her oil interests and the wish to undermine British influence in Africa, *Le Monde* answered in the affirmative.

p These and similar statements made by authoritative newspapers, as distinct from official declarations, provided quite a convincing insight into the real motives behind the Western powers attitudes to the events in Nigeria.

p There are also other noteworthy facts which illustrate the wish of the imperialist powers to "help" settle the conflict. At the end of March 1969, while the British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, was in Lagos, President Nixon's special representative, Professor Clarence Ferguson, visited Biafra. After this visit the separatist leader Ojukwu categorically refused to see Wilson. US tactics in Nigeria gave rise to pronounced irritation in London. According to the Paris newspaper *La Tribune des Nations*, British circles were "appearing somewhat exasperated" at the position taken by their American colleagues over the Nigerian conflict.<sup>24</sup> The San Francisco *Peoples' World* pointed out that "The Biafra secession is ... supported by US and French oil and banking interests ... to weaken and fragment Nigeria, and split the oil-rich Eastern Region away from British economic domination" and "If Biafra won her independence from Nigeria, the British

would be out and Biafra's 'allies' would control one of the world's great supplies of oil".<sup>25</sup>

p The civil war in Nigeria cannot, of course, be explained only by the intrigues of the international oil monopolies. Following neo-colonialist strategies and tactics, they made use of the situation that had developed in the country, inflamed passions and, in the final analysis, caused the crisis to drag on for 2 1/2 years. Only when they had realised the futility of the attempt to carry out a neo-colonialist redivision of Nigeria were the financial and monopolist circles of the West obliged to retreat.

p Even after the insurgents had been defeated in January 1970 and separatist Biafra had ceased to exist, the mutual accusations of the imperialist powers that were a party to the crisis continued. While hypocritically expressing their sympathy for Nigeria and offering various forms of "aid", they quite bluntly laid the responsibility for the events in the country at one another's doors.

p In an article significantly entitled "Guilty Conscience" the French *Le Monde* stated that "Great Britain has taken a hypocritical attitude throughout the affair by supplying arms to Lagos while bemoaning the fate of the casualties that these same arms were causing in the other camp".<sup>26</sup> The *New York Times* drew an analogy between French policy in Nigeria and in the Congo: "In each case it sought to pry loose from an 'Anglo-Saxon' zone of influence huge and prosperous chunks—Katanga, with its copper and uranium, from a pro-American Congo, and Biafra, with its oil, from a pro-British Nigeria". It goes on to say that "The Nigerian victory ends the French hopes of getting into that fast developing petroleum pool. This, in turn, heightens French interest in gaining a bigger share of Mediterranean oil, particularly Libya's".<sup>27</sup> The British *Sunday Express* declared forthrightly that responsibility for the Nigerian situation must be borne by the governments of those countries which supplied Biafra with arms in an attempt to obtain her oil.<sup>28</sup>

p There can be no lasting peace between the monopolies, but only temporary truces that are forced upon them. In the case of Nigeria, as the facts show, the inter-imperialist contradictions remained unresolved. This is another achievement of the Federal Government, which displayed outstanding tactical ability both within the country and in the international arena.

p Throughout the civil war there was no infringement of the oil monopolies' interests as a whole. The government declared that, once the oil-bearing regions had been cleared of insurgents, everything necessary would be provided to enable normal working to be resumed. Such guarantees were given not only to Shell-BP but also to other foreign companies. The only companies to receive threats that their concessions might be abolished were those from countries whose governments had openly sided with Biafra and had been inclined to grant her diplomatic recognition.

p The firm position taken by the Federal Government and, even more important, its success in conducting the military operations had their effect. The "friends of Biafra"

retired and, as soon as the oil areas had been liberated, all companies resumed production.

p Thus, despite the monopolies' plans, no substantial redistribution of their allocations took place during the struggle for Nigerian oil. It was rather different, though, with political influence.

p London had also tried to make use of the civil war in order to preserve its political position in Nigeria: armaments had been delivered to the Federal Government, loans and credits had been granted and Nigeria had been frequently visited by British ministers, MPs, trade union and religious leaders and businessmen; even the Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, had come. Nevertheless, Britain lost a great deal politically. London's wait-and-see tactics during the first months of the war, aptly termed "sitting on the fence" by the press, were extremely revealing and proved disastrous for Britain's prestige.

p France's position in Nigeria economically was, of course, not strengthened, but it was not undermined. However, the damage suffered by Paris politically has been very extensive. France's support for Biafra will influence relations for a long time.

p As the American magazine *Time* commented, the USA gained nothing but lost nothing. This is only partly true, if one bears in mind the economic interests of American imperialism. The USA also lost out politically from her doublefaced policy towards Federal Nigeria and her moral and material support for Biafra at various stages in the war.

p Economically speaking, the contest between the imperialist powers ended in a draw on this occasion, but they all sustained political losses. As a result, the general position of imperialism in Nigeria weakened.

p The oil monopolies' struggle in Libya is taking different forms. Yet the outwardly calm sequence of events there hides a great deal of tension. Oil production in Libya, which was started in 1961, has progressed at an unprecedented rate—from 800,000 tons to 160 million tons in 1970. Libya now accounts for 60 per cent of Africa's total oil production and has moved up to sixth place among the world's oilproducing countries.

p Practically all survey work and the production of Libyan oil is in the hands of foreign companies representing American, West German, Italian, British, Dutch, French and even Swedish capital. However, the American monopolies account for almost 90 per cent of all the oil produced (Exxon, Continental Oil, Occidental Petroleum, Amerada, etc.). The concessions for the principal known deposits also belong mainly to American companies: Esso Standard, Caltex, Esso Sirte, Libyan-American Oil and the Oasis Oil Company of Libya. The area of the foreign concessions in Libya exceeds 1 million square km, or 65 per cent of the country. Foreign capital is attracted not only by the size of the Libyan oil reserves but also by the high quality of the oil and the location of the deposits. Oil can be shipped from Libya at less than half the cost of transporting Iranian and Middle Eastern oil.

p The production of Libyan oil is concentrated in US hands, but its main consumers are the countries of Western Europe. This is one of the causes of inter-imperialist contradictions. In 1967 the FRG received 24 per cent of Libya's oil exports, Italy 21 per cent, France 13 per cent, Britain 12 per cent and the USA 3.5 per cent. The demand for Libyan oil increased particularly with the closure of the Suez Canal.

p The Libyan coup d'état of the 1 September 1969, which brought revolutionary-democratic forces to power, had a substantial effect on the position of the imperialist powers in the country. The removal of British and American military bases, as well as a number of other measures that were taken to limit US and British influence, altered the balance of forces. Speaking at a press conference in the Waldorf Astoria Hotel in New York on the 2 March 1970, the French President, Georges Pompidou, declared, for example, that "a vacuum has formed" in Libya which France had to "fill before others did so".<sup>29</sup> As was shown earlier, the imperialist powers turn to the "vacuum" theme whenever they need to find a cover for their expansionist urges. But the fact remains that Libyan oil is coming more and more to be an object of rivalry between the foreign monopolies. Nor do Western commentators make any secret of it. Thus, when pointing out that French companies were rather slow to tap the vast oil reserves in Libya and that they now hoped to make up for lost time, Alain Murcier, *Le Monde's* oil expert, concludes that one of the results of this will be "open war between the French and other international giants".<sup>10</sup> For its part, *The New York Times* comments that "Oil—France's need of it, the hope of her international companies to produce more of it—is a factor in French diplomacy in Libya. . . ."<sup>31</sup>

p Discussion of French oil interests in Libya appeared in the world press following the decision of the French Government to sell the new Libyan Government a large number of Mirage fighters. The gist of world opinion was that this decision was motivated not by any concern for Libya's security but by France's desire to gain opportunities for exerting pressure in defence of her oil position in the country. Libya is France's third largest supplier of petroleum products after Algeria and Iran. France purchases approximately 20 million dollars' worth of Libyan oil a month. One fact stands out. The French companies represented in Libya—the Compagnie Française des Pétroles and the 1<sup>re</sup> Entreprise de Recherches et d'Activités Pétrolières—belong to the French Government, i.e., the struggle is being mounted not by private capital but by state capital. It is reported that these companies have embarked on concrete measures. They have made the Libyan Government a higher offer for the concessions than their rivals from other countries. In addition, both companies have agreed to bear all survey expenses, even if new locations are not quickly discovered and to subsequently offer the Libyans an equal share in exploiting them.<sup>2</sup>

p The oil monopolies of the USA, Britain and other countries are deeply concerned by France's further, broader plans, which, according to the French weekly *Le Nouvel Observateur*, open up ". . . the path from armaments to oil, from oil to technical aid and from technical aid to political influence".<sup>33</sup> This refers to the important long-term oil agreement embracing France, Libya and Algeria. At the end of 1969 the President of the Algerian company SONATRACH, Ahmed Ghazali, and the Chairman of the board of

the Libyan corporation LIPETCO, Mustapha alKikhya, signed a protocol on the organisation of co-operation between the two companies in information and research and over the price, drilling, transport and sale of the oil produced in the two countries. At the same time, the question of setting up "Franco-Libyan parity companies" and an "Algerian-Franco-Libyan oil triangle" was raised.<sup>34</sup> France had suggested that Libya should step up deliveries of Libyan oil considerably and import more French equipment. *Le Nouvel Observateur* comments: "... France is 'recovering' Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria ... (and) is concentrating on the western Mediterranean, which is to remain or be firmly established once again as an area of French influence."<sup>35</sup> Naturally, these moves have not passed unnoticed among France's competitors and are giving rise to counter-measures. A good example is the activities of American companies in Algeria aimed at containing French influence.

**p** Major finds of oil and gas were made in Algeria in the second half of the fifties, and the oil industry began to advance rapidly. Algeria's oil reserves are estimated at 3,800 million tons, and output in 1970 amounted to 46.8 million tons (16 million tons in 1961). The expansion of foreign oil monopolies in Algeria began in 1958, after the French parliament had passed an oil code for the Sahara which allowed foreign (non-French) capital to acquire shares alongside French capital. By 1964, 37 foreign companies were 193 already operating in the Algerian oil industry: 15 French companies, 11 American, 4 West German, 4 Italian and 3 British and Anglo-Dutch. But most of the oil is produced by French companies—the Compagnie de Recherches et d'Exploitation de Petrole au Sahara (CREPS), the Societe Nationale de Recherches et d'Exploitation des Petroles en Algerie (S.N. REPAL) and the Compagnie Francaise des Petroles (Algerie) (CFP-A). 70 per cent of the oil produced in Algeria is swallowed up by France.

**p** In 1965 the Boumedienne Government concluded new agreements with France on the joint exploitation of oil and gas deposits. These agreements considerably strengthened the position of the Algerian national company for prospecting, extracting, refining, delivering and selling fuel (SONATRACH). The agreement concluded between SONATRACH and the American firm Getty Oil was mentioned earlier. This and subsequent agreements typify both the methods by which American monopolies penetrate the zones of French interests, and the means whereby a developing country can benefit from inter-imperialist contradictions. Making full use of the advantages provided by their 1965 contracts, the French firms fulfilled their obligations, but not as efficiently as they might have done. Thus, by artificially lowering the price of oil between 1965 and 1968, they deprived Algeria of over 110 million dollars. Not more than 10 per cent of the French companies' profits were reinvested. Algeria's dissatisfaction with these and similar actions by her French partner was used by France's competitors. Getty Oil, for instance, undertook to spend 16.3 million dollars over 5 years on survey work, a sum that is

**p** 4 times as great as the profits that the firm is currently making in Algeria. On the other hand, in December 1968 SONATRACH signed a new agreement with Getty Oil on the joint working of the major oilfields at Rourd el-Baghel and the repayment of the loan received by deliveries of crude oil. Additionally, Getty Oil agreed to fix the price of oil at 2.21 dollars a barrel, whereas the French companies' price was 2.095 dollars. Making use



of this agreement, the Algerian Government obliged the French companies (under the threat of a ban on oil exports) to raise their price by 1 dollar a barrel on their total turnover, and in April 1969 all foreign companies were compelled to raise their prices by an average of 30 cents a barrel.

p Other American firms have also stepped up their activities in Algeria. In 1969 an agreement was signed with the Corelab company providing for the founding of a mixed research organisation to locate and evaluate oil deposits. The mixed oil company ALFLUID appeared, with 51 per cent of its shares belonging to SONATRACH and 49 per cent to the American Core Laboratories Incorporated and others. In 1968 SONATRACH invited a mission of American businessmen and bankers to visit Algeria. They decided that there were good prospects for businesslike co-operation between Algeria and the USA.<sup>36</sup> Notably, the mission concluded that, in inviting representative of the American business world, the Algerian Government "was making an effort to balance its trade ties with France. . . ."<sup>37</sup>

p Algeria's struggle with the oil monopolies for more advantageous terms of co-operation, which is an important aspect of her struggle for economic independence, creates additional contradictions between the competing imperialist powers.

p These examples of the imperialist powers' struggle for Africa's raw material resources enable one to make certain conclusions.

p The inter-imperialist struggle for Africa's raw materials is acquiring a more clear-cut state-monopoly character. Its development is determined by more than the fact that considerable known and conjectured reserves of mineral wealth are concentrated in Africa. After the attainment of political independence by the colonies the foreign capital of both the former metropolises and their competitors still to a considerable extent retains key positions in the economies of the young states, especially since restrictions on its activities are introduced slowly, haphazardly and only in some countries.

p In view of the role of minerals in the industries of the developed capitalist countries and also considering that their own mineral resources are poor, while Africa leads, or nearly leads, the world in terms of reserves and the volume of output, it may be supposed that in the next 10–20 years the principal struggle will develop around the sources of uranium, manganese, chromites, copper, vanadium, antimony, lithic minerals, columbite, beryllium, monazite concentrates and, of course, oil. Consequently, those African countries possessing such deposits will be the main objects of inter-imperialist rivalry.

p The compromises that are forced on the imperialist powers in the course of their battles for African raw materials do not alter the position that many countries in the continent remain the owners of their resources in name only. Foreign capital retains its control over them. This inflicts additional damage on the economy of a young country.

Yet, on the other hand, the contradictions between the capitalist powers weaken the imperialist front and compel the monopolies to make concessions to the newly

independent countries, which can be used by progressive forces in order to transform and boost the national economies. The government policies of Algeria, Zambia and Guinea, where specific measures have been adopted to see that the raw material resources serve the country's own interests and where use has been made of the factor of the inter-imperialist struggle, show what opportunities in this direction lie open to a developing country.

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**p** An analysis of the economic aspects of the inter-imperialist struggle in the developing countries of Africa leads to a number of conclusions.

**p** Alongside the tendency towards monopolist integration of their efforts to exploit the liberated countries and retain control over their economic life, the imperialist camp is also more and more clearly displaying the processes of disintegration over these issues. Shifts in the world capitalist economy are invigorating the traditional inter-imperialist contradictions, which have already on more than one occasion produced wars for the re-allocation of territories, markets and capital investment spheres. But radical changes in the world now rule out this type of resolution of the contradictions. Therefore, the struggle to redivide the African continent, whose main outlines can be seen clearly enough, is being conducted mainly through economic means. The main 196 spheres of the interests of the imperialist powers in Africa have already been revealed.

**p** The causes of the intensive economic expansion of the USA in Africa lie not only in the defence of the interests of her own monopolies. American imperialism is also guided by considerations of the global struggle against the national liberation movement and socialism, and claims privileged conditions, moreover, in view of its "contribution" to this struggle. Claims of this sort spread additional discord in the imperialist camp.

Given the interests of world capitalism, the imperialist powers now have a certain interest in the rapid development of the liberated countries. Consequently, their economic strategy involves making some concessions to these countries, so long as they are compatible, of course, with the main aims of imperialism. In conjunction with the growing competition between the imperialist powers for new economic positions in Africa, this fact offers the African countries real possibilities for the first time in their history to make use of some of the processes and tendencies in the world capitalist economy in their own interests.

**PART THREE**  
**SOCIO-POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL ASPECTS**  
**OF THE INTER-IMPERIALIST STRUGGLE**  
**IN THE NEWLY INDEPENDENT COUNTRIES**  
**OF AFRICA**

**CHAPTER X**  
**THE STRUGGLE FOR POLITICAL INFLUENCE**  
**IN THE COUNTRIES OF FREE AFRICA**

p The limiting of imperialist rule in Africa has applied to more than just territorial and economic factors. Simultaneously a process is taking place that reduces the practical possibilities of imperialist policies in relations with the newly independent countries. In this situation, despite the fact that the imperialist powers' foreign policies are concentrated on the struggle with the main enemy—world socialism—their rivalry in the narrowing sphere of political influence on the continent is also becoming fiercer.

p Before the disintegration of the colonial system the destinies of African countries were determined by the policies of the metropolises. At the present the peoples of Africa are increasingly becoming the masters of their own fate. The governments of many young states are trying to limit the activities of foreign capital and to fit them into a definite framework. The liberated countries are also exerting a perceptible influence on international relations.

p However, with a few exceptions, the measures being taken by African countries both in the economic and political spheres in order to attain genuine sovereignty are still proving inadequate. It is impossible to give a simple explanation for this fact. But among the host of reasons, which include both the legacy of the colonial past and the effect of neo-colonialist policies, one basic reason must be singled out. It was discussed at the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties held in Moscow in 1969. Many 198 of the young states have still not chosen a course of development, and in a number of countries power has been seized by reactionary elements which have close connections with imperialism. It is precisely this factor that offers the governments and monopolies of capitalist powers a certain "freedom of action" and encourages them to struggle for political positions in Africa.

p The political aspect of the inter-imperialist struggle in Africa is the most contradictory. All the Western powers have an interest in keeping the young states within the orbit of imperialist policies. At the same time, each power is attempting to occupy the dominant position in the social and political life of a newly independent country.

p Ever since the beginning of the gradual collapse of the colonial regimes the USA has used her advantages over the European colonial powers in an attempt to obtain a leading political role in Africa. By the end of the fifties the US position in the political life of

Western Europe and Asia appeared to Washington to be sufficiently solid; only in Africa, where the old colonialists still held sway, was there a check to American opportunities for independent action. The disintegration of colonialism removed the formal limitations on American political expansion and caused US ruling circles to lay claim to a leading role in the new Africa.

p There are many aspects to the inter-imperialist struggle for political influence in free Africa. We shall confine ourselves to those which highlight the most important sides of the struggle, its forms, methods and prospects.

p *The African Commonwealth countries as the object of political rivalry between the imperialist powers.* In 1960 there were three clearly delineated zones of British influence in the Third World: South-East Asia, the Middle East and a large part of Africa south of the Sahara. Today only this last area remains. Britain has largely managed to retain her economic, political, cultural and, to a certain extent, military ties in the vast region stretching from Cape Town to Lusaka and from Nairobi to Accra. In addition, Britain has been able to include almost all her former African colonies (with the exception of South Africa and Rhodesia) in the Commonwealth and to keep them within the system of imperial 199 preferences and the sterling area. Of the 33 members of the Commonwealth (including Great Britain) 13 are African countries: Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Gambia, Zambia, Malawi, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Mauritius.

p These countries have widely differing relations with Britain, but they all take part in the numerous organisations that foster co-operation within the Commonwealth. The former metropolis provides the bulk of their financial and technical “aid”, organises the training of national personnel, and so on.

p The question of what the Commonwealth as a whole and its African part mean to Britain has been given detailed examination in a number of studies by Soviet and foreign specialists. These works analyse the contradictions within this political structure, its development trends and prospects.<sup>1</sup> So we shall look at just one problem—the political rivalry between the imperialist powers, especially the USA and Britain, in some of the main countries of former British Africa.

p Rupert Emerson points out that "As far as the United States is concerned, access to the English-speaking countries has generally been easier than to those linked to France".<sup>2</sup> The common language, the "special relationship" that has made London dependent on Washington and the deep penetration of American capital into the economy of Britain herself really have made US political expansion into the African parts of the former British Empire very much easier. Nevertheless, this expansion is meeting with increasing resistance. A scarcely veiled Anglo-American contest can be seen everywhere both over general issues and over those affecting each individual country. In 1959 the USA turned down a British proposal, dictated by tactical considerations, that Britain and America should work out a joint policy towards Africa south of the Sahara. Britain in turn rejected an American idea for co-ordinating “aid” to the African countries, seeing

this as a US move to establish control over the British programmes and to secure more profitable markets for her manufactured goods.

p During the first few years after Britain's African colonies had attained independence the United States pursued a very 200 restrained policy towards the English-speaking countries of Africa, despite the loudly proclaimed policy of "filling the vacuum". Although carrying out an economic penetration, the USA acknowledged the supremacy of her European ally in the sphere of political influence.

p William Attwood recalls how amazed he was, when preparing to take up his post as American ambassador to Kenya, to learn from State Department officials working in the Bureau of African Affairs that it was US policy "to tailor our actions in Africa to the wishes of our often shortsighted NATO partners. . . ."^^3^^ But at the same time Attwood also learnt something else. He was given a copy of the report presented by the task force assigned by President Kennedy to review US policy in Africa. Attwood writes: ". . . It rejected the Eurafrica idea . . . that Africa was still a semidependency of Europe and that America should put intrude. . . . But it stressed that our 'intrusion' should be low-key, practical. . . ."^^4^^

p This thesis formed the basis for all subsequent US actions aimed at seizing the channels of political influence in the English-speaking countries of Africa from the USA's "shortsighted" NATO partner.

p When drawing up and carrying out this policy, Washington proceeded from several premises and circumstances. Firstly, the USA always secretly shared the false colonial idea that the African peoples were incapable of running their own affairs independently, without the help of foreign guardians and mentors. Secondly, owing to the general weakening of Britain, American ruling circles increasingly took the view that London was no longer capable of being such a "guardian". Thirdly, having taken upon herself the mission of "protecting" the young states from "communist infiltration", the USA considered that only her political influence, in conjunction with economic and military means, was able to accomplish the task. Although it does not rule out measures taken jointly with its allies, Washington nevertheless does not fully trust them and, more important, has no confidence in their strength and ability to actively oppose communism in the Third World. Military and political disagreements have long been rife between France and the USA. Although Britain is regarded as the USA's main 201 partner thanks to the "special relationship", she is coming to be seen less and less in the United States as a "reliable barrier" to the further development of the national liberation revolution in Africa.

p Also of no small importance was the fact that in the second half of the sixties Britain's political ties with the African members of the Commonwealth became substantially weaker—a result of London's policy towards South Africa and Rhodesia. Only their economic dependence on the former metropolis prevented them from carrying out their oft repeated threats to "leave the Commonwealth" and "break off relations" with Britain. Naturally, this process did not pass unnoticed in the USA.

p Finally, in recent years Anglo-American relations have been losing more and more of their “special” nature. Thus, the main obstacle to political rivalry between the two powers is falling away.

p It should be remembered that, when establishing the "special relationship" with the USA, which was initiated by Churchill's unfortunate speech in Fulton on the 5 March 1946, Britain's ruling circles were pursuing very definite aims. With American help they hoped to overcome the postwar economic difficulties, slow down the national liberation movement of the colonial peoples and restore Britain's international position. But the main point is that London viewed the "special relationship" with the USA as a means of limiting American claims to the "British legacy" and of possibly preventing the Americans from getting, as Churchill put it, "the guardianship of the British Empire, minus Great Britain".<sup>5</sup> In order to achieve this, it was necessary to encourage US expansion into those spheres and areas where there were only minor British interests or none at all. The plans of Britain's ruling circles even included the mobilisation of the USA for a “crusade” against communism. This point was made clear by Roosevelt shortly before his death, when he stated that "the British were perfectly willing for the United States to have a war with Russia at any time. . . ."<sup>6</sup> It was only when Britain's military doctrine was supplemented by a section on the “indefensibility” of the British Isles that her ruling circles began to realise the possible consequences of these provocative tactics.

202

p In fact, Britain did not achieve a single one of the aims which she had set herself when entering into the "special relationship" with the USA.

p Eventually, by the end of the sixties, this relationship had become an obstacle to the two countries' developing their own policies, as became abundantly clear over Britain's intention to join the Common Market. In October 1967 Lord Chalfont, the Minister of State at the British Foreign Office, even went so far as to say that the "special relationship" with the USA no longer existed.

p If one compares different writers' views on the state of the Anglo-American "special relationship", a number of typical features emerge. The main point is how this relationship affects the policies of both powers towards the developing countries and, particularly, those in Africa. The gist of American declarations is that this is precisely the sphere that gave rise to the contradictions which caused the crisis. The prominent American publicist Stewart Alsop observes that ". . . the 'special relationship' has been for some time in a process of rank decay... . The process of decay started with the ill-advised Suez adventure by the British in 1956, and the angry and ungenerous American reaction to that adventure".<sup>7</sup>

p British views are less categorical and boil down to saying that the United States will still “need” Britain. Moreover, this view is held by academics as well as political commentators. In his study *The Future of British Foreign Policy*, published in 1969,



Professor Max Beloff of the University of Oxford writes that the USA is "the natural and inevitable successor to Britain". However, the professor considers that "It has suited the United States—at least until very recently—to encourage the view that Britain could still play a Great Power role in the old sense. In part this has been due to the clear American dislike of being left with no proper interlocutor on her own side of the great ideological divide; in part it has been due to a hope that Britain could still sustain some of the burden of common defence, and thus take some of the load off American shoulders".<sup>8</sup> So it is no longer a matter of a "spiritual alliance", full of "mutual understanding" and so on. Emotion has given way to unconcealed expediency, or, as *The Observer* pointed out, Britain's sentimental credit has long been exhausted in her relations with America.<sup>9</sup>

p In this situation the USA's political expansion into the African Commonwealth countries, as into the other traditional areas of British interests, began to take on a more and more determined character.

p Four main tactical devices can be singled out in the actions of the imperialist competitors: (1) the adoption of a broad complex of different measures in the sphere of information, ideology, culture, education, etc., with the aim of generally consolidating political influence in the particular country; (2) the setting up of strong points within the ruling party (or grouping) in order to split it and isolate the forces that are looking to the competing power, and subsequently to secure the decisive political positions; (3) the organisation of a new party (or the resurrection of an old one) led by their "allies", which is later brought to power by "democratic" methods or through a coup d'état; and (4) the use of crisis situations in the country for attempts to fill key posts with pro-American or pro-British individuals.

p The choice of one stratagem or another (a combination is usually selected) is determined by the specifics of each country, by the strength of the imperialist rival's position and by the level of strategic interests in the area. An important feature of American policy as a whole, which must be particularly borne in mind when undertaking an analysis, is the fact that attempts are made to use the political and social peculiarities of the young states and their development problems. Let us consider a few of the most typical examples of Anglo-American political rivalry in the countries of East and West Africa.

p The struggle for political influence in East Africa is well illustrated by Kenya, the country which is viewed by both the USA and Britain as the main stronghold in the region.

p By expanding into East Africa, Britain was pursuing political aims as well as economic aims. For British imperialism it was a region of great military and strategic significance. Kenya was the crossroads of the sea and air routes linking the metropolis with its Asian possessions, Kenya protected the flank in the "east of Suez" strategy and Kenya was the "gateway" to Central Africa. In addition, a considerable number of immigrants from Britain had seized the best land and had become firmly established in Kenya. Many of these factors are still relevant today, but others have been added. Kenya, Uganda and

Tanzania formed the nucleus of the African part of the Commonwealth of Nations; geographically they are adjacent to the racist and colonial south of Africa, in which considerable British interests are concentrated.

p The USA, in turn, has also long shown an interest in East Africa. Typically enough, the first diplomatic representation in the area was the American Consulate, opened on Zanzibar as early as 1833. But right up to the Second World War and during the early postwar years Britain kept her "East African reserve", as William Attwood, the former US ambassador to Kenya, called the region, under lock and key.

p The situation changed completely when the countries of East Africa attained national sovereignty, and open political rivalry between the USA and Britain was initiated by the visit to Kenya paid in 1961 by the Under-Secretary of State for African Affairs, Mennen Williams, and by his scarcely veiled anti-British speeches there. "... Washington evidently saw a favourable opportunity for gaining political credit in this area by contrasting itself with London,"<sup>10</sup> said the well-known historian Maclean.

p Kenya soon came to occupy a privileged place in the US programme for Africa. Kenya received Most Favoured Nation treatment when applying for "aid", loans, etc. US expansion was furthered both by the firm policy of capitalist development pursued by the Kenyan Government and by the laws that were passed guaranteeing capital investment and the free export of profits. However, the USA was obliged to reckon with the strength of the British economic position in the country and so applied pressure in those areas where her rival was most vulnerable—in the sphere of politics, ideology and social measures.

p One of the largest centres of the USIA (United States Information Agency) was opened in Nairobi, and in a short time it extended its activities to cover the whole country. 205 The centre inundated local libraries, schools and other educational establishments with American propaganda. Americans work as sub-editors in all sections of the Kenyan Government's radio station, the Voice of Kenya, and Kenyan employees are regularly sent to the USA on courses. The position is much the same in the local television service. American companies have bought up 60 per cent of the broadcasting time. Needless to say, their programmes are loud in their support of US policies and advertise the American way of life.

p The "Americanisation" of government officials is carried out in the Government Training Institute, built with US funds. About 500 people receive additional training there every year. Work among young people is carried out through the National Youth Service and the National Union of Kenyan Students, which are also American-financed. American missionary groups, with a combined staff of about 1,000, carry the political and ideological influence of the USA into the hinterland. They run 40 secondary schools, 12 colleges, 48 clinics and 12 hospitals, and have their own "flying doctor" service.

p The reciprocal visits of government, social, trade union and other workers are an important means of strengthening US political influence in Kenya. During the last few

years nearly all Kenyan ministers and many high-ranking military officers and the managers of banks and other establishments have visited the USA by special invitation. Kenya, in turn, has been visited since 1968 by the former American Vice President, Hubert Humphrey; Judges Marshall, Douglas and Stewart of the US Supreme Court; Heard, a director of the Ford Foundation; the Negro Senator Edward Brooke; and, lastly, none other than US Secretary of State William Rogers. All these visits were used to advertise US policy in Africa. Apart from this, the Americans mounted a large-scale ideological campaign in Nairobi in 1968: the International Press Institute conference and "The First African-American Dialogue", in which African and American statesmen, members of parliament, academics, journalists and others took part.

p All in all, the USA has managed to significantly strengthen her political influence in Kenya at the expense of 206 Britain. An example of this is the situation in the country's ruling party, KANU. Speaking at a meeting of the KANU executive committee in April 1968, the President of Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta, was forced to admit that the ruling party had lost its unity and had split into two rival groups: the pro-American KANU-A and the pro-British KANU-B. It is significant here to remember the fate of the former Secretary-General of KANU and Kenyan Minister of Economic Planning and Development, Tom Mboya, who was considered to be the leader of the KANU-A grouping and who was killed on the 5 July 1969. Those responsible for this act of terrorism have never been unmasked. Tom Mboya was one of Kenya's main politicians and statesmen, and was seen as a likely successor to Jomo Kenyatta, i.e., as the country's future president. He made virtually no secret of his pro-American leanings and was known in the government as "the USA's man".

p In the late sixties Mboya began to create difficulties for the pro-British grouping, and London became seriously worried about the prospects for its Kenyan "allies" remaining in power. Thus, in January 1968 Mboya did all he could to prevent Charles Rubia, the former Mayor of Nairobi and a man who had close connections with the British Embassy, from being elected Chairman of the Nairobi branch of KANU. In the spring of that year he tried to retain the old procedure for the presidential elections (through the National Assembly), which drastically lowered the chances of the leaders of the pro-British grouping. He managed to establish KANU-A groups, later abolished with great difficulty by Jomo Kenyatta, in the major branches of the party—in Mombasa, Machakos and other towns. In addition, as Minister of Economic Planning and Development, Mboya began to extend the country's economic relations with the Scandinavian countries, Italy and Japan, thus enlarging the number of Britain's competitors.

p The fact that during the last months before Mboya's death he outwardly weakened his ties with the USA and began to speak as a pure nationalist was seen by his enemies as a tactical move in the battle for the presidential chair.

p Mboya's assassination evoked a broad response abroad, as well as in Kenya. The British press was perplexed over what 207 harm the "Kenyan Crown Prince" was doing to anyone. In July 1969 the *New York Times* reported that Mboya had not discounted the possibility of physical violence being used against him by his political enemies. He was

alleged to have told his New York friends that "the danger is growing, since President Kenyatta plans to hold a general election". The Italian weekly *Rinascita* revealed who Mboya's New York friends actually were. They were political intriguers and shady dealers associated with the CIA, and they informed the American press that in a letter written a few hours before his death Mboya had admitted that he might well become a victim of the struggle between the groupings in KANU. After analysing the political situation in Kenya, *Rinascita* reached a very definite conclusion: "Mboya was a dangerous candidate for the succession to Kenyatta, and he was all the more to be feared since he enjoyed the full support of the USA".<sup>11</sup>

p The Kenyan armed forces are also an object of AngloAmerican rivalry, with London trying to preserve its influence in them and Washington making stubborn efforts to dislodge the British. The following example is typical. In July 1967 an exchange of letters took place between Edward Peake, the British High Commissioner in Nairobi, and the Kenyan Minister of Defence, Njoroge Mungai, confirming the agreement to establish a British military training team in Kenya "to assist in the training and development of the Armed Forces of Kenya". The agreement preserved Britain's complete supremacy in matters of assisting "the Commanders of the land, air and sea forces of Kenya in the discharge of their responsibility for the training and development of those forces".<sup>12</sup> Thus, the Kenyan forces were assured of "highly competent guidance" and felt no need of "aid" from anyone else.

p But Washington took a different view. Shortly after the exchange of letters just referred to, Njoroge Mungai was invited to the United States, where it was agreed that some Kenyan servicemen, including air force personnel, should be sent to America for training. Then in March 1968 a group of 42 American officers headed by General Goodpaster, the Commandant of the National War College in Washington, arrived in Kenya. In talks with Mungai the 208 general again raised the question of strengthening co-operation between Kenya and America over the creation of a national Kenyan air force.

p The growth of American influence in Kenya is demonstrated by the fact that in recent years there have been no serious disputes in Kenyan-American relations. The USA has come in for no direct criticism either in the press or in statements made by Kenyan leaders, unlike Britain, which has been frequently attacked. London, however, was in no mood to acquiesce to the political expansion of its rival into an area where its influence was once supreme, and the British reaction can be described as passive resistance, accompanied by persistent anti-American propaganda: "The first proponents of anti-Americanism in East Africa were probably the white settlers, who so often accused the United States of stabbing Britain's imperial back", as Ali Mazrui puts it.<sup>13</sup> The British counter-measures were successful. A less hostile attitude towards the former metropolis prevails in East Africa nowadays than previously.

p Anglo-American political rivalry is taking other forms in Ghana. As is shown by the way events have developed in recent years, the methods of staging a coup and compromising undesirable candidates for power, creating new parties and abolishing old ones, and the use of elections and economic pressure have all been used in Ghana in

various combinations. Temporary truces were concluded between the rivals and their actions were co-ordinated depending on the situation, and then the competitive battle flared up again with renewed force.

p Before February 1966 American influence in Ghana was insignificant compared with Britain's. There were no open displays of the two powers' political rivalry. Only in the economic sphere did the interests of the British and American monopolies conflict. Britain and the USA were equally unhappy with Kwame Nkrumah, which forced them to coordinate their actions. The coup d'état of the 24 February 1966 was one of the results of their joint tactics.

p It would, of course, be simplistic to view the change of regime in Ghana as being only the result of the subversive activities of the imperialist powers. The causes of the coup are far more varied and run deeper. To some extent, they 209 reflect the complex processes that accompany nation-building in young countries recently delivered from colonial bondage. But, in analysing this event, it would be equally wrong to ignore the tactics of imperialism, its subversive activities and its use and aggravation of a situation through the methods of political, economic and ideological sabotage. As the British sociologist David Horowitz admits, imperialist subversion in developing countries is not "an isolated aberration of policy".^^14^^

p In order to understand the course of events, it must be realised that Britain engaged in subversive activities against progressive forces in the Gold Coast colony long before "granting" it independence. Even at the end of the forties the British had recognised the grave danger to imperial interests represented by the movement headed by Nkrumah. They also realised that the imposition of sanctions and restrictions alone would not remove the danger. So from 1949, when the Convention People's Party (GPP), the main political force in the country's national liberation movement, was founded, the British authorities did all they could to undermine its position and influence. Acting through agents and following the theory of "intercepting" a social revolution, the British began to organise new parties on a massive scale to counterbalance the CPP. There were soon more than ten of them, but none could compete seriously with the CPP. Then the so-called United Party headed by Kofi Busia was set up. But its efforts to occupy a dominant position in the country were equally unsuccessful. The party was dissolved, and Busia emigrated from Ghana.

p Britain probably possessed sufficient means to organise and carry out the coup of the 24 February without the help of the USA. All Ghana's senior officers had been trained and educated in Britain and, by and large, kept up their close connections with British military establishments. Before 1961 the commanding positions in the Ghanaian army were held by British officers—the leaders of coups in the past were their immediate subordinates. Apart from that, as the London newspaper *Tribune* commented on the 27 February 1966, "in comparison with any other British colony in Africa, Ghana had the most clearly defined class of the middle 210 bourgeoisie, brought up in the British tradition. Ghanaian establishments were very closely linked with the British system of government and were really copies of their British counterparts."

p The need for Britain to co-ordinate her actions with the USA arose from two factors—the Agreement on Joint AntiCommunist Actions and the influence that the USA had already acquired in Ghana's police force, the second participant in the putsch. American news agencies stated forthrightly that the coup had been organised by British Intelligence in collusion with the Central Intelligence Agency of the USA.

p The result of the Ghanaian coup was not just the complete reorientation of the new regime towards the West, described as "balanced neutrality". The new political climate also created a favourable environment for an inter-imperialist struggle for influence, primarily between Britain and the USA. *Le Monde's* African specialist, Philippe Decraene, wrote: "Very discreet at the time when Dr. Kwame Nkrumah still presided over the destiny of the Republic of Ghana, the American presence today is clearly perceptible in Accra.. .".<sup>15</sup>

p It is certainly true that within a short time the number of staff at the US Embassy in Ghana rose steeply. Accra was invaded by hundreds of various American specialists acting as advisers and consultants to the National Liberation Council and to the country's government agencies. The number of representatives of the "Peace Corps" trebled between 1966 and 1969. The visits of American officials to Ghana became more frequent. Explaining the heightened interest being shown in the country, Washington said that it was acting in the "interests" of Ghana's peoples. On his return from an African tour during which he also visited Ghana in January 1968, US Vice-President Hubert Humphrey stated bluntly that Africans did not wish to be perpetually dependent on the former metropolises. Africans longed for friendship with the USA, her support and assistance.<sup>16</sup> Backing up this thesis, the USA provided the new Ghanaian regime during its first two years with about 50 million dollars in the form of loans, technical "aid" and goods. US Ambassador Williams, who left Accra in March 1968, 211 declared with great satisfaction that relations between Ghana and the USA were at their zenith.<sup>17</sup>

p Britain, however, reckoned unequivocally that the overthrow of Nkrumah would secure the return of this "recalcitrant" member of the Commonwealth to the patronage of the former metropolis, and the increasing activity of her competitor alarmed British ruling circles and put them on their guard. Counter-measures were soon taken. In the first place, the British proceeded to strengthen their old links, and establish new ones, with Ghanaian military and business circles. An agreement was reached with the leaders of the National Liberation Council to renew the training of Ghanaian servicemen in Britain. Next a group of British army officers went to Accra, where they concluded an agreement providing for the exchange of military units "for training purposes". The London journal *Africa and the World* pointed out in August 1968 that "British troops are to take over stand-by security duties in Ghana. ... Police Chief Harlley, the real boss of the NLC (National Liberation Council), ordered his police security organisation to keep a tight watch on the army." It will be shown below that the rivalry between the army and the police in Ghana was also a result of the bitter struggle between the imperialist powers for influence in the country.



p At the same time, London launched a cautious but persistent anti-American campaign in the British-controlled press. Articles appeared describing racial discrimination in Ghanaian hotels owned by US firms; the newspaper *Daily Graphic* revealed that the Americans had bought up a pharmaceutical factory built by Hungary; and a number of publications, of clearly British origin, dealt with Negro riots in the USA, and so on. But the main struggle centred upon key figures in the highest spheres of Ghana's national, political and social life.

p As soon as it had been set up, Ghana's National Liberation Council became the object of rivalry between Britain and the USA and also, although to a very much lesser extent, the contest was later joined by France and the FRG. The first results of this rivalry were the persistent crises within the NLC and the worsening of relations between the army and the police. The imperialist struggle for influence in Ghana developed further with the NLC's declaration of its plans for a transition to civilian rule, and the conflict came to a head at the same time as general parliamentary elections were held in Ghana.

p On the Ghanaian side, the main role in preparing and carrying out the coup of the 24 February 1966 was played by Colonels E. K. Kotoka and A. A. Afrifa and the Inspector General of the police force, J.W.K. Harlley. The first two were well-known for their pro-British sympathies, while Harlley was in permanent contact with US representatives. Having created the NLC, the leaders of the coup set up a compromise figure to head it—General Joseph Ankrah, who was at that time supported by the British, not without good reason, Ankrah had been brought up in a British mission school, he had served in the King's African Rifles, had repeatedly visited Britain and was in constant touch with various official bodies. However, while Ankrah's position was growing stronger and he began to be viewed as a potential candidate for the post of President once civilian rule had been restored, the general's sympathies swung perceptibly towards the USA. This was marked outwardly by his frequent meetings with American representatives and by the freedom of action that he gave them in the country. The French *Le Monde* observed that immediately after Ankrah had visited the USA Washington stepped up its activities in Ghana noticeably.<sup>18</sup>

p Ankrah was removed from the political scene in the best British tradition. The firm Geafan Ltd., an imitation of the American Gallup Institute, knew that the head of the military-police regime aspired to the position of "Father of the Nation", a man who stood "above tribal and party differences", and offered him its services in 1968. Accordingly, the firm not only regularly published in the local press the results of its public opinion polls, which revealed that the whole country "welcomed" Ankrah as a future President, but also blackmailed foreign firms in Ghana into providing sums of money which it then transferred, in Ankrah's name, to potential members of the presidential electoral college.

p Rumours that Ankrah was secretly conducting a personal electoral campaign, especially when political activity in the country was forbidden, appeared in April 1969 and led to an enquiry. In the end, Ankrah admitted the "error of his ways" before a special commission which included members of the NLC and the Supreme Court, and resigned. A. A. Afrifa became Chairman of the NLC. The way was now clear for further British

manoeuvring. It should be added that the firm of Geafan Ltd., registered in Britain, was formally headed by a Nigerian who had a Swiss wife, and was not involved in any other, similar operations.

p In Accra two versions of Ankrah's exposure were in circulation. According to the first, emanating from the British Embassy, at the end of 1968 British Intelligence received "information" from a number of British firms in Ghana about the financial contributions that were being demanded of them in order to prepare for Ankrah's election as President. British Intelligence recommended these firms to continue payment for a few months, and then informed the other members of the NLC of the matter. Ankrah was removed from his post at the insistence of Harlley, i.e., with the knowledge and consent of his American friends. The second version differs from the first in one small, but substantial, detail: British Intelligence revealed Ankrah's machinations not to the other members of the NLC, but to Afrifa personally, who, despite Hartley's attempts to play the incident down, appointed a commission of enquiry. One other fact is typical. In its edition of the 3 April 1969, prepared before the NLC's announcement of Ankrah's retirement, the London-controlled Ghanaian weekly *Guardian* carried an article setting out the charges against Ankrah in great detail and in very harsh terms.

p But the Ankrah affair was only a stage in the inter-imperialist rivalry in Ghana. As the British African specialist Colin Legum commented, "The power struggle centres on two leaders—Professor K. A. Busia, former leader of the opposition United Party, and Mr. Komlo Gbedemah, Nkrumah's former Minister of Finance".<sup>19</sup> Both returned to the country after the coup. According to Legum, Busia was supported by Afrifa, and behind Gbedemah stood Harlley, who was, moreover, a relative of his. It is true that Gbedemah's position was extremely weak, since he had been Minister of Finance under Nkrumah and, according to a NLC 214 decree, was "disqualified", i.e., stripped of the right to be in government service for 15 years. However, Gbedemah was fully rehabilitated through Harlley's efforts which aroused the indignation of Afrifa, who suggested, as a result, that the Disqualification Commission should be dissolved.

p On the 1 May 1969 the ban on political parties in Ghana was lifted and preparations for parliamentary elections got under way. About twenty parties appeared in the country immediately. However, only the leader of the Progress Party, Busia, and the leader of the National Alliance of Liberals, Gbedemah, possessed the means for setting up party organisations, renting premises, procuring transport and, most important of all, for conducting an electoral campaign. After the parties had been registered, Busia visited London and Gbedemah went to Geneva. As a result of these trips, the funds of both parties were substantially replenished. As was pointed out in Accra's diplomatic circles, the American and West German representatives were convinced that Gbedemah's party would triumph in the elections, while their British and French colleagues were in no doubt that Busia would carry the day.

p In the parliamentary elections that took place in Ghana on the 29 August 1969 a majority of the electorate voted for Busia's Progress Party, which won a total of 105 out

of 140 seats in parliament. Busia headed the first civilian government in Ghana since 1966.

p The end of this “round” in the conflict of imperialist interests in Ghana is noteworthy. After the parliamentary elections the US Embassy in Accra was restaffed almost completely, while the British *Times* of the 25 October 1969 reported with great satisfaction that a democratic Ghana under the realistic leadership of Busia was clearly in Britain’s interest. It went on to say that Ghana was clearly adopting a pro-Western position and favoured co-operation between the Commonwealth countries. Nevertheless, the USA has not set aside the plans for strengthening her political influence in Ghana at the expense of Britain. Accra, which usually figures in the African routes followed by Washington’s representatives, was included in the African tour made by Secretary of State William Rogers in February 215 1970. Ghana remains on the United States’ list of “select” African countries. The activities of the American "Peace Corps" have been stepped up considerably in the country, and the penetration of US private capital into the Ghanaian economy intensified. However, the Ghanaians themselves have caused the imperialist plans to be modified. Military leaders assumed power in Ghana in January 1972. Busia’s regime came to an end, and its leader sought refuge in Britain.

p It was pointed out earlier that the imperialist powers try to make use of crisis situations in individual African countries in order to strengthen their political influence. A clear example of this is provided by the events in Nigeria, once British imperialism’s main springboard in West Africa. In Chapter IX the Nigerian crisis was analysed from the viewpoint of the monopolies’ struggle for the sources of strategic raw materials. That is undoubtedly the main point in the events. Yet they also involve the substantial political interests of the Western powers.

p After the first coup in Nigeria (15 January 1966) differences could already be seen in the views on the country’s future political system between Britain, the USA and France. Washington preferred a unitary system, the speedy abolition of the emirates in the north of the country and feudal relations, and the rapid capitalist development of all the regions, since it considered that in these circumstances the political influence of Britain would inevitably dwindle. Besides, the Americans had by that time managed to establish close ties in the circles of the local bourgeoisie, and British advisers and consultants began to feel the mounting pressure from their American colleagues.

p For its part, London was categorically opposed to the idea of a unitary government. In British plans Nigeria was dissected into a number of territories ruled by a "native administration", i.e., the system of indirect rule was to be restored in slightly changed forms. The *Financial Times*, for example, even suggested that any form of federation should be rejected and that the regions of Nigeria should become completely autonomous entities.

p France was not directly seeking any real political position in Nigeria, but for a number of reasons might have had an 216 interest in seeing the country dismembered. Firstly, this would have eliminated a dangerous economic and political competitor to West African

countries that looked to France. Secondly, there was a prospect of extending French influence to individual regions of Nigeria, especially since many of the leaders and emirs in the Northern Region protested against "Ibo rule" after the coup of January 1966, and threatened to leave the federation. In this connection the British journal *Foreign Report* stated on the 16 June 1966 that Northern leaders had approached the government of the neighbouring Republic of Niger, which once belonged to France, about some form of political union. The journal went on to say that another plan which was being discussed concerned the establishment of ties between Northern Nigeria and Cameroun. And, thirdly, the division of Nigeria would have been a serious blow to the British position in Africa and to the Commonwealth, and would have given France some important cards to play in her political rivalry with Britain: it would have been a clear demonstration of the superiority of French policies in Africa.

p The declaration of Biafran "independence" and the civil war that flared up in Nigeria gave some French circles real reasons to believe that their plans would succeed. Thus, supporting the separatists was a step towards achieving their political, as well as economic, aims.

p London was perfectly well aware of this. "*The Times* declared on the 22 October 1968 that "General de Gaulle is apprehensive that Nigeria's French-speaking neighbours will be drawn into the orbit of Lagos should Nigeria remain one country. . . ." Rumours circulated in London to the effect that Niger had already unofficially informed Nigeria that she would be willing to enter into close co-operation, were it not for her complete dependence on French subsidies. Dahomey was in a similar position. The view was attributed to Paris that such events clearly indicated a "British plot".

p The actions of Britain and France during the events in Nigeria threw into sharp relief their contradictions and the struggle for political influence in West Africa. France's support for Biafra and her partially successful attempts to ensure official recognition of the separatist regime by countries in French-speaking Africa (Ivory Coast and Gabon) were regarded in Britain as parts of a "policy of trying to penetrate former British African territories".<sup>20</sup>

p An examination of the present state and prospects of the Western powers' policies towards the countries of former British Africa that now form part of the Commonwealth of independent states shows that, apart from those rejecting a capitalist orientation, these countries will remain an object of neo-colonialist political rivalry, primarily between the USA and Britain. The former metropolis will not give up its position voluntarily and will make no move to dismantle a structure which assures British imperialism of substantial advantages. Washington, in whose plans Africa is beginning to occupy a more prominent place, will undoubtedly step up its political expansion into the English-speaking countries of Africa. Additionally, Britain is beginning to face political competition in Africa from the FRG, Japan and South Africa (in countries like Malawi, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland) and also, to some extent, from France.

p As for US plans, a number of conclusions can even be drawn from the route followed by Secretary of State William Rogers during his African tour in February 1970. He visited ten countries: Morocco, Tunisia, Ethiopia, Kenya, Zambia, Ghana, Zaire, Nigeria, Cameroun and Liberia. Morocco and Tunisia feature in the US policy towards both Africa and the Arab East. Washington has long had a "special relationship" with Ethiopia, Liberia and Zaire. Of the remaining five countries four are English-speaking, and in them the USA is struggling either for political influence (Kenya and Ghana) or for raw material sources (Nigeria and Zambia). Thus, to some extent, the route followed by Rogers indicates the USA's priority interests. A part of the American press tried to explain the omission from Rogers' tour of the French-speaking countries of Tropical Africa (with the exception of Cameroun) by claiming that the USA was showing a certain restraint towards the zones of French influence.

p Obviously, the language barrier presents some difficulty, but, as will be shown below, plans for acquiring a decisive 218 political influence in French-speaking Africa also form part of Washington's programme.

p *The imperialist political contest in French-speaking Africa.* The main protagonists in the political contest between the imperialist powers in French-speaking Africa are France and the USA. The other competitors to French imperialism in the area—Britain, the FRG, Italy and Japan—are restricted to secondary roles for the present.

p French foreign policy during de Gaulle's presidency caused a considerable deterioration in Franco-American relations as a whole. One of the results of this process was the further deepening of the contradictions between the two powers in the African countries which were formerly French possessions.

p Not so long ago, while pursuing the policy of expansion in Africa, the USA did at least pretend to "respect" France's position, especially when the steps taken affected the former French territories. But in 1966–67 the Americans rejected these tactics and began to act decisively and openly against French interests. Nor was any concern shown for trying to hide the deepening contradictions. On the contrary, American propaganda launched a vigorous anti-French campaign in the African countries.

p Thus, the hidden contradictions between the two Atlantic allies came out into the open in Africa and emerged as out-and-out rivalry.

p In recent years the United States has considerably boosted her political and diplomatic activities in the countries of former French Africa. In 1967 North Africa was visited by the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Joseph Palmer. In January 1968 Vice-President Humphrey was in Tunisia and the Ivory Coast. In June and July of the same year Palmer again toured ten countries of former French Africa (Senegal, Cameroun, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Guinea, Upper Volta, Niger, Chad and the CAR). In 1970 Secretary of State William Rogers visited Morocco, Tunisia and Cameroun.

p In addition, special invitations were issued during 1968– 69 and official visits were paid to Washington by the Presidents of Niger, Cameroun, the Ivory Coast and 219 Tunisia, King Hassan of Morocco and a number of other statesmen from African countries linked by agreements with France.

p US diplomatic activity went hand in hand with measures designed to undermine French influence. Thus, for example, the USA is aware that the Common Afro-Malagasy Organisation (OGAM) is one of France's mainstays in Africa, and has frequently tried to split the organisation and weaken French influence in it. Pointing to the close ties between Washington and President Mobutu, American political commentators also stressed the fact that the USA was a party to the creation at the beginning of 1968 of the Union of Central African States (UEAC), comprising the Congo (Kinshasa), the Republic of Chad and the CAR. The appearance of this union almost torpedoed the Central African Customs and Economic Union (UDEAC), carefully nurtured by France, and so nearly damaged France's political interests as well as her economic ones. In this connection a UPI correspondent reported from Fort Lamy that the new amalgamation was expected to have close relations with Washington.<sup>21</sup> As soon as UEAC had been set up, the Congolese applied, of course, to the USA for help in carrying out the new union's regional projects.

p The USA was instrumental in organising the Monrovia Conference of April 1968, attended by 14 West African countries. America hoped that a new amalgamation would emerge, comprising both French and English-speaking countries. According to the US plan, such an amalgamation might lead to the dissolution of OGAM and, with the help of pro-American representatives of countries like Liberia and Ghana, French influence in the western part of the continent could be openly challenged.

p The US propaganda attack on France's position in Africa also involved "special means". *African Betrayal*,<sup>22</sup> a book written by Charles Darlington, the first American ambassador resident in Gabon, appeared in New York in 1968. It sharply criticised France's "anti-American" policy not only in Gabon but also in other French-speaking countries in Africa. Two chapters were devoted to this theme ("The Seamy Side of Grandeur" and "A Long Way from Lafayette").

220

p At the same time the United States increased the pressure on those African governments which "are not heeding the voice of Washington". This is borne out by the American press campaign of 1968 against President Albert Bongo of Gabon. He was openly accused of "complete dependence" on the former metropolis, and the "evidence" produced included not only the expulsion of the "Peace Corps" from Gabon but also the fact that the Gabonese delegation to the UN had voted against Israel in the debate on the Middle East crisis and the invitation to visit Libreville given to the Minister of Education of the Canadian province of Quebec.



p American propaganda is showing a clear tendency to explain the political instability and economic difficulties of certain African countries by their continued dependence on France. Thus, even the student unrest in Dakar in June 1968 was interpreted in the USA as a direct result of Senegal's serious economic position, brought about purely by the orientation of the Senegalese economy towards France.

p US representatives and the American press are constantly impressing upon countries such as Senegal, the Ivory Coast, the Malagasy Republic and Gabon that they need to carry out a thorough "Africanisation" of government officials, in the economic, political and ideological spheres and in all other areas where Frenchmen are still "running the show"; they, of course, are "obstacles" on the road to "genuine progress" and are impeding the "friendly assistance" that could be given to these countries by the "disinterested American representatives".

p Also relevant in this connection is the series of articles on the Malagasy Republic published in the *Washington Post* at the end of 1967. They were sharply critical of the country's relations with France, and aroused open indignation in the Malagasy Republic itself. The *Washington Post* was obliged to publish a special letter signed by the Malagasy Republic's ambassador to the USA. The letter condemned the "tone and content" of the articles and also declared that "the sarcastic remarks aimed at French aid to Madagascar are ill-founded".^^23^^

p Paradoxical it may seem, but the greatest indignation in the United States is aroused by France's military presence 221 in Africa, brought about by the agreements on "mutual defence". Not a single French military measure in Africa manages to avoid bitter criticism in the American press and official "regret". There are constant disapproving references to the support given by French paratroops to President M'Ba of Gabon in 1964, when a pro-American putsch had been fomented in the country; the sending of French troops to the CAR in November 1967; and the French military exercises in the Ivory Coast, in which a newly created division of the "invasion forces" took part, and so on. It is quite revealing to see that the creation of this military unit, which is kept on permanent stand-by alert, was interpreted by the American press as evidence of France's determination to maintain pro-French regimes in a number of African countries at all costs and to prevent US penetration.

p The propaganda campaign and the practical steps taken by the USA to seize from France the means of wielding political influence in French-speaking Africa have not gone unnoticed in Paris and have given rise to determined opposition. French imperialism still has a sufficiently firm base in its former African possessions from which to take countermeasures. In accordance with the Franco-African agreements that accompanied the granting of independence and which are still maintained, the two sides are obliged to constantly exchange information on international issues with the aim of co-ordinating their foreign policies. In practice, of course, this condition is rather one-sided and had the effect of placing the foreign policies of the young African states under French control. What is more, a special paragraph in the agreement on collaboration in international

politics states that the African countries' UN representatives will keep in constant touch with the representative of France, i.e., will vote according to his recommendations.

p However, with the strengthening of the liberated countries' national statehood and the growth of national awareness and also under the pressure of their imperialist competitors, the ruling circles in France have begun to sense the inadequacy of their existing forms of control over the young states. This gave rise to the idea of "Francophonie": ever since the beginning of 1967 various French politicians, public figures and statesmen have been calling persistently for the amalgamation of the French-speaking countries of Africa into a single organisation headed by France. This plan is connected with the need to establish new principles for Franco-African co-operation. The idea is supported by Senegal's President Senghor, Niger's President Diori and a number of other African leaders. In an open or concealed form "Francophonie" is propagated by the Paris-controlled African press. Supporters of the idea contend that it is only based on France's wish to make maximum use of co-operation with the developing countries in their interests; it is also a constructive alternative to the setting up of regional economic groupings. At the same time, great emphasis is laid on France's "altruism" and "disinterestedness".

p In an article entitled "The International Legacy of General de Gaulle" Michel Debre, France's former Minister of Foreign Affairs (subsequently Minister of Defence), wrote: "Thus, in the space of a few years the African states and Madagascar attained independence, in most cases in an atmosphere of friendship and joy. This decolonisation, effected without difficulty, with one exception, gave rise to the new reality of a relationship of trust between the former metropolis and the young states. . . ." In the same article Debre stressed that it was an important responsibility of France's to "uphold . . . her natural, traditional role in Africa".<sup>24</sup> But if this "role" is to be maintained, then imperialist competitors have to be kept out of the former colonies and French imperialism's shaky position there has to be shored up. In the eyes of its creators, this new version of a community of French-speaking countries went a long way towards achieving these aims.

p News of de Gaulle's resignation brought sighs of relief in the capitals of France's imperialist competitors, since the former President was held to be primarily responsible for France's resistance to pressure from her rivals. But at the same time the changes in France were also used to undermine the African countries' trust in the policies of the new regime. Articles appeared in the American, British, West German and even Swiss press claiming that substantial modifications would be made in France's African policies, that the policies would become "purely pragmatic" and that 223 French-speaking Africa should not pin its former hopes on Paris, but should urgently seek new "allies and partners". The British *Foreign Report* commented: "The governments of Africa's French-speaking states enjoyed a special relationship with General de Gaulle and are very apprehensive at his departure\_\_\_" Providing its own interpretation of the reasons for this apprehension, the journal went on to say that now "France will almost certainly maintain the agreements with countries which are of strategic or economic importance. . . ." This is clarified later: ". . . even a Gaullist like M. Pompidou might think twice before helping President Tombalbaye of Chad. . ." and "There seems little chance that a new French

president will provide President Senghor of Senegal with enough support to get him over his troubles".<sup>25</sup> It was thus impressed upon the governments of Africa's French-speaking countries that they needed to renounce their orientation towards France.

**p** Another device used by France's imperialist competitors consisted of attempts to compromise the African policy pursued by France under de Gaulle and to explain it only in terms of the selfish interests of French ruling circles. Thus, the West German journal *Afrika heute* rams home several basic propositions. The journal thinks that there is "something predatory" in France's African policy and that it fails to reckon "with the ideological or racial boundaries in Equatorial or Southern Africa". The orientation towards overseas territories "can be explained mainly by France's desire to survive in world politics" and to attain "with the help of overseas influence her ultimate aim— hegemony in Europe". The final thesis is that the "spiritual foundation" of France's African policy is "devotion to national interests". The journal has not discovered anything new, since the foreign policy of any bourgeois state is primarily determined by its national interests. The aim, however, is to prove to the Africans that Paris's arguments about "the community of French-language culture" and the "historical traditions" in Franco-African relations and so on are just a facade.<sup>20</sup>

**p** The events of recent years show that de Gaulle's departure has done nothing to lower the intensity of France's rivalry with her Atlantic partners over political influence in 224 the French-speaking countries of Africa. In fact, the imperialist contradictions in the northern part of the continent have even deepened. The causes of this are the Middle East crisis and the seizure of power in Libya by revolutionary democrats, which has had a considerable effect on the imperialist balance of forces in Arab Africa.

**p** Unlike the USA and Britain, France took up, on the whole, a special position from the very start of the 1967 crisis in the Middle East, although during the first days of the fighting she placed an embargo on deliveries of arms to both of the belligerents. In the final analysis, the position was neither pro-Arab nor anti-Israeli. It was determined by the interests of the French monopolist bourgeoisie, which was in search of new markets. France's political manoeuvres over the Middle East crisis are a direct legacy of the general policy that she has been pursuing recently, aimed at ending her economic, military and political dependence on the USA, relegating Britain into the "second division" and refurbishing the French role in Europe. The events in the Middle East in 1967, which directly affected the interests of the USA and Britain and put them into an extremely difficult position *vis-d-vis* the Arab world, provided France with an additional trump in the struggle for influence in North Africa and, consequently, with substantial political gains. At the same time, the contradictions between France and her allies had taken a turn for the worse. In Washington, London and Bonn Paris's actions were seen as betraying the concept of the Atlantic Community and sacrificing Atlantic solidarity to selfish interests.

**p** Particular dissension was caused by the Franco-Libyan negotiations over Libya's purchase of Mirage fighters. These negotiations coincided with the new Libyan Government's decision to rid the country of American and British military bases.

p “The story of the French arms sale to Libya . . . has shaken the credibility of the French Government. . . . It is threatening open deterioration in French-American relations. . . .” That was how the *New York Times* of the 24 January 1970 saw the situation. The basis for this declaration was the growing conviction in US governing circles that the French were positively trying to deceive the Americans.

225

p News of the negotiations in Paris with the Libyan armspurchasing mission first appeared in the *New York Times* on the 19 December 1969, but France’s Ambassador to the USA, Charles Lucet, immediately denied the report. Later, however, officials in Paris admitted that the question of selling Libya 10 or 15 Mirage fighters had been discussed, but said that the figure of 50 that had been mentioned was vastly inflated. US Ambassador Shriver pressed the French Foreign Ministry, and was told that the reported sale of 50 Mirage fighters to Libya was an exaggeration. The situation was clarified by the Minister of Defence, Michel Debre, at a meeting of the French National Assembly’s Defence Committee on the 21 January 1970. He was obliged to declare that all the original reports really had been inaccurate. Libya was to be sold not 50, but 100 planes!

p Washington and London considered this declaration to be a very grave matter indeed. The US Congress and the British Parliament immediately resounded with near-demands for sanctions action to be taken against France. But the French Government was in no mood to give way. At a meeting of the French Council of Ministers on the 30 January 1970 the Centrist leader, Jacques Duhamel, asked: “Is it really necessary to provide military equipment, even over a period of time, in order to replace the British and the Americans in Libya?” President Georges Pompidou replied that “France must have a Mediterranean policy and as powerful a presence as possible”. This was demanded by the country’s “historical role, its policy of *entente* with the Arab countries” and by its centuries-old tradition”.<sup>27</sup> Typically enough, both question and answer were couched in terms that leave no doubt as to France’s strong determination to strengthen her position in North Africa regardless of the objections of her imperialist competitors.

p The Franco-American-British dialogue on the question of political influence in Africa was taken a stage further by a French Government foreign policy statement made in the National Assembly on the 25 April 1970 by the Foreign Minister, Maurice Schumann.

p The Minister emphasised that the aim of France’s Mediterranean policy was to prevent the Mediterranean basin 226 from again becoming an arena for rivalry between the Western powers, and the prime means for achieving this aim was to strengthen co-operation between France and the countries of North Africa, in other words, to re-establish the supremacy of French influence in the area. The statement says that, apart from the French-speaking countries of Africa, with which France “is linked by ties of a special nature”, there are other states—Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia—to which 95 per cent of French teachers and 64 per cent of technical specialists are sent. The success they have attained in economic development, Schumann says, results from the relations which, though fully independent, these countries wish to maintain, above all, with France. A

reply to France's competitors is thus already given in the name of the African countries themselves. Relying on this argument, Schumann declares that France is willing to maintain and develop that presence, that French influence, one of whose virtues is the fact that they are wanted. They form the basis of French Mediterranean policy.

p Nor was the question of Franco-Libyan relations avoided in the statement. Schumann presented them in a rather special light. He pointed to the fact that it was Libya herself which had taken the initiative in suggesting to France that they improve their co-operation, which "is already spreading to the economic and cultural sphere and will do so more and more", and said that in such circumstances "no French Government would have refused".

p The visit paid by the French President, Georges Pompidou, to the United States in February and March 1970 showed again that the contradictions between the two powers had hardly lessened at all. Only their geographical setting had changed slightly—they had largely shifted from Europe to Africa, although Georges Pompidou attempted to join the two continents when he declared that "The Mediterranean is the belly of Europe".<sup>28</sup>

p The problem of Franco-American relations, as projected on to Africa, occupied a prominent place in the statements and speeches made by Georges Pompidou during his American visit. Speaking at a reception in the Waldorf Astoria Hotel on the 2 March 1970, he said: "Of course France has retained a privileged position in the states that have emerged from her former empire, but competition is progressively making its appearance and is now operating there".<sup>29</sup> On the following day, when replying at a press conference to a question about France's policy towards Libya, the French President resorted to a completely unexpected device—he stated that France had not wished to sell Libya planes but had only sought to "establish a presence in Libya, since a vacuum had formed there and we preferred that it should be filled by us".<sup>30</sup> An instructive transformation! France is now turning America's weapon against America. The French weekly *France Nouvelle* comments that the "vacuum theory" was invented by American imperialism in order that "each time that French or British colonialism was beaten somewhere in the world it would be replaced by an American presence on the pretext of 'filling a vacuum'". Seen from this point of view, Pompidou's Libyan policy is no departure from neo-colonialist practices.<sup>31</sup>

p The measures taken by France to ward off an American penetration into North Africa included a reconciliation with Tunisia and Morocco, assisting the settlement of frontier and other disputes between Algeria and Tunisia, Morocco and Mauritania, the conclusion of an agreement with Libya and the offering of credits to Morocco and Algeria. In conjunction with a number of other actions, these tactics brought France definite political gains.

In a television interview on his return from the USA on the 12 March 1970 President Pompidou summed up his visit as follows: "...we noticed that of course French policy and United States policy are not the same thing, but basically our long-term and general objectives come very close to one another, and, if the way of approaching them, the way

of looking at questions, is not always the same, all that we have to do in the end is to talk in order to understand one another and consequently in order to either support one another or at least, as it were, to put up with one another".<sup>32</sup> If one reads between the lines, this statement indicates that there are profound disagreements between the two powers, and mere talking will hardly be enough to ensure that the imperialist rivals will permanently "put up with one another" in Africa.

228

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**p** This analysis of some aspects of the inter-imperialist struggle for political influence in the liberated countries of Africa allows one to draw the following conclusions.

**p** Firstly, the struggle shows that the tendencies towards political integration and disintegration within modern imperialism not only co-exist, but are competing with one another, with the second tendency often gaining the upper hand in Africa. Although their policies are a mixture of Atlanticist and Eurocentric elements, the West European former metropolises have no wish, however, to extend this combination to the "overseas" zones of their traditional influence. Secondly, the incidence of political conflict between the imperialist powers in the developing countries indicates that each power is trying in its own way and in accordance with its own interests to handle the common class task of setting up in these countries a state political structure that meets the interests of imperialism as a whole.

**p** Thirdly, the nature and level of the political rivalry between the imperialist powers in different part of Africa underline the fact that this rivalry is taking on its most noticeable forms in countries which are obediently treading the capitalist path. The imperialist forces present a considerably more united front towards the young states that have chosen a socialist orientation.

**p** The political contest between the imperialist powers inflicts undoubted harm on the young states and impedes their internal consolidation. In their rivalry the imperialists rely on forces which, although competing among themselves, are nevertheless pro-imperialist and are opposed to progressive transformations in their countries.

The outlook for the inter-imperialist struggle for political influence in the developing countries depends on the extent to which the tendency towards integrating policies and carrying out a common anti-socialist strategy will prove capable of surmounting the limitations created by the internal processes of imperialism and the general correlation of forces in the modern world.



## **CHAPTER XI**

### **IDEOLOGICAL RIVALRY AND THE MASS MEDIA**

p The central problem in the socio-political life of free Africa is the choice of a path for development and consequently the theoretical search for an ideological basis of socio-political and economic construction. The active process of forming political ideas is taking place in many African countries; Africa is seeing the appearance of new and modified old ideological currents, backed up by broad social strata. These currents represent a curious synthesis of borrowed and local ideas, with the bourgeois ideology of the West exerting a strong influence on the African intelligentsia which is working out the political ideas.

p In this situation imperialism has not only expanded economically and politically in Africa but has also launched a massive ideological offensive, based on anti-communism. The imperialists realise that the collapse of colonial domination has already significantly extended the scope of the world revolutionary process, has undermined the international position of capitalism and has helped to change the international balance of forces in favour of socialism. Equally clear to them is the fact that the national liberation movement has reached new heights and that the forces which oppose not only imperialist domination and the consequences of colonialism, but also capitalism as a social system are consolidating their position. The ideological expansion of imperialism in Africa is, therefore, directed primarily at walling off the young states from the influence of the socialist countries and socialist ideas, perpetuating the bourgeois ideology among the masses and splitting the progressive forces, in order to prevent the national liberation revolutions from developing into socialist revolutions.

p At first glance, imperialism seems to be presenting a united front ideologically. Given the ideological struggle between the two systems and from the viewpoint of imperialism's global strategy and its ultimate aims, the imperialist powers really are united in this sphere. However, owing to the 230 specific interests of monopoly capital groups from different countries, they are also locked in bitter rivalry over certain aspects of the ideological expansion in the developing countries. A clash is taking place in the methods of ideological persuasion, which is supposed to ensure that the decisive political influence in a liberated country belongs to a particular imperialist state.

p The common ideological strategy of modern neo-colonialism is to convince the African countries that it is necessary and advisable to follow the development pattern of the West. However, by the "West" nearly every imperialist power means primarily "itself", its own experience of development. Consequently, bitter contradictions arise between them. This can be seen even from the interpretation by bourgeois academics from different states of such fashionable concepts as "interdependence", "partnership" and "mutual benefit". Thus, the American sociologists and Africanists G. Roberts, Adolf Berle, Vernon McKay, Rupert Emerson, Walt Rostow and others give a broad interpretation to the concept of "interdependence" and extend it to include the newly

independent countries' relation with the whole capitalist world. At the same time, their European colleagues insist on the inevitable "interdependence" of the African countries and the former metropolises.<sup>1</sup> This theory was expounded, for example, by French sociologists at the international gathering organised at France's suggestion in the town of Bouake (Ivory Coast) in 1962. A similar viewpoint is held by the Austrian bourgeois publicist Hugo Portisch, who asserts that the fate of the African countries is inseparably linked only with Europe, which built towns, roads and railways in Africa and created the mining industry and farming, "but never ruled over Africa".<sup>2</sup> The British sociologist Brian Crozier maintains that the former British colonies and Great Britain are "eternally interdependent".<sup>3</sup>

**p** When recommending young states to follow the capitalist pattern of economic development, American writers have in mind only the experience of the United States. US policy envisages that the modernisation process may take a number of forms in the young African states, but the vital condition to be observed is American patronage in the most important economic, political and ideological areas. In his book *Capitalism and American Leadership* Professor Oliver Cox of the University of Lincoln (Nebraska) wrote in 1962 that the ability of the capitalist system to survive economically "depends upon every cubit of colonial and semi-colonial territory" and that "The United States as a consequence of its leadership, sits at the top of an international structure which rests upon a broad base of backward economics".<sup>4</sup> This thesis was widely developed in many subsequent works by apologists of the USA's leading role in the modernisation of African states and, particularly, in the ideological moulding of their peoples. Originally it was a question of the USA's wish to merely supplement the waning influence of the former metropolises by her own influence, i.e., to compensate for the European imperialist powers' "ideological losses" in Africa. But by the end of the sixties there was a strong tendency to promote American ideological supremacy in the liberated countries of Africa. This tendency was also a result of the effect on Washington's policies of the decisive factor in modern times—the struggle and competition between the two world systems. Relying on the thesis of "resisting communist infiltration", the USA is trying to convince not only the African peoples but also her West European allies that only the "American version" of bourgeois ideology is capable of halting the spread of socialist ideas in Africa and the growing influence of the Soviet Union and other states of the socialist community.

**p** The governing circles of the other Western powers do not share this viewpoint. Consequently, the imperialist struggle for "ideological supremacy" in Africa takes the form not of theoretical discussions but of clashes between different practical steps. Without going as far as to create a serious flareup of inter-imperialist contradictions, both Britain and, particularly, France are nevertheless constantly resisting their rival's pretensions.

**p** When "granting" independence to her African colonies, Britain immediately took steps to ensure that she retained control over the young states' ideology and, consequently, over their mass media. The British ruling circles saw in this an important

means of preserving and strengthening British imperialism's influence and position in the territories of the former empire.

232

p The problem of political influence in Britain's wish to retain control over the liberated colonies' ideology is closely bound up with many psychological factors engendered by imperial traditions. As, for example, Ali Mazrui points out, the British have long considered themselves to be the "moral leader" of humanity. "Britons visualise themselves as playing 'Greeks' to American 'Romans', saving Europe from itself. . . ."<sup>5</sup> It is natural that these pretensions should be primarily disseminated among the peoples of the liberated countries, and especially those in the former British colonies in Africa. However, since the USA has similar pretensions, rivalry has sprung up between the two countries as to which one is to be the "teacher".

p A number of African academics and political leaders point out that British culture (especially literature) has exerted a considerable influence on the development of political ideas in Africa. To some extent, one can agree with this view. But Britain's principal means of influencing the liberated peoples is not classical literature at all, but the mass media, and it is in this sphere that the bitterest interimperialist rivalry between the Western countries is taking place.

p In order to ensure control of the propaganda organs in the liberated African countries, the relevant British foundations and newspaper monopolies have taken a number of measures which can be conveniently classified under three headings: the creation of new organs, the seizure of existing ones and the more active use of those in which Britons already had some influence.

p London's ideological expansion takes on a different colouring according to the specific conditions in each individual African country, the international situation and the current objectives of British policy. But its main purpose is to rehabilitate the colonial policies of the past, to disguise neocolonialism and to strengthen Britain's political influence. Moreover, as American penetration into former British Africa becomes more intense, the activities of the Londonbased propaganda machinery are taking on a more perceptible anti-American tone.

p France is trying even harder than Britain to retain ideological supremacy in the countries of former French Africa. 233 The British historian Teresa Hayter comments: "Immediately after the independence of the States, the French were mainly concerned to maintain their influence and positions in Africa."<sup>6</sup>

p The first series of measures to this end took the form of the conclusion of a cultural collaboration agreement with each newly independent country. Apart from listing mutual obligations, these agreements put particular emphasis on the "moral and intellectual" solidarity of the African countries with France. They provide for the broad dissemination of French language and culture and, more important, the inculcation of pro-French

sentiments and the retention of French influence. The significance of French culture to Africa has been frequently stressed by various French academics and publicists. Thus, the well-known sociologist Alfred Sauvy observed that an analysis of French "aid" to the former colonies reveals that economic and political interests are closely interwoven with cultural interests and that "the motive force of development is not money, as has long been thought, is not capital, but culture.. . ."<sup>7</sup>

p It is not, however, possible to agree with some writers' contention that the earnest dissemination of French culture in the former colonies is almost an end in itself, determined by tradition and historical ties. Paris's ideological expansion is only a means of attaining political aims and is a weapon in the inter-imperialist struggle. This is supported at least by the fact that the arguments about "collaboration", "partnership", etc., produced by the ideologists behind French policy in Africa are constantly permeated by one thought—France alone can and must offer the liberated countries a special, "third" road of development, differing both from the capitalist and socialist paths. The idea was most clearly formulated in 1964 in the report of the Jannene Commission,<sup>8</sup> which was set up on the instructions of the President and whose recommendations formed the basis for all later French "aid and collaboration" policy.

p France's competitors point out in this connection that, from Paris's point of view, the "solidarity that ignores overseas cultural boundaries" is more important than West European solidarity, and that, for example, "the contradictions between Great Britain and France . . . result from a 234 foreign policy concept" in which the most important spiritual element is French-language culture.<sup>9</sup>

p The French ruling circles have created an extensive mechanism for cultural expansion into Africa. There are 78 cultural centres, about 700 libraries and exhibitions and a host of other propaganda organs functioning in the French-speaking countries of Africa. Their work is supervised by special cultural advisers. Radio propaganda and the press receive considerable attention. The commission for collaboration in French-language broadcasting is in constant touch with local radio stations, designs programmes for them and provides equipment.

p France is ahead of all the other Western powers in the number of periodicals devoted to Africa. About 30 different journals dealing with African affairs and French policy in the continent are published in Paris alone. In addition, some 35 newspapers and other publications that appear in the African countries themselves are controlled from Paris. France accounts for over one-third of the Western countries' total expenditure on propaganda and cultural activities in Africa.

p In recent years the concept of "Francophonie", referred to above, - has come to occupy a prominent place among the measures designed to ensure French cultural influence in Africa. President Senghor of Senegal defined "Francophonie" in the following terms: "It is a way of thinking and acting: a way of posing problems and seeking solutions to them.... In brief, apart from the French language and civilisation, Francophonie is, more precisely, the spirit of that civilisation, i.e., French Culture."<sup>10</sup> But the main task of

“Francophonía” is, as Leopold Senghor interprets it, to see that a community of French-speaking countries blocks the penetration of American influence in Africa and helps to maintain the French “cultural presence”.

p The idea of “Francophonía” is also given a material embodiment. A conference held at Niamey in February 1969 examined a plan for setting up in the French-speaking countries an agency for cultural and technical assistance with an annual budget of 30 million francs. The West German journal *Afrika heute* estimates that there are already 74 “Francophonía” institutes of various kinds (associations, 235 societies, foundations, centres, etc.). Thus, the journal goes on to say, France “has a foreign policy vehicle that is not available to other countries” and is righting against her competitors with her own “weapons system”.<sup>11</sup> The idea evokes resistance from France’s imperialist rivals. They see it as a renunciation of collective strategy and as a tendency to put the slogan “Africa for the French” into practice.

p Facts show that, together with the export of capital, ideological measures have recently become one of the main instruments of American expansion into Africa. In the midsixties US Government circles had already reached the conclusion that, in view of their political goals, economic “aid” alone to the African countries was not achieving the desired results. The benefits were not living up to expectations. Consequently, Americans were becoming increasingly disillusioned with the conduct of a number of African nations. The policy review swung in favour of cutting down on the volume of economic “aid” and transferring the money to the ideological sphere. The first official signal of these changes was given in a speech made by President Johnson in May 1966 to African ambassadors in Washington. Later the main principles of the USA’s “new approach” to Africa were formulated, on White House instructions, by Edward Korry, the former US Ambassador to Ethiopia, in the document that became known as the “Korry Report”. Essentially, the document calls for maximal returns on minimal outlays. The conclusion of the need for an all-out expansion of the ideological campaign as the most effective means of penetrating the African continent is also contained in more recent American documents on Africa, as, for example, in US Secretary of State William Rogers’ report *The USA and Africa in the Seventies*.

p In order to mount the ideological assault on Africa, an extensive network of organisations has been set up in the USA and is constantly enlarged and modified in accordance with the changing situation in Africa. The system includes not only specialised services like the US Information Agency and the “Peace Corps”, for example, but also numerous private organisations and foundations, as well as practically all the institutions in the country which have any connection with foreign policy.

236

p At the International Meeting of Communist and Workers’ Parties held in Moscow in June 1969 Leonid Brezhnev, the General Secretary of the CC CPSU, pointed out that today “imperialism cannot count on success if it openly proclaims its true aims. It is obliged to create a whole system of ideological myths which cloak the real nature of its

intentions and undermine the peoples' vigilance".<sup>12</sup> Among the new myths created by American propaganda for African consumption there are some which are not only blatantly anticommunist in content but also serve aims in the inter-imperialist struggle and assert the USA's hegemony in ideology and politics. Thus, there is constant reiteration of the thesis that the USA is the "centre" of modern civilisation and is "the world's moral leader", although in the eyes of the liberated countries Britain, the FRG and France lay claim to the same role. It is impressed upon the peoples of the European powers' former colonies that only America is capable of understanding their current needs and long-term objectives. At the same time, American propaganda assumes the undisputed right to interpret and explain the processes that are taking place in the liberated countries, and even the essence of decolonisation. As for the "methodological" basis of the USA's ideological intrusion into the zones of influence of her European allies, the course steered recently was towards "positivism"—the demonstration of the "selfless" interest that America, unlike the former colonialists, had in the destiny of the liberated countries and her willingness to offer them her assistance in overcoming the disasters of the colonial period. In this way, the USA is offering the African peoples an "American alternative" to the West European thesis of "interdependent evolution".

[p](#) These tactics found their most complete embodiment in the American version of the "third road" for African countries that was advanced in the face of the similar French and British concepts. The concepts sound identical, but differ substantially as to who will guide the developing countries along the so-called "third road". Joseph Slater, the former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Cultural Affairs and later one of the Directors of the Ford Foundation, declares, for example, that the less-developed countries "... are 237 not likely to travel the road along which the Western industrialised nations moved into the twentieth century". Therefore, American ideologists offer a different version—the USA must "provide a third road, along which the lessdeveloped countries can move forward. ..."<sup>13</sup> This is all the more "natural", since, as Edward Murrow, the former Director of USIA, puts it, America is not worried by change, she has no wish to perpetuate the status quo and she has always had a bent for change and revolution.<sup>14</sup>

[p](#) Apart from treating Africa to information that demonstrates the USA's "interest" in "modernising" the liberated countries and advertises the American prescription for their development, the USA is making a determined effort to implant American culture there. In this field too Washington is encountering the opposition of the former metropolises. Ali Mazrui declares: "This cultural onslaught is not being accepted entirely without resistance. It has given rise to a special form of cultural anti-Americanism, particularly marked among the populations of America's own allies in Western Europe."<sup>15</sup> The USA's "cultural onslaught" on Africa serves political aims and is an important means of poisoning the masses ideologically and spiritually.

[p](#) While propaganda involving concepts for "development" and other theoretical formulations is directed mainly at the governing circles in African countries, the cultural methods are designated for the ordinary African. This method accords fully with the American doctrine of "the battle for men's minds". Victory in this battle, in the view of its creators, holds out the promise of political hegemony. Further development of this



theme can be found in the works of many American imperialist ideologists. Thus, for example, Sargent Shriver, the former Director of the "Peace Corps", wrote: "The source of any political process is in the minds and hearts of people. It is in the towns and villages, on farms and in factories, in unions and in schools, wherever people live and work and talk and learn, that world politics begins."<sup>16</sup> But the USA is not alone in trying to find the way to the "minds and hearts" of the Africans. Britain, France and the FRG are making efforts in this direction that are just as determined, and this produces rivalry and struggle.

**p** The geography of the USA's ideological expansion into Africa shows that the brunt of the invasion is being borne by those countries which are of greatest interest to the former metropolises and where the latter have a considerable opportunity for ideological persuasion. Thus, the vanguard of US ideological sabotage, the Information Agency, had 70 information centres in Africa in 1969, but most of them, and the largest of them, were located in Kenya, Nigeria, Uganda, Ghana, Morocco and *Zaire*. In Accra the USIA publishes a monthly magazine, *American Outlook*, with a circulation of over 100,000; a similar magazine, *Perspectives Americaines*, is produced in French in Kinshasa; in Nigeria and Uganda a branch of the USIA prints periodicals and pamphlets, which are sent out to various institutions and individuals, and so on. In addition, in Nigeria a magazine called *Nigerian American Quarterly* is published specially for students, and in Uganda a Uganda-American Cultural Association has even been set up. The USIA's main "allAfrica" publications—the magazines *Topic*, *Ebony* and *Dialogue*—are also mainly distributed in those countries where there is no shortage of their British and French counterparts.

**p** Speaking in 1963 before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the US Congress's House of Representatives, Edward Murrow, then Director of the USIA, gave the following formulation of the main aims of the USIA in Africa:<sup>17</sup>

**p** —to depict the United States as a country which looked with particular sympathy and understanding on the problems confronting the Africans;

**p** —to present the Africans with a favourable picture of the progress and achievements made by Negroes in the USA and to remind Africa that 20 million American citizens were Negroes; and

**p** —to represent the American experience of social development as being the most suitable for Africa, under the slogan, moreover, of "in our mutual undertakings we are the children of similar revolutions".

**p** It is not difficult to see that purely American interests lurk behind these aims of the USIA, and some points are deliberately designed to undermine the influence in Africa of the USA's European allies.

p One of the USIA's main instruments is the Voice of America radio station, which broadcasts in English, French and many African languages, giving African countries 120 hours of programmes every week. According to the directors of this service, the broadcasts of the Voice of America are intended to become a vital ingredient of the Africans' spiritual life, i.e., to ensure the USA's ideological leadership.

p Bitter rivalry between the imperialist competitors can be seen in the field of African television. Britain and France are ahead of the USA in organising television stations in a number of African countries, but in recent years American television has been invading the continent with ever greater vigour and using the latest technical advances.

p The International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium (INTELSAT) was set up at an international conference in Washington in 1964. Its members now include 14 African countries. The influence of the USA predominates in the consortium, since 53 per cent of the capital and over half the votes are in the hands of the American Communications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT).

p The USA attaches great importance to communications satellites in activating her ideological expansion in Africa. A special African section was even created within COMSAT. In order to attract African countries into INTELSAT, the Americans drastically reduced membership dues for them. Considerable cuts have also been made in the cost of organising receiving stations in Africa to link up with the Atlantic-2 satellite. In 1969 stations were established in the Ivory Coast, Morocco, Nigeria and Senegal; in 1970—in Cameroun, Kenya, Ethiopia and the Sudan. Stations were built in Zambia (1971) and in Algeria (1972).

p A significant role in establishing the USA's ideological supremacy in Africa is played by private charitable foundations, all the more so since her European rivals do not possess such powerful foreign policy instruments. Making use of their enormous funds and the support of US Government agencies, the foundations' emissaries are hard at work in a number of African countries.

240

p The Ford Foundation made its African debut in 1951. Since then 10 million dollars has been allocated annually for various "African programmes". The bulk of the funds was spent on training the young African states' administrative personnel and especially their top civil servants. The Foundation's 1967 report declared that high priority was given to the training of officials and students capable of government service.<sup>18</sup>

p The Ford Foundation has frequently offered direct opposition to the measures taken by the former metropolises. Thus, the Commonwealth Foundation, set up in the midsixties with British Government backing, intended to offer financial assistance to Nigeria for the construction of an agricultural institute in Ibadan. Using its considerably broader financial resources, the Ford Foundation seized the initiative, and in the end the institute was built with American allocations.

p Typically enough, the Ford Foundation concentrates on the English-speaking countries of Africa, "...while its activities in African countries closely associated with France are on a very small scale. ...",<sup>19</sup> This is explained by the fact that the French are putting up stiffer resistance to the Foundation's activities than the British, which is taken into account by the American "benefactors".

p All the measures taken by the Ford Foundation in Africa appear outwardly to be charitable, but they are pursuing purely political objectives. The carrying out of every project is accompanied by a propaganda campaign stressing the "selflessness" of US policy, the high level of US development, her scientific and technological superiority, and so on. The head of the Foundation's Africa Section is Fredericks Wayne, an experienced diplomat who from 1961 to 1967 held the post of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs.

p The Ford Foundation's expansion in Africa has grown both broader and deeper in recent years. Its programmes are beginning to involve the most varied strata of the population. The 1969 annual report on the Ford Foundation's activities in Africa states that the Foundation is gradually changing its priorities in the granting of aid. In many countries support was originally given to the main 241 educational institutes and for the consolidation of the still inexperienced administrative services. Now the Foundation is extending aid to social development at a more complex stage.<sup>20</sup>

p It is symptomatic that among the countries whose "social development" is of primary interest to the Foundation we find precisely those African states that were selected by the USA and classified as being "key" countries: Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya, Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, Liberia and Zaire.

p The political orientation of the Foundation's activities is clearly exemplified by its attitude to Ghana. While Nkrumah was in office, the Foundation ignored Ghana, although it encountered no resistance from the Ghanaian authorities; but the coup of 1966 was marked by a massive inflow of Foundation money into the country. The programmes financed are noteworthy: the salaries of American advisers in a number of Ghanaian ministries and assistance to the University of Ghana's School of Administration, to name but two.

p The influence of other US monopoly capital foundations is also growing in the English-speaking countries of Africa. Thus, the Rockefeller Foundation spends about 2 million dollars in these countries every year. It has, for example, been giving financial "aid" for several years now to various colleges and the University of East Africa in Uganda. The Foundation's specialists are working in many educational establishments. The Carnegie Corporation first took notice of Africa in 1927. Now it provides funds (some 800,000 dollars annually) mainly for the same purposes as the other two foundations.

p An important part in the brainwashing of Africans is played by American missions. Rupert Emerson mentions that "Politically the missions have been attacked ... accused ... of having a large share of responsibility for stirring up nationalist disaffection. . .

.”<sup>21</sup> Clearly, there is some reason for these accusations by the former metropolises. American religious organisations have amassed a great deal of experience of work in Africa, and after most African countries had attained independence, their activities in them increased considerably. Catholic and Protestant 242 organisations publish magazines in Africa and even have radio stations at their disposal.

p The main task of American missionaries in Africa is to fight communism. But their activities are also directed against the USA’s European competitors, whose policies in Africa are gradually discredited by the American missionaries. They preach the USA’s non-participation in colonialism, unlike the European powers, her “philanthropy”, “understanding” of the African soul, and so on.

p In recent years, adapting their activities to the demands of the times, American missionary groups in Africa have also been participating in carrying out various agricultural projects, have pioneered the founding of co-operatives and have financed the building of roads, various workshops and so on.

p The Church’s intrusion into this purely temporal sphere is also officially explained by the requirements of the struggle against communism. In his book *Christianity and the New Africa* the well-known churchman Thomas Beetham writes that only by helping to solve Africa’s basic problems is it possible to eliminate the conditions which make communist ideology attractive to the Africans.<sup>22</sup> In practice, however, this “help” has another side. Making use of the fact that rural areas in most African countries are generally far removed from political and social life and that their populations have often not even heard the word “communism” yet have a perfect grasp of the idea “British or French colonialist”, the missionaries openly indulge in proAmerican propaganda among the local people and do their utmost to contrast the USA with the former metropolises.

p Paying tribute in his book to the activities of the American Church in Africa, the former ambassador William Attwood recalls how during his trip through Guinea the missionaries working there told him proudly that as a result of their sermons “. . . the people in their area were finally saying nice things about America. . . .”<sup>23</sup>

Naturally, one should not attribute too much importance to the rivalry between the imperialist powers over their ideological influence on the liberated countries. Ultimately, they have a common strategic aim, determined by the struggle between the two world systems. But, at the same 243 time, the analysis and consideration of inter-imperialist competition in this sphere, the nature of the conflict between methods of ideological expansion that are aimed at strengthening the political influence of the “national” imperialism in a particular liberated country can help progressive forces to select the most effective counter-measures and to work out an anti-imperialist counter-strategy.

## CHAPTER XII

### THE TRAINING OF NATIONAL PERSONNEL AS A PART OF THE INTER-IMPERIALIST STRUGGLE

p The training of national personnel is one of the most important tasks confronting the newly independent countries of Africa on the way to achieving genuine independence and the final elimination of the consequences of colonial rule.

p The imperialist powers approach the question of training national personnel in Africa from several positions. Firstly, since they have an economic interest in increasing the role of the liberated countries as a source of profits and, consequently, in their development, they are obliged to provide the young states with help in organising systems of general and specialised education, while trying, however, to retain full control over this process. Secondly, the imperialist powers try to use their influence on the formation of national personnel in order to exert general ideological pressure on broad sectors of local opinion. Thirdly, the training of local personnel is viewed by the West as the means of creating a new social support in the liberated countries; it will be the vehicle of bourgeois ideas and will help neocolonialism to achieve its main goal—the retention of the developing countries within the system of the capitalist mode of production.

p Thus, the imperialist powers appear to be united as regards the aims and tasks in this sphere, and there seems to be nothing that would give rise to contradictions. Yet there is bitter rivalry here too. It is explained by the fact that the training of national personnel in the liberated 244 countries is also indissolubly linked with the prospects for the exercise of political influence on them by the capitalist state which is controlling the process.

p The imperialists themselves make no secret of the fact that it is now a matter of their national interests—a question of which of the imperialist powers will acquire a decisive influence in a particular developing country. The former metropolises are jealously preserving their supremacy in the training of national personnel, and their main competitors are the USA and the FRG.

p Pointing out that there is a constant stream of people from all over the world into British universities and that this is "a stream which must be preserved, whatever its marginal cost to the overstrained economics of British education", the journal *The Political Quarterly* concluded significantly: "Britain's major universities are still international centres of learning and, if they do not remain such, the loss of this position will be as much a disaster in the long run to Britain as a naval defeat would have been in the days when sea power was the dominant force in history."<sup>1</sup> The explanation for this is that, owing to the disintegration of the colonial empire, British ruling circles have proceeded to create an extensive system of attracting to Britain students from the former colonies in order to give them an education within the British tradition and to "unobtrusively" mould their general view of the world in a way that suits the former metropolis. The process of saturating the liberated countries with British teachers went hand in hand with this. The true objectives of these measures are revealed in a statement

made by the former Minister of Defence for the Royal Navy, Christopher Mayhew: "In the battle for international influence we shall at last be fully deploying our most powerful weapon—the English language. . . .The world's demand for teachers of English will be insatiable, and will provide Britain with a superb opportunity to help and befriend developing countries."^^2^^ The British Minister equates assisting education in the developing countries with "the battle for international influence". There is good reason for this. The need to "grant" political independence to the colonies and trust territories gave rise to the problem for British imperialism of creating a new "human infrastructure" in the 245 liberated countries, capable of preserving the British position in changed circumstances. As Lenin pointed out, neocolonialism is, like any other policy, "conducted through people". Like the other Western powers, Britain saw that the difficulty could be resolved only by specially training the young states' governing personnel and by promoting it to key posts in the state, party and trade union machinery.

p The main British method for creating a new social support in the liberated countries came to be the training of "allies" of Britain from various strata of the local population. From the beginning of the sixties Britain's foreign policy-makers and the political science serving these circles increasingly appreciated the obvious fact that military force could no longer be employed against young states that had won their political independence and that methods involving economic pressure were insufficient. They needed other channels of direct and indirect political influence—in other words, people occupying posts in the state machinery, the army, the police, the political parties and trade unions, in the economic sphere, etc., who would obediently act in accordance with the interests of British imperialism.

p Britain employs many methods for training its supporters in the young states of Africa. One important method is to "Anglicise" selected persons. In his book *Independence and After* the British sociologist Richard Harris states, for example, that in most cases the native of a developing country returning home after spending several years in British educational establishments is unlikely to participate in struggle against imperial rule, since ". . .British example is here the only one worth quoting"/

p According to Harris, Anglicised men and the governments they form only appear formally to be independent. The author is, of course, exaggerating the role of the method he suggests. Certainly not all the students from the liberated countries that were once British colonies become "Anglicised". Nevertheless, London is at great pains to retain control over the training of personnel, especially for the English-speaking countries of Africa.

p Incidentally, it should be noted that the "Anglicisation" theory is not an invention of Harris's. He has simply given a pseudo-scientific form to a thesis advanced by Anthony 246 Eden while he was the Prime Minister of Britain. Referring to the steps to be taken to preserve British influence in Cyprus, Eden pointed out to the Colonial Secretary that "There might be much to be gained by the provision of an institution of university status, linked with our own universities, which would help to wean the Cypriots away from the cultural attraction of Athens".^^4^^



p Of the practical steps taken by Britain the most important was the throwing open of the doors of British universities and other educational establishments to students from the young states. There were over 45,000 students from the newly independent states in Britain in 1963. In 1967 the number of foreign students in this category had already reached 53,700 (of whom 44,411 came from Commonwealth countries), and in 1970 the figure was over 70,000, of whom about 11,000 were Africans. At the same time, the stream of British teachers sent to the liberated countries increased.

p In dealing with the task of training and fostering “Anglicised” personnel in the developing countries through the method of “controlled” university education, the British ruling circles are constantly perfecting the co-ordinating and administrative bodies necessary for the job. The Association of Universities of the British Commonwealth was founded in 1948. In 1963 it was renamed the Association of Commonwealth Universities. It co-ordinates and controls the activities of about 150 higher educational establishments in more than 20 countries.

p The Association annually sends 150 professors and lecturers to overseas universities to carry out the "agreed higher education policy", i.e., the policy that is in the interests of the former metropolis. The Association also regulates the flow of students from the liberated countries into British universities. In 1964–65 consideration was given to a proposal for setting up a special university for Commonwealth students in London. However, the idea was rejected since it was felt that, in order to set coloured students in a proBritish mould, it was better to disperse them among all the British educational establishments.

p The stepping up of inter-imperialist rivalry in the training of national personnel for the African countries, and also the growing influence in this field of the states of the 247 socialist community compelled the ruling circles of Britain to introduce organisational reforms in 1970.

p Their aim is to further centralise the administration and control of the educational systems of the newly independent countries.

p A new Centre for Educational Development Overseas (CEDO), set up by the Ministry for Overseas Development, was opened in London on the 1 April 1970. It is part of CEDO's functions "to provide information, advice and other help to those concerned with the modernisation of education at all levels".^^5^^ CEDO maintains a close liaison with the British Council. British Council representatives in the developing countries will also act as representatives for CEDO. The new body's practical functions involve the creation of local educational centres and systems in the developing countries, the organisation of training in Britain and locally for teachers and directors of educational establishments and the introduction of new teaching methods, including the use of radio and television.

p Typically enough, the activities of this body extend beyond the Commonwealth countries. It has representatives, for example, in Ethiopia and a number of other African states.

p France has also taken urgent measures to protect the zones of her interests in Africa from the ideological expansion of the USA and her other competitors. The French had an easier time than the British in this respect, since France's system of direct colonial rule had enabled her to deal in advance with many of the staffing questions in the dependent countries. Then, through the agreements on collaboration in education that had been concluded with the former colonies, their school system and further and higher educational establishments were placed under the complete control of Paris. The French language was the only medium of instruction, the syllabuses were those of France and the teachers were French. John Hargreaves, Professor of History at the University of Aberdeen (USA), observes: "The French, even more concerned than the British that standards at the peak of the educational system should be as high as those in France, proceeded very cautiously toward the creation of University institutions in Africa. . . ." This 248 was necessary "to train Africans for the highest position. . . ."^^6^^

p Carefully pursuing their adopted course, the French Government sent teaching staff on a massive scale to the former African colonies immediately after they had attained independence. In 1968 there were about 28,000 French teachers in the countries of French-speaking Africa, together with some 1,260 lecturers in further and higher educational establishments. In these same countries there are also several dozen purely French schools and a host of lecture foundations of the institute type.

p In order to control this network, special administrative organs were set up in Paris, headed by the State Secretariat for the Affairs of Overseas Departments and Territories and the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs, which is responsible for collaboration with the countries of Tropical Africa. Among the main French institutions dealing with the training and retraining of national personnel are the University Association for the Development of Education and Culture in Africa and Madagascar, the Committee for Developing Scientific Exchanges between the French-Language Universities, the Foundation for Higher Education in Central Africa, the International Institute of State Administration, the International Institute of Law of the French-Speaking Countries and a number of others. In all, some 260 different organisations are active in the field.

p Paris devotes particular attention to the French-speaking African countries' military personnel. It is stipulated in agreements that such personnel must be trained only in France. In 1968–69 2,600 African servicemen, including 673 Algerians, were being trained in French military colleges. Apart from this, in order to give "aid on the spot" with the building up of the African countries' armed forces, French instructors and special missions are there on a permanent basis. In 1969 there were 18 such missions and a total of about 2,500 commissioned and non-commissioned officers.

p The Universities of Dakar, Tananarive, Abidjan, Yaounde and Porto Novo and a centre for higher education in Brazzaville were founded with French help and staffed with French lecturers. The French authorities are keeping a 249 jealous eye on these universities, so as to ensure that not a single lecturer from any other country joins them without French permission.

p The number of Africans studying in France is also constantly growing. In the 1959/60 academic year there were about 3,000 of them, and in 1968/69 over 6,000, or 15 per cent of the total number of foreign students at French centres of higher education. Typically enough, the overwhelming majority of the Africans are reading arts subjects. This reflects the tendency of the French ruling circles to give priority to ensuring the political and cultural influence of the former metropolis in the young states. This purpose is also served by the Association for the Instruction and Reception of Overseas Technicians, set up in 1960 under the auspices of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Finance and the Economy and a number of private foundations. The Association not only caters for the trainees' specialised education, but also sees to it that they are ideologically indoctrinated in a pro-French vein. Every trainee receives individual treatment throughout his stay in France, and contact is maintained with him by correspondence after his departure. This process of "Gallicisation" is a direct continuation of the system of assimilating people from the developing countries.

p In 1963 France created a counterpart to the American "Peace Corps"—the "Volunteers for Progress". The committee in charge of this association is headed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The main body of the "Volunteers" is made up of conscripts who have been excused military service. After special training they are sent to African countries as teachers, agricultural or medical instructors and so on. The "Volunteers for Progress" generally appear in places to which American helpers also come. The main task of the "Volunteers" is really to outdo or dislodge their transatlantic colleagues.

p An indication of the significance that France's ruling circles attribute to the training of national personnel for their former African colonies is provided by the fact that the issue has been elevated to the level of national policy and comes within the province of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Ministry is directly responsible for 250 promoting the French language in the developing countries and for "assisting" them in the training of national personnel.

p Naturally, the efforts made by London and Paris to retain control over the training of national personnel for their former possessions are not merely determined by the factor of the inter-imperialist struggle and by the need to resist the rivalry of their competitors. At one and the same time, they comprise both an important element in the strategy of British and French neo-colonialism as a whole, an attempt to regulate the further growth of national awareness in the liberated countries, and a form of resistance to the growing ideological influence of these countries from the socialist states. However, the policies of their imperialist competitors in this field, especially the USA, provoke counter-measures by both Britain and France, as can be seen from American statements and practical measures that have a bearing on the question of African personnel.

p US Secretary of State William Rogers' report to President Nixon entitled *The United States and Africa in the Seventies*<sup>1</sup> declares unambiguously that "Africans have taken much of their political inspiration from the United States .. ." and goes on to say that "More than a few Africans who studied in America became leaders of independence of their countries. ..." Making the point later that the governments of many African

countries are headed by young leaders, Rogers recommends that special attention should be given to programmes for “co-operation” with young Africans “in preparation for their present and future responsibilities”. He also defines the main areas for this co-operation— education, technical training and “support” within the framework of the “Peace Corps”. There is nothing fundamentally new in these ideas. Sargent Shriver, the “Peace Corps’s” former Director, used to say that the members of his organisation were preparing new generations of national leaders who would later look to the USA. The importance of American control over the education of young Africans was stressed, for example, by Professor Victor Le Vine of Stanford University in his book *Political Leadership in Africa*.<sup>8</sup> Unlike Rogers with his vague formulations, those who specialise in “Americanising” young Africans use precise definitions and declare that it is a matter of creating a broad stratum of US “supporters” in Africa, i.e., a buttress for American imperialism.

p The practical steps taken by Washington in the training of African personnel give a clear demonstration of the fact that social expansion is currently becoming more than just one of the most important means whereby international capital exerts a class influence on the nation-building and development process in the liberated countries. It is also a weapon for strengthening the positions of individual imperialist powers. It is typical, for example, that over half the Africans trained with the help of the USA are government officials, workers in the ideological sectors, teachers, specialists in the co-operative movement and so on. When the US Congress was deliberating on the question of providing training for African students in 1965, it was pointed out that political changes occurred unexpectedly, and their consequences would cost America dear unless she took substantial and timely measures to train well-qualified and capable leaders.<sup>9</sup>

p America’s ruling circles took these measures. US state expenditure alone on the training of personnel for the young states has increased by 11 times over the past 15 years and is now running at over 200 million dollars a year. Increased allocations resulted from the programmes approved by John Kennedy (1961) and Lyndon Johnson (1967). The training of personnel is also given “high priority” in Richard Nixon’s African programme. Apart from courses for students, the USA also provides training schemes for young national specialists. For example, in Cambridge (Massachusetts) a private firm of business consultants, Arthur D. Little, organises 10-month courses for African businessmen. Also noteworthy is the fact that in Africa itself 77 per cent of the national graduates are regularly used by AID missions to carry out specific assignments, i.e., the Americans provide work for a high percentage of the young specialists trained with the help of the USA, which also serves to make this aid more popular.

p Ever since the African countries were freed, their education systems began to attract the close attention of the USA and soon became an object of inter-imperialist rivalry. In 1954–55 there were 1,234 African students in the USA, or 252 3.6 per cent of the total number of foreign students; in 1964–68 there were 6,865 of them (8 per cent), and in 1968–69 approximately 15,000 (18 per cent). The increase mainly involved students from the English-speaking countries of Africa, i.e., Britain’s former possessions. For instance, in 1965 there were 1,382 students from Nigeria in the USA, 305 from Tanzania,

282 from Ghana, 774 from Kenya, 223 from Uganda, 390 from South Africa and 203 from Rhodesia. There was also a total of 581 students sent by Liberia and Ethiopia. French-speaking Africa was only represented by Guinea and Zaire, each of which sent about 100 students. There has been no substantial change in the ratio since then.

p The ASPAU programme, a curious patronage system for educating Africans which embraces over 200 American colleges and universities, has been functioning in the USA since 1960. In 1967–68 this programme provided 1,306 places for African students in America. Again the bulk of the students were from English-speaking countries of East and West Africa.

p It is worth mentioning that the Americans are giving considerable attention to the question of educating Africans from Southern Africa, mainly political emigres. The AfricanAmerican Institute has built a number of special schools for them in Tanzania and Zambia. In the USA the question is handled by the organisation known as SASP (Special African Student Program), founded by the State Department. In 1965 this programme already provided places for 339 students from Southern Africa in the USA, and later their numbers grew by 120 every year. The programme forms part of a long-term policy, a blow in the future battle for influence in the southern part of the continent. This, in fact, is the way in which the personnel for Southern Africa, so necessary to the USA's long-term plans, is being trained. As Rupert Emerson comments, these people are being "educated to shoulder the responsibilities which will, be it sooner or later, come their way",<sup>10</sup> i.e., when their countries achieve independence. The nature and aims of this measure are also revealed by officials. Speaking before the Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Refugees and Escapes the US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Mennen Williams declared: "The education the students receive here will help prepare them to make a responsible, constructive contribution to the development of Africa and to provide intelligent and democratic leadership to their people."<sup>11</sup> In London voices have frequently been raised in protest against the American measures insofar as they have affected emigres from South Africa and, especially, Rhodesia, which formally still has the status of a British colony.

p The Americans are also trying to dislodge the British from positions which they are going to particular lengths to fortify. For example, the University of East Africa and the Universities of Botswana and Lesotho now receive "aid" from AID and the Ford Foundation. US expansion is particularly vigorous in the field of education in the East African countries. The main feature of American "aid" to Kenya is the fact that it goes mainly on extending the system of general and specialised education. Effort is concentrated on training administrative staff and recruits for the army and police force, building youth clubs and schools to teach modern farming methods and expanding university education. These programmes and activities are led by specialists from the United States of America.

p These tactics result from planning in advance. This is borne out by the fact that immediately after the declaration of Kenya's independence, the USA set to work to build 17 schools there, 6 colleges, 19 farm study centres, an administrative institute, a medical

school and so on. The 11 December 1968 saw the opening of a new Faculty of Engineering block, built with American money. In 1969 AID provided 33 teachers' training college lecturers and 133 secondary school teachers for work in Kenya. In Uganda an institute for training administrative staff and a number of other educational establishments were built with US aid. The special Teachers for East Africa Program was adopted and is now being implemented.

p Over 80 per cent of the Africans currently studying in the USA come from the English-speaking countries of Africa, and especially East Africa. The campaign is already beginning to yield results. Ali Mazrui writes: "Both the numbers in absolute terms and the proportion of Africans studying in the United States have been rising steadily over 254 the years. The skills and the intellectual habits that these students acquire in the course of their training in the United States are bound to have some kind of cumulative influence on certain aspects of national life in their own countries."^^12^^

p Education is not the sort of field in which inter-imperialist contradictions are resolved in the form of bitter clashes. The resistance offered to a competitor in this sphere is of the hidden, but persistent, kind. William Attwood, the former US Ambassador to Kenya, recalls: "British civil servants who had stayed on in the Kenya Government often opposed American initiatives in reforming bureaucratic procedures and adapting the rigidly traditional school curriculum to contemporary African needs; for example, our vocational agricultural courses were introduced into certain high schools over the strenuous objections of expatriate principals and educational advisers."^^13^^ As Attwood also informs us, it was no easy task to settle the disputes that arose. Needless to say, the bone of contention was not really the teaching methods and the "bureaucratic procedures". The British were not upset by the syllabuses and teaching methods, but by the political consequences of the USA's intrusion into a sphere controlled by Britain.

p For the ruling circles of the USA the "Peace Corps" serves as an important instrument for seizing control of the training of national personnel. Education is the main sphere of its activities: about 80 per cent of its volunteers "sow the seeds of learning".

p The creation of the "Peace Corps" is directly linked with the transformation in US foreign policy towards the developing countries that resulted from the substantial changes in the general international situation. Faced by the growing power of the world socialist system and by its increasing influence in the developing countries, the United States had to find new and more subtle methods for imposing her political rule over them. The "Peace Corps" was supposed to become a sort of symbol of the USA's relations with the liberated countries: in contrast to the former metropolises, they were founded on "anti-colonialism", on the "selfless" wish to assist development and on "indifference" to the countries' internal political processes. The "Peace Corps's" basic ideological platform is anti-communism. Its organisers 255 make no secret of the fact. But the tide of history is such that, although the political and ideological expansion of the "Peace Corps" is directed against socialist ideas and the national liberation movement, the allies of American imperialism also fall victim to it. Examination of the Corps's practical activities shows that they are intended, particularly in education, to bind the developing



countries with numerous strands to the political and economic system of the USA and to convince the peoples of these countries of the “advantages” of the American way of life. In schools, colleges and universities teachers from the Corps are gradually preparing a pro-American stratum from among their pupils. In ministries and government departments "Peace Corps" consultants sing the praises of the American system of private enterprise and give advice that is in the interests of the USA. In agricultural training centres Africans are taught how to run a farm by American methods, how to manage American agricultural machinery and how to use American chemical products; construction engineers are acquainted with American machinery, equipment and technology; future doctors are instructed in American dispensing methods and American medicines.

p Of course, due note is taken of all this by the USA's imperialist competitors. In those countries of French-speaking Africa where she has the power to do so, France, for example, makes every effort to obstruct the activities of the "Peace Corps", even to the point of contriving to have the volunteers expelled.

p Even in the USA it is grudgingly admitted that the "Peace Corps" activities have primarily political objectives. A survey conducted among the volunteers in 1968 showed that 30 per cent of those interviewed replied affirmatively to the question: "Do you consider that the Peace Corps is more concerned with advertising the USA than with offering real help to the developing countries?"<sup>14</sup> This view was indirectly corroborated by the former Director of the Corps, J. Hood Vaughn, who stated at New York's Columbia University that the "Peace Corps" was an instrument of US foreign policy,<sup>15</sup> and also by Secretary of State William Rogers, no less, in a speech made during his visit to the Corps's headquarters in January 1969.

256

p In the initial period after the attainment of independence by the African countries the resistance offered by the former metropolises to the USA's intrusion into the sphere of training national personnel was of a passive type and consisted mainly in taking steps to outdo the Americans in some enterprise. However, as the expansion of their competitor gathered momentum, Britain and, particularly, France began to put up direct resistance.

p In West Africa the attitude of French representatives to their American colleagues took on an openly hostile air. The French press also sounded the alarm when it complained that the government had “overlooked” the stepping up of US activity. Paris was particularly displeased over the extension of the "Peace Corps's" activities to the Frenchspeaking countries of Africa: in 1967–68 the Americans had managed to sign agreements providing for the despatch of volunteers to Chad, Upper Volta and Dahomey and increased their numbers in Gabon and Niger. The "different position" that France took up as a result was greeted in Washington with unconcealed irritation. When the whole group of "Peace Corps" volunteers was expelled from Gabon in January 1968, the *Washington Post* of the 14 February 1968 reported that Washington's official circles suspected that the French President had made yet another anti-American move. In

March 1968 the threat of expulsion also hung over the volunteers in Niger. Only a trip to Niger made by the "Peace Corps's" Director, J. Hood Vaughn, caused Hamani Diori's decision to be set aside. France's actions, however, did produce some results. In February 1968 the USA was obliged to declare officially that the "Peace Corps's" efforts to spread the use of English would be discontinued in all the French-speaking countries of Africa.

p The imperialist powers' struggle over the training of African personnel will continue until the liberated countries themselves take full control of this social issue, which is vital to their further development. This is not to say that the young states must tackle the problem without outside help. Such an approach is unrealistic, and there is neither the basis nor the conditions for action of this type in Africa. But the question of personnel is a class issue. Either the liberated countries will, through appropriate legislation and other 257 measures, ensure the formation of new social forces, capable of accelerating their national, anti-imperialist development, or imperialism will create a social group which will not only make it easier to cement these countries within the system of the world capitalist economy but will also tie them either to the former metropolises or to their imperialist competitors.

Nor should it be forgotten that the growing help given to Africa by the Soviet Union and other socialist states to promote economic and cultural construction, the most important part of which is the training of African personnel, is compelling the imperialist powers to step up their activities in this field and is deepening the inter-imperialist struggle for the narrowing zones of influence. At the same time, however, the contribution of the socialist community to the cause of the African countries' complete social emancipation is making their struggle for genuine national progress vastly easier.

### CHAPTER XIII

#### THE ATTEMPT TO SEIZE CONTROL OF THE TRADE UNION MOVEMENT

p The imperialist powers see control of the trade unions in Africa as an important and promising means of strengthening their ideological and political influence over large numbers of Africans. Consequently, the struggle over the trade union movement in the African countries is an important aspect of the general political rivalry between the imperialist powers.

p African trade unions were created during the development of the national liberation movement. In a number of countries they played an active part in the political struggle and protested against the hard working conditions in enterprises owned by foreign companies—the principal employers in Africa. Since the achievement of independence by the African countries the role of trade unions has increased significantly, which predetermines the attitude of the 258 imperialist states towards them. What is more, in most of the liberated countries the trade unions are truly national institutions, acting outside the bounds of ethnic communities and administrative areas. They occupy an important place in the economy, since they embrace the workers in precisely those sectors on which economic development depends. Finally, the trade union movement is linked with international organisations and is tending towards regional and sub-regional amalgamation. All these factors offer African trade unions the opportunity to become a major political force and, at the same time, turn them into an object of inter-imperialist rivalry. Even during the colonial period Britain, France and Belgium devoted considerable attention to the trade union movement in the colonies, with the colonial authorities trying, moreover, to take absolute control of them. In some of the French colonies trade unions were entirely forbidden. In her book *African Trade Unions*,<sup>1</sup> published in 1966, the British sociologist Joan Davis, who has made a close study of the trade union movement in Africa, points out that in the British colonies all trade unions had to be registered and receive the approval of the authorities. The colonial administration would either take harsh measures against trade union organisations that avoided this control, as happened in Kenya, for example, or it would set up completely servile trade unions, run by “non-political” bodies such as the Labour Council in Sierra Leone. In those French colonies where trade union activity was permitted only a person who was able to read French could become a member before 1944. The Belgian colonial authorities had complete power over the amalgamations of Congolese workers. In order to qualify for membership of a trade union, a person had to be at least 18 years of age, and needed 6 years of education and 3 years’ work experience behind him. All political action by the trade unions was banned and every attempt was made to isolate them from political parties.

p Despite conditions like these, however, trade union activity increased in a number of countries, especially during the Second World War. The membership of the trade union organisations grew rapidly in Nigeria, Gold Coast, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Tunisia, Tanganyika and several other African countries. In postwar years they became an

important force in the national liberation movement, notably in Kenya, Mali and Tunisia.

p The rapid growth in the African peoples' national liberation struggle in the fifties was closely associated with the development of the workers' movement and the increase in the numbers of the working class, which acted in a number of countries as the vanguard of the anti-colonialist forces. Examples of this are provided by the massive miners' strike in Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) in 1955–56, the strike by workers in Sierra Leone in 1955 and the stoppages on the plantations of Tanganyika in 1957–60. In 1952 the trade unions organised a general strike in all the countries of French West Africa.

p From about the mid-fifties the metropolises, and Britain in particular, started to give serious consideration to the trade union movement in the African countries. The British ruling circles and the trade union leadership tried to direct it along the reformist path, well tested in Britain. The policy of "setting up trade unions in the colonies" was carried further, with one of its instruments being the "labour departments" specially created in the African countries, through which the local governments provided help and useful advice to the trade unions.

p The aim of these measures was clearly delineated—to place the trade union movement in the colonies that were on the verge of liberation under British control and to forestall the creation of militant organisations, capable of leading the struggle of Africa's working people for complete independence. It may be recalled in this connection that it was precisely the British trade unionists who kept in constant touch with African trade unions who were used by the British ruling circles to exert influence on African opinion. For instance, these trade unionists made strenuous efforts to persuade the leaders of the national liberation movement in Nigeria, Rhodesia, Uganda, Kenya and other countries that it was necessary to accept the neo-colonialist constitutions and other pseudo-democratic reforms that London wished to impose on the colonies before independence.

p In the new conditions that arose in the African countries after their emancipation from colonial rule the problem of guiding their social development took on an even greater importance for the former metropolises, since in addition to the internal front there was now an external one—the expansion of imperialist competitors. London and Paris were obliged to take extra measures to see that control of the trade union movement in former British and French Africa was not seized by their dynamic rivals.

p In 1961, when greeting the Prime Ministers of the Englishspeaking African countries that were about to become independent, the General Council of the British Trades Union Congress expressed its conviction that the trade unions of these countries would maintain their links with Britain and would play a "worthy" role in the new situation of independence. In subsequent years both the Executive Committee of the British Labour Party and the General Council of the TUG took constant steps to strengthen their influence on the trade union movement in the former colonies.

p Accordingly, particular attention was given to the conferences of Commonwealth trade unions, which welcomed their new participants—the colonies that were about to attain political independence. In June 1962, at the 13th annual conference, for which a record number of participants from 15 Commonwealth countries had assembled, the British delegates persistently voiced the thesis that the world was not seeing the disintegration of the colonial system under the blows of the national liberation movement, but the process, "consciously prepared" by Britain, whereby the Empire was being transformed into the "free Commonwealth of Nations", and the trade unions should do all they could to further the consolidation of this Commonwealth. At the same time, the TUG General Council announced that, in order to achieve "better mutual understanding" in tackling the tasks that lay ahead, it had accepted the Conservative proposal to extend its collaboration with the British Government and with the Federation of Overseas Employers in all spheres of the trade union movement in the Commonwealth countries.

p This step by the General Council was not just explained by the need to unify the efforts of the Right-wing trade union leadership with the alliance between the monopolies and the state in the struggle (already on a neo-colonialist footing) against the further growth of the national liberation movement in the newly independent countries. An important factor in this and other similar measures was the attempts being made by Britain's imperialist competitors, particularly the USA, to gain control of the trade unions in Britain's former African possessions.

p France has opted for a slightly different means of defending her position in the trade union movement of the liberated countries. Deprived of the opportunity to make full use of their own trade unions owing to the communist influence within them, the French ruling circles act mainly through the national governments, relying on the collaboration agreements that accompanied the granting of independence to the colonies. Since they are bound by these agreements, many governments categorically reject the calls of individual trade unions for a revolutionary struggle against neo-colonialism and capitalism, and limit the role of trade unions to purely industrial functions. This is the situation in the Ivory Coast, for example. Isolating the trade unions from political problems helps to reduce outside influence (American included) on them.

p In the USA's general plans for expansion in Africa and in her struggle with the former metropolises for political influence an important role was assigned at the outset to seizing control of the trade union movement. The amalgamated American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organisations (AFL-CIO), which had previously done its utmost to establish links with the trade unions in the former British colonies, turned its attention in the early sixties to the French-speaking African countries as well, and the US Government began to view the trade unions as one of the main instruments of its African policy. As the magazine *Time* explained in July 1961, since the workers' leaders are generally the most brilliant and energetic young people in Africa, the nation which today controls the African trade unions stands a good chance tomorrow of controlling the whole continent.

p As in other areas of American imperialist expansion, the assault began under the banner of the struggle with "communist infiltration". Joan Davis recalls in her book that, when the representatives of the African trade union 262 movement appeared at meetings of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) in 1945, the monopolies "... were less concerned to develop a labour movement than to recruit troops for an anti-communist crusade".<sup>2</sup> But after the split in the WFTU in 1949 and the founding of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), which really did become an instrument of US foreign policy, the activities of American trade unions in Africa were stepped up and acquired more than just an anti-communist orientation. The struggle against imperialist competitors is an important part of the AFL-CIO programmes.

p From 1960 onwards the US Government began to allocate an annual 13 million dollars to the trade unions' international activities. Over 100 labour attaches and promotion advisers appeared in American embassies in the developing countries.

p Characteristically, the first targets of US "trade union" expansion in Africa were precisely those countries in which American diplomacy was trying to strengthen the USA's position and to oust the former metropolises. Thus, US trade union leaders were particularly active in Kenya, Nigeria, Uganda and Ghana. A headquarters for the Kenya Federation of Labour was built in Nairobi. In 1958 the Americans set up a trade union school under the auspices of ICFTU in Kampala (Uganda). Similar schools later appeared in Zaire and Ghana. An American-financed Afro-Asian Institute of Labor Studies was organised in Tel-Aviv in order to train personnel for trade union work in Africa and Asia. Typically enough, the Ugandan authorities have frequently accused the school opened in Kampala of interfering in the country's internal affairs, and London has advised them to "nationalise" it.

p Nor has this aspect of policy been ignored by US official representatives. After his visit to Africa in 1957 Richard Nixon commended American trade unions on their "active support for the free trade union movement in Africa".<sup>3</sup>

p In order to further expand their activities in Africa, the AFL-CIO set up the African-American Labor Center (AALC) in New York in 1965. The AFL-CIO annually provides the centre with 100,000 dollars to cover administrative expenses. In addition, the Agency for International Development (AID) contributes 500,000 dollars, and sums running into millions of dollars arrive from all kinds of hidden sources, including the CIA.<sup>4</sup>

p According to official figures, the centre is carrying out 34 programmes for "assisting" trade unions in 16 African countries, with the core of these programmes consisting of pro-American propaganda, amply spiced with anti-communism.

p In 1966 AALC set up in Nigeria the Institute for Trade Union Studies, which had produced over 70 African trade union leaders by the beginning of 1968. A School for the Training of Trade Union Personnel, founded by AALC, operates in Kinshasa (Zaire) and trains intermediate-level and junior officials. Similar schools have been built in Sierra Leone and Dahomey. At the centre's instigation, the "Peace Corps's" "volunteers" sent to



the African countries now include an increasing number of specialists on the trade union movement. There is a steadily increasing stream of African trade union workers invited every year to the USA, where they are given as much “Americanisation” treatment as possible.

p Relying on her influence in ICFTU, the United States has been trying to make use of this organisation too in order to seize control of the trade union movement in Africa. In 1957, at the suggestion of the American trade unions, ICFTU created a so-called “solidarity fund”, thus trying to monopolise the granting of “aid” to the trade union movement in Africa. The move failed, however. The largest African trade union amalgamations left ICFTU, and “... the Americans, disappointed in the ICFTU as a medium for activity, are increasingly using the Secretariats (i.e., International Trade Union Secretariats—*author*) to further their own aims”.<sup>5</sup> This version of US “trade union” expansion gives America certain tactical advantages over her competitors. The point is that, although many African trade union centres left ICFTU, their industrial unions retained membership of the International Trade Union Secretariats. These Secretariats, in turn, frequently act in cohesion with the American trade unions and depend on their financial support, as well as on loans from the ICFTU “solidarity fund”. In this way, US influence on the International Secretariats is maintained through two channels.

264

p In the struggle to control the African trade union movement the Americans also make wide use of the method of simply bribing Africa’s trade union leaders. Confirmation of this can be found in a number of sources. For instance, Vernon McKay wrote: “Tom Mboya . . . was given 35,000 dollars by the AFL-CIO . . . this money was used by Mboya for political activities.”<sup>6</sup> The paper *Evening News* of the 16 December 1963 pointed to similar operations being carried out by the US Embassy in Uganda. The British Africanist Jack Woddis observes bluntly that “The open use of dollars to ‘buy’ up African trade union leaders has become so much of a scandal that the US has had to find more indirect ways of carrying on this activity”.<sup>7</sup>

p An example of these indirect methods for establishing the financial dependence of African trade unions on the USA is provided by the arrangement whereby the US Government gives direct financial support through AID to the activities of the AFL-CIO in the developing countries, and especially those in Africa. In particular, AID has agreed to meet 90 per cent of the expenses borne by the AFL-CIO in maintaining the African-American Labor Center.

p US State Department direction and co-ordination of American trade unions’ foreign policy activities have been intensified. To this end a special Consultative Committee on Labor in matters of foreign aid has been set up. The committee consists of representatives from the AFL-CIO leadership and prominent officials from the State Department, AID and the Department of Labour.

p In the struggle with the USA for control of the African trade union movement Britain and France and, more recently, the FRG too have been trying to use a weapon which the Americans do not possess—social-democracy.

p The British and French social-democratic leadership made attempts in the late fifties and early sixties to interfere in the political and trade union life of Africa in order to seize the initiative. The old links that the British Labour Party and the French Socialists had with the African colonies were exploited, and new inroads were made into the political and trade union organisations. The French Socialist Party even merged its local branches in Africa into an African Socialist Movement, while Labour's Executive 265 Committee strove tirelessly to extend its influence in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. Neither had any great success though. There are many reasons why organised socialdemocracy finds a poor following in Africa, but the main one is the pact it has made with imperialism against the national liberation movement. This is well exemplified by the position taken up by British Labour delegates to the Socialist International Congress in May 1966. One item for discussion was "Socialist Thought and Action in New Countries". The Congress was attended by representatives from the national liberation movements in a number of African countries, but, when they wished to speak on the main problems encountered by their movements, they were not allowed to. This was categorically demanded by the British Labour delegation, which feared public condemnation of the Wilson Government's compromise policy towards the racists in Rhodesia.

The inter-imperialist rivalry for control of the African trade union movement, just like the combined pressure on it from the AFL-CIO, ICFTU and the British Trades Union Congress (TUG), is very damaging to the movement. It is still torn by dissension. Nevertheless, the struggle of the African working people for their rights and the support given them by the World Federation of Trade Unions are producing results. The African trade union movement will develop in step with the growth in the numbers of Africa's working class and the strengthening of its class awareness. The outlook for the inter-imperialist competition for control of African trade unions depends largely on the positions that these unions adopt. A strengthening of the anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist tendencies in their activities and a consistent struggle for continental unity and the complete emancipation from foreign influence may weaken the interimperialist rivalry and oblige the imperialists to seek compromises. At the same time, treading in the reformist footsteps of the trade union bureaucracy of the West will prepare the ground for further rivalry between the imperialist powers. Another important factor is the way in which relations will develop between the trade unions and the ruling parties.

## **CHAPTER XIV**

### **THE CONTRADICTIONS BETWEEN THE IMPERIALIST POWERS OVER REGIONAL CO-OPERATION BETWEEN AFRICAN COUNTRIES**

p Regional co-operation between the newly independent countries of Africa can be a means of accelerating their economic development. In recent years this idea has been gaining greater recognition in Africa, and its implementation on a genuinely democratic and scientific basis could bring the African peoples considerable benefits—political as well as economic.

p The urge towards anti-colonialist unity is one of the characteristic features of the national liberation movement in Africa. Moves towards unity were taken by a number of countries immediately after emancipation.

p The impracticability of many of the regional organisations that have appeared in Africa cannot simply be explained by divergencies in African leaders' interpretations of units. The members of the organisations had differing levels of economic development, but the structure of their foreign trade was more or less identical, and so the organisations failed to eliminate competition. The failure of a number of groupings can also be blamed on the imperialist powers, which were apprehensive over the formation in Africa of strong state alliances, since (1) these alliances had an antiimperialist basis and might obstruct neo-colonialist policies, and (2) they weakened the influence of the former metropolises on individual countries.

p The regionalist tendencies that appeared in Africa between the late fifties and early sixties arose mainly from political factors; but in the second half of the sixties they displayed a new feature: organisations were being largely created on an economic basis and in the interests of economic development. Thus, the years 1967–70 saw the creation of the East African Economic Community, the Union of Central African States, the West African Economic Community and several other regional groupings.

p The economic bias of the tendencies towards integration, as well as the further improvement of neo-colonialist tactics and their adaptation to the new situation, brought about 267 considerable modifications to the positions of the imperialist powers. For political and economic reasons they could no longer resist the drive of the African countries towards regional co-operation and began to apply themselves to making use of the processes of integration in their own interests.

p By giving their support in principle to the tendencies towards economic integration, the imperialist powers think that they will be able to exert a comprehensive influence on whole groups of African countries. This factor is responsible for the more or less positive approach adopted by the West towards new forms of regional co-operation. However, the attitudes of Britain, France, the USA and the FRG towards the actual processes of integration are not identical. Consequently, there is now a fierce struggle between various

imperialist groups and individual powers over the question of regional organisations in Africa.

p The contradictions in this sphere between the USA and the FRG on the one hand and France and Britain on the other are particularly bitter, as is the rivalry between the former metropolises for influence in the existing and emergent groupings. The main bone of contention is the basis on which regional organisations should be formed. The USA actively supported a proposal put forward by the UN Economic Commission for Africa to organise four economic sub-regions in the continent, and welcomed the signing of the protocol inaugurating the East African Economic Community. In practice, however, and not without British endeavours, an East African Community was set up, consisting of only Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, i.e., the countries of former British East Africa. The main levers of influence in this community remained in London's hands. Some other proposals made by the ECA were not acted on either. Then, in collaboration with the FRG, the USA drew up her own plan for sub-regional economic co-operation in Africa, aimed at removing Britain and France from their dominating positions in the continent.

p For their part, France and Britain, which have retained relatively firm economic ties with most of their former colonies, reject all ideas on sub-regional co-operation and support integration, but only within a framework that takes 268 in the territories of the former British or former French Africa. At the same time, they are opposed to "mixed" groupings, in which they might come up against competition from the other imperialist powers.

p The most jealous attitude to the regional question is that of France. Mention has already been made of the measures taken by Paris after the Republic of Chad and the Central African Republic left UDEAC at the beginning of 1968 in order to found jointly with the Congo (Zaire) the new organisation UEAC. Fearing an upsurge of American influence in this part of Africa, France secured the return of the CAR to UDEAC, thereby breaking up the new grouping.

p One of France's successful moves was the setting up in April 1973 on the basis of the West African Customs Union (UDEAO) of a new regional organisation called the West African Economic Community (CEAO). It consists of six French-speaking countries: Senegal, Upper Volta, Ivory Coast, Mauritania, Niger and Mali. Guinea was also invited to join, but declined to do so.

p In effect, CEAO acts as an alternative to the American plan for setting up an economic sub-region in West Africa. The new grouping may, in theory, become one of the largest regional economic organisations in Africa. The total area of the member countries is 4,271,000 sq km, with a combined population of 25,300,000 people. Considerable mineral reserves are concentrated in the area, a varied range of agricultural commodities is produced and livestock-raising and the textile and food industries are relatively well developed.

p Britain is doing all she can to protect the East African Community, all the more so since it was formed out of the East African Common Services Organisation, which had remained from colonial times. Ethiopia, Zambia, Somali, Burundi and Swaziland have applied for membership, but any expansion of the community is clearly not in London's interests, which is evidently one of the reasons for delay in considering the applications.

p Despite the resistance of the former metropolises, however, the USA and the FRG, making use of the integration processes in Africa, are trying to recarve the British and French spheres of influence. The position of the USA in the matter merits special attention, since Washington is making the most consistent efforts to use the regionalist idea as a means of inter-imperialist struggle.

p The USA first announced her support for regional cooperation in Africa in 1966. The US attitude was formulated by Edmond Hutchinson, the Assistant Administrator of the Bureau of African Affairs at AID, when speaking on the 23 March 1966 in the House of Representatives Commission on US Aid to Africa.

p Hutchinson justified the US Government's intention to focus attention on regional organisations, regional methods for development and regional channels for "aid" as being of benefit, in the first instance, to the United States. He stated that, since the other Western powers still had an undiminished interest in granting "aid" to Africa, a situation had come about in which the USA, although playing the role of "active partner", was, nevertheless, not predominant in the matter of "aid" for the continent as a whole. In this connection, the interests of the USA are *forcing* (my italics—*author*) the government to concentrate its efforts on a few African countries and also to support regional tendencies. All Hutchinson's incidental arguments about the benefits that regional organisations might bring the African countries themselves were nothing more than a necessary diplomatic camouflage for the overriding factor—the USA's urge to become "predominant" in Africa and to oust the former metropolises, since it was precisely they that were being referred to as "the other Western powers". This thesis was carried further in his speech. Hutchinson made it plain that AID would take measures to see that the "aid" was directly administered by the USA, to a degree and at a rate, moreover, that would accord with "general American interests".

p The frank pragmatism in this speech and its evident bias against the European partners produced a negative response in London and Paris, which compelled Washington to provide a "theoretical" basis for its pretensions. The mission was taken on by Walt Rostow, who was then special assistant to the President. He declared that the move towards regionalism was of special significance to the United States. After the Second World War world-wide responsibility was thrust upon the USA owing to the need to fill power vacuums. 270 For the USA, he continued, regionalism was a way of avoiding excessive bilateral relations. Regionalism was not a return to isolation, but a means of offering countries in different regions the opportunity of doing the maximum for themselves, and ultimately even more, while at the same time preserving their bonds of interdependence.<sup>1</sup> Returning to the themes of the USA's "global responsibility", the need to fill the "vacuum" and so on, Rostow does, nevertheless, make one concession to

his European partners. This is contained in his reference to upholding the principle of “interdependence” and the possibility of the USA’s “avoiding” “excessive” bilateral relations with the developing countries. But the ruling circles of Britain and France were not so much listening to Washington’s voice as carefully following the practical steps taken. While commenting on the founding of UEAC, the French weekly *Le Nouvel Observateur* noted with obvious irritation that the grouping arose “hot on the heels” of Vice-President Hubert Humphrey’s visit to Africa and that it should be seen as a US attempt to undermine French influence in that part of the continent.<sup>2</sup> In response to the American “switch” towards regional organisations in Africa, France adopted a number of concrete counter-measures: in particular, she immediately supplied some of them with additional funds in order that French patronage should be retained.

**p** In order to form a correct understanding of the essence of the inter-imperialist contradictions over regionalism, one must, in the first place, determine why the processes of integration in Africa attracted the attention of the USA and began to “accord with her national interests”, as was particularly stressed by Secretary of State William Rogers in his report to President Nixon *The United States and Africa in the Seventies*. Walt Rostow, who has now left the political scene, went so far as to state that it was the USA that was responsible for “a situation in which the Africans are more and more taking over their destiny through regional and subregional institutions”.<sup>3</sup>

**p** To some extent, the expansion of American private capital into Africa is limited by the poor economic development of most of the continent and the absence in most countries of opportunities for the transatlantic monopolies to deploy capital investment at a high profitability rate. Other obstacles are the preference barriers that have now been raised by 21 countries (as a result of their association with the EEC) and Africa’s traditional links with the former metropolises. Regionalism in the form proposed by the USA is breaching these barriers. Thus, the USA welcomes regionalism not because it is in the interests of the African countries but only because it opens up additional opportunities for the American monopolies and facilitates the redistribution of markets and spheres of influence on a new basis, in accordance with the existing correlation of forces in the world capitalist economy.

**p** The main source of contradictions is the fact that the existing system of the African market as a whole corresponds to the interests of the former metropolises, whereas it does not suit the USA, the FRG and Japan, since it limits opportunities for trade and investment. So, while concentrating “aid” on a limited number of selected countries, the United States is encouraging regionalism in order to prevent a fall in the influence of American capital on the economic and social life of the other African states. This explains why the USA is sparing no expense on regional aims in Africa. Full account has been taken of the main recommendations of the “Korry Report”, which pointed out that American “aid” to Africa should be effected primarily through regional and multilateral projects and programmes, and should also make use of methods and channels that involved more than one participant. Guided by this thesis, the USA is attempting to further her expansion by using numerous regional groupings in Africa—from the East African Community to the Council of Concord. These tactics give rise to fresh



contradictions with the former metropolises, since they occupy key positions in the regional organisations of African countries.

p In practice, US support for the processes of integration in Africa has boiled down to a reduction in the programmes for bilateral “aid” to the African countries and a simultaneous increase in support for regional projects.

p While supporting the idea of creating large economic subregions, the USA is at the same time taking steps to secure opportunities for influence within the existing groupings. Thus, Washington has granted loans and subsidies to the 272 East African Community, has expressed the wish to help the Council of Concord to carry through its regional projects, quite apart from the considerable financial and technical “aid” already being given to its members (especially the Ivory Coast), is trying to gain favour with the Common Afro-Malagasy Organisation (OGAM), and so on.

p Quite typical are the attempts being made to extend the mechanism of the USA’s regional policy in Africa to include the African Development Bank, in, which, according to its constitution, capital from non-African countries cannot participate. In view of this, the USA operates through two channels—AID and the World Bank. AID suggests that projects should be carried out jointly, and the World Bank offers “aid” for selecting projects and evaluating them.

p The inter-imperialist struggle over African integration takes the form of conflict between groupings of capitalist countries, as well as between individual powers. New, collective forms of struggle have appeared, for use in situations where individual states are opposed by a whole bloc of competing countries. This aspect of inter-imperialist contradictions stood out most clearly in the relations between the USA and the EEC (Common Market) over the creation of association between the EEC and Africa.

p The inter-imperialist struggle over African integration cannot be examined without analysing the effect on it produced by association between the EEC and Africa—a system of collective neo-colonialism involving 18 fully associated African countries and 6 with agreements on partial association with the Common Market. The question is highly topical owing to Britain’s entry into the EEC, which will clearly lead to a further expansion of association to include the African Commonwealth countries.

p The true nature of the association between the EEC and Africa, its origins and mode of operation are closely examined in a number of books and articles by Soviet and foreign writers. We shall, therefore, dwell on just two aspects—the practical opportunities for the EEC to influence the processes of African integration and the role of the inter-imperialist contradictions developing within and around the Common Market over association.

273

p The main feature of all the African countries’ principal economic and political unions, communities and organisations is the fact that these groupings generally involve in

various combinations precisely those countries that are connected with the Common Market (see chart).

**p** An important question thus arises: to what extent can the members of regional groupings take independent decisions that conflict with the interests of the EEC countries? Or, to put it another way: do the bonds of association or the regional links come first? The facts show that, at least up to the present time, the members of the EEC, and especially France, have retained broad opportunities for influencing the activities of the African groupings and are, above all, furthering the development of African economies along the capitalist path.

**p** In the case of a member with low economic potential, EEC associate status limits that member's opportunities not only to decide on the course of internal development but also to foster co-operation with other African countries. These limitations are imposed by the multilateral agreement on association, the EEC countries' numerous bilateral treaties with the associated countries and also by the fact that the credits, loans and subsidies granted to the associated countries generally have strings attached. Thus, within the framework of their regional groupings the African countries can only use the money received for those projects which would benefit the monopolies of the EEC. What is more, Article 3 of the Yaounde Convention allows associated countries to set up regional groupings or conclude customs and other unions with third states only with the blessing of the EEC! The vital condition here is that the activities of a regional grouping must not be damaging to the interests of one or more members of the EEC. In other words, the regional integration of the associated countries is under Common Market control, and the African countries themselves are constantly threatened by sanctions if they overstep the bounds prescribed by the EEC.

**p** The provision of finance is the Common Market countries' strongest means of putting pressure on their associated African partners. Let us consider a few typical examples.

**p** 1967 saw the conclusion of a special convention on 274 *Table 12* Chart Showing the Affiliation of EEC-Associated African Countries to Regional Organisations Also members of Countries fully or partially associated with the EEC Council of Concord Common Afro- Malagasy Organisation Central African Customs and Economic Union Union of Central African States 1 fl nj O £ \*( \* & // Equatorial Africa and Cameroun Monetary Union West African Economic Community East African Economic Community Maghreb Countries Economic Organisation .2 0 % So o'SS Niger River Commission Organisation of Senegal River States 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Ivory Coast X X X X X Burundi Upper Volta X X X X X Gabon X X X Dahomey X X X X X Cameroun X X X X X People's Republic of the Congo X X Zaire X X X X Mauritania \ X X 275 Malagasy Republic X Mali X X Niger X X X X X Ruanda X Senegal X X X Somali Togo X X X CAR X X X Chad X X X X X Tunisia\* X Morocco\* X Kenya\* Uganda\* X Tanzania\* X Nigeria\* X X X X X Partially associated. 276 operation between the Central African Customs and Economic Union (UDEAC) and France. In accordance with this convention, the French aid and co-operation fund is financing

UDEAC's main projects, at a total cost of some 170 million African francs, and French technical advisers are working in various Union bodies.

p The two monetary groupings—the West African Monetary Union and the Equatorial Africa and the Cameroun Monetary Union—have a total membership of 11 African countries. Each union is run by an administrative council in which two-thirds of the members are from the African states and the remaining third from France. Nevertheless, France retains complete control over the decision-making process, since she can at any time refuse to grant loans and credits to the unions.

p The Council of Concord, a political and economic organisation of 5 countries, has been in existence for 12 years. During these years the members of the Council have been very active in economic co-operation. They have spoken with a single voice in the Organisation of African Unity, but have adopted the most conservative positions. The Council's financial basis—the Mutual Assistance and Loan Guarantee Fund—is supported materially by France.

p The co-ordinated study and exploitation of the natural resources of river basins is very important to many African countries. The Organisation of Senegal River States, the Chad Lake Commission and the Niger River Commission, for example, were set up for this purpose. All these organisations have already displayed a certain amount of vigour in tackling their assignments. But the speed at which they can achieve results is impeded by lack of funds. In the end, Holland undertook to subsidise development work on the River Niger, and Lake Chad is being developed by some of the EEC countries and even the USA.

p It would not be difficult to multiply the examples, but they all lead one to the natural conclusion that the independence of the regional groupings in Africa is still considerably limited and subject, with all that entails, both to the EEC associateship obligations of their members and to the willingness of individual Western countries to finance the various projects.

277

p It was France which in 1957 initiated the idea of associating African countries with the EEC. The object was to preserve the French monopolies' position in the colonies under the new circumstances, although this step meant some sharing of France's sphere of influence with the other members of the Common Market. In Paris's view, however, this was a lesser evil than allowing the United States into Frenchspeaking Africa. In addition, France counted on being able to use the capital of her West European partners in the pursuance of her African policy. Belgium had similar designs, while the FRG, Italy and Holland saw the association between the EEC and Africa as a possible means of penetrating the French colonial empire, which was on the verge of collapse, and thereby making up for their losses in other developing regions. Thus, the contradictions between the Common Market members themselves—which later intensified—have existed ever since association was devised. However, the main aspect of the inter-imperialist rivalry

over EEC associate membership for African countries was the fundamental inter-imperialist contradiction of modern times—between the USA and the Common Market as a whole.

p Neither the Common Market itself nor its African branch could suit Washington, which continued to uphold the idea of global integration, headed by the USA, on the basis of "Atlantic solidarity". What was more, association raised direct tariff and other barriers against the expansion of the American monopolies over a considerable part of Africa. Sidney Dell, a director of the UNCTAD Secretariat, reflected US views when he wrote: "... The association between African countries and the EEC cannot be considered a healthy one... Western European aid to Africa ... is to be applauded, but there is no reason that it should be made conditional upon associate membership in the EEC."^^4^^ In the end, the USA launched a frontal assault on the EEC's African policy.

p It is significant that, up to about 1957, Washington considered its position in Europe to be firm enough and supported some of the "Eurafrican" measures that were being taken while the colonial regimes were still intact. The idea then was to have a "united Europe" and Africa connected to it as links in an "Atlantic partnership" system headed by the USA. But, when a vast area of Africa came to be protected from American monopolies by "associateship" barriers and Eurafrica began to evolve in the direction of a closed market for the West European countries, America's ruling circles changed course abruptly. In January 1957 the State Department declared ominously that US readiness to assist the countries of Western Europe to consolidate their political and economic strength was conditional upon the further expansion of the Atlantic Union. At a session of the UN General Assembly at the end of 1957 the American representatives insisted that "co-operation" with Africa should be conducted under the auspices not of the EEC, but through the Council of Europe and the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), i.e., under the actual control of NATO bodies. With the founding of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1961, the United States proposed that this organisation should be entrusted with African "development".

p However, Washington did not confine itself to appeals, but took concrete counter-measures against association. Through the GATT mechanism American representatives in Brussels persistently strove to level the EEC tariffs on produce from the associated and non-associated countries of Africa, thus removing the privileges of the associate members and undermining the basis for association. Several times the US Government handed special memoranda to the EEC countries demanding an end to preferences and customs restrictions. It should be noted that this attitude was viewed most unfavourably by the associated African countries.

p The Americans managed to obtain some results. Under pressure from Washington, the EEC slightly reduced the customs dues on produce from non-associated countries, and some breaches were made for the passage of commodities from the American monopolies to the markets of the associated African countries. But the USA's struggle with association between the EEC and Africa has not come to an end. It depends closely on

the contradictions between the USA and the Common Market as a whole and continues, as these contradictions intensify still further.

p Britain's attitude to the EEC's operations in Africa was largely determined by the fact that (1) in 1961 London decided to join the Common Market itself and (2) the zone of British interests in Africa was not originally affected. It soon became clear, however, that the grouping's expansion was aimed at more than just the former colonial possessions of its members. The EEC leaders were trying to extend Eurafrica to embrace other African countries, including those belonging to the Commonwealth. Despite Britain's own attitude to the Common Market, her political and business circles were understandably alarmed and irritated by these tendencies.

p A particularly fierce battle developed over the application to the Common Market made in 1963 by Nigeria, and later by Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, which proposed that their economic relations should be adjusted, i.e., they were seeking associate membership. Supported by the USA, Britain exerted the strongest pressure on Nigeria to drop the idea. The USA delivered a further memorandum to the EEC countries in July 1965 objecting to the attempts of "Little Europe" to draw Nigeria into its orbit, and London and Washington both threatened the Nigerian Government with a suspension of "aid". Nevertheless, the Ironsi Government, which came to power in Nigeria after the coup of January 1966, signed an agreement on the 16 July 1966 confirming Nigeria's partial associate membership of the EEC. However, this agreement remained in force for just over a fortnight. A further coup took place and the Gowon Government suspended the agreement. It seemed that Britain and the USA had won the contest, but their victory was short-lived. London had to backtrack, since it applied for Community membership itself in May 1967, and Lagos ratified the agreement after all in January 1968.<sup>5</sup> This act not only damaged the Anglo-American position in West Africa, but also unleashed a curious chain reaction among the African members of the Commonwealth.

p On the 26 July 1968, the Common Market's negotiations with the countries of East Africa, which had been going on since 1964, came to an end, and Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania signed a convention providing for their associate membership of the EEC up to the 31 May 1969. On this occasion too the counter-manoeuving of Britain and the USA was of no avail. London sent the Commission of European Communities and the Governments of the "Six" an official note warning that Britain would challenge the convention under the GATT rules, but this protest had no effect. On the 21 September 1969, representatives of the East African Community and the Common Market signed a protocol in Arusha extending their convention until the 31 January 1975. In this way, the leaders of "Little Europe" accomplished their plan for inducing the countries of East Africa to become associate members in accordance with the principle of free trade and reciprocity. According to press reports, Britain tried to prevent the new agreement from being concluded, but stopped short of open conflict, since she was herself in the Common Market's waiting-room.

p The discriminatory practices introduced by the EEC in relation to the African countries which are not members compel them, as in the case of Nigeria, Kenya, Uganda and

Tanzania, to establish a "special relationship" with the Common Market and to conclude association agreements. The members of the Common Market, and especially the FRG and France, have used these agreements as a means of inter-imperialist struggle for the redistribution of spheres of influence in Africa on a regional basis. Thus, a strategy of active defence is being employed against competition from the USA, and a frontal assault was launched against the British position.

p Prominent in the plethora of contradictions in the modern imperialist world are those between "national" imperialisms which participate in the same economic blocs. This thesis is amply supported by the relations between the EEC partners over Eurafrica. The Common Market today embraces Britain, France, the FRG and Italy, which have long been at odds with one another in Africa as well as in Europe. Their traditional contradictions are now supplemented by disagreements arising from their joint membership of the EEC.

p It was pointed out earlier that, when agreeing to found the association between the EEC and Africa, the members of the EEC were inspired by different motives. This predetermined the further development of the contradictions and also the fact that their expansion into Africa is being carried out mainly on a national, rather than collective, basis.

281

p The main contradiction within the EEC is the rivalry between the FRG, France and Britain. West Germany views association with the African countries not only as a means of penetrating the former colonial empire of France, but also as an opportunity, by expanding the association, to deprive Paris of its privileged position in French-speaking Africa. Under West German pressure, a start was made to abolishing the system of the so-called "super-prices", which tied a group of African states to France and retarded the development of their trade with other members of the Common Market.

p It may also be recalled that during the existence of the first fund for developing the associated countries (from 1958 to 1962) the FRG did all she could to impede the export of their goods on to her own market, since it was mainly French companies that benefited from this trade. Relying on her economic supremacy within the EEC, the FRG is using the levelling of customs and tariff conditions in Africa for all Common Market members in order to further the expansion of West German capital into Africa and to oust her partners.

p Holland has taken up a rather special position in her policy towards the African countries. In the first place, Dutch interests are centred not so much in Africa as in Asia; and, in the second place, despite her membership of the Common Market, Holland is closely linked with the USA and adopts an Anglo-Saxon, rather than European, outlook on many matters, coming into conflict with both France and the FRG. Thus, during the negotiations on the second Yaounde Convention Holland insisted on the abolition of mutual preferences, which would have benefited neither the associated countries nor the



EEC, but would, on the other hand, have greatly extended the opportunities for Anglo-American exporters by raising the competitiveness of their goods.

p One of the EEC's African clusters of contradictions centred on the Maghreb. Since Tunisia and Morocco had already attained political independence before the Treaty of Rome was signed, both these countries remained outside the convention on association (it automatically applied only to Algeria, which was then considered French territory). 282 However, France managed to arrange for a special protocol to be signed which ensured the preservation of the French economic relations with Tunisia and Morocco that had been established during the colonial period. Naturally, other EEC members objected to this situation, especially since some of the exports from the Maghreb competed with their own products. A struggle that was to last for nearly 10 years began between mainly Paris and Bonn, with France trying to retain her special relations with Morocco and Tunisia and the FRG to weaken them. After lengthy negotiations agreements were signed with Tunisia and Morocco in March 1969 granting them partial association with the EEC for a period of 5 years and the extension to other members of the "Six" of preferences on three-quarters of the commodities entering France on preferential terms. In return, Tunisia and Morocco received tariff quotas for some of their export goods. Algeria, which is pursuing a policy of co-operation with the socialist countries, rejected association with the EEC, while retaining close bilateral economic ties with France.

p Association between the EEC and Africa is a highly dangerous instrument in the neo-colonialist policy of "Little Europe" in the African countries, and the inter-imperialist struggle over association inflicts additional damage on the young states, since the attempts to resolve the contradictions are made principally at their expense.

p The integration processes in Africa, which are emerging from the laws of the world capitalist economy and the world economy as a whole, will undoubtedly develop further as one of the very real possibilities for eliminating the consequences of the colonialists' fragmentation of the continent and its economic backwardness. However, the imperialist plans for regional economic co-operation between the African countries cannot serve as a democratic alternative to this. Such plans, no matter what form they take, are designed to benefit not the African states but the imperialist power or bloc of capitalist states involved. Any version of imperialist integration is aimed at a fresh redistribution of spheres of influence in Africa. That is why a bitter inter-imperialist struggle is now taking place over regional issues.

The question of regional co-operation between African countries can only be settled to their advantage by them 283 alone, without the interference or patronage of the imperialists. In the struggle to uphold their interests the young states can always count on the help of the socialist community, which consistently opposes all forms of discrimination in international economic relations.

## **CHAPTER XV**

### **AFRICAN ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND THE INTER-IMPERIALIST CONTRADICTIONS**

p When questions affecting the African countries are being discussed in international organisations, the Western powers display a mixture of unity and dissension. As in other spheres, the factor that unites their efforts is the class interests of the struggle against the national liberation movement, their fear of the spread of socialist ideas, their desire to keep the African countries in the capitalist orbit and, finally, their hostility towards the growing links between the states of the socialist community and free Africa. At the same time, the clash of imperialist interests can also be seen here to a considerable degree. Their rivalry in the economic and political spheres is transferred to international gatherings, traditional inter-imperialist contradictions deepen and new ones appear.

p To a certain extent, this situation is brought about by the fact that the various policies and interests do not clash in any simple way in the activities of the international organisations. The correlation of forces in the world, with which the imperialist powers have to reckon, are reflected here, as in a mirror. In addition, every action taken in an international organisation comes immediately within the focus of world opinion. The positions adopted by the members of an organisation over the main questions being discussed do not remain unnoticed. In many cases these circumstances also have a centrifugal effect on imperialist coalitions.

p The nature of the various international organisations also has a certain bearing on the competition between the imperialist powers. For our present purposes, they can be 284 classified into three groups: (1) organisations whose members include African countries, e.g., the UN; (2) organisations which do not provide for African membership but whose activities extend to Africa, e.g., OECD; and (3) organisations made up entirely of African states but which are of great interest to the imperialist world, e.g., the OAU and EGA. In the first group of organisations the inter-imperialist contradictions include the struggle for the votes of African representatives and for influence on countries that used to form part of the old colonial empires, with due account being taken of the fact that African questions are being discussed in the presence of the Africans themselves and with their participation. In the second group there is direct conflict between the interests of the monopolies in the sphere of economic and trading relations with the liberated countries, and the contradictions are frequently resolved at the latter's expense. The third group is the object of a hidden struggle between the imperialist powers, which try to influence the decisions taken by these organisations and to propel their "supporters" into the top positions.

p The relations between the USA, Britain and France over African issues became one of the clusters of inter-imperialist contradictions in the UN. The appearance of a large group of young African states in the UN presented Washington with two problems: to preserve

American influence within the organisation and to use the organisation for the USA's further expansion in Africa. Britain and France, in turn, saw in the changing composition of the General Assembly the opportunity to strengthen their own positions through the votes of the African countries, which were linked with them respectively by the British Commonwealth system, the Franco-African "agreements on co-operation" and other bonds. It must be pointed out immediately that the hopes of both the former metropolises and the USA were not realised. With the constant support of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, the African states are displaying considerably greater independence in the UN than their would-be guardians imagined. The pro-American majority in the UN also faded away. But the contradictions between the imperialists have in no way diminished and in some respects have even intensified,

285

p At the beginning of the sixties the book *Africa and the World Order*, edited by the prominent Africanists Professor Norman Padelford and Professor Rupert Emerson and published in the USA, posed the question: "What kind of United Nations will emerge from the influx of African members, the end of which is not yet in sight? . . . Every country, and perhaps most notably the United States, is confronted by the necessity to reappraise its views of the organisation and of the part it can expect to play in relation to its national interest."^^1^^

p Examination shows that the USA did not substantially "reappraise her views" of the UN, but did modify her policies within the organisation owing to the new situation. Thus, in a number of cases, e.g., during the Congo crisis (and after it), American diplomacy attempted to use the UN apparatus in the interests of the USA and to oppose the UN to the former metropolises in Africa. Dean Rusk declared forthrightly that, if political problems had to be solved, an international organisation was more acceptable than any of its members acting in isolation and the UN flag might fly in places where the flag of any sovereign nation would be viewed as a challenge. It was this idea in particular that lay behind the American proposal for a permanent United Nations peace-keeping force, which was discussed at the 21st session of the General Assembly (December 1966). Apart from the USSR and a number of African and Asian countries, France opposed the suggestion, which serves as a further illustration of the contradictions between France and America in the UN.^2^ The USA took steps to see that the young states had limited voting rights. To this end, the Americans tabled a motion to set up a so-called "finance committee", in which representation would be proportional to contributions to the UN, i.e, in accordance with the jointstock company principle, and, when deciding on UN operations, the General Assembly would be guided by the recommendations of this committee. This move also failed.

p A series of UN defeats, caused partly by the position of the colonial powers, obliged the USA to resort to subtle manoeuvring when African issues were being debated and voting was taking place on the subsequent resolutions. Britain and France also began to dissociate themselves from their 286 partner quite frequently and even to speak against US proposals when they would clearly affect their interests in Africa. Thus, before 1958

the USA persistently refrained from voting on the UN resolutions condemning South Africa. But in 1958 and in 1960 the American delegate, unlike the British and French representatives, voted on the first occasion for a resolution expressing "concern" over South Africa's racist policies, and on the second occasion for a resolution condemning the massacre of the 21 March 1960 during the demonstration at Sharpeville. On the 14 July 1960, in the voting on the first Security Council resolution on the Congolese issue the USA supported the resolution, while Britain and France abstained. Needless to say, Washington's position arose not from any "sympathy" for the indigenous population of Southern Africa, but from the need to curry favour with the new Africa and from the US wish to prevent a progressive initiative from being the prerogative of the Soviet Union alone.

p An example illustrating one of the first open clashes over Africa between the USA, Britain and France in the UN is provided by the debate on African affairs at the 15th session of the General Assembly arising from the US Government proposal to include in the session's agenda the item "Africa: a United Nations programme for independence and development". This act of American diplomacy heralded the USA's "frontal assault" on Africa that had been prepared over a number of years.

p The programme for Africa proposed by the General Assembly took considerable account of the recommendations of a number of scientific centres as well as US Congress special missions which had visited Africa.

p The main feature of the programme was that it was not simply directed against the newly independent African countries' establishing ties with the socialist states. Behind the US proposals lay a clear desire to also force the former metropolises back and to use the UN flag to seize commanding positions in Africa.<sup>3</sup> In addition, the whole programme was permeated by a spirit of paternalism towards the independent African states. Consequently, the American proposals met with no support even from the USA's "special relationship" partner. The British Prime Minister, Harold 287 Macmillan, confined himself to the observation that he welcomed Eisenhower's ideas in principle, but recommended that there should be preliminary discussion of the matter at a summit conference at which, moreover, the Soviet Union was to be present. In fact, Britain rejected the American programme. Most African representatives did not support it either.

p Since the 15th session of the General Assembly overran its time-limit, a number of questions, including the agenda item proposed by the USA, were carried over to its second part, held in March-April 1961. But by that time a new administration had begun to function in Washington, that of John Kennedy, who favoured an African policy that was independent of the European powers.<sup>4</sup>

p Eisenhower's programme for Africa had already displayed a clear departure from the policy of alliance with the old colonial powers. The modifications made to it by the new US Administration considerably reinforced this tendency and emphasised the fact that the West European metropolises were incapable of "handling" the growing national liberation movement in Africa on their own.

p Discussion of the “modified” American programme in the First Committee showed that the Kennedy Administration had decided to replace Eisenhower’s plan by a version of the Latin American "Alliance for Progress", suitably adapted for Africa. The US representative, Adlai Stevenson, stated bluntly that the ideas that President Kennedy had expressed in connection with the aid programme for Latin America could be equally applied to Africa.

p This way of looking at the question was not to the liking of either Britain or France. London and Paris were not prepared to grant Washington the same amount of freedom in Africa as it had in a large part of Latin America. Harold Macmillan had suggested that the Eisenhower programme required "further consultation", but the Kennedy plan was whole-heartedly opposed, moreover, by the delegations of countries which usually leant towards Britain and France. The representative of Pakistan, for instance, while acknowledging the urgent need to help Africa, suggested nevertheless that the British "Colombo Plan" should be taken as a model rather than the "Alliance for Progress". In fact, the intention behind this suggestion was that aid programmes for Africa should follow British lines rather than American and should be directed by Britain and not the USA.

p Criticism of the American proposals was also voiced by the representatives of Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Ivory Coast, Morocco and other African countries. 25 African states tabled a draft resolution on the question, in which their viewpoint and that of the USA were diametrically opposed. In the end, the First Committee failed to complete its discussion of this item and suggested that it be carried over to the General Assembly’s 16th session. There, however, it was not examined.

p Of course, the failure in the UN of the American programme for Africa cannot be explained merely by interimperialist contradictions. The main role here was played by the representatives of the African countries themselves, who recognised the true nature of this programme. But they made successful use of the contradictions between the imperialist powers, and this lightened the struggle against the USA’s expansionist plans. The firm, principled position of the socialist states provided considerable support to the African representatives.

p The 15th session of the UN General Assembly coincided with the Africa Year, when 17 African countries were declared independent. In the years that followed their numbers were swelled by a further 17 young states, and by 1970 the African representation at the UN accounted for 42 votes. As the numbers of the UN’s "African group" grew, the Western powers began to show a regular disarray when voting on resolutions affecting Africa. More and more differences arose between them: the interests of a general imperialist policy were in conflict with those of the “national” imperialisms.

p The records of ten sessions of the UN General Assembly (15th-24th) show that on the 48 occasions when such resolutions were voted the votes of the three powers coincided only 16 times. The French vote failed to coincide with the British vote 25 times and with the US vote 27 times. Britain voted differently from the USA 14 times.^^5^^ Even

without any indication of the content of the resolutions, these figures show, firstly, the general level of imperialist solidarity 289 over African matters in the UN and, secondly, the relative level of the contradictions between the individual powers.

[p](#) The specific instances of disagreement are also of interest. On several occasions the USA, for tactical reasons, supported resolutions condemning Portuguese colonialism, which caused resentment in Britain as well as Portugal. In 1963, unlike Britain and France, the USA voted for a Security Council resolution calling on all states to halt the sale and delivery of arms to South Africa. In 1966 at a plenary session the USA voted for resolutions condemning apartheid and South Africa's policy towards Namibia. At some sessions France opposed, and Britain and the USA supported, resolutions on the Congo situation. The three powers voted in different ways on resolutions concerning Namibia, Algeria, the Portuguese colonies, the implementation of the declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries, and so on.

[p](#) Naturally, one should not attribute too much importance to this dissension among the main imperialist powers and should not consider it as reflecting a greater or lesser understanding of Africa's problems or the countries' degrees of "sympathy" for the African peoples. It is based purely on the selfish interests of individual imperialist detachments and the rivalry for influence in the continent. For instance, the American press emphasised that, when the USA voted at the 21st session of the General Assembly in favour of a resolution to convert Namibia into a UN trust territory and abolish South Africa's mandate, she was only trying, to restore the African countries' trust in her, which had been weakened by open US support, in most cases, for the policies of the colonial powers. Swept along by the "wind of change" in Africa and bearing in mind the growing influence and authority in the UN of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, the imperialist powers are increasingly obliged to resort to subtle manoeuvring and to conceal their true aims.

[p](#) Not only the UN but also a number of other international organisations are becoming an arena for the inter-imperialist struggle over influence on the development of the young states in Africa. American methods for seizing political and economic control in the liberated countries and for ousting the former metropolises are spreading into various regional 290 and specialised bodies. An instructive example of this is provided by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

[p](#) OECD owes its very existence to inter-imperialist contradictions. Formed at the instigation of the USA in 1961 from the Organisation of European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), OECD was intended to unite the competing West European economic blocs under American hegemony. Although the convention inaugurating OECD reflected the tendency towards limiting the disagreements between the main imperialist powers over their policy towards the developing countries, at the latter's expense, moreover, it is centrifugal forces that predominate in the organisation's practical activities. The USA intended not only to end the division of capitalist Europe through OECD, but also to use the new organisation in her own economic and foreign trade interests in the Third World, and especially in Africa. As Secretary of State Dean Rusk explained to the National



Association of Manufacturers, OECD would offer the USA the opportunity to "put pressure on countries" which maintained restrictions on American exports and also to secure guarantees that America's trading interests would be fully considered in all the agreements concluded. But, when joining OECD, the former metropolises and several other capitalist countries intended to make use of the organisation to further their neo-colonialist policies and, at the same time, to control the activities of their competitors. Unlike OEEC, the OECD programme mentioned the task of "co-ordinating the efforts" of the capitalist states in granting "aid" to the developing countries. Of course, "coordination" largely turned OECD into an instrument of "collective neo-colonialism", but it also allowed the partners to keep a close watch on one another's activities. The organisation's convention, painfully worked out through two years of trying to balance the members' bitter contradictions, made special provision for mutual information and consultation over plans to "aid" the development of young states, but, at the same time, it incorporated an article stating that: "No decision shall be binding on any Member until it has complied with the requirements of its own constitutional procedures."<sup>1</sup>

291

**p** The OECD's main concern in Africa is to clear the path of obstacles to penetration by the monopolies of the member states and to ensure capital investment spheres and markets. However, the inter-imperialist contradictions outweigh the common stimuli towards unity and constantly slow down the taking of "concrete decisions". Thus, at one of the first minister-level sessions of the OECD Council at the end of 1962 an attempt to work out a common "aid" policy towards the developing countries ended in failure. The leading members of the organisation were unable to agree on how to allocate these countries' markets and investment spheres. In the end, they produced a woolly declaration about the need for "concerted action". The Development Assistance Committee, OECD's main body, tried unsuccessfully to devise alternatives to the negative consequences of the OECD states' "tied aid" to the developing countries.<sup>7</sup> It proved impossible to surmount the barriers of capitalist competition. The Technical Co-operation Committee, which selects "experts" and "volunteers" for the developing countries, spends a good deal of its time in patching up quarrels between the main rivals in this field. The 1967 discussion on setting up an OECD consultative committee on oil ended in deadlock. Despite pressure from the USA and Britain, France and the FRG did not support the proposal.

**p** There are plenty of examples of the inter-imperialist dissension within OECD over policy towards the developing countries. An overall examination of them shows that into the Third World are being transferred the fundamental contradictions between the main members of OECD (those between France and the USA; the FRG and Britain; Britain and France; and France and the FRG), as well as the general complex of contradictions between the USA and Western Europe and, more recently, between the USA and Japan too. All these contradictions stood out particularly clearly during the OECD discussions from autumn 1967 onwards on the monetary crisis. The devaluation of sterling, the dollar and the French franc, the introduction of a two-tier price for gold and the revaluation of the West German mark caused bitter conflict during the meetings of the OECD Council

of Ministers. Since the representatives of the USA, Britain, France and a number of other countries were 292 looking to increased exports to the developing countries as a means of solving their monetary problems and possibly ending their balance of payments deficits, bitter, but fruitless, discussion revolved around the US proposals for abolishing the "reverse preferences" that were being granted to the Common Market members by the "associated" African countries.

p The logic of the growing competitive struggle between the imperialist powers inevitably urges them to seek compromises, deals and agreements on the allocation of spheres of influence and markets. In the end, international alliances between monopolies are created, which are, in Lenin's description, "the most striking expressions of the internationalisation of capital".<sup>8</sup> However, the inter-imperialist contradictions do not disappear. In its final document the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties declared that in the capitalist world "industrial and commercial competition is growing sharper, and the financial and currency war is spreading. Competition is growing in Western Europe, including within the Common Market, and also between the capitalist countries of Europe and the USA. Japanese imperialism is energetically joining this struggle for markets and maximum profits".<sup>9</sup> The relations between the members of OECD and the organisation's practical activities lend full support to this thesis.

p The UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) is an international organisation in the heart of Africa, around and within which bitter open and concealed clashes take place between the imperialist powers. The very inauguration of the Commission was the centre of a fierce battle: the colonial powers were opposed to it up to 1958. As a result, the ECA appeared ten years later than the similar Commissions for Asia and the Far East, Europe and Latin America.

p Although the ECA's members comprise only the African countries (except for South Africa, excluded because of her racial discrimination policies) and Britain, France and Spain are the only non-African states to have associate membership, the scope of the Commission's activities and certain of its structural features predetermine the opportunities for struggle between the imperialist competitors.

293

p Officially, the ECA is supposed to help the African members of the UN to determine the prospects for their economic development. But, in fact, EGA is only a consultative body. The Commission's plenary sessions are held once every two years, and all the practical work is entrusted to its Secretariat, which is a part of the machinery of the UN Secretariat and has a staff of international officials, mainly from the Western capitalist countries. These officials are fully independent of the African countries, are formally answerable to the UN authorities, but can, of course, "heed the advice" of the governments of their own states. This discrepancy between ECA's tasks and its organisational structure is not only responsible for the Commission's ineffectiveness in dealing with the economic development of Africa, but also creates opportunities for inter-imperialist struggle, since the competing Western powers receive two channels of

influence—the governments of the African countries that follow their lead and the ECA Secretariat.

p It has already been mentioned that the USA and the FRG were very much interested in the drawing up by the Commission of a plan for setting up four sub-regional economic communities in Africa, irrespective of their member countries' former colonial affiliations. Washington did everything it could to support this scheme. However, as a result of British and French endeavours, the economic unification of Africa did not follow the path suggested by the ECA. The day was won by the former metropolises.

p The interests of the imperialist powers also clash in ECA over the frequently raised matters of economic co-operation and developing the infrastructure of the African countries. Here are a few typical examples.

p In 1965 the EGA Secretariat set to work on plans for improving Africa's transport system. The continent was "divided" between the missions of the donor countries, which, in practice, meant mainly between the former metropolises. Britain, for instance, was given an area that included Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia and Rhodesia, while France received West Africa. Apart from this, transport missions were invited from the FRG, Belgium and Italy to design the projects. Owing to the events in Rhodesia, the British transport mission could not begin work. In its place, 294 a US mission set out under the flag of the World Bank. Disagreements arose both during the missions' work and after its completion. Thus, under British pressure, the Sierra Leone authorities actually refused to let the French mission into the country, and an American expert dismissed the reports produced by the West German and French missions as unsatisfactory. But, ultimately, the Africans were the losers: the arguments and delays dragged out the designing of regional plans for developing the continent's transport system for many years.

p In 1963–65 the EGA Secretariat was working on a plan for setting up an All-African Clearing Union. The American expert R. Griffin was entrusted with the preparation of concrete proposals. His report was reviewed at the first meeting of representatives from the African monetary bodies in 1964. Since the Griffin project was primarily geared to US interests and would, if implemented, ease the penetration of American goods on to the African market, the representatives of the countries that were still dependent on the former metropolises (especially the countries linked with France) categorically opposed the project.

p The measures taken by the EGA Secretariat to prepare national development plans for individual African countries are a particular sphere for the contradictions between the imperialist powers. In 1963–67 such plans were drawn up by EGA experts for Zambia, Zaire, Ghana, Ethiopia and several other countries, in accordance with their governments' applications. The competing capitalist powers watched this form of activity by the Commission's Secretariat with unslackening interest. The proposed plan could, in fact, put the economic development of a country at variance with the interests of the foreign

capital predominant in it or, on the contrary, without taking account of the efforts of an imperialist rival. Just such a situation arose in practice.

p In Zambia a group of experts was working under the leadership of the British economist Dudley Seers, the Director of the Economic Development Division of the ECA's Secretariat. Part of the group's assignment was to make a survey of Zambia's economic position, analyse the employment prospects of the gainfully active population and to make proposals on the strategy for the country's economic development after its departure from the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The programme presented by the Seers group completely oriented Zambia towards retention of close economic ties with Britain and Rhodesia and took the interests of the British mining companies as its starting point. They were assigned the principal role in the future development of the country's economy. The programme came under fierce attack from experts belonging to other states, and, in the end, it was shelved. Neither Zambia nor the EGA Secretariat returned to it later.

p Attempts were made twice (in 1963 and 1967) by the EGA to compile an economic development plan for the Congo (Zaire). On the first occasion a "multinational" group of experts arduously put together a blueprint which reminded one, as the Indian economist S. Patel put it, of "the first faltering steps of an infant learning to walk".<sup>10</sup> However, in a situation of fierce inter-imperialist struggle in the Congo this project was stillborn too. A follow-up EGA mission confined itself to recommendations on the setting up of state planning organs.

p There are examples,, though, which show that the situation in a country can force the imperialist powers to push their contradictions into the background. In 1966, shortly after the coup d'état in Ghana, an EGA mission was sent there to work out proposals for the reorganisation of the country's economy. The mission set off on the personal instructions of the ECA's Executive Secretary, R. Gardiner. He also selected the members. In this case, the assignment was a limited one—to help Ghana turn away from a noncapitalist path of development, to do away with the state sector in the country's economy and to limit its economic ties with the socialist countries. The measures that were later taken by the new government of Ghana showed that the mission's "advice" had been borne in mind. Typically enough, no mention of the mission's activities was made in the ECA's official documents.

p The rivalry between the imperialist powers in the EGA is also manifested in the struggle for places in the Secretariat between the French-speaking and English-speaking countries of Africa. For instance, at the 8th and 9th plenary sessions of the Commission the representatives of a number of 296 French-orientated countries complained that they had only been allotted 30 per cent of the places in the Secretariat. Also noteworthy is the fact that the post of Executive Secretary of the EGA Secretariat has been occupied for many years by R. Gardiner. In the summer of 1969 the question arose of making a new appointment to this post. The most likely candidate was the Kenyan Tom Mboya, who had recently inclined towards the USA. Mboya was killed before he could take up the

post of Executive Secretary of the EGA, and his main rival, a representative of the pro-French grouping, was not elected.

p The examples quoted above and many other similar ones provide clear proof of the attempts made by the imperialist powers to use the UN Economic Commission for Africa as a venue for the inter-imperialist struggle. In conjunction with a number of other circumstances, the disagreements between the imperialists paralyse the EGA. There is every reason why the regional economic groupings in Africa are not based on the Commission's proposals. The organisational forms taken by these groupings do not coincide with the ECA's plans either, and the Commission's sub-regional bureaux are ignored. The plans being made for the regional industrialisation of Africa give rise to objections from the African countries, since priority is given in them to the interests either of the former metropolises or of their rivals, to the detriment of the social needs of those for whom the plans are designed. The EGA Secretariat's measures to train a national planning staff have little effect, since they are not only aimed at inculcating Western planning methods but also have to be implemented amid the conflicting interests of various monopolist groupings. And so on.

p At the same time, one must bear in mind the constant effect on the imperialist powers' policies towards the EGA of the fact that its sessions and the meetings of its working parties are followed by observers from the socialist countries (the USSR, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia). The delegations of the Soviet Union at sessions of the Commission support the idea that the African countries should be given maximal support to spur on their economic growth, and criticise the neocolonialist manoeuvres of the Western powers in Africa, 297 which often compels them to make concessions to the young states.

p The inter-imperialist struggle over African issues in international organisations as a reflection of the whole complex of contradictions between the imperialist powers in Africa shows no signs of abating. Quite the reverse. Apart from the imperialist powers' selfish interests in the African countries the factors that stimulate this struggle include the political instability characteristic of modern Africa, the rivalry between individual countries and regional organisations for political and economic leadership, the growth of social contradictions and the rise of centrifugal forces in various countries and geographical regions.

p The outlook for the inter-imperialist struggle in international organisations is closely connected with the evolution of the political course taken by the African countries themselves, especially in the UN. They are still split by substantial differences over a number of intra-African problems and aspects of world politics, and this is being used by the imperialist powers for their own ends. Recently, however, there has been a noticeable consolidation of the African countries, especially as regards international economic cooperation, a review of the conditions of world trade and the abolition of the remains of colonialism. Further unification of the "African group" at the UN will compel the imperialist powers to look for other ways of resolving their contradictions. Compromises at the expense of young states will become impossible.

Since the UN and a number of other international organisations also serve largely as forums for the dialogue between the two world systems, the outlook for the inter-imperialist struggle in these organisations both over African issues and over all other matters must be viewed through the optic of the relations between the two systems. The growing international influence of the socialist system and its unity with the national liberation movement will reinforce the antiimperialist front in the UN and other organisations, and will enable the African countries to make still more effective use of the contradictions in the imperialist camp for the sake of peace and progress.



## CONCLUSION

p In conclusion, one can point to the high variety and complexity of the many aspects of the inter-imperialist struggle at the present stage in the development of statemonopoly capitalism. This struggle results from the internal contradictions of imperialism and the effect of the contest between the two world systems, the bitter conflict of the centrifugal tendencies in the capitalist world and the specific national and state interests of individual capitalist countries, the achievements of scientific and technological progress and the limitations imposed on the practical opportunities for using them, the upsurge in the international workers' and national liberation movements and the restrictions of imperialism's foreign policy strategy *vis-d-vis* the young states.

p Analysis of the processes we have reviewed shows that the changes in the economics of modern capitalism, the appearance of new forms of the international division of labour and the increasing internationalisation of productive forces and economic life do not eliminate the contradictions between the capitalist countries, and, in some instances, become the basis for new antagonisms. As in the past, the unevenness of these countries' economic and political development acts as an important factor in deepening the contradictions between them. The struggle between the two world systems inevitably results in the increased consolidation of imperialism's forces, which is taking place mainly in the military and 299 political spheres and to a lesser extent in economics. There has been an increase in the significance of economic rivalry in the total system of inter-imperialist contradictions over the past decade. It can be concluded that the struggle between the imperialist powers for the redistribution of spheres of domination and foreign markets is not weakening, is of a highly varied nature, is taking on new features and directions and is increasingly coming to involve the former colonial and dependent countries.

p The disagreements between the Western powers in the developing countries are not temporary, chance episodes. They have definite historical roots. The inter-imperialist contradictions over colonial matters intensified during the war and throughout the postwar years, which brought about the further development of these contradictions in the newly independent countries.

p The collapse of the colonial regimes spurred on the antagonism between the class interests of the monopolist bourgeoisie as a whole and the selfish interests of individual sections of it. Before the downfall of the colonial empires the metropolises exercised undisputed control in the dependent territories and the unevenness of the development and the consequent change in the balance of forces within the imperialist camp did not have any great effect on their position in the colonies. But once the colonial barriers were down, a completely different situation emerged.

p The community of their class aims forces the imperialists into a certain unity of action *vis-d-vis* the young states. This unity is helped by the policy of neo-colonialism. Yet in today's conditions neo-colonialism itself has come to be a factor in deepening the inter-

imperialist contradictions. In practically all its aspects a policy of neo-colonialism is defending, above all, the interests of a specific imperialist power. For the former metropolises neo-colonialism is a means of preserving their positions in the former colonies; for their imperialist competitors it is an instrument for the redistribution of spheres of influence. The differences between their short-term aims generate contradictions and rivalry.

p Analysis of the policies of the imperialist powers towards the developing countries of Africa leads one to conclude 300 that the tendency towards concerted action is making no further progress. The principle of one's own benefit is beginning to play a more and more active role. The removal of opportunities for capitalism to rely in the course of its development on the colonial rule of the metropolises, and the gradual loss by the metropolises of the means determining the main directions of the former colonies' economic and political life are encouraging the centrifugal tendencies in the imperialist camp. This aggravates the inter-imperialist struggle in the liberated countries for the redivision of old spheres of influence and the seizure of new ones.

p An ineradicable antagonism can, thus, be clearly seen in the imperialist powers' relations in Africa between the common foreign policy strategy that they are trying to employ *vis-d-vis* the young states and the specific national and state interests that throw the imperialists into disarray.

p One can also conclude from this study that, in addition to the imperialist powers' economic competition, their rivalry for decisive political and ideological influence in the liberated countries is also on the increase. This is a new development and is brought about by a number of circumstances. Firstly, in modern conditions military methods of struggle with a competitor are giving way to political means. Secondly, the changed situation in many newly independent countries makes the attainment of economic goals directly dependent on political and ideological influence. And, thirdly, imperialism's gradual loss of opportunities for really preventing the national liberation movement from developing towards socialism gives rise to mutual distrust between the imperialists and a lack of confidence in the effectiveness of an ally's counter-measures.

p An examination of the evolution of the inter-imperialist contradictions in the liberated African countries allows one to infer that, with all the various combinations of competing forces and the host of bilateral and multilateral disagreements, these contradictions can still, to a certain extent, be reduced to the question of relations between the USA and Western Europe. The sixties showed that the situation that had developed in Europe and the whole world had caused a deepening of the imperialist antagonisms between the USA and the West European states and a fall in US prestige and 301 influence. Moreover, these tendencies were of a long-term kind. In addition, unlike the early postwar period, when American imperialism reigned supreme in the capitalist world, the sixties saw the relatively clear emergence of a number of new imperialist economic and political centres. They were the EEC grouping, France with her system of Franco-African agreements, Britain, still maintaining the Commonwealth of Nations, and Japan. These centres each

have very different policies towards Africa, but, to varying extents, they are all in competition with the USA.

p When evaluating the outlook for the inter-imperialist contradictions in Africa, it is necessary to take full account of the effect that the situation in Africa itself has on them. The growth of unity among the African countries, based on their common interests in the struggle with imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism, acts as a factor which limits the inter-imperialist contradictions. However, the antiimperialist tendencies that objectively exist in all African countries, irrespective of the path of social and economic development that they have selected, are as yet developing very slowly. During the seventies the internal and foreignpolicy instability that is inherent in most African countries will probably remain, and this may give the imperialist powers more scope for manoeuvre.

p At the same time, one must not lose sight of another important circumstance—the steady reduction of imperialism’s sphere of influence in Africa. The number of countries with a socialist orientation is growing. Many African governments are taking measures to limit the activities of foreign capital. And, most important of all, the idea of a non-capitalist course of development is finding broad and increasing support in public opinion. In this situation the imperialist powers, while adhering to a single strategy *vis-d-vis* the young states, are, nevertheless, employing different tactics. They often try to uphold their own interests at the expense of one of their capitalist partners. To varying degrees, this factor influences inter-imperialist relations in Africa and helps to deepen the contradictions.

p It can be safely concluded from the results of this study that the liberated countries of Africa are currently being given a real opportunity to take advantage of the 302 intensifying battle between the imperialist powers for economic positions, investment spheres and political influence in the continent. Imperialism is already making definite economic concessions to these countries. It is being driven to this by the pressure of the national democratic forces, the rivalry of competitors and also the need to give some assistance to the development of the young states’ economies in order to strengthen its own position in them. The use of the interimperialist contradictions by the liberated countries is also made easier by the vital fact that their political, socioeconomic and cultural foundations are being laid within the framework of total world development, in the context of the struggle between the two world systems and the further activation of the anti-imperialist and national liberation movements, and with the help and support of the Soviet Union.

p *The Directives of the 24th CPSU Congress for the FiveYear Plan for the USSR’s Economic Development in 1971– 75* state: "Development of stable external economic, scientific and technological ties with developing Asian, African and Latin American countries shall be continued on terms of mutual benefit and in the interest of strengthening their economic independence."^^1^^

p A number of African states are already taking advantage of the competitive struggle between the imperialist powers, especially as regards the granting of loans, credits or various kinds of “aid”. The fear of being overtaken by a rival often causes capitalist governments and monopolies to make concessions to the young states. The further change in the world’s balance of forces in favour of socialism will create even more varied possibilities in this direction.

p What is the outlook for the further evolution of the interimperialist contradictions in the developing countries of Africa? It is impossible to give a simple answer to this question, just as it is impossible to provide for all the possible combinations of internal and external factors that may affect the development of centripetal and centrifugal tendencies within the imperialist camp. Nevertheless, the study does permit of a few observations.

p There is every indication that the relations between the former metropolises (France, Britain and Belgium) and the 303 main pretenders to their succession (the USA, the FRG and Japan) will continue, in the foreseeable future, to be the principal cluster of inter-imperialist contradictions in the liberated countries of Africa. This contradiction will develop in conjunction with numerous bilateral contradictions— between Britain and France, the FRG and the USA, and so on. One can clearly expect the bitterest battle to be that between the USA and the Common Market grouping, with the main accent on the contradictions between the USA and France.

p Three groups of countries are most likely to be the centres of particularly fierce rivalry and competition: (1) those possessing reserves of scarce raw materials, (2) those occupying key positions politically and (3) those having strategic importance. In the countries with a socialist orientation, unlike those that have chosen the capitalist path of development, the inter-imperialist struggle will take place in muted and concealed forms.

p In the seventies economic problems will continue to dominate the total complex of competition and rivalry between the imperialist powers. There will be more energetic attempts to redistribute Africa economically.

p Among the means for economic expansion, the export of private capital will play a sharply increased role. This conclusion is supported by the importance of its new functions and also by the fact that the main imperialist powers intend to step up investment in Africa during the seventies and are now taking organisational measures accordingly. The importance of imperialist “aid” among the means of inter-imperialist struggle will clearly diminish. This arises from the monetary troubles of the “donors”, as well as from their disillusionment with the results achieved so far. The contradictions over trade in Africa will probably intensify during the seventies, since the sales problem is growing progressively worse in the imperialist states and the African market, albeit somewhat limited, will retain its importance for capitalist exporters.

p Nor will the imperialist powers’ struggle for African sources of raw materials slacken throughout the seventies. A number of factors will see to that. Although the relative reduction in the consumption of natural raw materials will continue, the demand for them

in absolute terms will 304 increase as a result of the expansion of production and the energy crisis. This applies particularly to those countries which have no raw material deposits or whose deposits are exhausted. There will undoubtedly be a further and, clearly, even more rapid growth in the new industries— the atomic industry, the aerospace industry, electronics, the petrochemical industry and so on. This will raise the demand for raw materials from Africa—rare-earth and nonferrous metals, oil, etc. Further measures by African governments to limit the activities of foreign capital will help to intensify the monopolies' struggle over raw material sources. The ousting of capitalist monopolies will increase their competition on shrinking ground.

p One of the principal objects of the inter-imperialist contradictions in Africa during the seventies will, as might be expected, be the cluster of problems connected with the processes of economic integration. Determined as they are by the world capitalist economy and the world economy as a whole, these processes will continue to develop in Africa. The principle of integration will remain a bone of contention. Clearly, the former metropolises will continue to champion the idea of regional co-operation merely within the bounds of their former colonial possessions. Their competitors will not reject the possibility of sub-regional or mixed groupings in which Britain and France would be deprived of decisive influence.

p The outlook for the imperialist powers' rivalry over political influence in the liberated countries of Africa depends on many factors—the evolution of the relations between these powers, the level of the African peoples' antiimperialist struggle and the nature of the development of the main contradiction of the times, that between the two world systems. Consequently, it is only possible to assess those tendencies whose long-term nature has been basically established.

p In the seventies we can expect a further intensification in the rivalry in the countries of French-speaking Africa between the USA and France. The catalyst will be the USA's growing interest in these countries on the economic and trade level, which is also inevitably bound up with the struggle for political influence. There will, on the whole, be 305 no weakening in the rivalry between the imperialist powers for supremacy in control over the training of national personnel and over the army, the trade union movement and the mass media.

p Examination of the tendencies, practical measures and long-term plans for the main imperialist powers' ideological expansion in Africa leads one to conclude that in the seventies their relations in this respect will be feeling the growing effect of the ideological struggle between the two world systems.

p As the Marxist-Leninist ideology makes ever greater headway in the developing countries—an irreversible process—and bourgeois ideology is forced to retreat, the imperialist powers will be faced by the increasingly acute problem of whether to defend their shrinking ideological preserves jointly or in isolation. It is impossible to say that the tendency towards joint action will unquestionably triumph. Therefore, one can also expect individual Western states to take independent steps in the ideological sphere and

seek compromises with the new social forces. This, in turn, will generate new forms of inter-imperialist rivalry. In fact, the common foreign policy strategy of imperialism and individual imperialist states and groupings *vis-d-vis* the young states is already stretched to the limit in Africa.

Examination of the various aspects, evolution and prospects of the inter-imperialist struggle in the developing countries ultimately shows that this struggle too is a manifestation of imperialism's wish to adapt to modern circumstances and to prolong its existence. This is why the forms of conflict are constantly changing and the competing forces are always regrouping. Bitter disagreements and political and diplomatic clashes alternate with the imperialist powers' unity of action against the peoples of the liberated countries. However, imperialism is powerless to regain the historical initiative that it has lost, just as it is unable to rid itself of the internal and external contradictions that are inherent in capitalist society. They will disappear only with the death of capitalism itself.



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307

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308

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310

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312

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313

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315

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316

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317

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p “ West Africa, June 13, 1970.

p -" The Ford Foundation, *Annual Report*, 1969.

p ^21^ R. Emerson, *Africa and United States Policy*, p. 50.

p ^22^ Thomas Beetham, *Christianity and the New Africa*, London, 1967.

p ^23^ W. Attwood, *The Reds and the Blacks*, p. 82.

p Chapter XII

p ^1^ The Political Quarterly, 1970, No. 1.

p ^2^ The Sun, Jan. 24, 1968.

p ^3^ R. Harris, *Independence and After*, L., 1962, p. 30.

p ” The Memoirs of Sir Anthony Eden, p. 398.

p ^5^ Survey of British and Commonwealth Affairs, 1970, Vol. 4, No. 9, p. 435.

p ^6^ John D. Hargreaves, *West Africa: The Former French States*, Prentice-Hall Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New York, 1967, p. 151.

p ^7^ US and Africa in the 70's, Wash., 1970, pp. 2, 4.

p ^8^ Victor Le Vine, *Political Leadership in Africa*, Stanford University, 1967.

p ^9^ "African Students and Study Programmes in the United States. Report and Hearings of the Subcommittee of Africa Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives", Wash., 1965, p. 8.

p ^10^ R. Emerson, *Africa anil United Slates Policy*, p. 48.

p ^11^ "Statement by G. Mcnnen Williams before the Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Refuges and Escapes", Wash., lan. 21, 1965.

p ^12^ Africa Report, 1969, No. 1.

[p](#) <sup>13</sup> W. Attwood, *The Reds and the Blacks*, 1967, p. 169.

[p](#) <sup>14</sup> *Peace Corps Volunteer*, July-August, 1968.

[p](#) <sup>15</sup> *Peace Corps Volunteer*, Apr. 1968.

318

[p](#) *Chapter XIII* ' J. Davis, *African Trade Unions*, L., 1966.

[p](#) <sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 190.

[p](#) <sup>3</sup> "The Emergence of Africa", Report to the President by VicePresident Nixon on his trip to Africa, Feb. 1957, p. 5.

[p](#) <sup>4</sup> In 1967 the AALC was exposed by independent US trade union leaders as being attached to the CIA. It was reported that it acted as a training centre for persons selected and recruited in the developing countries by US intelligence.

[p](#) <sup>5</sup> J. Davis, *African Trade Unions*.

[p](#) <sup>0</sup> Vernon McKay, *Africa in World Politics*, N.Y., 1963, p. 262.

[p](#) <sup>7</sup> *New Africa*, London, March 1964, Vol. 6, p. 9.

[p](#) *Chapter XIV*

[p](#) <sup>1</sup> "The Great Transition", A Lecture by Walt W. Rostow, Special Assistant to the President, Feb. 23, 1967, *United States Policy Statement Series*—1967.

[p](#) <sup>2</sup> *Nouvel Observateur*, June 3-7, 1968, Suppl. No. 177.

[p](#) <sup>3</sup> *New York Times*, Jan. 5, 1969.

[p](#) <sup>4</sup> S. Dell, *Trade Blocs and Common Market*, L., 1963, p. 214.

[p](#) <sup>5</sup> The Lagos Agreement did not, however, come into force owing to the disruption in Nigeria's relations with France caused by French aid to Biafra. Unlike the other members of the "Six", Paris did not ratify the agreement before it expired on the 31 May 1969.

[p](#) *Chapter XV*

[p](#) <sup>1</sup> *Africa and the World Order*, Edited by Norman G. Padelford and Rupert Emerson, N.Y., 1963, pp. 4-5.

<sup>2</sup> At the earlier 19th and 20th sessions of the General Assembly France had not supported the USA over the financing of the "UN operation" in the Congo and the Middle East. Many of the Frenchspeaking countries of Africa adopted a similar position.

<sup>3</sup> James Wadsworth, the permanent US representative to the United Nations, who announced the American proposals, declared: "It is imperative that the international community protect the newly emerging countries of Africa from outside pressures that threaten their independence and sovereign rights. . . ." (United Nations,

319

General Assembly, Fifteenth Session, Official Records 68th Plenary Meeting, 22 September, 1960, p. 48.)

In 1959–60 John Kennedy was chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa of the Senate's Committee on Foreign Affairs and called frequently for an independent US policy towards the continent.

<sup>5</sup> Calculated by the author from records of the UN General Assembly sessions.

<sup>6</sup> *Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development*, P., 1960, L., 1962.

<sup>7</sup> "Tied aid" obliges the recipient countries to purchase goods from the donor countries. This condition is damaging to the countries receiving the "aid" and, at the same time, restricts trade co-operation between the donors themselves.

<sup>8</sup> V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, p. 252.

<sup>9</sup> *The International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties* Prague, 1969, p. 18.

<sup>10</sup> *Economic Bulletin for Africa*, Vol. V, Jan. 1965, p. 82.

*Conclusion*

<sup>1</sup> 24th Congress of the CPSU, M., 1971, p. 315.